

American Power and
International Theory
at the Council on
Foreign Relations,
1953-54

David M. McCourt, Editor

AMERICAN POWER AND INTERNATIONAL THEORY AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1953–54

Between December 1953 and June 1954, the elite think tank the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) joined prominent figures in International Relations, including Pennsylvania's Robert Strausz-Hupé, Yale's Arnold Wolfers, the Rockefeller Foundation's Kenneth Thompson, government advisor Dorothy Fosdick, and nuclear strategist William Kaufmann. They spent seven meetings assessing approaches to world politics—from the “realist” theory of Hans Morgenthau to theories of imperialism of Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin—to discern basic elements of a theory of international relations.

The study group's materials are an indispensable window to the development of IR theory and illuminate the seeds of the theory-practice nexus in Cold War US foreign policy. Historians of International Relations recently revised the standard narrative of the field's origins, showing that IR witnessed a sharp turn to *theoretical* consideration of international politics beginning around 1950 and remained preoccupied with theory. Taking place in 1953–54, the CFR study group represents a vital snapshot of this shift.

This book situates the CFR study group in its historical and historiographical contexts and offers a biographical analysis of the participants. The book includes seven preparatory papers on diverse theoretical approaches, penned by former Berkeley political scientist George A. Lipsky with the digest of discussions from the seven study group meetings. *American Power and International Theory at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1953–54* offers new insights into the early development of IR as well as the thinking of prominent elites in the early years of the Cold War.

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American Power and International Theory at the Council on Foreign Relations, 1953–54

Edited by David M. McCourt

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Acknowledgments

Good fortune pervades this volume, perhaps more than most. First, discovery of the documents reproduced here was entirely by accident: I had traveled to Princeton in early 2014 to push forward a project on the role of think tanks in postwar US foreign policy, not the history of International Relations (IR) and the Cold War social sciences. Scrolling through the superbly curated archive of the Council on Foreign Relations—for which Daniel Linke and all the staff at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library deserve praise—I was excited beyond reason to see the papers of a “Study Group on the Theory of International Relations, 1953–54.” Working with the documents has been a labor of love since, a side project frequently taking me away from my main work on the institutional architecture of American hegemony. I could not have hoped for such a stimulating academic hobby.

Second, the papers would likely have remained just a file on my laptop had it not been for the good fortune of encouragement from Inderjeet Parmar, my favorite scholar of said institutional architecture of American hegemony. Listening to me extol the virtues of the study group records, Inderjeet, against a good deal of hesitation on my part, urged that I seek publication. So too did my longtime friend Jack Gunnell over frequent coffees in Davis, which sadly ended after Jack packed up and headed back to the East Coast. Encouragement and affirmation of the documents’ interest also came from a group of IR historians who took the time to read the papers—and write their own assessments—for a roundtable at the 2017 meeting of the International Studies Association in San Francisco. My sincere thanks to Luke Ashworth, Emily Hauptmann, Adam Humphreys, Felix Rösch, Or Rosenboim, Brian Schmidt, Bob Vitalis, and Jon Western.

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Introduction

The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on the Theory of International Relations, 1953–54

Over seven months between December 1953 and June 1954, the prestigious think tank the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) held a study group dedicated to the theory of international relations (IR). The group brought together select members of the CFR and prominent thinkers on international affairs. Some are still well-known to scholars of IR, like Yale's Arnold Wolfers and Kenneth W. Thompson from the Rockefeller Foundation. Others have faded from prominence but were influential at the time, such as leading political scientist Robert Strausz-Hupé, from the University of Pennsylvania, and Dorothy Fosdick, an early member of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department before a long career as advisor to Democratic senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Together, the experts collected at the CFR spent some thirty-five hours dissecting a variety of approaches to the study of world politics, from the new "realist" theory of Hans Morgenthau, to the theories of imperialism of Karl Marx and Joseph Schumpeter, to the psychological perspective of Harold Lasswell. The group's aim was to discern the basic elements of a theory of international relations.

Hidden until now in the CFR archives at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, this volume reproduces the digests of discussions from the study group. Also presented are seven papers that laid the groundwork for the group's conversations. The author of the preparatory papers was George A. Lipsky, a former University of California–Berkeley political scientist spending the academic year 1953–54 at the CFR as a Carnegie Fellow. Lipsky's papers introduced the topic to be considered at each meeting, with the discussions ranging far beyond the thinker at hand to the nature of international relations itself, the possibilities and limits of theory, the place of values in theorizing international relations, and the role of the scholar in foreign policy making.

In this introduction to the documents, I ask *why should scholars care to remember a seemingly obscure Council on Foreign Relations study group almost seventy years later?* The answer is that the materials of the CFR study group are an invaluable resource for historians of IR, students of US foreign policy during the early Cold War, and historians of social science. The documents suggest insights for two literatures in particular, one within IR and one in the broader history of the social sciences.

The first literature impacted by the discovery of the Council on Foreign Relations study group is that over the origins of IR and IR *theory* specifically. In recent years, a group of revisionist historians of IR have questioned the standard narrative of the field's origins, showing, among other things, that IR did not emerge fully formed after the First World War, as the common dating of IR's founding to the creation of the first chair of International Relations at Aberystwyth in 1919 holds.¹ The revisionists have also debunked the myth that the interwar years witnessed a "Great Debate" between realists and idealists over the nature of power in world affairs and the possibility for international organization, the first of a series of titanic struggles that was for a long time held to have structured IR's subsequent development.² Rather, much of IR's disciplinary architecture, particularly the centrality of theory to the field, were post-World War II constructs, exactly the timing of the CFR study group detailed here.

Publication of the materials from the CFR study group on theory thus offers an opportunity to reassess the current state of the historiographical art in IR. In particular, it allows us to reassess the arguments of historian of IR Nicolas Guilhot,³ who has analyzed a more well-known conference on theory held in May 1954 at the Rockefeller Foundation. Guilhot shows how the Rockefeller conference was the centerpiece of a "realist gambit" aimed at heading off the incorporation of IR into an increasingly behavioralist American political science. The gambit, on the part of a group of self-defined realist scholars, centered on the thought of Hans Morgenthau, who promoted a non-behavioralist theory of international relations grounded in a prudential form of *realpolitik*.

The existence of the CFR study group is evidence of a more widespread turn to theory in postwar thinking about international affairs in the United States than the notion of a realist gambit suggests. In short, the group suggests that the realist gambit was a crucial stimulus to the birth of IR theory after World War II, but it was not the only one. Theory had captured the imagination of a wider range of scholars and institutions, as indicated by the discussions held at the CFR in the winter and spring of 1953–54.

What remains from Guilhot's realist gambit thesis when juxtaposed with the CFR study group? As I detail further below, while the turn to theory cannot solely be accounted for as a realist gambit, many of Guilhot's arguments remains intact when placed alongside the study group: the CFR group shares with the Rockefeller group a rejection of a narrow behavioralism, in the context of a defense of liberalism and democracy, mounted, importantly, from scholars either hailing from Europe or well-versed in European intellectual culture. Together, rediscovery of the study group promises to further enrich the revisionist account of the origins of IR theory in America.

The second literature impacted by the CFR study group is a debate over the influence of the Cold War state on the social sciences in America. Located primarily in history, sociology, and science and technology studies (STS), a now expansive literature has traced the emergence of what has been termed the "military-academic complex," or for historians Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens "Cold War social science."⁴ In academic fields from anthropology to area studies and linguistics and the behavioral sciences, the growth in funding opportunities associated with the expansion of the Cold War state significantly shaped research priorities and disciplinary trends.⁵ For Solovey, "A variety of professional, financial and institutional opportunities encouraged social scientists to produce the right sort of knowledge for the Cold-War related tasks at hand."⁶

One might expect maximal impact of the Cold War state on the discussions at the CFR given the prominence of geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time when the meetings were taking place. In fact, the CFR group throws up puzzles for the Cold War social science thesis. The digests reveal multiple explicit traces of the Cold War. Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were, as might be expected, common illustrations of theoretical points. At a number of places in the discussions the participants were sidetracked into a discussion of contemporary US-Russian relations, a tendency other members tried to prevent.⁷ Elsewhere the inherent evils of communism as the participants saw them became the focus.

Yet the Cold War did not dominate the discussions, which ranged well beyond contemporary US foreign policy, and it defied the political times by including an analysis of Marxist theories of imperialism. For the most part, the Cold War remained an implicit backdrop to the conversations, not their main focal point. The CFR study group on international relations theory thus represents further evidence of IR's problematic relationship to policy relevance.⁸ An issue of periodic concern in the discipline, the study group adds weight to

the sense that IR has never fully embraced a policy-driven mission, even as it has taken advantage of government and foundation funding to form itself as an academic field.

In the remainder of this introduction, I provide an overview of the study group and situate it at the intersection of work on the historiography of IR and history of the social sciences in Cold War America. I begin with a description of the study group and its historical context. What was the reasoning behind the study group's creation? Who participated? Who turned down invitations to the group and why? What did the group talk about? What conclusions, if any, did they reach about the most suitable way of theorizing international relations? The chapter then turns first to the implications of the group's discussions for disciplinary history, before examining the significance of the group as an artifact of IR's position within the Cold War social sciences. The introduction concludes with a series of biographical sketches of the study group's key members, followed by a plan of the rest of the volume.

The 1953–54 CFR Study Group on the Theory of International Relations

“The Council on Foreign Relations, in its three decades of work, has ordinarily concentrated its attention on concrete international issues,” Columbia University professor Robert MacIver told invitees to a Council study group on the theory of international relations convened in December 1953. But “[r]ecently, it has seemed . . . that there would be merit in examining some of the basic assumptions on which the foreign policies of this country and other countries are predicated.”⁹ MacIver, a sociologist by profession, had been tasked with chairing such a group, which would set to work with the aim of identifying the most suitable theoretical basis for the study of world politics.

The original idea for the Council to sponsor a systematic study of the theoretical aspects of international relations came from Council member Henry L. Roberts.¹⁰ Roberts was one of the “younger men” of the Council very interested in the group and eager to participate, according to the records.¹¹ Several of them, such as eventual rapporteur John Blumgart, had been involved since early staff discussions with Lipsky, and according to William Diebold, director of the Economics Program and long-time member of the Council, had shown “themselves to be excellent critics.”¹² Their interest was surely vital in persuading more senior members to support the study group.

The reason for their interest was likely the promise of continuing and shap-

ing the CFR's formative role in postwar international relations. The group was explicitly designed as a "complement or sequel" to Grayson Kirk's *The Study of International Relations* from 1947, a CFR-sponsored survey of teaching and research in international studies in America's colleges and universities. Kirk, perhaps predictably, found American higher education in need of serious investment if future leaders were to have adequate knowledge of the rest of the world.¹³ Whereas "Grayson was interested principally in method and system" the study group on theory would "deal with the subject matter from the point of view of a political scientist."¹⁴ A handwritten note under these words suggested the aim of the group was to inquire why "men—especially policy-makers—act as they do?"¹⁵

In his introduction to the group for the invitees, MacIver noted how "For many years Wilsonian idealism dominated American thought. . . . Then a reaction set in and writers who emphasized power politics and "real" national interests came to the fore."¹⁶ Continuing, he said that some of the newer, realistic approaches "stressed national power; others have underlined the role of geography or economic considerations. More recently Christian morals and natural law have been propagated as the true foundations of foreign policy."¹⁷ As a result of these "great debates,"¹⁸ MacIver went on, the CFR considered it a pressing task to "examine these and other approaches . . . and to judge their adequacy as methods of understanding the phenomena of international affairs."¹⁹

Dedicating a study group to international relations theory meant a real investment of time and resources by the Council. As Peter Grose, the Council's biographer, explains, study groups were the Council leadership's answer to the question of how and how far to shape public opinion when it came to matters of foreign affairs.²⁰ Unlike more informal "discussion groups," the aim of study groups was to produce a "written analysis with policy conclusions by a single author."²¹ The aim was not a public statement by the group or the CFR as a whole: "Rather, as the method evolved, the designated author would guide discussions, present tentative analyses to be considered and criticized by fellow experts and peers, and polish and assemble them in writing under his sole responsibility."²² The format of the study group explains the prominence of George Lipsky to the discussions represented below, and the lack of a final statement laying out the group's conclusions. As Grose notes, "Rarely would the group leaders attempt to negotiate agreement on a consensus that, in most cases, would have to be compromised into blandness."²³ What we are left with then is a tantalizing record of discussions on the nature and purpose of international relations theory, rather than a finished product.

The study group on theory was a deviation from the more common pattern of convening on pressing issues of the day. Groups convened in 1950–51, for example, to discuss topics like “Anglo-American Relations” and “Questions of German Unity.”²⁴ The historical backdrop to the study group on international theory offered plenty for the Council to discuss. The early 1950s saw the Cold War and its domestic implications reach fever pitch: the Korean War continued until July 1953, shortly followed by the CIA-backed overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh; the failed uprising in East Germany in June 1953; and the height of McCarthyism in America and McCarthy’s demise, which began in early 1954. Yet the dramatic events in the background are little mentioned in the group’s discussions, remaining a context rather than an overriding preoccupation of the participants.

The hosting of a study group suggested serious and sustained interest in the topic at hand. During the War, the CFR had taken on a direct role in relation to US foreign policy through its study groups with the “War and Peace Studies”—dedicated to issues deemed vital to the American war effort—which became increasingly integrated into the State Department and eventually subsumed entirely.²⁵ While until now lost to the intellectual history of IR, we can be sure of the importance of the group to the Council’s leaders and at least a subset of its members.

George A. Lipsky and the Formation of the Study Group on Theory

The immediate stimulus for the study group on international theory’s formation was a request from Berkeley political scientist George A. Lipsky, who had been awarded a Carnegie Research Fellowship for the year 1953–54, to be spent at the CFR. The involvement of the Carnegie Corporation in stimulating consideration of international relations theory in the early 1950s should come as no surprise. Carnegie was a generous benefactor of the Council and had made an annual grant to the War and Peace Studies, which was also funded by the other great philanthropic organization at the time, the Rockefeller Foundation.²⁶ Lipsky’s receipt of a Carnegie fellowship fits with what historians of IR know about the structure of funding in international studies in the late 1940s and 1950s, with legally inclined scholars gaining funding from the Carnegie Endowment and other organizations like the American Society of International Law.²⁷

Lipsky, MacIver told the group, had been studying the problem of theory in international relations “for some time,” including in a book on the interna-

tional thought of sixth president John Quincy Adams.²⁸ In his prospectus for the study group, Lipsky noted, “The study of international relations as a discipline is of relatively recent origin. Quite naturally, therefore, it has been occupied with the gathering of substantive and descriptive data.”²⁹ The next step was to discern some firm theoretical principles, a cause considered pressing not only for disciplinary reasons but because practitioners used implicit theoretical schemas. The existence of multiple competing theories was thus potentially a debilitating problem in US foreign policy, since “alternations of emphasis in a field where adequate understanding is vital to national and human survival, emphasize the great need for a continuing systematic theoretical analysis.”³⁰ The purpose of the group was thus to aid Lipsky in his work.

The format for seven meetings that took place between December 1953 and June 1954 was discussion, punctuated with dinner and cocktails, covering the thought of six prominent theoretical approaches, followed by a general stock-taking session. For each meeting, Lipsky circulated a paper that formed the topic of conversation. A more free-flowing discussion continued into the evening.

The participants represented a selection of scholars, government advisors, members of the CFR, and Council staff members (see table 1). A more extensive set of biographical sketches is provided later in this introduction. What should be emphasized at this stage is the professional diversity of the group. The only individuals that may have been considered well-known as IR theorists were Arnold Wolfers and, perhaps, Kenneth W. Thompson. The others represent a cross-section of diverse fields and non-academics, including individuals from business and government. Their membership, however, is evidence of their prominence within American foreign policy circles in the early 1950s.

The group’s racial and gender homogeneity is far less surprising, given what IR scholars now know about the systematic silencing of African American and women international theorists historically and in later historiographical work.³¹ Dorothy Fosdick’s inclusion is, therefore, noteworthy as the exception that proves the rule. So sought after was Fosdick’s membership that the CFR bent the informal rules that had until that time kept “lady members” from joining. As Council member William Diebold explained to MacIver, “It would probably require action” by the Council’s Board of Directors to change the rule that female members could not join study groups, “and in any case to make an open breach of the rule would be difficult, since we are often pressed to let much less qualified women participate in some of the things we are doing.”³² By listing Ms. Fosdick as the secretary and hence staff, which Council

Table 1. Members of the CFR Study Group, and Other Attendees

Name (alphabetical order)	Brief biographical information
<i>(Group members)</i>	
John Blumgart	American Committee on United Europe
Edgar M. Church	Shearman, Sterling and Wright
Dorothy Fosdick	Formerly of the Policy Planning Staff and Instructor in Sociology at Smith College
Hajo Holborn	Professor of History, Yale University
William W. Kaufmann	Professor, Princeton University Center of International Studies
George A. Lipsky	Carnegie Research Fellow, CFR, formerly Assistant Professor of Political Science, UC-Berkeley
Robert M. MacIver	Professor of Sociology, Columbia University
Isidor Rabi	Professor of Physics, Columbia University
Robert Strausz-Hupé	Professor of Political Science, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania
Kenneth W. Thompson	Rockefeller Foundation
R. Gordon Wasson	Investment banker, J.P. Morgan and Co.
Arnold Wolfers	Professor of International Relations, Yale University
<i>(Others)</i>	
Byron Vincent Dexter	CFR staff member
William Diebold	Director of Economic Affairs, CFR
Charles Burton Marshall	Formerly of the State Dept.
George S. Franklin Jr.	CFR staff member (1945–1971)
Grant S. McClellan	CFR staff member
Gerhart Niemeyer	CFR staff member, formerly of the State Dept.
Paul Zinner	CFR staff member, formerly of the State Dept.
Walter Mallory	CFR staff member
Charles M. Lichenstein	CFR staff member
Henry L. Roberts	CFR staff member
William Henderson	CFR staff member
John Armstrong	CFR staff member

Source: CFR archives, Mudd Library, Princeton University.

officer William Diebold explained “in Council parlance was an honorary position just below that of the Chairman . . . [that] would not entail any clerical or administrative duties,”³³ Fosdick would be able to take part in the group’s deliberations.

The Council was not entirely successful recruiting for the study group. As Diebold warned MacIver in a letter of 5 November 1953, “I am reasonably

sure that a few people will turn us down. For instance, George Kennan has been refusing most invitations lately.”³⁴ Diebold enclosed a letter, sadly no longer with the study group documents, of possible substitutes. In the end, Kennan evidently did turn down the invitation, as did Kennan’s substitute, a Mr. Cohen, along with a Mr. Bennett.³⁵

More concrete is that Diebold and MacIver did not consider or failed to recruit George N. Shuster, Frank Tannenbaum, and William E. Hocking to join the group. Shuster was president of Hunter College in New York and chairman of the US National Commission to UNESCO at the time of the study group.³⁶ Tannenbaum was an Austrian-born criminologist and historian at Columbia University, known for his work in creating the Farm Security Administration during the New Deal era.³⁷ Hocking was a retired Harvard philosopher, trained by Josiah Royce.³⁸ Finally, MacIver and Diebold also discussed the importance of having “a clergyman” member, relatively unsurprising given Reinhold Niebuhr’s stature within American foreign policy circles after World War II. There too, they appear to have failed.

The choice of thinkers to engage was contentious, and it changed as the meetings progressed. Early in first meeting, for example, Arnold Wolfers suggested studying concepts rather than authors, while political scientist Robert Strausz-Hupé opposed the tentative list of theorists, saying he believed that “many of the listed authors were simply elaborators of previous theories; [E. H.] Carr, for example . . . , seems to be a restatement of Hegel.”³⁹ But eventually the first six meetings covered: (1) the international thought of E. H. Carr as the exemplar of historical theorizing; (2) Hans J. Morgenthau, as a means of approaching the issue of the national interest; (3) the scientific approach of Harold D. Lasswell; (4) geopolitical theory, via the work of Yale political scientist Nicholas Spykman; (5) the theory of empire, approached through the thought of Lenin and Joseph Schumpeter; and finally (6) Wilsonian idealism. The final meeting was a general assessment of theory in international relations and an attempt to draw some conclusions from the study group’s work.

The Realist Gambit Revisited: The CFR Study Group and the Origins of IR Theory

The Council on Foreign Relations study group on the theory of international relations took place in the midst of a sharp uptick in interest in the theoretical aspects of world politics. While today the taken-for-granted core of IR, before

1950 theory was largely absent from the field. This was true even for early texts now deemed groundbreaking.⁴⁰ The group therefore represents a unique window into the origins of IR theory.

A 1946 survey of International Relations by Waldemar Gurian, a Notre Dame political scientist and editor of the prestigious *Review of Politics*, for example, made no mention of theory. For Gurian, the study of International Relations “involves geography, economics, international law, history, anthropology, demography, social psychology (study of mass emotions, public opinion, propaganda), and comparative government.”⁴¹ Prophetically, Gurian made a point of stressing that “It would be fatal if the study of international relations were to be determined solely by professional and specialistic interests.”⁴² Similarly, in 1949 Frederick Dunn of the Yale Institute of International Studies conducted a survey of “The Present Course of International Relations Research” that made scant reference to theory.⁴³

But by 1952, when Kenneth W. Thompson published “The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments,” theory was front and center.⁴⁴ The first edition of Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* had appeared in 1948,⁴⁵ and Columbia Professor John H. Herz’s *Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities* three years later.⁴⁶ Noting how the primary methodological approach to the study of international relations in the interwar period had been that of diplomatic history, Thompson complained, “The price which was paid for this rigorous, objective and non-generalized approach to the field was the absence of anything corresponding to a *theory* of international relations.”⁴⁷ Thompson was concerned that the dominance of the diplomatic history approach left the study of contemporary international relations to journalists: “The ‘bible’ . . . became *The New York Times*.”⁴⁸

A Google Ngram search reinforces a survey impression that serious interest in the theory of international relations only began a few short years before Lipsky, MacIver, and co. gathered in New York. The term *international relations theory* was essentially unknown before 1950.⁴⁹ The related terms *theory of international relations* shows a large spike in popularity in the 1950s, following its emergence in the 1920s.⁵⁰ The term *IR theory*, however, emerges only much later in the 1980s.⁵¹ While far from exhaustive, these data help demonstrate the emergence and sedimentation of a specific thing called international relations, known increasingly by the acronym IR. In other words, in the 1920s the emphasis was on the theory of *international relations* understood as a feature of the world, whereas by the 1950s it was *international relations* theory understood as a growing body of (at least potentially) theoretical knowledge. By the 1980s, IR was not just a body of knowledge but a coherent disciplinary social sphere. What explains the turn to theory?

The Realist Gambit

For historian of IR Nicolas Guilhot, the turn to theory was driven by an attempt on the part of “a number of scholars, policy practitioners, and public intellectuals” to “defin[e] IR as a separate field based on a distinct *theory* of politics.”⁵² Drawing on the archival record of another conference on international theory, held at the Rockefeller Foundation on 7–8 May 1954, Guilhot describes the activities of a group of scholars—including Chicago political scientist Hans Morgenthau and Morgenthau’s friend and former colleague Kenneth W. Thompson from the Rockefeller Foundation—who made a “realist gambit” aimed at defining IR itself by providing the field a realist theoretical cornerstone.

The group who gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation hoped to head off the absorption of IR into political science, which, as a number of scholars have shown, was becoming increasingly behavioralist in orientation in the postwar period.⁵³ The *theory* of IR, for Guilhot, was developed by this realist group as a way to secure a space for an alternative vision of politics and scholarship to the behaviorist paradigm.⁵⁴ Following the theoretical work of theorist Hans Morgenthau from the University of Chicago,⁵⁵ together with others such as theologian Reinhold Niebuhr,⁵⁶ a realistic approach to politics placed in the center the struggle over power and the inherently tragic nature of human social life. Realists thus opposed as hopeless the attempt to replace political with scientific forms of solving collective problems, such as the interwar League of Nations. While such instruments might foster trust, they could never replace the need for constant vigilance in the defense of the national interest. As Guilhot explains, because for realists like Morgenthau politics was “ultimately impervious to rationalization, its best rational rendition was under the form of prudential maxims, not scientific principles.”⁵⁷

Alongside other revisionist accounts of IR’s history,⁵⁸ Guilhot’s investigations have turned commonsense understandings of the field’s history on their head. For scholars entering IR in the 1980s and 1990s, realism was the chief mainstream approach to world politics. The reasons were twofold. First, realism was supposedly the distillation of centuries of political wisdom, connecting such thinkers as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bismarck, battle hardened by the First Great Debate in IR between realism and its idealist or utopian alternative. Guilhot proves this was only partially true and wholly manufactured. Second, realism was popular because it was considered adequately scientific in ways competing theories—the much-maligned idealism as well as later “traditional” approaches—were not.⁵⁹ Realism was thus thought to represent dispassionate objective knowledge of world politics with a strong lineage.

Guilhot's attack thus takes aim at the centerpiece of IR. He shows that contrary to received wisdom, "realism" was neither separable from the development of the field of IR after 1945 nor ever a genuinely scientific approach. In fact, common wisdom is wrong on both counts. Rather than offering a suitably scientific approach to the study of international affairs, the realists gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation in fact put forward realism as a defense *against* the growing dominance of scientism within political science. IR *theory*, for Guilhot, is best "understood as a case of intellectual irredentism, resisting its own integration into American social science."⁶⁰ Moreover, while the "early IR theorists [the Rockefeller group] referred to traditions and historical lineages that had been repressed under the rule of pragmatism and empirical social science (whether Augustine, Machiavelli, or a pre-rationalist views of politics),"⁶¹ realism was very much tied to concerns located in mid-twentieth-century American politics and society.

Beyond the Rockefeller Conference

Guilhot's intervention has been highly productive, but discovery of the CFR group calls for a reassessment of its central claims since, clearly, thinking about international relations theory in America in the early 1950s went beyond the small but influential group that gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation. Although a Council study group had been proceeding for six months prior to the Rockefeller conference, and that there was significant overlap in membership—namely former Policy Planning Staff member Dorothy Fosdick, Rockefeller Foundation consultant Kenneth W. Thompson, and Yale political scientist Arnold Wolfers (see table 1)—almost no trace can be found of the realist gambit in the archival record.⁶²

The lack of any mention of a realist gambit is doubly curious because according to Guilhot, Thompson was the central figure behind the Rockefeller Foundation's decision to host the 1954 conference.⁶³ Hired by Rockefeller Foundation president Dean Rusk as a consultant in 1953, Thompson was keen to influence the Rockefeller's funding of IR programs away from a narrow behavioralist focus. Yet if this was such a central theme of the Rockefeller conference, why did Thompson make no mention of it at any point? Why did neither Fosdick nor Wolfers?

Of course, the issue could have been discussed at the group's dinners, of which the archival record is silent. Equally possible is that the decision by the Carnegie Corporation to fund Lipsky's year at the CFR was part of an

anti-behavioralist gambit organized at the foundation level, also absent from the documents. But if so, it remains curious that there was no mention of the realist gambit in more than thirty-five hours of on-the-record discussion. Also curious is that Lipsky's theoretical interventions as well as the theories discussed during the study group's meetings were not limited to realism in the vein of Morgenthau and Thompson.

Why then was there no sustained cross-fertilization between the Rockefeller Foundation conference and the similar set of discussions going on in New York at the CFR? Two non-mutually exclusive explanations suggest themselves: first, Thompson was deliberately concerned to keep the discussions separate; or their separateness was so evident that spending the study group's valuable time elaborating on a related set of conversations would have been impolitic. Whichever is correct, it would seem clear that the notion of a realist gambit does not exhaust the reasons for a turn to theory in the 1950s. To be sure, a realist gambit was being made in the manner and for the reasons Guillhot describes. But the turn to theory was broader than the realist gambit allows.

If the existence of the CFR study group on theory proves that the realist gambit of Morgenthau, Thompson, and co. was a reason—but not the sole reason—for the turn to theory in thinking about international relations in the early 1950s, much of Guillhot's interpretation of the origins of IR theory in the early 1950s nevertheless remains intact when juxtaposed with the documents of the CFR study group. In particular, the CFR group highlights the crucial role played by émigré scholars in the formation of IR theory, scholars steeped in long-standing philosophical traditions less prominent in America, in the context of a practical defense of liberalism against totalitarian alternatives that occupied an array of thinkers in the United States after the war. Also highlighted at the CFR and Rockefeller Foundation meetings is the elite institutional context of IR theory's birth and its inherently conservative nature. Finally, George Lipsky's attempts at fashioning a theory of international relations lays bare the practical difficulties faced by both groups when set in the context of the practical power of science in the American political and social disciplines, then as now.

The Nominalist Gambit: Lipsky, Liberalism, and the Search for Theory at the CFR

Over the course of his seven preparatory papers for the study group, George Lipsky developed a position on the theory of international relations he la-

bels “nominalist.”⁶⁴ Lipsky’s thinking was inspired by his engagement with the work of one Karl Pribram,⁶⁵ a government economist at the United States Tariff Commission who in 1949 published *Conflicting Patterns of Thought*.⁶⁶ Pribram’s book is dedicated to the delineation of four general patterns of thought he terms universalistic, nominalistic, intuitional, and dialectical. Of the four modes, Pribram privileges the nominalistic because in his words—which Lipsky reproduced almost verbatim in his background work for the CFR study group⁶⁷—only nominalism “has rejected [the identity of thinking and being]” and accepted that “to grasp the order of the universe must proceed by way of assumptions and purely hypothetical concepts—whose verity cannot be postulated but whose usefulness must be demonstrated.”⁶⁸

In the terminology of today’s IR, Lipsky’s view of theory might be labeled proto-constructivist: knowledge for Lipsky is perspectival and purposive, rather than objective and disinterested. Humans have an imperfect grasp on the world and it is only through trial and error that they move forward tentatively. Lipsky, following Pribram, criticizes in particular the universalistic pattern of thought—which characterizes religion and dogmatic scientism—for falsely believing in the ability to gain direct access to the order of the universe. For Lipsky, like Pribram, no such direct access is possible. Instead, knowledge is composed of the piecemeal addition of facts collected from testing hypotheses that are limited in scope and provisional. Thus, Lipsky explains to the study group, when it comes to theory the “disposition of this writer is to understand a general theory in a nominalist manner as an organization of hypotheses concerning the nature of objective reality.”⁶⁹ Theory is less ultimately true than tentatively true.

Like common criticisms of constructivism,⁷⁰ Lipsky’s nominalist theory does not resemble theory at all to our contemporary eyes. Nominalism represents rather a meta-theoretical perspective on the nature of knowledge and hence theory. Therefore, while Lipsky states that his theory “is designed to explain the objective world of reality,” his nominalism seems to militate against precisely the type of theory we understand as theory. Unlike the realists like Morgenthau, for whom international relations is a struggle for power between states, Lipsky does not make similarly strong claims about the object or objects of international relations, of what international relations consists. From a nominalist perspective there can be no ultimate statement of what international relations is. Tellingly, this includes politics, since, “The study of international relations transcends any confining discipline and is an area where data focus with relation to particular problems that cannot be called exclusively or even basically political.”⁷¹ In particular, philosophical issues are

not, in Lipsky's opinion, to be considered adjunct issues that can be discarded: "basic philosophical problems are immediately involved in this field."⁷²

From a nominalist perspective it follows that there can be no single and unified theory of international relations. As Lipsky states, although "One is tempted to assert that a search should be undertaken to find a final theory of international relations," this "could only be achieved in the presence of total knowledge. Man will not achieve this result in the foreseeable future."⁷³ As Lipsky continues, "If these propositions are true, there cannot be a theory of international relations that will be sufficiently operational for all men as to deserve the designation *the* theory of international relations."⁷⁴

But whereas Lipsky's nominalism is opposed to realism on the existence of a clear—"realistic"—referent object for international relations, in multiple other ways Lipsky's nominalism has deep connections with the realists and the broader context of IR's birth, as Guilhot describes. Lipsky's attempts at the CFR to develop a nominalist theory of international relations demonstrates that the search for theory was not simply an attempt to defend IR as a multidisciplinary academic field but was rather reflective of the character of international relations as an elite social space, crossing academia, the world of think tanks and the media, and into government and the intergovernmental sphere, where international relations are practiced. As such, the search for a theory of international relations reflected the priorities of and social forces acting upon American elites at the time: namely the search for an intellectually supported defense of liberalism and liberal democracy against serious challengers, a search heavily influenced by the influx of émigrés from Europe before and after the war.

In this the Rockefeller and CFR conferences are more similar than they first appear. An initial comparison is unfavorable to the CFR group: the Rockefeller conference boasts greater name recognition both within IR, especially Morgenthau, and in the history of American foreign policy, including Paul Nitze, the architect of containment,⁷⁵ and future secretary of state Dean Rusk (1961–69) (see table 2).⁷⁶ But later notoriety should not hide the similar positions of the elites gathered at the two sets of meetings.

From the Rockefeller Foundation group, Don Price, Dean Rusk, and Kenneth W. Thompson were administrators at the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, respectively, and Robert Bowie and Dorothy Fosdick were then current and former members of the Policy Planning Staff. The CFR group had Thompson and Fosdick, but a broader array of academics. The only major difference was the prominence of journalists and public intellectuals James Reston and Walter Lippmann at the Rockefeller meetings, while the CFR's

Table 2. Rockefeller Conference June 1954 Attendees

Robert Bowie, Policy Planning Staff (PPS)
Dorothy Fosdick, former PPS
William T. R. Fox, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
Hans J. Morgenthau, University of Chicago
Reinhold Niebuhr, Union Theological Seminary
Paul H. Nitze, Foreign Service Educational Foundation
Don K. Price, Ford Foundation
James B. Reston, <i>New York Times</i>
Dean Rusk, Rockefeller Foundation
Kenneth W. Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation
Arnold Wolfers, Professor of International Relations, Yale University

Source: Guilhot 2011, 239.

ties to Wall Street and business was represented by banker R. Gordon Wasson and lawyer Edgar Church. As Guilhot notes, therefore, the CFR study group also signifies an attempt to retain a role for elite nonspecialists in international relations quite distinct from later understandings of theory.

Like their Rockefeller counterparts, Lipsky and his CFR colleagues also faced the predominant scientism of the early 1950s within which they were making claims to theory, knowledge, and explanation. Both were trapped by the need to speak the language of science and the search for theory while simultaneously questioning and in large measure rejecting then popular notions of science. The concept of explanation, for example, clearly means for Lipsky something quite different than the approaches that seek to subsume unique events and recurring conjunctions of variables under general causal laws. Since direct knowledge of such laws is impossible from a nominalist perspective, Lipsky's use of the term "explain" does not refer to the subsumption of observed acts under causal laws.

More broadly still, the CFR and Rockefeller groups shared an intellectual background in the United States concerned with defending liberalism and liberal democracy. This context goes well beyond the later IR liberalism focused on intergovernmental cooperation and the coordinating role of international organizations and into the mid-century zeitgeist chronicled by Ira Katnelson.⁷⁷ For Pribram, an adequate defense of democracy cannot be based on a universalist pattern of thought alone since "[t]he natural temper of democracy is empirical."⁷⁸ By this Pribram means that democracy is based on a fiction that is not universally valid but practically useful, appealing to individual interests. A corollary is that persuasion and education, rather than dogma, are the only

permissible methods of influencing the views of communities and peoples. “A strong case can be made for a defense of nominalist methods, quite independently of the logical validity of other patterns. In all democracies, freedom of thought and individual liberty have ranked among the highest social values. Experience shows that hypothetical thinking provides the safest logical foundation for the experience and protection of these liberties.”⁷⁹

Although he drew heavily on Pribram in 1953–54, it was not until later, in *A Formula for Liberals* (1972), that Lipsky explicitly developed a nominalist theoretical defense of liberalism. There “liberalism” refers to a “political philosophy insisting upon the preservation of individual areas of freedom within which he may associate himself with others in groups in the creation of a tentative, non-dogmatic consensus.”⁸⁰ Lipsky asserts that a “formula for liberals” can “be constructed on the proposition that there can be a sound theory which will operate as a continuing restraint on government so that it does not become a vehicle of interests which are adverse to the individual.”⁸¹

Lipsky’s “formula” for liberals is then a theory in the sense of being a philosophical defense of democracy as the proper vehicle for truly liberal governance, a theory in the sense we might use political theory, not empirical theory. As he goes on, “It must be emphasized that the correctives that may be required to improve our society do not require the acceptance of any authoritarian panacea.”⁸² No authoritarian political philosophy—fascist, socialist, communist, or any admixture of them—can be liberal, however efficient or effective. The role of his formula is to provide a robust, philosophically driven vehicle to remind scholars and statespeople of this fact.

Lipsky’s formula is thus similar to, yet at the same time starkly different from, the realism of Morgenthau and the Rockefeller group in revealing ways. Both are, for example, elitist and quite conservative in their vision of foreign policy and how it should ideally be made, a fact emphasized by Guillhot about the Rockefeller group.⁸³ Whereas Morgenthau foregrounds the role of the prudent statesperson as the proper practitioner of realism and protector of the national interest,⁸⁴ in *A Formula for Liberals*, Lipsky shows a marked concern for the role of the intelligentsia versus the “newly enfranchised” masses by emphasizing that his is a formula for elite politicians as defenders of a never-ending process by which something like a common or “national” interest emerges. Having both “a descriptive and a manipulative function[,] [i]t is the responsibility of an intellectual elite, recognizing the limitations upon human knowledge, to build and fight for a nominalist theory that is designed to justify democratic processes.”⁸⁵

Such statements were, of course, likely to resonate at the Council on For-

eign Relations, a key node in the field of elite power in the United States, then as now. They remind us that when analyzing the CFR study group—like that which gathered at the Rockefeller Foundation—the scholar is not only assessing the actions of scholars engaged in an *intellectual* project, but elites in a *political* project. The interconnections between the American state, business, the academy, and organizations like the CFR—unique in their breadth and scale—is one of the most signal features of the American political context.⁸⁶

Lipsky, and the CFR group as a whole, were then bound to be both drawn to yet ultimately dissatisfied with Morgenthau's realism. Realism had a prudent aspect that was attractively tentative, conservative, and elitist, preserving a prominent place for the historically and philosophically informed statesperson, presumably a member of the CFR one could easily add. In the study group documents Morgenthau thus gets a good reception.⁸⁷ But the sense from many participants is that the theory is in the end overblown. Lipsky warns that if the theorist exceeds proper scope in his or her generalizations, “the theorist passes beyond the function of the social scientist (or the democratic statesman) and becomes the religious leader, the metaphysician, or political fanatic preoccupied with imposing his values on reality.”⁸⁸

The conceptual centerpiece of realism, the national interest, is a particular weak spot. Not only does it focus unnecessarily on the nation and the state—which, it is noted, have only been around for two hundred years or so—it is philosophically indefensible since each political community defines the national interest differently.⁸⁹ Once again, Lipsky's disposition is “to understand a general theory in a nominalist manner as an organization of hypotheses concerning the nature of objective reality,” but “the terms in which man may know reality must forever fall short of totally revealing reality.” Therefore, “Although essence or substance of reality may be assumed, nothing meaningful may be said about it as a totally comprehended truth.”⁹⁰ Proclaiming, as does Morgenthau, that international relations ultimately consist of the struggle over power to achieve the national interest is in the end too universalist a pattern of thought for Lipsky.

In place of the prudent search for the national interest and its ongoing defense in the anarchical environment of international politics, Lipsky substitutes “non-doctrinaire empirical liberalism” based on “an intellectual preference for the relative and the tentative.”⁹¹ Even the prudent statesmen, we might say, can sometimes get it wrong. For Lipsky, consequently, “The alternative to the self-limiting democratic process is the application of the authoritarian assumption that the decision of leadership can be and has been produced by a process that can distinguish between good and evil in the ultimate sense.”⁹² Liberalism requires instead policy making through trial and

error, popular mandates, education and persuasion, the never-ending search for popular consent, which can be withdrawn as well as given.

In place of the prudent statesperson, Lipsky substitutes the leader aware of when and where to draw on expertise:

The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon providing ends and means; in the role of statesmen, upon applying means to desired ends. The ideal would be a combination to discover and apply in the same person or persons. An approach to the ideal is the collaboration of the theorist whose expertise includes capacity to gather sufficient and relevant data and organize them, particular those relating to the political conditions influencing the statesman's activity, and the statesman with the capacity to recognize necessary expertise when he sees it. This collaboration requires some combination of amateur and professional capacity in both.⁹³

Lipsky's formula for liberals remains nascent in his preparatory papers in 1953. By the end of the meetings he has elucidated a theory of theories, while hoping that this could inform an actual theory, which remains out of reach. Only later does he develop what counts as a clearly normative theory covering the best mode of governance and its practical implications.

It is perhaps not surprising that, unlike Morgenthau's realism, Lipsky's nominalist theory of international relations has passed largely into obscurity. Lipsky's is a call for a certain type of constrained—or in IR scholar Daniel Levine's words, *chastened*—form of expertise.⁹⁴ Lipsky's expertise is a form of knowledge aware of its limitations. No single theory, derived from supposed verities of international life—be they the struggle for power, the effects of geography, or the needs of effective political communication—can nor should seek to provide total knowledge to fully comprehend and control international life. Lipsky's is a call for a self-denying ordinance, directed at IR scholars and to scholars and statespersons in general. No one likes a self-denying ordinance; it does scholars little good in their attempt to speak to power and define the scope of their competence, and it does policy makers little any good in their political projects. Yet its philosophical merit would seem undeniable and well worth revisiting.

International Relations: A Cold War Social Science?

If the CFR study group on international relations theory took place during a period of growth and consolidation of the field of International Relations, its

broader backdrop was a massive and rapid expansion of the social sciences in the United States. In the words of evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin, the “Big Truth” about the Cold War is that it “was responsible for an unprecedented and explosive expansion of the academy.”⁹⁵ As Mark Solovey notes, to illustrate, the American Sociological Association had around one thousand members in the early 1900s. By the 1970s, the number was above 14,000.⁹⁶ Sociology’s impressive growth was typical of the other social sciences like psychology, political science, and economics.

The Second World War, and the New Deal before it, had witnessed exponential growth of the American state, with unprecedented opportunities for social scientists. As Marshall Planner Jacques Reinstein later commented, to cite just one example, when he was close to finishing college in the mid-1930s the “New Deal agencies . . . were proliferating like mushrooms.” Ambitious men and women like Reinstein spent a good deal of time “hanging around personnel offices, trying to get interviews, one after the other.”⁹⁷ After the war, some like Reinstein stayed in Washington, but many others returned to college campuses, which themselves witnessed a boom in admissions from returning servicemen funded by the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act—the GI Bill—and spurred by the institutionalization of government support of the sciences through the creation of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950.⁹⁸

Recent years have seen a corresponding rise in historical attention paid to the interrelationship between the trajectory of the social sciences and the development of the American state after 1945, especially its expansion during the Cold War.⁹⁹ Authors contributing to this literature have traced the deep interconnections between Cold War concerns, the provision of state and private funding to the social sciences, and the changing visions of the appropriate scope, methods, and boundaries of social science disciplines. Modifying President Eisenhower’s famous phrase, scholars like Sonia Amadae, David Price, Ron Robin, and Joy Rohde—to name just a few contributors to this generative research agenda—have highlighted episodes like the rise of rational choice theory at the RAND Corporation in the late 1940s and the use of psychology to study populations deemed susceptible to communist propaganda. Solovey explains that “many historical accounts have argued that the social sciences were, indeed, altered in significant ways in accord with these Cold-War inflected visions” of the proper relationship between academia and the state, captured in such labels as the “Politics-Patronage-Social Science” or “Military-Intellectual complex,” and the “militarization” or “weaponization” of social science. For Lewontin, consequently, “When liberal and

Left academics think of the Cold War, they think of research agenda warped by the ideological fervor and political pressures of American foreign policy, and of professional and personal lives ruined directly and indirectly by anti-communist witch-hunts and pusillanimous academic administrators.”¹⁰⁰

More recent historical scholarship, however, has cautioned the need to resist the assumption that the social sciences were uniformly impacted by the Cold War, and that the imbrication of the social sciences with the American state was the sole or even primary influence on their development in the period.¹⁰¹ The various social sciences interacted with the state in highly diverse ways, with many scholars having little to do with the funding streams and projects historians have analyzed. In other words, the social sciences in the mid-twentieth century were not passive receivers of government priorities; disciplinary change occurred for broader reasons, both internal and external, and many scholars pursued their own research agendas away from the priorities of the Cold War state.

In this section, I use the scholarly debate over the impact of the Cold War state on the social sciences as a foil to continue introducing the CFR study group on the theory of international relations. To what extent does the study group prove or disprove IR’s status as a “Cold War social science?” Given that the topic was international affairs and foreign policy, we might expect there to be significant or even predominant traces of Cold War concerns. Was that, in fact, the case? If not, what subjects did preoccupy the group’s participants.

Four central issues emerged in the discussions: the nature of international relations as an object of inquiry; knowledge and the corresponding status of theoretical vis-à-vis practical knowledge; the role of values in international relations theory; and the nature and purpose of theory. These four issues do not exhaust the contents of the debates, but they do capture their most salient features, not least because IR scholars to this day frequently disagree on these very questions. In each case, I show they spoke to broader and more long-standing concerns in the social sciences including IR’s status in 1953–54 as a Cold War social science.

The Nature of International Relations As an Object of Inquiry

Members of the study group considered one of their core tasks to be determining the nature of international relations. William Kaufmann made the point strongly during the first meeting’s discussion. The “first step” in thinking about international relations theory, he argued, “is to define the ‘animal’ . . . [:] the

field of international relations.”¹⁰² Alongside, or even prior to, the question of theory, then, was the issue of object: what is international relations? What does the term cover?

Kaufmann’s suggestion was to “begin with the idea that one is dealing with a system or society.”¹⁰³ Such a call should have been familiar to the participants. The notion of “international society” or the “society of nations” was common in prewar scholarship on international relations, and, indeed, in its practice through such international organizations as the League of Nations.¹⁰⁴ A systemic perspective, however, was a more recent and more prominent influence.

As historian Hunter Heyck has shown, the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a broad convergence across the social sciences on the power and appropriateness of a systemic perspective, which came to redefine “the central concepts, methods, tools, practices, and institutional relations of postwar social science.”¹⁰⁵ Spurred by the influx of social scientists into government service during the New Deal and the Second World War, and by the “organizational revolution” in twentieth-century business, what Heyck terms the “age of system” was characterized by the rise of *control technologies*, understood as “device[s] or formalized procedure[s] that [are] used to coordinate the operations of multiple components so that they function as a single unit.”¹⁰⁶ As historian Joel Isaacs has chronicled, the creation of the interdisciplinary Department of Social Relations at Harvard provided a fulcrum for formation of systemic approaches in sociology and related fields and for the work of key figures like Talcott Parsons and Clyde Kluckhohn, and within the area of political science and IR, Karl Deutsch.¹⁰⁷ Between approximately 1920 and 1970, Heyck shows, “virtually every field of social science re-conceptualized its central object as a system defined and given structure by a set of processes, mechanisms, or relationships.”¹⁰⁸

It might be expected then that the CFR study group would adopt such a systemic perspective as the basis of their discussions. Indeed, strong traces of systems theory are evident in the digests, primarily through the discussion of Chicago political scientist Harold Lasswell and David Easton, one of the earliest and most forceful proponents of a systems perspective to the study of politics. The group felt Lasswell’s approach—which centered on the interaction of political psychology and mass communication—was powerful and innovative, despite the opaque style of its author.¹⁰⁹ As a tool to understand the psychological basis of liberal democracy, Lasswell’s work was considered to have significant merit, not least because Lasswell was said to be gaining political influence at the time. As CFR member Charles Burton Marshall impressed upon the group, Lasswell was then currently popular within the

halls of power, as “many members of the ‘new team’ in Washington refer to Lasswell as an authority for their views on how policy should be articulated and communicated.”¹¹⁰

The study group ultimately felt that international relations was a broader object than Lasswell’s psychological approach allowed for. “Professor Wolfers,” moreover, felt “that to apply a theory of individual behavior to national behavior is a non-sequitur.”¹¹¹ With the movement away from Lasswell, the idea of a systemic or macro-level societal approach failed to gain a foothold in the group’s discussions. In 1953, IR was evidently still some years away from a full engagement with systems theory, indicated by the appearance in 1957 of Morton Kaplan’s *System and Process International Process*, and Kenneth Waltz’s turn to systems theory, as described by IR historians Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot.¹¹²

The reason a systems perspective did not catch on is telling, however. Over the course of the study group, attempts to fix the nature of “the animal”—in Kaufmann’s terms—on one single aspect of world politics were countered by members asserting the importance of other facets and repetition of the theme that international politics is too complex to be reduced to a single system, however elaborate. Soon after noting the potential for an approach focused on constellations of states, for example, Rabi himself asked “what ‘international relations’ covered. Does it not include international commerce and investment?”¹¹³ Most pressingly, the role of foreign policy makers or practitioners repeatedly intruded, impeding considerations of international relations as a coherent entity. Kaufmann noted the imperative to include the political process in any attempt to explain international outcomes.

Beyond the notion of system, the study group explored other conceptualizations of international relations as an object of analysis through their discussions of the theoretical approaches of Carr, Marx, Wilson, and others.

The idea of the “national interest” gained significant attention. Several objections, however, were quickly raised to an equation of the search for and fulfillment of the national interest and the scope of international relations. The objections equate to what contemporary IR scholars view as the nonobjective, or socially constructed, aspects of the national interest and, indeed, the state itself as a political unit. As Lipsky interpreted Morgenthau’s argument, “the national interest . . . is a subjective abstraction that will receive differing content depending on the outlook of the individual employing it.”¹¹⁴ Elsewhere, Chairman MacIver noted that “The state . . . , which is the chief object of inquiry in international political theory, is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving certain ends.”¹¹⁵ Thus, while the search for the

national interest could be viewed as part of international relations, it was too narrow as a picture of the whole.

The case of geopolitics provides a further example of the distillation of one crucial aspect of international relations deemed insightful, but ultimately inappropriate as the foundational feature of the object “international relations.” Kenneth Thompson was particularly drawn to the approach. Thompson felt that “there was some merit in thinking of the elements of international politics as a pyramid with the geographic element constituting its base”¹¹⁶ and that “There is little doubt that this country has suffered from failing properly to appreciate the geographic factor” in international politics.¹¹⁷ But the group appears ultimately to have agreed with Lipsky’s conclusion that prediction based on geography could too easily slip into self-fulfilling prophecy. Geography mattered, in other words, but was not the only aspect of international relations with which a proper theory of the subject must deal.

Finally, of all the conceptualizations of the fundamental nature of international relations, Marxist theory—and particularly imperialism—got as close as any to garnering general agreement by the group, which must strike us as surprising given the political climate of the early 1950s. For Robert Strausz-Hupé, for example, “Marx offered a superbly intelligent theory.”¹¹⁸ Hajo Holborn agreed, noting that “while he was, of course, by no means a Marxist, he had the feeling that Marxism has been, in some respects, underrated. As a theory of history, or perhaps of political sociology, it had created certain insights which were an advance over previous concepts.”¹¹⁹ Holborn argued that Marxism had “contemporary relevance . . . when one notices the extent to which US foreign policy appears to be based on perverted Marxist notions. This country’s economic and technical assistance programs seem to be largely predicated on a theory of economic determinism, yet US policies fail to recognize the power of ideas and the interrelationship between ideas and material welfare in attempting to influence behavior abroad.”¹²⁰

In the end, however, the Marxism fell afoul of its political distastefulness for many of those gathered. The topic was whether the United States could be understood as an imperialist power. Thompson argued that “if imperialism is defined as an alteration of the *status quo*, then direct [American] action in countries like Italy or Guatemala could be termed imperialist.”¹²¹ Dorothy Fosdick, however, “questioned whether US intervention for the purpose of liberating a nation which had succumbed to Communism could be termed imperialist.”¹²²

In sum, there was much enthusiasm expressed about coming to some clear understanding of the nature of “the animal” as a first necessary step in the the-

orization of international relations. There were also clear traces of the systems theory in the waters of American political science in the early 1950s. But no agreement emerged on the question of what such an understanding would look like. The group stumbled over multiple insightful yet partial perspectives, concluding that no single approach or master concept could grasp the whole in all its complexity, especially its historical specificity and the crucial role of policy makers in international affairs.

The Nature of Knowledge and the Status of Theoretical Vis-à-Vis Practical Knowledge

During the group's discussions, considerations of the object of analysis—international relations—frequently slipped into the nature of knowledge itself. In other words, behind or at least alongside the question of what international relations is lay the issue of *how one comes to know* international relations. The group's conversations thus offer a case to examine the position of IR within broader trends in the postwar social sciences concerning the meaning of knowledge and the type of knowledge the social sciences should aim for.

In particular, the study group offers the opportunity to assess the importance of behavioralism, as we have already seen. Based on recent historical work on IR and other fields, there are reasons both to expect behavioralism to be adopted and to expect it to have been rejected by the participants in the CFR study group.

The rise of behavioralism in America is a prominent theme in historical work on Cold War social science. Centered on the RAND organization, Robin shows how a key group of behaviorist academics collected around the study of conventional warfare, as opposed to the more well-known nuclear strategists, the famed “Wizards of Armageddon.”¹²³ At RAND, behaviorists like Nathan Leites developed ideas such as the “operational code” as tools to explain the foreign policy behavior of foreign elites, drawing on psychology as an inspiration. Largely absent, Robin notes, were humanists, who were suspect due to both understanding of communism and the fact that “the humanities prized the past and put a premium on experience. Such concepts had no place in the military-academic complex.”¹²⁴

The members of the group were “guided by a defining mission to transform American society and control global trends,”¹²⁵ a mission that had been nurtured by similar educational training. Many, indeed, had been students of Harold Lasswell at the University of Chicago in the 1920s.¹²⁶ The group shared

“a pervasive reluctance to ascribe to others any social or cultural trait that behavioralists could not identify within American society.”¹²⁷ To illustrate, Robin cites the example of a late-1940s study for the Office of Naval Research (ONR) on “leadership in early communities” to highlight the absurd effects: a study of urban Philadelphia that did not consider the context to be culturally specific.¹²⁸ How, Robin asks, “did behavioral scientists come to monopolize the function of interpreters and developers of modern culture”?¹²⁹

Either to affirm its value or to reject it, therefore, we might then expect behavioralism to have been very much on the table at the study group meetings. As we have already seen, what we actually witness in the meeting digests is little attention to behavioralism, but not because the group coalesced around a non-behavioralist realist perspective, as Lipsky attempted to persuade the group of the merits of a nominalist understanding of theory as the proper philosophical underpinning of a theory of theories of international relations.

Many of the members would have preferred not to spend so much time on the subject of knowledge. Hajo Holborn, for one, made clear at one stage that “The group had been convened to discuss theory of international relations, not theory of knowledge.”¹³⁰ MacIver similarly “expressed the opinion that the group would have a hard time reaching agreement unless it avoided metaphysical questions.”¹³¹ Nonetheless, the issue emerged at each of the meetings, and Lipsky’s defense of a nominalist position suggests a view of knowledge struggling against the greater certainty of realist and behavioral perspectives more prominent in mid-twentieth-century social science.

Lipsky’s defense of a nominalist position remains, however, very much relevant to contemporary thinking about the nature of theory and knowledge in international relations, particularly new trends within broadly speaking constructivist work that stress the centrality of practice, practical knowledge, and prudence in international relations. A nominalist perspective by and large accords with accounts that highlight the socially constructed rather than objective or given nature of knowledge. For practice theorists in particular, much social action in international relations is neither based on consequentialist nor norm-governed reasoning, but is rather habitual, everyday, and taken-for-granted. Yet Lipsky posed an interesting question to this literature: Is there a fundamental difference between the knowledge of the statesman and the scholar?

Lipsky disagreed with political scientist David Easton, who had then recently articulated the view that the two were distinct.¹³² Lipsky claims instead that “The theoretician may be distinguished from the practitioner of power for some purposes [but] they should not be distinguished for all, even main,

purposes. The knowledge they work with is or should be basically the same, that is knowledge to be understood in terms of a scientific systematics."¹³³ In relation to the supposed "prudence" of the statesman, for Lipsky, "I have no way of discovering what prudential knowledge is; nor has any theorist ever presented me with any test for separating qualitatively the kind of knowledge that the scientist gathers and the kind that the statesman should act by."¹³⁴

Lipsky's rejection of any difference in the type of knowledge of the statesman and academic leads him to espouse a position close to Plato's call for philosopher-kings: "The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon producing ends and means; in the role of the statesman, upon applying means to achieve discerned ends. The ideal would be a combination of capacity to discover and apply in the same person or persons."¹³⁵

Contemporary work on practical knowledge, however, suggests that there is indeed a difference between the knowledge of the policy maker and the academic, only that the difference is practical rather than philosophical. As William Kaufmann noted of Morgenthau's theory, "Morgenthau confuses, Professor Kaufmann felt, his position as an observer with that of a would-be policy maker."¹³⁶ While philosophically the knowledge of the policy maker and the scholar is the same, their distinct social locations makes all the difference. Indeed, even Lipsky acknowledges that the difference "between theoretician and statesman is that the former does not have to make decisions as to the means that are to be employed to achieve particular value goals or situations and the latter *does* have that most difficult task."¹³⁷ His final plea "is for greater awareness on the part of the natural collaborators, theorist (scientist) and statesman (practitioner of theory) of the nature of the scientific process, for greater awareness of what they are or should be doing."¹³⁸

The Role of Values in International Relations Theory

The third major issue confronted by the study group was the role of values in international relations and International Relations theory. Value-freedom cropped up numerous times during the discussions. We should not be surprised. The role of values has been a persistent source of contention in the social sciences, back to the *methodenstreit* of the late nineteenth century. By extension, value-neutrality has been key to long-standing debates over the relationship between the state and the academy, and whether the term "Cold War social science" is an appropriate umbrella term for developments in America after 1945. The role of values has been central to those in favor of the designation

“Cold War social science,” due in large part to the prominence of episodes like the Project Camelot affair, which placed the role of government-funded social science in American foreign policy firmly in the political spotlight during the mid-1960s.

As historian Joy Rohde recounts, Project Camelot was a counterinsurgency campaign in 1964–65 funded by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), a multiyear research institute created by the army in 1956 and housed at the American University in Washington, D.C.¹³⁹ SORO was designed “to be a hybrid institution that would seamlessly meld social scientific expertise with the operational concerns of army officers,” and it carried out numerous empirical studies on the ideas and doctrine of real and potential enemy populations, with the aim to “usher gradual, stable change toward and American-led world order.”¹⁴⁰ Along these lines, Project Camelot aimed to study counterinsurgency techniques in real conditions in Latin America. That was before, that is, Chilean scholars realized the study was being paid for not by American University, but by the Pentagon,¹⁴¹ raising criticism that spread to the Chilean government and critics of the military-industrial-academic complex in the United States, “who hoped to draw attention to the problems of militarization in social science and American foreign affairs.”¹⁴²

Historian Robert Proctor, has shown, however, that the meaning of value-freedom or value-neutrality has changed over time, which cautions against careless contextualization or periodization of the form in which it emerged during the study group’s conversations. Value-neutrality, Proctor argues, “far from being a timeless or self-evident principle, has a distinctive geography: ‘value-freedom’ has meant different things to different people at different times.”¹⁴³ “Slogans like “science must value-free” or “all knowledge is political” must be understood in light of specific fears and goals that change over time,” he goes on. Arguments for value-neutrality “may be a response to state or religious suppression of scientific ideas; value-neutrality may be a way to guard against personal interests obstructing scientific progress. Value-neutrality may reflect the desires of scholars to professionalize or to specialize; value-neutrality may conceal the fact that science has social origins and social consequences. Neutrality may provide a path along which one retreats or a platform from which one launches an offensive.”

In sum, “value-neutrality” to those who raised the issue at other times and places might not have meant the same thing as at the CFR in 1953 and 1954. Indeed, voices in favor of value-neutrality were muted at the CFR meetings, which accords with the general skepticism shown toward more objective and formalized understandings of both international relations and knowledge de-

tailed above. As group chairman MacIver noted, the supposedly value-free methods of the natural sciences “could not be utilized by the social scientist. The fields of investigation are not analogous.” The example he drew on was the state, “the chief object of inquiry in international political theory.” For MacIver, the state “is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving certain ends.”¹⁴⁴ As such, it was “shot through with value.”¹⁴⁵

Physicist Isidor Rabi disagreed. When confronted by Lipsky as to his reasoning, Rabi expressed the view that the question of the role of values in theory “is an aesthetic question, not one related to the problem of knowledge.”¹⁴⁶ Lipsky used the opportunity to explore further the implications of his nominalist understanding of theory. Nominalism, he suggested, asserts the nonidentity of thinking and being, which, it follows, implies that the function of value is related to the indeterminacy of knowledge, since if a “theory is complete, if it explains all phenomena, then value is irrelevant since absolute predictability exists and one would not value or desire that which one knows is impossible.”¹⁴⁷ As a further implication, “all statements of ends are attempts to freeze the status quo, a situation, on the time continuum. This is an impossible task at best, and there is no scientific basis for asserting the goodness of such an illusion.”¹⁴⁸

The issue reared its head during the discussion over the reality of “realism” and the question of the national interest. In terms that might have come from debates in political science and IR from the early 1990s,¹⁴⁹ Carr, Lipsky suggested, “underestimates the power of ideas.” Interests come from ideas, Lipsky asserted. “Interest is not a tangible thing that exists externally; it is related to a theory and value system.”¹⁵⁰ Again, if Carr saw revolution as an inevitable feature of international change it was because, for Lipsky, he must desire it: “Carr is basically a man of violence who, driven by his desire for the fulfillment of a revolution, defined in his own terms, has not taken the time to be philosophically precise.”¹⁵¹

Value-freedom, for Lipsky, was not appropriate, since “It is the academic theorists or the political leaders who lead in giving reality to interests by defining them, by producing theories outlining them.”¹⁵² Thus,

In this light, single or multiple causes, long-range explanations or predictions of what will occur are highly questionable ventures, especially in history and the social sciences. To the extent that long-range predictions are undertaken in these areas, they tend to admit value preferences under the guise of science. What man predicts in history, beyond his scientific capacity to know, is what he wishes to happen. . . . A sound methodology can propose to do no more

than provide a dynamic guide to assist the analyst in distinguishing between the suggestion of possibilities and the prophecy of the course of history.¹⁵³

Yet there was a limit to the rejection of value-freedom, which emerged particularly during consideration of the theoretical contribution of none other than Harold Lasswell. Lasswell, Lipsky's preparatory paper explains, thinks social science should be able to help teach society what to value and how to realize values.¹⁵⁴ Poles apart from Morgenthau, it explained, Lasswell wanted to develop a *policy science* of political science: a management science, which could tell leaders how to manipulate political society to want international organization.¹⁵⁵ Drawing on Freudian psychology and the notion of id, ego, superego, transposed to the level of the state, Lasswell's desire was for the social scientist to be able to "make recommendations with more confidence regarding the development of an elite appropriate to the needs of a society that aspires toward freedom."¹⁵⁶ Lasswell's policy science was aimed at supporting and promoting democracy through the creation of democratic personalities. Although the group found the approach unsuitable as a basis for a theory of international relations, "Lasswell's contribution is or could be enormous. At least here is a forthright attempt to embody a discipline in the social sciences within the framework of science in the conventional sense."¹⁵⁷

At one stage of the meetings, Charles Burton Marshall—who later became a noted IR theorist¹⁵⁸—shared his impression that he "thought that the group's discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theory often wandered from one yardstick to another . . . sometimes an aid to understanding, sometimes for advice to policymakers."¹⁵⁹ Marshall gave voice to precisely the predicament the study group approached but had no way to overcome over the course of their meetings. Thus "Professor Wolfers observed that political scientists would like to be able to perform two functions: the capacity for fairly accurate prediction and the capacity to make constructive political choice."¹⁶⁰ Holborn "suggested that a lesser, but perhaps more practical, objective of international relations theory than that suggested by Professor Wolfers is the counseling of shorter-range improvements in relationships between nations."¹⁶¹ And Rabi asked, "Is [the theory of international relations] a theory which attempted to define what was good and bad in a global sense? Or is it a theory which would be suitable for guiding policy-makers?"¹⁶²

The concern with offering relevant policy advice is telling. It is perhaps less surprising that value-neutrality was not trumpeted by Lipsky and the study group, as value-neutrality was quite simply a good fit in the context of organizations like the CFR. While sharing the moniker "think tank" with Feder-

ally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) like the RAND Corporation, organizations like the CFR and the Brookings Institution are in reality quite different, straddling as they do the boundaries between the government, academia, and the world of business. As Robin notes, FFRDCs like RAND were a new intellectual format, which “appeared to be creative, uninhibited meeting points between government clients and innovative scholars for solving the nation’s problems.”¹⁶³ As such, RAND’s government clients apparently preferred behavioralists, who “claimed supposedly value-free skills.”¹⁶⁴ Unlike RAND et al., the knowledge the CFR and similar organizations, like Brookings, provide to policy makers may be nonpartisan, but it is not value-free.

The Lure of Theory

The final issue central to the study group’s discussions was the nature of theory. What was “theory” when it came to international relations? What was it for? Not surprisingly given what has been said above about organizations like the CFR, members of the group thought that at the heart of the task of answering these questions was settling on an account of the relationship between the theorist and the policy maker. Should the theory of international relations offer “shovel ready” advice to the decision maker, or merely guide them in the exercise of their judgment?

The study group concluded in June 1954 without clear agreement on the proper parameters and unmistakable attributes of a theory of international relations. Seemingly mutually exclusive notions emerged alongside one another. On one side were voices sympathetic to Lipsky’s, for whom theories were necessarily partial, multiple, and practically oriented, militating against the possibility of a theory of international relations. On the other were accounts of theory more in line with natural science models, where the task of delineating the core aspects of international politics were precisely what a theory of international relations should aim at.

For Lipsky, theory was primarily “a basis for practice.” Policy makers, he argued, employ theory, however implicitly.¹⁶⁵ A primary function of theorizing international relations, then, is to engage in a “A constant process of refinement in the understanding of this implied theory.”¹⁶⁶ At the same time, Lipsky’s nominalism led him to caution against what is in other philosophical terms referred to as “reification” or the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” The role of the theorist of international relations, then, is to uncover the

implicit theory held by policy makers “without letting it become ossified or stereotyped.”¹⁶⁷ That, he opines, “would be an advance in knowledge.”¹⁶⁸

Others espoused a form of theory closer to the natural science model. Professor Kaufmann, for example, “thought a sounder criterion [for the value of a theory] is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish the observer with a greater capacity for understanding the political process and hence the ability to “predict” in a more limited sense.”¹⁶⁹ As might be expected from a hard scientist, Rabi was eager to narrow down the scope of international relations so as to facilitate conceptualization along a model familiar in physics. “[F]rom his own point of view,” he made clear, “a theory starts with a number of concepts elaborated to simplify the material with which the theory is concerned. Relations between these concepts are also an inherent part of a theory. The concepts are then tested with reference to their predictive value for the future or their predictive value in the past.”¹⁷⁰

Rabi’s understanding of science seems to have been for the group a clear touchstone around which to discuss the uniqueness of international relations. For CFR staff member Zinner, “With regard to the question ‘what is theory?’ . . . the following definition might be considered appropriate; ‘a theory is a generalized explanation pertaining to a set of related phenomena.’”¹⁷¹ For Strausz-Hupé, professor at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, as a young science international relations was like “botany in the time of Linnaeus . . . concerned more with classification than experimentation. To evolve further, International Relations must create criteria for measuring the phenomena of politics. As yet, however, no adequate means for testing has been found.”¹⁷²

Yet at the same time as affirming Rabi’s commonsense model, Strausz-Hupé raised a fundamental question about its suitability for the study of international affairs. The role of prediction in any theory of international relations once again raised the issue of the normal science model’s suitability. Rabi himself, for example, noted that full predictability is a big aim for IR since even in physics “most so-called prediction is merely extrapolation on the basis of previous experience.”¹⁷³ Therefore, “Professor Kaufmann thought a sounder criterion is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish the observer with a greater capacity for understanding the political process and hence the ability to ‘predict’ in a more limited sense.”¹⁷⁴ As already noted above, others at the meetings—notably Lipsky and the chairman, sociologist Robert MacIver—were skeptical about the importance of prediction, however limited, to theory.

The existence of disparate, perhaps even opposed or mutually exclusive

understandings of theory did not go unacknowledged. As Marshall expressed, “the group’s discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theory often wandered from one yardstick to another.”¹⁷⁵ At some points theory meant an aid to understanding, he showed, sometimes for advice to policy maker. Theory remained, then, an elusive goal, shared by the group in the abstract more than in the detail.

The CFR study group on international relations shines a much-needed light on the development of the field of international relations and its position within the military-industrial-academic complex. Of more interest than the multiple notions of theory is the question of why despite very different understandings of theory, the diverse members of the study group could nevertheless agree that theory remained of vital importance to the field of international relations. What does that tell us about the role of the Cold War in the development of IR?

The CFR study group took place at a time of increased interest in international affairs in the United States, an effect of America’s emergence as a global power during the Second World War. Newfound global primacy stimulated the creation of an expansive institutional architecture of world power, which included the academic specialty of International Relations (IR). As historian of IR Brian Schmidt has shown,¹⁷⁶ individuals considered experts in international relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s were not only located in universities, but in think tanks, the government, philanthropic foundations like the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations, and, through organizations like the CFR, in business too.

IR’s “in-between-ness” or interstitiality, I would argue, underpinned both the strong lure of theory and the difficulties in agreeing on what a suitable theory would look like. To highlight IR’s interstitiality in the postwar years is not simply another way of saying that IR had not yet undergone disciplinary specialization. IR had indeed not undergone disciplinary specialization, but the point goes further. Both the CFR study group and the Rockefeller Foundation conferences featured participants that today we would not consider IR specialists at all, but policy makers and elites with an investment in foreign affairs. Yet at the time they were thought suitable participants not merely to speak about the *practice* of foreign policy, but the *theory* of international relations.¹⁷⁷

As historians of IR have shown, the specific importance imparted to theory within that context lay with theory’s capacity to provide a core to the nascent field. As Schmidt suggests,¹⁷⁸ there was a feeling of urgency among many IR specialists in the early 1950s to define the subject of international politics by developing a distinct theory, since the “very act of defining international

relations, both as a distinct realm of political activity and as a separate and autonomous field of study, is inherently theoretical.” Thompson himself noted elsewhere that “It is frequently said that one test of the independent character of a discipline or field of study is the presence in the field of theories contending for recognition by those engaged in thinking and writing.”¹⁷⁹ Theorizing IR and defining international relations as a field thus went hand in hand.

While there was much interest in Lipsky’s nominalist “theory of theories,” defining international relations as—in Schmidt’s words—a “distinct realm of political activity and as a separate and autonomous field of study” was precisely what a nominalist approach *did not do*. Hans Morgenthau’s emphasis on the national interest, and the reality of power politics as the proper domain of IR, provided such a theory. Lipsky’s nominalist approach was weak by comparison. Unlike Morgenthau’s realism, it neither defined the nature of international politics “as a distinct sphere of political activity,” nor did it represent a strong and coherent position on the role of the scholar of IR in relation to their subject matter around which the group’s diverse membership could converge. The power of a realist approach was later amplified by the more structural realist theory of Kenneth Waltz, which further delimited the domain of IR and its object of study.¹⁸⁰

From this perspective, the study group represents an early episode in what Stanley Hoffmann would a few years later term IR’s “long road to theory,” the ongoing search among scholars of international relations for a theoretical core to their field.¹⁸¹ As Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach and others have detailed, an almost obsessive quest for theory is in many ways the defining feature of IR’s development during the Cold War and after.¹⁸² Paradoxically, therefore, it might be suggested that IR’s very *proximity* to the state in the early Cold War helped insulate it from the more overt politicization scholars have detailed of other cognate social science fields. Through theoretical reflection, IR scholars sought to identify a unique contribution IR could make to the conduct of American foreign relations.

The Study Group Participants: A Biographical Analysis

Thus far I have said much about the group’s formation and the content and context of its discussions. But who were the participants? Why were they chosen as authorities on theory and international relations theory more specifically? In the remainder of this introduction, therefore, I inquire into the turn

to theory not by theory, but by the theorists—actual or potential—brought together in New York in 1953–54.

George Arthur Lipsky (1912–1972)

Born in 1912 in Seattle, George Lipsky studied at the University of Washington and the University of California–Berkeley before serving in the army (1942–46).¹⁸³ After a stint as an instructor at West Point, he returned to Berkeley as an assistant professor in political science. In 1950, he published a study of the political thought of President John Quincy Adams,¹⁸⁴ which appears to have been broadly well-received.¹⁸⁵ Lipsky left Berkeley shortly before beginning the CFR fellowship in the fall of 1953.

Lipsky was a good match for a Carnegie Fellowship, which again was interested in funding scholars with an interest in legalistic analyses of international politics. He had edited a volume just before joining the CFR on the work of legal theorist Hans Kelsen.¹⁸⁶ In his introduction, Lipsky notes that Kelsen's project was to eliminate the problem of natural law from the science of law. Natural law, for Kelsen, is a metaphysics of law, in which description and evaluation are deeply and problematically intertwined. For Kelsen, natural law had no place in a dispassionate legal science. The pure theory of law Kelsen was developing thus excluded morality and was based instead on positive law as characterized by the hierarchy of legal norms acting in society. Given the prominence of international legal scholarship among scholars of world politics in the 1940s, and Morgenthau's own engagements,¹⁸⁷ Lipsky's shift from interest in international law to the theory of international politics is a recognizable transition.

Lipsky's interest in developing a theory of international relations waned after the study group, however. He published a version of the working paper on the international relations theory of Harold Lasswell in the *Journal of Politics* in 1955, but none of the other working papers, or a promised book manuscript, saw the light of day. Lipsky's interests shifted to East Africa and the Middle East, and he published surveys of the economy and culture of Saudi Arabia¹⁸⁸ and Ethiopia. After leaving the CFR, he spent a year as a visiting instructor at Yale before beginning a long and successful career at Wabash College in Indiana, where an undergraduate prize in political science still bears his name. Lipsky remained at Wabash until his death in 1972.¹⁸⁹

Robert Morrison MacIver (1882–1970)

Sociologist Robert MacIver's appointment as chairman is surprising from the present-day vantage point, yet in addition to the social connections he enjoyed on account of his location in New York, MacIver's work on politics and political theory qualified him for the position.¹⁹⁰

Born in 1882 in Stornoway, Scotland, and educated at the universities of Glasgow and Oxford, MacIver emigrated in 1915, becoming a political scientist at the University of Toronto. Moving to Barnard College in 1927, MacIver joined Columbia in 1929, where he stayed until 1950, holding the presidency of the American Sociological Association in 1940.

There is no record of MacIver and Lipsky's connections before the study group, but the two shared a broadly humanist approach that may have further supported the choice of MacIver. In *The Web of Government* (1948), MacIver described politics as more of an art than a science and explored the myths and techniques through which man "has outdistanced all other animals and made himself lord of creation."¹⁹¹ By *techniques*, MacIver means "the devices and skills of every kind that enable men to dispose of things—and of persons—more to their liking."¹⁹² By *myths*, he meant "the value-impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, that they live by or live for. Every society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating thought-forms that determines and sustains all activities."¹⁹³ *The Web of Government* thus focused in a proto-social constructionist way on the emergence of the state, the bases of authority in law and social forms, and the changing structure of governmental organization over time.

As his ASA obituary notes, MacIver distrusted the move toward academic specialization and "sought to define an integrated social science that could understand people in their economic, political, and social aspects simultaneously." Drawing more on classical philosophers (Plato, Aristotle) and theoretically inclined sociologists like Émile Durkheim, MacIver "focused instead on human agency, methodological diversity, and ethical issues."¹⁹⁴ MacIver had attempted to develop at Columbia a premier generalist sociology department based on the name recognition of members Robert Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld. As Elzbieta Halas shows, in this endeavor MacIver had much success, despite the prominence of Chicago and subsequently Berkeley overshadowing MacIver's contributions to American sociology.¹⁹⁵ The reason, most likely, is the increasing predominance of the strongly quantitative methods associated with Lazarsfeld, which occurred to MacIver's regret.¹⁹⁶ MacIver "pitted his polemical strength against the use of natural science methods in sociology, espe-

cially of quantification and measurement,” but in many ways he was swimming against the tide within the discipline and beyond.

Dorothy Fosdick (1913–1997)

Educated at Smith College and Columbia, Dorothy Fosdick joined the State Department in 1942 after teaching sociology and politics at Smith.¹⁹⁷ Fosdick served on the US delegations to the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences and for the preparatory committees for first three UN General Assemblies. In 1948, she was appointed to the new Policy Planning Staff,¹⁹⁸ created by Marshall in spring 1947 under the direction of George Kennan. Fosdick left government in 1953 following the Republican victory and became a writer for the *New York Times* and a consultant with NBC.

Fosdick was the daughter of religious leader and pacifist Reverend Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick and the niece of Raymond Fosdick, the prominent international lawyer and supporter of the League of Nations. But she came to hold more tough-minded foreign policy views than either. Fosdick advised Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1952, but in 1954 she met Washington Democratic senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, becoming his principal foreign policy advisor until 1983. Fosdick and Jackson “were both cold war liberals who were committed to government support for social causes at home and a strong, intrusive government abroad.”¹⁹⁹ Jackson’s position on the Senate Armed Services Committee gave him and by extension Fosdick significant influence. Fosdick worked principally in the background as a speech writer and close confidante of Jackson and as leader to a group of later prominent individuals who began their careers on Jackson’s staff, including Richard Perle (assistant secretary of defense, 1981–87) and Elliott Abrams (assistant secretary of state of for inter-American affairs, 1985–89, and advisor on human rights to George W. Bush from 2001).

Fosdick gave expression to her foreign policy views in the 1955 book *Common Sense and World Affairs*, where she argued for the application of principles common in American society, like “Whoever says he has the solution to our problems speaks too soon” and “Fashioning your methods in light of your end is prudence.”²⁰⁰ Fosdick’s emphasis on prudence, together with the role of power, raises obvious comparisons with both Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr (who had been a family friend and mentor she had met while growing up in faculty housing of the Union Theological Seminary, where Niebuhr taught). Fosdick was in agreement with Niebuhr’s belief that, as her *New York*

Times obituary put it, “evil is a palpable world force that must be resisted and overcome,” which “became the geopolitical creed of a generation of cold war theorists.”

Fosdick’s emphasis on preparing the ordinary citizen for participation in foreign policy deliberation, however, is a telling departure from Morgenthau. The reason is that Fosdick displayed a commitment to liberalism and democracy that was distinct from Morgenthau, both intellectually and perhaps practically. Like Lipsky and MacIver,²⁰¹ her writings indicated a concern for the maintenance of liberty and democracy at home.²⁰² In her 1939 book, *What Is Liberty?*, Fosdick interrogated the various uses of the term “liberty” in contemporary political discourse. Arguing that the word afforded no fixed definition yet rested at the base of the individual’s desire for control over his or her self-expression and its means, she asserted the need to think separately of the ways of maximizing liberties in the different economic, cultural, and political spheres.²⁰³

The question of the nature of liberty was not merely intellectual, however, and placing Fosdick into the context of liberal politics in the 1940s and 1950s, rather than a seemingly timeless debate within IR between “realists” and “liberals,” is telling. Liberalism was still recovering from the deep divisions that had emerged during the late 1940s, when liberals had split on the question of the possibility of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union, leading liberal favorite and former vice president Henry Wallace to split from the Democrats and run as a Progressive Party candidate in 1948.²⁰⁴ The significance of her father was that his Riverside Church was backed by the Rockefeller Foundation and was, according to Fosdick’s obituary, a “bastion of New York liberalism.” Niebuhr was prominent in the anticommunist wing of liberalism, strongly tied to New York City (which Morgenthau was apart from in Chicago), and was a founding member of the anti-Soviet Americans for Democratic Action (ADA),²⁰⁵ which tried to define the nature of liberalism and whose members came to have significant influence over the Kennedy administration.

Hajo Holborn (1902–1969)

One of the most vocal members on the question of the theoretical basis of international relations was Yale historian Hajo Holborn.²⁰⁶ Born in Berlin in 1902, Holborn was a student of Friedrich Meineke at the University of Berlin, receiving his doctorate in 1924 (at the age of only twenty-two). After spending time in Heidelberg, he returned to Berlin to the Carnegie-funded

Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, where fellow study group member Arnold Wolfers was also employed.²⁰⁷ Holborn, it should be stressed, was chair in international relations at the Hochschule. He was dismissed in 1933 by the Nazis but had already left for the UK, reaching the United States in 1934. Holborn spent six years at Tufts University (1936–42) before joining Yale at the end of the conflict. A historian of Germany, Holborn was the president of the American Historical Association in 1967.

Holborn had written his habilitation on the history of the Reformation period, but after joining the Hochschule he returned to modern diplomatic history and “became attracted to the methods of the study of international relations which had been developed in the Anglo-Saxon countries.”²⁰⁸ *The Political Collapse of Europe*²⁰⁹ is the clearest example, a book that for historians Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern became the “standard treatise on the decline of the Great Powers in Europe, whose early dominance [Leopold Von] Ranke had authoritatively depicted.”²¹⁰ More important for the study group perhaps is that a version of the book appeared in the journal *World Politics*,²¹¹ where Holborn also published on the subject of American foreign policy and European integration while the study group was ongoing.²¹²

Holborn’s academic credentials were then more than adequate for inclusion in the CFR study group. But so too were his connections with the world of policy making. During the war Holborn worked for the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services (1942–46), where he counseled a softer line than the tough approach that became the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization of Germany.²¹³ Holborn later consulted for assistant secretary of state John Hilldring on US policies toward occupied Germany and Japan.²¹⁴ As a German, Holborn was a perfect go-between for the US government with German leaders.²¹⁵

William W. Kaufmann (1918–2008)

The importance of resisting equating name recognition within IR as it developed later with prominence in the field of international relations in the early 1950s is nowhere more telling than with William Kaufmann. An advisor to secretaries of defense between the 1960s and 1970s, during the late 1940s Kaufmann was one of the RAND Corporation nuclear strategists later dubbed the “Wizards of Armageddon,” alongside others such as Herman Kahn and Albert Wohlstetter.²¹⁶

Born in New York in 1918, Kaufmann attended the same Connecticut

school as John F. Kennedy, before going to Yale to study international relations.²¹⁷ Kaufmann joined the faculty of the Yale Institute for International Studies (YIIS), which uprooted for Princeton in 1951. According to historian Fred Kaplan, YIIS—which also housed study group member Arnold Wolfers, as well as other early IR theorists William T. R. Fox, Frederick Dunn, and sociologist Nicholas Spykman—was then a “prime mover” in thinking about the implications of nuclear power for world politics.²¹⁸ Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and several other corporations like J. P. Morgan and Union Carbide,²¹⁹ YIIS provided a link between the East Coast schools and the University of Chicago, where in addition to Morgenthau both Bernard Brodie and Quincy Wright were spearheading a more realistic approach to the study of international relations. The latter was engaged in a sixteen-year study on the causes of war, a topic most students of international affairs had ignored during the 1930s.²²⁰

Kaufmann’s influence over US nuclear strategy came later, during the early 1960s, when he was hired as one of new secretary of defense Robert McNamara’s “whizz kids.”²²¹ His hiring was based, at least in part, on the challenge he and others offered during the late 1950s to the government’s strategy of “massive retaliation,” which many were beginning to view as impractical and morally indefensible. Kaufmann cautioned a more flexible response and the building up of conventional weapons.²²² But Kaufmann is interesting for us in the way he embodies some crucial links in the interstitial field of international relations in the early 1950s. YIIS was thus connected to Princeton, where Professors Edward Mead Earle and Klaus Knorr worked, and to the State Department and the Pentagon. Brodie, for example, had been a friend of Chicago economist Jacob Viner, who was both influential as a theorist and advisor on trade policy and a believer in the potentially peaceful effects of the atomic bomb.

Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903–2002)

The case of Robert Strausz-Hupé further confirms the disjuncture between later notoriety within IR and influence in the interstitial field of international relations from the 1940s onwards. If known at all today, the University of Pennsylvania political scientist is recognized as the author of *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*,²²³ which was representative of a resurgence of interest in geopolitical thinking in US international studies, best exemplified by Yale IR scholar Nicholas Spykman’s *America’s Strategy and World Politics*.²²⁴

But Strausz-Hupé was also the author of a number of works on US foreign policy that put him at the forefront of both the national debate and the emerging political science writing on international politics in the postwar years. These included the 1941 book *Axis America: Hitler Plans Our Future, The Balance of Tomorrow: Power and Foreign Policy in the United States* (1945), and *The Zone of Indifference* (1952).²²⁵

Strausz-Hupé was born in Vienna and moved to America in 1923, joining the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania in 1940, supposedly after piquing the university's interest during a campus lecture on "the coming war."²²⁶ His position within the academic study of IR was solidified with the publication, with Georgetown's Stefan T. Possony, of the textbook *International Relations in the Age of the Conflict between Democracy and Dictatorship* (1950), which was popular enough to run to a second edition in 1954.²²⁷

Evidence of Strausz-Hupé's broader influence, however, can be gleaned from the trajectory his career took after the CFR study group ended in 1954 and beyond disciplinary political science. The following year, Strausz-Hupé founded the Foreign Policy Research Institute, which later began publishing the public engagement journal *Orbis*, which remains influential today. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Strausz-Hupé also had a long stint in government, including ambassadorships in Sri Lanka, Belgium, Sweden, to NATO, and finally Turkey. This suggests significant influence within the field of International Relations in the first decades after 1945.

Kenneth W. Thompson (1921–2013)

Alongside Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson is the protagonist in Nicolas Guilhot's account of the birth of IR theory at the Rockefeller conference. Born in Des Moines, Iowa, in 1921, Thompson served in the army between 1942 and 1946 before studying at the University of Chicago (upon the suggestion of Quincy Wright), where he received his PhD in 1950.²²⁸ Thompson spent the first half of career (1953–74) at the Rockefeller Foundation before taking up a professorship at the University of Virginia, which he held until 2006 and where he also directed the Miller Center of Public Affairs.

At Chicago, Thompson came under the influence of both Wright and Morgenthau, whom he considered "the pivotal and dominant figures" of "the Chicago School of International Thought."²²⁹ Morgenthau called Thompson "his best student"²³⁰ and coauthored with him a selection of readings in IR that appeared shortly after Thompson received his PhD.²³¹ The analysis pre-

sented in Thompson's most well-known work *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy* (1960) certainly bears out Morgenthau's praise.²³²

Once again, however, Thompson's theoretical contributions inform us less about the field of international relations (both in the early 1950s and since) than does his biography: the trajectory that indicates how he was shaped by and in turn shaped the field. Thompson later argued that his signature interest in international relations was the interplay between theory and practice, which he in many ways embodied at institutions like the Rockefeller Foundation and Miller Center.²³³ As he noted, "because of my allegiance to *both* theory and practice, I have never been entirely at home in either world," feeling the scorn of academics when a practitioner, and vice versa. Along with a fear of professionalization, this feeling led to consistent concern with finding ways to "close the gap" between the two worlds.²³⁴ As only one example, in 1959 he published a book with Nitze for the Foreign Policy Association (FPA)'s "Headline Series" titled *Great Decisions, 1960—U.S. Foreign Policy—Ideals and Realities*.²³⁵ Likely a product of interactions stimulated first by the Rockefeller conference, the book represents yet another institutional link between theory, philanthropy, and a hybrid institution like the FPA that conducts research and outreach while trying to influence policy.

Arnold Wolfers (1892–1968)

In the vast number of works re-examining the work of the early IR theory over the past two decades or so, it is surprising that Yale's Arnold Wolfers has been largely passed over.²³⁶ Born in St. Galen, Switzerland, and trained as a jurist, Wolfers spent 1924 to 1933 (when he left Germany) at the Hochschule für Politik.²³⁷ While there, Wolfers developed a center of international studies using, as noted above, both Rockefeller and Carnegie money, and he was joined for a time by Hajo Holborn. In the United States, Wolfers joined the faculty at Yale, where he stayed until 1957.

Wolfers produced a number of important works, many collected in his 1962 *Discord and Collaboration*. He is most commonly known among contemporary scholars for the distinction he drew between "possession goals" and "milieu goals" in national foreign policies.²³⁸ Possession goals are things a nation wants to keep intact, like territory or membership of an international organization, and which the state must compete to achieve.²³⁹ Milieu goals are different, concerning the shaping of a state's foreign policy environment,

like promoting international law.²⁴⁰ Without milieu goals, Wolfers argues, international affairs would be closer to the Hobbesian world and peace would be impossible.

Wolfers has been termed a “reluctant realist.”²⁴¹ Yet while the breadth and subtlety on display in his writings in trying to assess the complexities of foreign policy justify such a label, when compared to more hard-nosed writings in early realism, the term does little to capture his influence and thus his social capital within the emerging field of international relations after the war. Wolfers was active beyond the academy, including being a member of the CFR and advising the government.

During the war, for example, Wolfers consulted with the Office of Strategic Services from 1943–45, acting as a key node in the network that saw Yale, and the Institute for International Studies, provide an outsized proportion of individuals to positions at the State Department, the OSS, and other government agencies.²⁴² As Master of Pierson College, one of the residential colleges at Yale that represented the center of campus life, Wolfers would be the designated host when important visitors came to Yale, which they frequently did. In particular, the YIIS strengthened links between the university and the State Department.²⁴³ As historian Robin Winks notes, Wolfers also stood at the center of a group of scholars referred to as “the State Department,” which met regularly to discuss world affairs and which included Corbett, Kirk, Dunn, Spykman, and Yale economist Richard Bissell, who would later direct the Economic Cooperation Administration, the organization founded to run the Marshall Plan.²⁴⁴

After the war less clandestine matters intervened as Wolfers founded the journal *World Politics* in 1948. At the time, as was discussed at length at the Rockefeller conference, there were a limited number of possible outlets for theoretical work on international studies. *International Organization* (also founded in 1948) offered primarily overviews of the activities of international organizations, which left political science journals (like the *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, and the *Review of Politics*) as the main recognized outlets. *World Politics* was thus a crucial venue legitimizing theoretical work in the nascent field of IR, as noted by Thompson at the Rockefeller conference.²⁴⁵ The editorial and advisory board of *World Politics* thus identifies many of the main actors in the field.²⁴⁶ The managing editor was William T. R. Fox, with Bernard Brodie, Frederick Dunn, and Percy Corbett. The board consisted of, among others, scholars Edward Mead Earle, Grayson Kirk, Klaus Knorr, Harold Lasswell, Wolfers, Derwent Whittlesey, and Quincy Wright. Perhaps more interestingly, it also included governmental insiders Viner and

Leo Pasvolsky, a state department economist active in postwar planning and in the design of the United Nations, who was head of international studies at Brookings between 1946 and 1952.²⁴⁷

In addition to the invited study group members, a number of staff members of the CFR for 1953–54 joined in the discussions. While many attended infrequently, Gerhart Niemeyer, Grant S. McClellan, and Charles M. Lichenstein attended often and made numerous interventions in the debate, while John Blumgart was assigned the important role of rapporteur.

Gerhart Niemeyer (1907–1997)

Of the CFR staff who attended the meetings while not being formally members of the study group, the most influential at the meetings was Gerhart Niemeyer, whose biography is an illuminating snapshot into the context of the study group. Born in Essen, Germany, Niemeyer studied at Cambridge, Munich, and Kiel, where he received his doctorate in jurisprudence in 1932 under the supervision of the legal theorist Hermann Heller.²⁴⁸ Heller was the author of the book *Staatslehre* and was engaged in a set of debates with Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen (who was also Hans Morgenthau's advisor) over the causes of the weakness of Weimar democracy. Niemeyer followed Heller to Madrid as he fled the Nazis before Niemeyer emigrated to America in 1937. Niemeyer held positions at Princeton and Oglethorpe University in Atlanta before spending three years at the State Department Office of United Nations Affairs. At the time of the CFR study group, Niemeyer was working as a research analyst at the CFR (1953–55). Niemeyer spent most of his subsequent career as a conservative political theorist at the University of Notre Dame (1955–76) before leaving to become a priest in the Episcopal Church.²⁴⁹

In his career before the CFR study group, Niemeyer wrote principally on international organization,²⁵⁰ politics, and law. In “World Order and the Great Powers” (1944), he extolled the responsibilities of the great powers after the war, by which he meant Britain, Russia, and the United States.²⁵¹ Striking a notably realist tone, he argued, “It is the absence of an adequate moral basis for international ‘order’ founded in superior power that gives aggression a plausible cause”²⁵² and is thus deemed legitimate to its bearer. Not intending to minimize the guilt of those who initiated war, it was nonetheless important to recognize that the war, “like past aggressions, has sprung from conceptions of international politics to which all nations, through their own practices, have at one time or another made a contribution.”²⁵³ The only way to end

aggression then is to end power politics, which is unlikely since “it is commonly assumed that power politics is the very essence of international relations.”²⁵⁴ Like Morgenthau, Niemeyer saw prudent statesmanship on the part of the leaders of the great powers, not international organization, as the basis of peace: “The prevention of war, like the prevention of revolution within the state, does not depend on legal procedures, but on the art of adjustment.”²⁵⁵

Niemeyer’s most substantive contribution prior to 1953–54, however, was his 1941 book *Law without Force*, where he elaborated on his skepticism of law and organization as the basis of international peace.²⁵⁶ Niemeyer dedicated the book to Heller, who had insisted that political theory must be understood as a cultural science grounded in reality, which relies therefore not on “abstract concepts but individual characteristics of political standards and forms.”²⁵⁷ Following this line of thought, Niemeyer repudiated the natural law tradition of Hugo Grotius, which was prominent in international legal theory and practice and which grounded international law in person, property, injury, and contract. Niemeyer saw this metaphysic as an unsuitable basis for opposing the forces against peace and security in the mid-twentieth century, and he sought a more realistic basis for international law based on the empirical analysis of political practice.²⁵⁸

Via Heller, then, Niemeyer was led to the thesis that “political reality has become unlawful, because the existing system of international law has become unreal.”²⁵⁹ Adopting a historical perspective, he argued that the decline of international law was not caused by its frequent violation in modern times, but because it was no longer backed by either a common moral code underpinned by a shared religion, as originally, or an independent bourgeois political society. Rather, international law is meant to rein in states at the same time the state is viewed as the ultimate power over human association. International law for Niemeyer, by contrast, is not a property of states but an artifact of relations between them. Accepting this allows him to see that international reality, as a cultural thing, has inherent law-like features, of which the pre-eminent role he later gave to the great powers in the postwar world is a good example. As a practical and not merely descriptive theory, Niemeyer’s approach sought to show that making international life more peaceful does not require making more formal law through additional institutions (as this will only exacerbate the problems), but by making international relations, whether conducted through international institutions or not, more *functional*, i.e., to correspond better to how international reality actually works.

John D. Blumgart, Grant S. McClellan, Charles M. Lichenstein,
and Paul Zinner

Council staff members Blumgart, McClellan, Lichenstein, and Zinner were each frequent attendees. McClellan and Lichenstein in particular were not overawed by the higher status afforded the permanent members of the group and offered numerous interjections into the debates. But each is less easily traced through prosopographic research, despite going on to prominent careers. Piecing together what information has been available thus indicates the types of people brought together by the clarion call of theory in 1953.

McClellan appears to have been working as a research analyst at the CFR at the time of the study group.²⁶⁰ In 1955 he contributed to the CFR volume, lead authored by Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1953*.²⁶¹ His whereabouts after leaving the CFR in the mid-to-late 1950s can only be traced through the short biographical statements at the beginning of a number of books (on topics ranging from “The Two Germanies” to civil rights and road safety) he wrote for the series the “Reference Shelf,” published by H. W. Wilson.²⁶² From these we can discern that McClellan went on first to a position as a staff member with the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) before moving by 1964 an associate editorship of *Current Magazine*.²⁶³

McClellan’s move to the Foreign Policy Association is interesting in that it highlights the interconnections in the interstitial field of international relations, here between two hybrid organizations, the FPA and the CFR, and also between them and the media field. Like the Council on Foreign Relations itself, the Foreign Policy Association was born of the First World War, founded in New York 1918 as the League of Free Nations Association, before changing its name in 1923. Its focus was, and remains, on stimulating discussion of international affairs among elites and the public, through public lectures and locally chaptered meetings. Not to be confused with *Foreign Policy* magazine (founded in 1970), the FPA publishes *Great Decisions* to this end, which also appears on public television in the United States.

Charles Lichenstein’s (1926–2002) biography highlights a different trajectory one could take after a position at the CFR early in one’s career.²⁶⁴ Born in Albany in 1926, Lichenstein studied at Yale. After the CFR, he worked for Richard Nixon’s 1960 presidential campaign and four years later for Barry Goldwater before a short stint at the Republican National Committee. Entering government, he served in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations. Lichenstein later went on to work at the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Lichenstein is most well-known for an incident on 19 September 1983

while serving as America's second-highest-ranking envoy to the United Nations, in which he told a UN committee the United States would wave a "fond farewell" if the members decided to move the UN elsewhere. The context was a New York and New Jersey ban on Soviet aircraft landings, which followed the Russian downing of a Korean airliner on 1 September 1983 that killed 269 people. Lichenstein's ire was directed at a UN committee set up to assess relations between the UN and United States, to which he said, "The members of the U.S. mission to the UN will be down at dockside waving you a fond farewell as you sail off into the sunset." Lichenstein was publicly backed by Reagan himself when controversy arose.²⁶⁵

John Blumgart was charged with recording the study group's proceedings. His early years are obscure, but he was educated at Oberlin College and Columbia. Blumgart spent the bulk of his career working for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided the rationale for an oral history interview conducted in 1995 containing information about his pre- and post-CFR trajectory.²⁶⁶

At Columbia Blumgart worked on international relations at the School of International Affairs, then headed by Grayson Kirk. Kirk was linked to the CFR as the author of a CFR-sponsored survey of teaching and research in international relations in US colleges and universities.²⁶⁷ Indeed, as CFR staff member William Diebold noted in his letter inviting MacIver to chair the 1953–54 study group, the group was expressly meant as a follow-up to Kirk's evaluation of the state of the field.²⁶⁸ Kirk may well then have been influential in gaining Blumgart access to the CFR.

But Blumgart was also linked to other Council members through his job at the American Committee on United Europe, the organization set up in 1948 to support European integration, which included funding European grassroots federalist movements (leading the British *Telegraph* recently to label the European Union as "always a CIA project."²⁶⁹) Founded by former OSS director William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan (1883–1959),²⁷⁰ the ACUE's board also featured Allen Dulles, Lucius Clay, Robert Patterson, Walter Bedell Smith, and one George S. Franklin Jr., also of the CFR and later of the Trilateral Commission. Franklin attended the first study group meeting on E. H. Carr but did not attend any of the subsequent meetings.²⁷¹

The final member of the study group deserving of biographical analysis is Paul Zinner. Zinner spent most of his subsequent career at the University of California–Davis as an expert in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.²⁷² Born in then-Czechoslovakia, Zinner moved to New York in 1940 before joining the US Army, being posted to the Office of Strategic Studies. He then

spent six years as an analyst with the State Department. In California, Zinner was a frequent consultant to government and a media commentator, working particularly on issues of nuclear power and the relationship between the University of California and the government concerning the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Plan of the Book

The remainder of the volume faithfully reproduces the group's records. Each chapter details one of the group's meetings, beginning with Lipsky's discussion of the approach under scrutiny during that session and followed by the digest of the meeting. The study group covered the following subjects: (1) the theory of E. H. Carr as an exemplar of what Lipsky termed the "historical approach" to international relations; (2) the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau and the issue of the national interest; (3) the theory of Harold D. Lasswell; (4) Marxist theories of imperialism; (5) political geography and geopolitics; (6) Wilsonian idealism; and finally (7) a general discussion of the nature of theory in the study of international relations.


I have adopted a light touch in editing the documents, standardizing formatting slightly for aesthetic reasons, and correcting the occasional typographical error. I have provided a small amount of extra information to make reading the discussions more straightforward where helpful, and I am sure it is correct. Beyond that, the materials are as they appear in the archives.

Biographies



George A. Lipksy

George A. Lipksy (1912–1972), former Berkeley political scientist, was the main figure at the study group. Lipksy’s commitment to philosophical nominalism significantly shaped the discussions, preventing any one approach from monopolizing the subject matter of “international relations.”



Robert M. MacIver

Robert Morrison MacIver (1882–1970), Columbia sociologist, chaired the CFR study group. Now largely forgotten, even within sociology, in the 1940s and 1950s MacIver was one of the foremost social scientists and public intellectuals in the United States, promoting a humanist approach in the method wars of the period.



Dorothy Fosdick

Dorothy Fosdick (1913–1997). Former member of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, Fosdick’s membership of the group was so sought after the Council bent its rules on “lady members.”



Hajo Holborn

Hajo Holborn (1902–1969) was a prominent scholar of international history and professor at Yale University. Holborn spent the interwar years in Berlin at the Carnegie-funded *Deutsche Hochschule für Politik*, with fellow group-member Arnold Wolfers, and later consulted for the US government on policy toward occupied Germany.



William Kaufmann

William Kaufmann (1918–2008) was another Yale affiliate. A scholar of international relations at the Yale Institute for International Studies, Kaufmann specialized in military strategy, following the institute to Princeton in 1951 before later joining the RAND Corporation as a nuclear strategist.




Robert Strausz-Hupé

Robert Strausz-Hupé (1903–2002). A professor of political science at the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, Robert Strausz-Hupé was a prominent proponent of geopolitics to the problem of American strategy, offering a stark warning of Germany's plans for the United States in *Axis America: Hitler Plans Our Future* (1941).



Kenneth W. Thompson

Kenneth W. Thompson (1921–2013) was an accomplished theorist, administrator, and institution-builder. Thompson played a key role alongside Hans Morgenthau in the development of realist theory, utilizing to good effect his administrative position in the early 1950s at the powerful Rockefeller Foundation.



Arnold Wolfers

Arnold Wolfers (1892–1968) of Yale University is today the most recognizable theorist who attended the CFR study group meetings.



Gerhart Niemeyer

Gerhart Niemeyer (1907–1997) was in 1953–54 a staff member at the Council on Foreign Relations. Niemeyer later went on to a long and distinguished career as a political theorist at the University of Notre Dame.



Paul Zinner

Paul Zinner (1922–2012) was a staff member at the CFR during 1953–54, and would spend most of his subsequent career at the University of California–Davis, a noted expert in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.



Charles Lichenstein

Charles Lichenstein (1926–2002) was a staff member at the CFR during 1953–54 and graduate of Yale University. Lichenstein later served in the presidential administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Ronald Reagan.

First Meeting: E. H. Carr and the Historical Approach, December 3, 1953

The first meeting of the Study Group on the theory of international relations was held at 5:45 PM on Thursday, December 3, 1953, at the Harold Pratt House. The subject was the theory of E. H. Carr. Present were: Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; Byron Dexter; William Diebold Jr.; George S. Franklin Jr.; William Henderson; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Grant S. McClellan; Isidor I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; R. Gordon Wasson; Arnold Wolfers.

Working Paper No. 1

Prepared by George Lipsky

Among the most important writers contributing to the theory of international relations today is the Englishman E. H. Carr. One measure of his importance is a recent comment by C. Hartley Grattan in *Harper's* to the effect that Carr is the most pernicious writer in England today. Presumably that means in his field. I do not deny my own impression that Carr's conclusions are often destructive, and, if taken seriously, work toward an end contrary to my values. His theory of theories and his evaluations imply a philosophical system that I in considerable measure reject. On the other hand, much credit must be given to him for the sights he has set upon important objectives in the field of international relations. Whether or not he has been successful in achieving his goal, he has stated forcefully the importance of hard, ruthless analysis, dispassionate and moved to a minimum degree by desire. His own works do not

carry this project through to a conclusion. His main concern, I judge, is with fitting into the dynamic world of politics. This political ambition is often, if not always, incompatible with the achievement of a theoretical system, consistent and complete.

This paper is a précis of a much longer essay evaluating Carr. The latter is thoroughly documented and makes reference to the relevant literature, especially the writings of Carr. Such works as *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*, *Conditions of Peace*, etc., are more important among Carr's works for our purposes than his *The Bolshevik Revolution*. The emphasis has been upon those works in which the theoretical development is most explicit.

Carr, his professions to the contrary notwithstanding, I would assess as a "radical" realist. The term "radical" is appropriate here to describe a realist for whom the real world is producing a change and a future quite different from what has been known before. Carr is a prophet of the revolution of our times. At the very least, he calls for conformity with these revolutionary trends. At the most, he calls, particularly among the young, for a participation in the revolution to take full advantage of its results. It is important to emphasize the "radical" quality of Carr's realism since in his own analysis the realist position is conservative, even sterile. The realist is the cynical determinist, willing and able to look at history without flinching, accepting its evils and its good with the same emotion. But I believe there is another kind of realist for whom the unfolding of history is producing a better world, institutions that are more in keeping with the pattern of historical trends. This kind of realist is much more ambitious than the realist bureaucrat, to whom Carr refers at length, who will employ exclusively the empirical method, reacting to each situation in an ad hoc manner and fitting it into the stream of events in an almost intuitive fashion. All these facets of the realist position may be so accounted because, as a matter of degree, they profess and, in some measure, realize a determination to view history as it is, especially assigning importance to power relationships, emphasizing practice as the source of theory and politics as the source of ethics. Whether they succeed in terms of theory of knowledge or practical politics is another matter. At this point their professions and intentions are the test of their position.

Theory of Knowledge

One product of such speculation and analysis as Carr holds important must, naturally, be a theory of theories. That is, a theory or explanation of how

the data of international relations should be viewed. In intellectual history he asserts that in the initial phases of a science the speculation is moved mainly by desire. The general principles are established and facts and events are presumed to be in conformity with them. As time passes the impulse grows stronger to view the world of reality first, to understand it and to derive from it conclusions concerning the correct actions that should be taken with respect to the situations history is producing. Carr accepts that this progression is normal and good. Those who look at reality and correctly see its development, the realists, place proper emphasis on the data, the facts of life. The concept of determinism appears; purpose comes to play a lesser role, except as one of the predetermined factors. The realist abandons the doctrine of free will.

There may be a type of realist who recognizes or emphasizes the limitations on human capacity to know. Carr may do so, but there is no place in his writings where he deals with this problem. He consistently refers to reality as if it may be known simply through observation, as if it may be known merely through the process of perception. Much that is occurring in history is self-evident to Carr, the realist. He does not doubt that there is a revolution of our times, which the young at least, should recognize. He does not doubt that we are moving into an era of planning on a statewide, if not global, scale. He does not doubt that history is inevitably modifying the application of the principle of national self-determination. Change is the one constant condition. What it is producing can be seen and one's conclusions about the results do not have to be sifted through the sands of an informing theory. The theory is produced after the event to explain it in terms of one's interest. The interest exists apart from the fact, but involves the application of a value to a situation that one finds good or relatively good.

Any theory of a harmony of interest is, for Carr, especially in this revolutionary age, the disguise for the desire of those who profit from a status quo to preserve it. Carr's variety of radical realist, living today, will attack the defenders of the idea of harmony or "artificial" means for realizing collective security. Such realists, being proclaimers of a new day, are most at pains to suggest the means of achieving change. And, I submit, they are inclined to sympathize with those states that are the most vigorous agents of change. The states that have most profited from the conditions that are being overturned are the satiated states or the states least dynamic in their thinking, least capable of devising new tactics, new strategy, or even new means of applying power. Success is told in terms of capacity to achieve power, and to maintain it. Carr has, to the disadvantage of his reputation as a prophet, if not as an analyst, been an apologist for success. The state which at any given time seems to be

the most effective agent of the revolution is provided with, if not his approval in explicit terms, at least apologies.

Thus, I take it, Carr believes it is possible to see and know reality, apart from an informing theory. This reality may be known so explicitly that, if one accounts oneself a realist, long-range prophecy is possible. In any event Carr does not eschew long-range prophecy. I judge him to be a historicist as described by K. R. Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. He assumes that he can know so clearly what is happening and what will happen that it is impossible to escape the conclusion that he wishes it to happen. Since he clearly cannot really know so explicitly the nature of the pattern of historical trends, he is, without acknowledging it, imposing his values upon history. This is the approach of the dangerous fanatic. Carr draws back, at least rhetorically, from the full implication of his thought, as we shall see, but I think there are times when he can reject or attack with all the passion of the fanatic. It is not only the utopian who can be dangerous, but also the thinker who exaggerates the realistic approach. He also can employ the weapons of destruction.

Finding it difficult, perhaps for reasons of his background, to accept the full implication of a realistic determinism, Carr insists upon employing some of the tools and techniques of utopian thinking. To escape the cold and sterile determinism that he at least asserts—although he really imposes his purposes upon reality—he says that, particularly in the social sciences, one should not abandon utopian thinking altogether. Without it, conservatism will pervade one's thinking. There will not be sufficient inspiration to action. It is notable, however, that all the utopian projects to which Carr refers, particularly in *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, are recorded in the annals of failure. They have been either the heady projects of vague, romantic radicals, or the theory of those who have wished to rationalize a policy of preserving a status quo no longer preservable.

Despite the fact, then, that Carr's realist or Carr, the realist, assumes that it is possible to know all that is essential to know and despite the fact that the utopian aspires to that which it is unrealistic to aspire to, Carr calls for the establishment of an equilibrium between realist and utopian thinking. I submit that, in terms of his own definitions, he seeks an equilibrium between contradictions. Why should failure be imported into the record of success? In the manner of John Locke, Carr has failed to inspect his first principles. Locke never saw, or did not plainly see, the conflict between his psychology and his metaphysics. Carr does not see that his theory of knowledge is incompatible with his ethical system. Contending that that realistic observer may know the course of history in explicit terms, he excludes the opportunity for purposes to

function in the historical process. And even more remarkable, he does not see that, in viewing the world about him, he has imposed his values even before he has consciously employed utopian purpose and value. The main difficulty, I think, is the lack of a formula. Carr, the politician publicist, wishes to know and to act and he has rested content with imprecise generalizations concerning how one may rightfully and correctly view the world and act with purpose with respect to it.

A way out of this problem exists, although perhaps not for one working from the premises Carr employs. There is in his thought much of a universalist character which identifies thinking with being. If his premise were nominalist and by virtue of this position he concluded that there is an unbridgeable gap between human knowledge, on the one hand, and final reality, on the other, he could not make such ambitious assertions concerning reality. In fact, concerning ultimate reality he would say or write little at all; his concentration or emphasis would be upon the limitations upon his own capacity to know. In such a view, all knowledge is a structure of data understood and organized in terms of an informing theory and/or philosophy. Every theory or explanation is an incomplete theory or explanation. In order for the significance of data to be judged, or for relevant data to be selected out of the mess that exists, human value preferences (giving direction to purpose) come into play. Every theory, then, is compounded of knowledge—as knowledge is given to the finite mind—and interstices or areas of ignorance. Within these areas of ignorance there is the greatest opportunity for values to function and to influence the selection and evaluation of data, the substance of situations. Wherein and to the degree reality becomes known in some forms and aspects it may and perhaps will happen that the values and purposes of the observer are in accord with that observed reality. If Carr's theory of knowledge denied to him the capacity to know reality so truly, there would not necessarily exist the contradiction between his view of knowledge and his conception of value and purpose. Moreover, he would not be so dogmatic concerning what is a utopian and what is a realistic project.

Power Politics

As I have suggested, Carr places a stress upon power as the central factor in politics. He writes, "Politics are, then, in one sense always power politics." He does not go so far in this emphasis as Hans J. Morgenthau, who leaves little room for the transformation of politics into administration of situations

in which conflicts are resolved. Carr refer to power as the essential element of politics, but would not define politics exclusively in such terms. His stress upon power is sufficiently strong, however, for it to be made a gauge of his realism. He is always at pains to discover, if not the more obvious manipulations of power, at least the “subtler forms of compulsion successfully concealed from the unsophisticated [as the] silent workings of political power.” Since power is the central factor in all systems, it becomes immaterial to emphasize institutional differences between them. Systems differ largely in terms of the means they employ for the exercise of compulsion. In any era, conflicts between systems are not to be judged as conflicts between those that invite obedience by the power of their basic ideas and those that compel obedience. The essence of government everywhere is compulsion. It is naïve, in this view, to stress in the comparison between Western democracy and Sovietism the variations in the method employed to achieve obedience.

The importance of political ideas in the conflicts of international politics is illustrated, however, by Carr’s own expositions of the problem of international politics. He certainly takes the study of international politics beyond the evaluation of power. I would judge Cobben to be wrong in his placing of Carr among those theorists who stress power exclusively and whose works, for this reason, illustrate the decline of political theory. His writings are impregnated with his purposes. They may not be explicitly stated, but they are easily understood and they are there: Anglo-American democracy is a product of a particular economic order, an order understandable and visible in the nineteenth century but anachronistic in the twentieth. This democracy is hyper-individualistic and atomistic and reflects an era in which it was reasonable to think that each person in serving his own interest was serving the general interest. One person’s vote used reasonably would represent his interest, and the mandate produced by vote- or head-counting would be a close approximation of a natural harmony of interests; this view on the level of domestic politics had its manifestations in the level of international politics. Each nation in seeking its own interest would be serving a general world interest. In Carr’s view, these arguments were attempts, mainly unconscious, to disguise conflicts of interest within and among nations. Politics are conflicts resolved eventually by compulsion. Carr would replace the utopian theory underlying Western democracy with a new one. The present era, he submits, is an era when in the conflict between giant power complexes a new political system more suited to the inevitable trends of history is being realized. Carr would call it a synthesis of the old and the new, just as he calls for an equilibrium between utopianism and realism. But I do not think he really subscribes to a new form. What

he finally produces, in terms of arguments most familiar, is a system stressing equality exclusively. Carr, the radical realist, comes to the point of supporting the New Democracy in much the same terms Vyshinsky would use. This fact is not in itself a refutation of Carr's argument, but there is reason for criticizing the argument on other grounds.

Revolution and National Self-Determination

Every new order, for Carr, has its origin in revolution, or perhaps more than one revolution. The revolutionary process is almost certainly violent, but we can take hope in the fact that the destructive phases come to an end and the period of constructiveness begins. This was true of the French Revolution and Carr counsels that it is true of the Russian Revolution. He does not provide any tests of constructiveness, but I judge that the revolutionary process may be termed constructive when it begins to produce an economic and social order of which Carr approves. The New Democracy, brought to full development in the Russian Revolution, had its origins in the French Revolution. The idea given expression is that each person should be allowed to participate in the benefits of the community, in the product of the community, and to have "maximum social and economic opportunity." Equality of economic opportunity or capacity so to participate is the fundamental condition. Unless this condition is met the principle of one head one vote is meaningless. The tensions of international politics today may be described largely as the clash between the old, anachronistic democracy and the new, real democracy. The latter represents an attempt to create a harmony of interests, or should we say unity of interests, and is not merely utopian wishful thinking that a harmony exists. There is no doubt in Carr's mind where the victory will lie. It will surely be with the New Democracy, the new economic order, and, very likely, the biggest battalions.

One product of the French Revolution that cannot survive in the present era is the idea and principle of national self-determination. The French Revolutionary spirit mainly affected those people whose national spirit could appropriately and efficiently be identified with the state. Democracy, nation, and state could easily be associated together both in fact and in theory, a convenient partnership between reality and thinking about reality. But the significant political orders have become more numerous since the early nineteenth century. The peoples of the great globe itself are immersed in the revolution, and they cannot be organized in terms of the principle of nation-

al self-determination. Their interests will not necessarily be served by identifying nation and state in organization. Modern technology has destroyed the viability, from a defense or power standpoint, of the nation-state. Even more, peoples cannot be fully permitted the luxury, even if they desire it, of independent, national, sovereign existence. What must be achieved is an efficient organization of human affairs, so that there is a large product in human satisfactions in which people may share. I surely have no quarrel with the idea that the principle of national self-determination may be applied destructively from the standpoint of my values, but I think it is going to another extreme to provide all the rationale that is required by the new Soviet Empire. To be sure, the argument serves what might be called by some American interests as well. But Carr oversimplifies in classifying the means of compulsion employed by the United States with the means of compulsion employed by the USSR. Compulsion within states is for Carr the central factor and he does not make distinctions in degree or type. The compulsion applied by one people upon another, he concludes, is much the same as the compulsion by any people over others. Carr selects key ideas; but he is not as determined to draw distinctions as he is to make comparisons. Whether these failures derive from his desire to place the Soviet Union in a better light in the current struggle is not clear, but it is obvious that for those who take his argument seriously this would be the result. He is not an ardent defender of the old imperialism but he has provided the arguments in support of a new imperialism. As he writes, "Every modern revolutionary movement of any importance, whether its original ideology was national or international, is sooner or later impelled to turn away from nationalism as a self-sufficient principle of political action."

One means of achieving change, as we have indicated, is revolution. The intense type of conflict known to domestic politics would be revolutionary conflict. In it, of course, the struggle for power is uppermost in importance. Although Carr admits that the goals sought in revolutionary struggle are not frequently the goals achieved, he would not eschew revolutionary struggle for that reason. The historical trend or drift in which he believes so much employs the revolution to achieve ends for which theoretical explanations can and will be produced after the fact. It is perhaps given to a few to chart the development of ideas as well as events. Carr would not be unique as the observer who assumes that he has a singular capacity for detachment and therefore for seeing what is happening and what explanations are and will be needed. In this detached view, the Soviet system presents a challenge to man "to complete the unfinished revolution." I can only conclude that this detachment is not detachment from values, for the revolution can only be unfinished in the

sense of not yet having achieved certain ends or situations which Carr holds good. Yet the course to those ends may not be one of progress, even in the light of Carr's values. The revolution may take us along the paths of "retrogression" (note the value-full worlds employed) to "new and unfamiliar forms" of institutions. He even, on occasion, decries the idea that revolution may be "a shortcut to utopia." But the lasting impression is of a theory that sees history and men making use of revolution to produce defined and definable results. And it is stern, violent revolution the he envisages: "Revolutionary dictatorship was the instrument used to bring *bourgeois* democracy to birth—a striking historical precedent for the theories of Marx and Lenin."

War

Another means of achieving change, if men do not realistically work for it in the context of peace, is war. Carr's devotion to this brand of change is so determined that he envisages war as a source of change with remarkable composure. He once in a lecture termed himself a quasi-pacifist, but I cannot believe that this was more than a sop to the students he was addressing. Before 1939 he also called for British neutrality to prevent the hardening of the two sides, but I judge this to have been a counsel of tactics. If he is a protagonist of the "unfinished revolution," it is significant that he has written "I cannot believe in the international revolutionary, whether of the right or of the left, as a good pacifist." "Nations, in this view, determined to play an active role in preserving a condition they prefer or in achieving a condition they desire, must be prepared, in the last resort, to apply the supreme penalty of war." One must be prepared for the use of power in war to preserve a system of collective security or an imperial order. Not only have revolutions and economic collapse been necessary to show the impotency of individualism but two world wars have had this result of convincing observers of the inadequacy of the individualist tradition. I do not think that Carr's main theses permit him to reject Bagehot's contention that "The characters which do win in war are the characters which we should wish to win in war." He has contempt for the Anglo-Saxon view "That any nation which desires to disturb the peace is . . . both irrational and immoral." Some states, quite naturally pursuing their interest, do not have the same interests as other states in peace. "The fact of divergent interests is disguised and falsified by the platitude of a general desire to avoid conflict." To be sure, he did not believe it possible under modern conditions to fight wars of limited objectives but, at least before the atom bomb, I

do not believe he entirely rejected even the idea of catastrophic, major wars. There are occasions in which nations and peoples are compelled to fight for their survival, at the very least, and even in the pursuit of their interests. An insight into his thinking is revealed in his acceptance of and insistence upon the point that all modern wars are at the same time wars and revolutions. As such they are catalysts in that process of change the products of which Carr is awaiting with such anticipation. At the very least, war provides the motive force of the economic system. The pacifist is an escapologist who would wash his hands of current political problems and abandon a major means of resolving them.

Carr, again, emphasizes the element of conflict in politics and the factor of power as the major means of resolving such conflict. The victory goes to the strong. Among nations the strong, those who, therefore, have an advantage in a status quo, seek to preserve that status quo. Within nations, the strong in terms of wealth and proximity to the seat or locus of power seek to preserve the conditions that give them these advantages. Strong nations and strong classes and individuals produce myths of a natural or contrived harmony of interests. In Carr's view, it must be the impulse of the weak or the underprivileged to dispute the myth of a harmony of interests; they must seek to produce a condition to their advantage. Every increment of their power will increase the possibility that they may alter the situation to their advantage. The picture that emerges is one of tension kept within bounds by power, the weak attempting to become strong, and the strong imposing myths of harmony and holding the capacity for compulsion always in readiness. In this evaluation, Carr appears always to favor the protagonists of change, that is, change in accord with his values or with the pattern of history, which is to say the same thing.

The defect that I see in this is that Carr underestimates the power of ideas. The weak may accept their physically inferior position. They may in fact see a long-range advantage in the maintenance of peace. Just as, say in Britain, certain classes may accept their position of inferiority because their conditioning makes it congenial, so among nations there may be those who recognize the advantage of not having to share in the responsibility for leadership and making great decisions. Moreover, a person or nation in an inferior social or power position may rationally weight the possibilities and decide that the struggle will cost more than it produces. Carr is at great pains to say that a nation may not have an interest in the *status quo* or in peace. Interest is not a tangible that exists externally; it is related to a theory and value system. It is the academic theorists or the political leaders who lead in giving reality to interests by defining them, by producing theories outlining them. Germany

in the interwar years is described by Carr as not having an interest in the preservation of peace. Germany did *not* have an interest in the preservation of peace as Germans under the leadership of Hitler and Co. evaluated the situation of the German nation. Under a different leadership the German nation might have desired peace first of all. I think there is a failure on Carr's part to establish a consistent philosophical basis for consideration of the problems of international politics. Second, he underestimates the power of ideas to work as significantly in the direction of accommodation as toward conflict. Third, he overestimates the dynamics of change and exaggerates his own capacity to see its quality and direction.

I think that Carr is basically a man of violence who, driven by his desire for the fulfillment of a revolution, defined in his own terms, has not taken the time to be philosophically precise. At the same time he has gone far to provide the theoretical arguments justifying a major onslaught on liberal democracy, a relatively free market economy, and a system of collective security. At one time, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, he stated his belief in an international community. Today he does not believe such an international community exists. Evidently the facts thoroughly belie the talk about such a community, but the facts surely must be established by other tests when talking or acting. In fact, if such a discussion is maintained on a level of vague generalizations, it will be almost certain that the observer is expressing his values rather than the result of his own empirical investigations. Carr almost surely would reject an international community based mainly upon the ideas and principles of Western democracy. He finds no real compatibility between Sovietism and Western democracy and cannot hope very strongly for a synthesis between the two as a foundation for such a community. And it would be temerity indeed for him at this stage to posit Sovietism as the basis history will employ.

International Law

In view of his premises, it is not surprising to note Carr's conception of international law. Among the available alternatives he has chosen to depreciate international law as law. The most he has been willing to contend for—and this when he accepted the idea that there was an international community—is that international law is “the law of an undeveloped and not fully integrated community.” Custom is its only source. “A treaty, whatever its scope and content, lacks the essential quality of law.” Multilateral treaties cannot become the course or repositories of even customary international law. Since he no

longer believes in an international community, his test for the existence of such law no longer exists, for international law can have no existence except insofar as there is an international community which, on the basis of “a minimum common view,” recognizes it as binding. The conditions of international life do not have that quality of fixity and regularity that law can and does give to a situation. Nations today are in the midst of a great tension: they are in danger of oppression and even annihilation. In such a condition, as Hitler contended, “the question of legality plays a subordinate role.” There is no international political order making possible the “legal definition of international public policy or of what is internationally immoral.” Since he once would have contended for the existence of an international society, the rule *pacta sunt servanda* he held to be more than a moral principle but rather a rule of international law. That society does not exist today, inter-law does not exist, the rule *pacta sunt servanda* is a moral principle honored only as the power political necessities of nations engaged in a titanic struggle for survival and not maintaining a basic consensus make possible. The forces generated by the contemporary revolution are too great to be contained by any existing framework for society. A radical realist must in fact become a disturber of the peace and an enemy of the law. Only when a political order implying a basic consensus has been re-created will law effectively operate among peoples, or in fact exist as law. “The condition of international legislation is the world super-state.” If they both are the criteria of the existence of international law in Carr’s mind, international law under these terms cannot exist.

Conclusion

I think, then, that we now may summarize at least the evaluation of Carr given in this paper: He is a publicist of great power who has made an important contribution to theory of international relations. Although he calls for a combination of realistic appraisal and utopian aspiration, in terms of the definitions he offers he is properly accounted a radical realist for whom historical trends are producing one of the major revolutions of human history. He escapes what he properly calls the sterile conservatism of the realistic approach by assuming that he can see the major historical trends of our times. He thus imposes his own radical values upon history, and in the fashion of Plato, Hegel, Lenin, et al., he concludes that what is the product of reality *ought* to be the product of reality. Although he occasionally writes in eclectic terms and speaks of men making choices on a short-term basis and building by a slow process of ad-

justment, he generally calls for seeing the revolution whole and pressing on to its obvious fulfillment. He is ambivalent, often coming up with his logical conclusions and then pulling away from their full implications. He states nobly the creed for hard ruthless analysis and then, himself, fails to inspect his own first principles. He has been in the main an apologist for success, after the fashion of a realist, although he is in no doubt a dissatisfied man, for the future promises the goals which the present usually denies. For him the revolutionary and unstable ages are the productive and creative ages, but he fails to set up tests by virtue of which the product may be judged or creativity determined. He handles vast masses of data with consummate skill in description, but his stylistic accomplishments permit him often to disguise the embryonic quality of his philosophical analysis. He is a worthy antagonist who illustrates as all men must that they can aspire to be no more than part of a process in intellectual history. His stimulus to students of international politics cannot be denied, nor can the danger that he will earn more respect than he deserves. He states his resentment that the defenders of the status quo can overlook inequities, but he looks with singular composure toward a future that may provide a prison for the human mind. His quasi-detachment is at least sufficiently real to allow him to survey the stringencies of dictatorship without particular concern. And last, but not least, he is neither systematic enough nor direct enough to reveal whether Carr is speaking for himself or for others. This latter creates the risk that what one asserts about him will be subject to denial either by Carr or other analysts. But that risk must be taken, for otherwise a theorist of significance would be neglected.

Digest of Discussion

The chairman called the meeting to order and suggested that the group might first devote some thought to planning its method of work. One method was that of taking up representative authors and publicists in the field and analyzing their predominant theories; another might be to study the basic concepts or problems which made a working theory of international relations such as the balance of power, the national interest, the limits of power, international law and so on.

Professor Holborn wondered about the method of selection of the persons listed in the letter of invitation. Mr. Lipsky said that each person mentioned in the letter was especially concerned and identified with a theory of interna-

tional relations having a particular emphasis. Since the group was scheduled to hold seven meetings, some selectivity was necessary although he was by no means suggesting that the listing in the letter was definitive. In any case, the phenomenon of theory will undoubtedly enter as the discussions are studied.

Professor Wolfers felt it would be easier for the group to study concepts such as Geo-Politics than authors such as Spykman, although much would depend on how either was introduced.

Professor Strausz-Hupé believed that many of the listed authors were simply elaborators of the previous theories; Carr, for example, as presented in the working paper, seems to be a restatement of Hegel.

Professor Rabi wondered whether a better approach might not start from the question, what conditions must be a body of ideas satisfy in order to be termed a theory? He doubted whether a real answer would emerge from a study of the bygone era and that an effective theory must be able to interpret the facts of international life as they exist today.

Professor McClellan agreed. Although he thought the first method suggested by the chairman to be a good one, he also felt that a fundamental shift had occurred in the political scientist's approach to a theoretical interpretation of world politics. It might do, he added, to run through the principal authors and then proceed to the substantive problems.

Professor Holborn considered that none of the listed persons, with the exception of Wilson, were first-rate thinkers; most of them depended on other sources for their basic ideas. He felt that it would be better to discuss the essential problems of theory rather than the authors.

The chairman raised the question of the reality behind a particular theory and the degree to which theory corresponds to reality as a criterion for the theory's value.

Professor Strausz-Hupé raised the question as to whether International Relations can be considered a science. He personally felt it was at a stage of evolution approximate to that of botany at the time of Linnaeus, concerned more with classification than experimentation. To evolve further, International Relations must create criteria for measuring the phenomena of politics. As yet, however, no adequate means for testing has been found.

Professor Wolfers felt that the question of whether the theoreticians suggested in the letter were great minds or not was not relevant to study the theory of international relations as it existed today. This particular body of theory was still at an early stage of development, and, in this context, the selection could be considered a rather good one so far as "giants" exist in the field.

Mr. Diebold noted that the question of approach had been examined in

the preparatory work and it was felt that the authors would provide convenient foci for the conduct of the group's discussions. Naturally, the list was not definitive and others could be added if the group wished to do so. But the authors merely furnished convenient points of entry into the larger topical problems which, it was hoped, would receive the greater emphasis.

Mr. Thompson expressed the hope that the present study would come up with observations and suggestions on the material used by academicians in teaching international relations.

Professor Strausz-Hupé pointed out the significance of Lenin's theory of imperialism to the general theory of international relations. Several members felt that the Marxist contribution did not stop with the Leninist view of imperialism but included a complex of theories which were being continuously subjected to refinement and development down to as recently as Stalin's pronouncement of October 1952. Mr. Thompson believed that Marx could not be ignored, for example, in evaluating Carr, hence some attention to Marxian theories was desirable. Mr. Diebold suggested that the Marxist complex be substituted for Schumpeter and that Schumpeter's views be examined as those of one critical toward Marxism.

Professor Holborn observed that the study of international relations was still in an experimental stage. It was not important, he felt, where the group began its own study, but out of the early discussions should emerge an idea of what international relations theory has failed to do. Thus the group can proceed to the complexes of problems inherent in such theory and attempt to make a constructive contribution to thinking about these problems. He would not agree, however, that Toynbee represents the historical approach to the study of international relations nor could he find a representative of that approach among those listed.

Mr. Lipsky and Professor Wolfers wondered about the distinction made between "giant" and "midget" minds in the field of political theory. Professor Wolfers noted that in a recent re-examination of the great English-speaking theoreticians such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Burke, he had found that while they were strong on theories of government, they were quite weak on theories of relations among governments. Professor Holborn felt that greatness consisted in large part of originality of concept. The thinkers mentioned in the letter were mostly of originality of concept. The thinkers mentioned in the letter were mostly "plumbers" of the idea of others. Mr. Lipsky believed that interpretive application and creative synthetization of ideas was as important as their original conception. Professor Holborn agreed to the extent that the persons listed in the letter were mostly concerned with harmonizing

the idea of others and putting them to work in a new field. Mr. Thompson noted that the “plumbers” nevertheless had a monopoly on the theory of international relations, which may be indicative of the poverty of thought existing in that field.

In response to the chairman’s query as to which authors the group felt it would be most useful to consider, Miss Fosdick expressed the opinion that consideration of the substantive theoretical problems would be more valuable than an analytical survey of particular points of view on these problems. The author should merely be a device for initiating discussion on a problem. The chairman felt this constituted a sound approach. Mr. Diebold agreed but reminded the group that theories are methods of looking at phenomena.

Professor Holborn felt the group was theorizing too much on how to go about discussing theory; once it began discussing Carr it would rapidly move into more abstract theoretical problems.

Professor Strausz-Hupé suggested that the group compile a list of theories of international relations which could be used as a check to determine whether the authors mentioned in the letter sufficiently covered the field. Miss Fosdick thought that some of the theories on such a list would not be relevant to contemporary problems of international politics and felt that a topical list by subject headings would be more useful. Professor Wolfers believed that the group could discuss formulated propositions more readily than abstract problems gleaned from a survey of publicists and thinkers. Professor Strausz-Hupé noted that theories, once considered remote or antiquated, have a disconcerting habit of springing back to life and again becoming applicable to international affairs.

The chairman, summarizing the discussion to that point, felt that the consensus of the group leaned toward using representative authors as starting points or introduction for studying a particular complex of problems. He asked Mr. Lipsky whether the subsequent working papers could be elaborated in that manner—taking, for example, Morgenthau as an introduction to a study of the problem of the national interest—and containing formulated problems for discussion. Mr. Lipsky felt that the papers could be drawn up in that manner but pointed out that Morgenthau’s theory of national interest was bound up with the totality of his theory. The chairman agreed that the procedure would be artificial to that extent. Nevertheless, Morgenthau’s theory of the national interest should be able to stand by itself if it has validity.

Mr. Diebold wondered whether the procedure should be one of relating the theory to its proponent or whether attention to the applications of the theory to the world of politics would be more profitable. He hoped that the

group would take into account the conclusions for policy which are apt to flow from a particular theory and whether other policy conclusions could also be drawn. Speaking for the Council, he hoped that this group's work would furnish guidance to that of other groups concerned with more concrete problems of international relations. In response to a question from the chairman about the Council's attitude toward the present group, Mr. Diebold said that this was the first time the Council had sponsored an effort devoted solely to the theory of international relations. Because the group was something of an experiment, the Council was interested in the conclusions the present study would lead to. With the help of a Carnegie Research Fellowship, Mr. Lipsky was doing the spadework for such a study. The Council hoped that the group's discussion would be helpful to Mr. Lipsky's own work and that both projects would enlighten and enrich the Council's research and study program, which was so largely devoted to more specific problems in the international field.

Professor Holborn, reading from the letter of invitation, noted that while the second sentence indicated that the group will undertake an analytical examination of foreign policy assumptions, the third sentence proceeds to make such an assumption about US foreign policy.

Professor Strausz-Hupé observed that some of the most eminent practitioners of the art of diplomacy, such as Bismarck, had elaborated political theories to guide their conduct of statecraft. Professor Holborn wondered whether such theories were simply *ex post facto* rationalizations. He also wondered about the general nature of the relationship between theory and practice in international affairs. Was the value of a study of theory to be derived from the influence such theory is presumed to exercise upon the practitioner?

Mr. Lipsky felt that statesmen and diplomats are usually influenced in their choice of alternatives by their belief in a given informing theory, hence the practical value of theory evaluation. Professor Holborn expressed some doubt as to whether most practitioners were greatly influenced by an explicit theory of international relations. He felt that weight must also be given to the more nebulous social mores and customs prevailing upon the practitioner at the time. Mr. Thompson thought a strong causal relationship existed between theory and the policies of statesmen. Theory had certainly exercised an important influence on the policies of Wilson, and both Wilsonian theory and practice had more recently become a focal point of debate and critique among scholars and practitioners. The position that theory has no or little relationship to the statements or actions of political leaders has been used by the Marxists to attack democratic liberalism. The extent to which practitioners such as George Kennan and others have been influenced by theory is quite

significant. This is not to say, of course, that every step the practitioner takes is based upon an informing theory, he concluded.

Professor Holborn replied that he was confining his argument to concepts of action dominated by theory. The Soviet Union, for example, makes a great point of the alleged theoretical foundations for Soviet foreign policy, but it is also obvious that political exigencies often force the Soviets to turn to expediency. Therefore there is the problem of analyzing the two influences. The trend nowadays, he felt, was toward giving theory greater weight as an influence on practice.

Professor Wolfers, referring to a study he had made of the writings and speeches of a numbers of leading statement such as Hull, the late Senator Taft, and Churchill, noted that in each case certain postulates and generalizations kept reappearing and seemed to be the premises for their beliefs and actions. For example, a recurrent assumption of the late Senator Taft was that a nation does not go to war unless its territory is attacked, hence his conclusion that there was no risk from Russia should the US proceed to implement MacArthur's proposals for military measures against China. Hull, and even Churchill, likewise operated on fairly clear-cut and consistent premises or theories which could be deduced from their utterances. It was quite probable, Professor Wolfers said, that these theories were not explicit but unconscious.

Professor Strausz-Hupé pointed out that foreign offices themselves have theories of policy which tend to exercise a heavy influence on whatever foreign secretary happens to be in office at the time. These theories involve a particularized doctrine of foreign policy which is part and parcel of the traditions and lore of the foreign office in question. Thus the policies of the Quai d'Orsay continue to be permeated by the theories of the Count de Clauzel, who analyzed the problem of French foreign policy shortly after 1870. Similarly, the British Foreign Office and the American State Department possess their indigenous doctrines which exercise a kind of momentum in the formulation of policy. When a foreign secretary attempts to break out of the confines of prevailing tradition it is usually an indication that the nation is facing a crisis for which the tradition is found to be inadequate.

Miss Fosdick thought her experience on the Policy Planning Staff tended to confirm Professor Strausz-Hupé's remarks insofar as the State Department was concerned. The past three or four years had, in her opinion, been a period of considerable ferment in the Department during which new ideas and outlooks challenged older, more customary ones. She had been surprised at the extent to which the new administration had relapsed into the more traditional doctrines of foreign policy.

Professor Wolfers posed the question as to whether the group's main objective was that of analyzing certain fundamental problems in international relations theory—such as, for example, whether the concept of the national interest was an adequate guide for the conduct of foreign policy—or whether the discussion should be slanted to determining how a theoretician, such as Morgenthau, reached his particular definition of the national interest. Using Carr as another example, is the group interested in analyzing Carr's theories or is it interested in the truth or non-truth of certain propositions propounded by Carr?

Mr. Lipsky felt that both objectives were valid and useful. He was interested, for the purpose of assisting his own evaluation, in having the benefit of the group's thinking on the theories of a number of prominent publicists. The second basic purpose was that of attempting to elaborate a sounder informing theory for the conduct of foreign policy, hence the need for topical analysis. The working papers were merely points of departure for discussion along both of these lines.

The chairman remarked that the question seemed to be one of choosing a focal point for the discussion. For example, the group might choose Carr's particular theory of international behavior or the subject problems which the man has enunciated. Mr. Roberts felt the most fruitful procedure was one of discussing the ideas which emerge out of the man rather than the man *per se*.

Professor Holborn suggested that the group devote the remainder of its first meeting to Carr, take up Morgenthau and the theory of the national interest at its second session, turn its attention to the Spykman and the geopolitical strategic theories during the third meeting, and devote the fourth session to the Marxist complex and Schumpeter theories of imperialism. He further proposed that the group consider the remaining subject it wished to discuss in the light of its progress by that time. This is not to suggest, he concluded, that Toynbee or Lasswell be eliminated. Miss Fosdick felt that if Toynbee was discussed, Butterfield's theories should be considered at that time.

Mr. Diebold agreed with Professor Holborn's proposal. In this way the group could utilize a given theorist for the purpose of analyzing his ideological contribution and then proceed to a critique of his particular methodology.

Professor Wolfers suggested that Lasswell be substituted for Spykman. Professor Holborn felt that Lasswell was the least rewarding theoretician of those proposed to the group. Professor Wolfers believed that Lasswell was the most influential of the contemporary theoreticians and deserved serious attention. Professor Holborn expressed doubt as to the influence of Lasswell's theories but agreed that perhaps the group, and even he, might learn something from such a discussion.

It was agreed that topic for discussion would be scheduled at least two meetings in advance—the minimum necessary for the preparation of working papers.

Professor Strausz-Hupé felt that some attention should be given to the theories of such influential practitioners and advocates as Clarence Strait and Aristide Briand. The chairman suggested that these people had a political mission but not a theory. Professor Strausz-Hupé maintained that a coherent conceptual theory lay behind the mission of each, and that the influence exercised by these theories was a valid claim for attention.

Professor Holborn said that the Wilsonian-utopian school merited consideration on both counts. Mr. Diebold noted that Mr. Byron Dexter's excellent papers on Wilson and Herbert Croly would undoubtedly be of great help in considering the utopian school. Professor Wolfers pointed out that both Carr and Morgenthau began by a scathing critique of the liberal-utopian school; the group would render a substantial service if it could put Wilsonian theory in its proper perspective.

Professor Strausz-Hupé suggested that some consideration be given to George Catlin.

Summary

Summarizing the discussion to that point, the chairman noted the group's consensus that the next three to four meetings be devoted to Lasswell, Carr, Morgenthau, Marx-Schumpeter, that the theories offered by each author be used to initiate discussion of a major topic or theoretical problem, and that after two or three sessions the group would reconsider this method of procedure and plan its future program.

Mr. Thompson added that he thought it might be helpful if Mr. Lipsky included a concise statement of the main gist of each author's thought in the working papers.

At this point, the chairman recessed the meeting.

The Theory of E. H. Carr

Upon reconvening, the chairman asked Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion of Carr's theory of international relations.

Mr. Lipsky said that if he seemed somewhat negative about Carr's conclusions, it was due to the serious deficiencies which he felt existed in Carr's

theory of international relations, despite the fact that Carr's proclaimed intention is to conduct a hard, ruthless analysis of that subject. The analysis, Mr. Lipsky continued, begins with the dichotomy of the realist and the utopian approaches to the phenomena of politics. The realist, assuming that the relevant data may be inspected and known, draws conclusions from the world of reality concerning the correct policy which should be taken. For the utopian, wish precedes the assessment of data and policy strives to bring reality into conformity with ideology.

Carr then concludes, Mr. Lipsky observed, that neither approach alone is adequate and that a combination of the two is required for sound policy. Actually, Mr. Lipsky noted, this is similar to trying to combine water and oil since the two approaches, as postulated by Carr, are antithetical. It is more than coincidental that Carr's examples of realistic policies are those which have achieved success while the utopian policies cited by Carr are associated with failure. One cannot escape the conclusion that the synthesis of realistic and utopian policies which Carr advocates is an impossibility because Carr has not inspected the first principles of his system. One such principle, for example, is the dubious assumption, implicit in his realistic position, that knowledge of reality can be attained simply through observation and perception.

In response to questions by Professor Rabi and the chairman, Mr. Lipsky observed that Carr viewed the nineteenth century as a political oasis between the monarchical despotism of the eighteenth century and the dictatorial totalitarianism of the twentieth. The world is moving into a new era marked by the breakup of such fundamental liberal tenets of the supremacy of the individual and the organization of political life in terms of the nation-state. The new era is one demanding greater satisfaction of the needs of the masses, hence the necessity for economic and social planning. Carr assumes that planning and individual freedom are incompatible and that the latter must be sacrificed to the demands of the former.

While it is often contended that Carr is a Marxist, Mr. Lipsky could not agree to that conclusion. Carr does, however, assume that the Soviet Union is leading the world toward fulfilling the historical revolution into the twentieth century, just as he assumed that the Nazis were performing this mission in the 1930s. To the extent that the political democracies recognize and adjust to the revolutionary conditions of the new era, no fundamental difference between democratic and totalitarian states exists. The essence of government is compulsion, by one means or another. The antithesis of democracy, according to Carr, is not dictatorship but aristocratic government, that is, government which does not serve the demands of the masses and opposes public planning.

Mr. Thompson wondered whether Carr's major contribution to international relations theory was his critique of the assumptions and conclusions of the Wilsonian-utopian school, and equally, his questioning the assumption of the existence of a harmony of interest between the policies of the "status quo" nations and conditions for a secure, peaceful and prosperous world order. Mr. Lipsky felt that Carr's critique on these points, while influential, were simply points of departure into his general theory.

Interpretation of History

In response to a question from Professor Rabi on Carr's basic, cardinal ideas, Mr. Lipsky mentioned that among Carr's premises was the idea of the inevitability of change, that the historical change was necessarily often accompanied by violence and that the direction of change could be interpreted by the intelligent, reasonable statesman. Moreover, the promise of the future is a world organized in terms of the individual's contribution to society rather than in terms of individual liberty.

Professor Holborn agreed that Carr viewed history as being in constant, dynamic change and that a static society is a doomed society. He seems to construe our present era, Professor Holborn continued, as analogous to that of the French Revolution. The communist challenge is a disturbing element to older societies but, as was the French-Republican challenge, contains the seeds of a new era. The role of the statesmen is to recognize the necessity of change and adjust to it positively by distilling the good elements of the revolution from the bad. In present-day terms, the Western statesman must be able to take the Bolshevik revolution seriously, to analyze it dispassionately, determine its good, constructive elements and thus have the insight to predict the trend of historical development. Such a statesman will also appreciate the fact that the Bolshevik challenge is a direct result of the failure of the liberal system to provide a viable international order.

Professor Strausz-Hupé felt that Carr was also impressed by the growing complexity of modern industrial civilization and the inability of man to cope with its problems within the framework of democratic liberalism. Hence Carr has a strong Marxian orientation and seems to believe that Marxism enables man to understand his environment and furnishes a means by which man can master technology.

Professor Holborn interpreted Carr as believing that there is much in history which is terrible and ruthless and he views men as often being a slave to

historical destiny, hence Carr's proximity to the Hegelian position. Carr also believes, Professor Holborn continued, that the function of the intelligent statesman is to try to interpret the trend of history and fall in step with that trend. In other words, policy is the process of marking intelligent concessions to the wave of history. Mr. Lipsky agreed with these observations and pointed out that Carr maintains that the most productive ages of history are also the most unstable.

Professor Rabi wondered what the relevance all this had for international relations.

Professor Wolfers observed that Carr began writing towards the end of the interwar period when the Nazis were in the ascendancy in Europe, challenging the Western Wilsonian system based on the Versailles Treaty and the League. Carr criticized such principles as collective security and sanctions as the hypocritical moralizing by which the "status quo" powers justified their preferential position in world affairs; he considered himself a "realist" in seeing through this hypocrisy. Carr viewed the challenge of the revisionist powers as the challenge of newer, more vital historical forces destined to mold the future. Basic, underlying technological changes had rendered the nation-state and individual liberty passé; the compulsions of the new technology must be served. With the military-political defeat of the Nazis, Carr looks to the Bolsheviks as the agents to usher in a new era, and the violent challenge of communism to the Western world is simply the birth pangs of a new social age.

Mr. Lipsky remarked that Carr could therefore be termed a historicist. It was impossible to escape the conclusion that Carr's "inevitabilities" are developments which he himself wishes to see fulfilled.

The chairman posed the question as to the basic causal forces, according to Carr, for the inevitable historical development. What are the forces which could mold the future?

Mr. Lipsky felt that they were somewhat difficult to define with precision. Professor Rabi believed the advance of industrial technology to be the causal force which was rendering the nation-state obsolete. Mr. McClellan detected a strong element of economic determinism in Carr, hence his proximity to the Hegelian-Marxism school of historical determinism.

Professor Holborn did not consider Carr to be a historical materialist since he seemed to subordinate economic technology to the needs of society. His message was apparently that economic policy must be harnessed to the needs of men. Hence his repudiation of economic liberalism and his advocacy of economic planning. Professor Holborn concluded that Carr might be described as a "radical liberalist."

Professor Rabi stated that he was still hoping for a definition of Carr's basic system of thought.

Professor Strausz-Hupé pointed to Carr's analysis of a historical trend toward larger systems of production and exchange and the need for comparable political adjustments. Hence the view, also held by the Marxists, that qualitative change merges from quantitative change.

Implications for Policy

Professor Kaufmann felt Carr's theory of change to be rather meaningless. Professor Holborn agreed to the extent that it offers no criteria for good policy advice. Carr, Professor Holborn noted, must ultimately fall back on simple common sense, that is upon certain basic values. For example, he argues that economic liberties should be stressed in the new Bolshevik-inspired era, but there is nothing in his theory which leads to that conclusion; it is simply a common-sense judgment. Mr. Lipsky agreed that Carr's theory did little to furnish statesmen with the basis for making "realistic" decisions.

Professor Wolfers felt that Carr's policy advice was fairly consistent. Now, as before the war, he addresses himself to the Western powers. Before the war his advice took the form of anti-League recommendations; today he is sympathetic to the claims of the new revisionist force, the Soviet Union. He consistently sees the West as the status quo force, justifying its preferential position with hypocritical moralizing.

The chairman wondered whether Carr could be thought of as consistently anti-capitalist; was the capitalist order at stake at the time of Munich? Mr. Thompson held that, in Carr's view, capitalism had been at stake, thus leading Carr to sympathize with the challenge posed by the revisionist powers. Mr. Thompson expressed the opinion that Carr carried a large quantity of Marxist baggage around with him. For example, Carr fully endorses the Marxian view that democratic ideology is simply a mask for ulterior ambitions. Similarly, he points out the impossibility of separating the basic interests from the morality of nations. Thus interest and morality furnish keys for understanding the realities of power politics. Carr then proceeds to attempt to transcend this juxtaposition by looking for higher moral grounds for policy. In *The Twenty Years' Crisis* he apologizes for appeasement, in *The Conditions for Peace* he advocates social and economic planning, in the *Nationalism and After* he argues that the nation-state is no longer large enough to be politically viable, and in the *Soviet Impact on the Western World* he is again a Marxist—somewhat in the sense that

many Westerners were “Marxist” during the war. Carr’s theories are susceptible to an economic critique as well as a political critique but both relate to his attempt to escape from the dilemma of power.

Professor Strausz-Hupé noted that Carr’s analysis constantly seem to deal with elements in juxtaposition, having no organic unity. Carr never explains how he arrived at this picture of the world. Nor does his analysis of recurrently opposing forces gel into a unified political theory.

Professor Wolfers felt that in postulating political forces in inherent antagonism, Carr was defining world politics as he saw them. Carr assumes that the problem of peace can only be solved by granting concessions to the dynamic force which is willing to resort to violence to achieve its objectives. The chairman agreed and thought that Carr sympathized with the dynamic side because he believed it was in step with the march of history.

Mr. Thompson remarked that Carr points out that nations are sometimes viewed as masses of individuals while at other times are regarded as collective organisms. He resolves this dilemma by suggesting that nations have both qualities. He further seems to believe that, whatever the causal forces, nations are faced with inherent conflicts in their relations with one another. Being a political scientist, Carr is interested in the behavior of nations as they react to those dynamic forces, Mr. Thompson said.

Mr. Lipsky asked whether Mr. Thompson felt that Carr wished to rise above the confines of a pure power analysis. Mr. Thompson thought that Carr had explored one means after another in his attempt to transcend power. Professor Holborn observed that Carr did not seem to foresee a historical trend toward utopia, but viewed history as a constant, unending struggle between dynamic and static forces.

Professor Wolfers remarked that Carr’s advice was in the nature of urging constructive adjustments to the inevitable forces of history. Professor Holborn agreed; Carr seemed to believe that “the beast of history can be slightly domesticated but never tamed.” Thus the “realistic” policy for the Western statement is one of making sensible concessions to his opponents. Mr. Diebold observed that Carr’s advice of “give a little, keep a little” was precisely that adopted by feudal Britain toward the rising bourgeoisie. Professor Holborn agreed and felt that in the present world situation, Carr’s advice to the Western diplomat would be to oppose the terror of the Bolshevik revolution and attempt to make it more humane, but at the same time, to accept it and come to terms with it.

Miss Fosdick wondered why the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, was not the revisionist historical force that figured in Carr’s theory.

Professor Wolfers felt that this was simply an *a priori* value judgment on Carr's part. The chairman remarked that Bolshevism was progressive or reactionary depending upon which side of the Soviet system was emphasized. Professor Holborn noted that Carr's interpretation of America's role in history was limited to American foreign policy and especially Wilsonianism. He never analyzes the American system as a domestic organization. And for Carr, Wilsonianism is a kind of political backwash from the French Revolution, Professor Holborn stated.

Basic Assumptions

The chairman posed the question as to Carr's basic assumptions. Is one such assumption that the great historical changes must take place through violence? If Carr assumes the irreconcilability of historical forces, much of his theory becomes more intelligible, the chairman pointed out. Mr. Lipsky felt that Carr was not very optimistic concerning the ability of the status quo nations to recognize the need for adjustments and concessions, hence his anticipation of violence. It would almost appear, Mr. Lipsky thought, that Carr approves the use of violence to break the grip of the status quo nations on the necessary course of history.

Professor Rabi observed that if Carr's writings furnished conclusions for policy with respect to the kind of concessions Western statesmen should make, then it might be accurate to designate those writings as the expression of a theory. This is plainly not the case, Professor Rabi said. Mr. Lipsky felt that a theory may exist even though incomplete. Professor Rabi expressed the opinion that for an assortment of ideas to be a theory it must contain certain basic elements, among them being a number of fairly clear assumptions, the ability to apply these assumptions, and the capacity to draw certain general, if not precise, conclusions. While Carr's ideas contained bits of wisdom, they did not constitute a theory, according to Professor Rabi.

Mr. Wasson noted the observation on page one of the working paper to the effect that Carr's ambition to fit into the world of politics made it impossible to elaborate a consistent and complete theoretical system. Mr. Lipsky felt that Carr's political ambitions made his theoretical problem more difficult but not impossible.

Professor Wolfers believed that certain general conclusions could be derived from Carr's theories. For example, Carr concludes that political life is of necessity being organized in ever larger units or orbits, that the content of

world politics is evolving into the political relationships among these large orbits, and that clashes between orbits are to be expected unless the status quo orbits make the necessary concessions.

Mr. Thompson felt that Carr's theory did not offer any precise criteria concerning the kind of concessions Western nations can and should make.

The chairman thought that Carr's theory was fairly inchoate. The chairman was further inclined to believe that the basis of the theory was economic and that Carr viewed economic and technological developments as the generating forces for inevitable international political struggles.

Mr. Thompson expressed the opinion that in his early writings, Carr's theoretical basis was political and that he shifted to a theory of economic causation in his later writings.

Mr. Franklin wondered whether Carr, like Anne Morrow Lindbergh in *The Wave of the Future*, wrote uncritically about a totalitarian system because of an inner dislike for it. Mr. Lipsky and the chairman did not feel this was the case with Carr.

Mr. Thompson noted that Carr has no notion of the existence of a world community. Carr's passage on the world community in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* is perhaps the weakest part of the book, Mr. Thompson felt.

Miss Fosdick thought that another weakness of Carr, like that of Niebuhr, was an inadequate conception of human interest and motivation. According to Carr, people are either selfish or altruistic; this oversimplification prevents Carr from making an adequate analysis of world politics.

The chairman expressed the opinion that the subject of Carr had been pretty well thrashed out. After consulting with members of the group it was agreed to hold the second meeting on Thursday, January 14, 1954.

John Blumgart
Rapporteur

Second Meeting: Hans J. Morgenthau and the National Interest, January 14, 1954

The Study Group on Theory of International Relations held its second meeting on Thursday, January 14, 1954, at 5:30, at the Harold Pratt House. The subject was the theory of Hans J. Morgenthau. Present were: Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; Edgar M. Church; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; R. Gordon Wasson; Arnold Wolfers.

Working Paper No. 2

Prepared by George Lipsky

Professor Morgenthau of the University of Chicago asserts the existence of a great debate for our times, going far beyond academic limits, between two main theoretical interpretations of the phenomena of international politics. On the one hand, there is the school of realistic theory, which manifests central preoccupation with political objective fact and self-consciously asserts its unwillingness to be guided by large-scale moral abstractions in arriving at political decisions or in making political appraisals. On the other, there is the school that is frankly moved by moral aspiration in description as well as prescription. This school emphasizes the international political world as it ought to be and not as it is, even though protagonists of this school will, on occasion, use such terms as “the reality of idealism.” Morgenthau is, of course, the leading academic contender for what some would call a realistic, cold, neo-Machiavellian theory of international politics. His literary product

is already large and is growing rapidly. Its scope presents difficulties to anyone proposing to encompass it, but at the same time provides opportunities for seeing the growth of his thought. His theory is an evolving description of international politics. It is embodied in a felicitous, almost poetic, English prose style, the more remarkable by reason of the fact that English is not Morgenthau's mother tongue. Occasionally style may interfere with analytical structure and logic, although there may be other reasons that will be referred to later for deficiencies of this type, if they exist.

The main concern of this paper is suggested by the title of what is perhaps Morgenthau's best known publication, *In Defense of the National Interest*. In addition to presenting and later appraising Morgenthau's changing conception of the national interest, this paper provides some view of its intellectual and philosophical context, which explains in some measure the particular aspects of that conception. I have had the good fortune to see the revision in galley proof of Chapter I of Morgenthau's larger book, *Politics Among Nations*. This chapter in its revised form is entitled "A Realistic Theory of International Politics," a change from the original "Political Power." This title suggests Morgenthau's growing concentration upon the task of building a solid base of theoretical constructs, but the chapter itself has the additional advantage of presenting a capsule survey of the main aspects of his theoretical approach.

In addition to the works already referred to above, other titles of main importance to understanding Morgenthau are *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (especially important in suggesting his general philosophical approach) and the articles appearing in the *American Political Science Review*, "Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy," 44 (Dec. 1950), 833–854, and "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," 46 (Dec. 1953), 961–988. Other titles used in the preparation of this paper are listed below.

Morgenthau's Philosophy

Professor Percy E. Corbett of Yale University, an antagonist of Morgenthau on the issues to which Morgenthau directs his main attention, complains that "American foreign policy has recently become a favorite target area for attacks upon an alleged moralizing and legalistic habit which ignored or condemns national interest."¹ The existence of the attack is a certainty. When we have finished with the analysis, we shall have some basis for determining whether the case against American foreign policy as made out by Morgenthau is effective.

Fundamental to this case is Morgenthau's view that "Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars there has been an ever increasing tendency in the Western world to shift attention away from the substance of international politics toward simple formulas and formal arrangements, which either would do away with international politics altogether or at least would guide it into peaceful channels."² This tendency is particularly apparent, he asserts, in the United States because of the philosophy of international relations which dominated American thinking during the "better part of the nineteenth century" and because of the "particular political and intellectual circumstances" of United States foreign relations.³ This is, in Morgenthau's view, a tendency that forever invokes "justice against expediency" and, forever "blind to the tragic complexities of human existence . . .," "contents itself with an unreal and hypocritical solution of the problem of political ethics."⁴ For pragmatic reasons the realist position would eschew such a stand and is indeed its antithesis. The realist position in Morgenthau's view helps avoid policies and popular attitudes reflecting "uneasy confusion," "cynical despair," and the risk of being overwhelmed "by the enemies from within and without."⁵ Morgenthau would at all costs avoid being so wedded to a metaphysic as to accept static concepts as descriptive of society, losing sight of the fact that all life is flux. Only by recognizing that he can but partially solve problems can man avoid that dogmatic and escapist perfectionism which has led him so often to the edge of catastrophe. Understanding is as much an attempt to comprehend the limitations of the mind as it is to acquire the substance of knowledge.

Under the impact of a realistic resolve, says Morgenthau, modern man may begin, indeed has begun, "to examine the fundamental and persistent forces of world politics." "Thus the political scientist is moving into the international field at last . . .," not with the view of praising or condemning, but to aid in the search for survival through knowledge of basic drives. In this view, international politics is not a simple study seen through a body of abstractions, but a vast, shifting panorama of events, those of the present being correlated with those of the distant past in terms of a theory that does not profess too much or too little. Such a theory denies that international politics can be reduced to legal rules and institutions just as a realistic theory of politics in the United States will refuse to identify "American politics on the national level . . . with the American Constitution, the federal laws, and the agencies of the federal government."⁶

Although Morgenthau's general philosophy is dynamic and growing, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* still represents his philosophical position, which he thinks gives better answers than those given by the traditional custodians

of Western thought. Fearing that modern man will look even further afield for his philosophical convictions, Morgenthau has entered passionately into the combat to forestall that contingency. Morgenthau's concern with the great debate is not fortuitous. He thinks the outcome, if it favors the lessons of realism, will conduce to democratic survival. He is particularly opposed to modern philosophy's habit of elevating its "truths into suppositions of absolute validity, based on the authority of reason and claiming the objectivity of what the modern age calls science."⁷ He contends for a more-than-scientific man who with an insight and wisdom beyond science can resolutely elevate his expressions into the universal laws of human nature.⁸ In this perspective, the "nothing-but-scientific man appears as the true dogmatist who universalizes cognitive principles of limited validity and applies them to realms not accessible to them." When the latter appears in the field of international politics, he is the fashioner of formulas, the protagonist of single causes, the utopian champion of final solutions, who, when events turn out contrary to his theory, blames the events rather than the theory. The orthodox theorist in international politics has not gone beyond the assumptions of scientific thought in the nineteenth century, whereas scientific theory today recognizes limitations of theory, the tentativeness of conclusions, the reality of probability.⁹ Morgenthau is led to a paradoxical conclusion. This theorist, placing false hope in the unreal security present in the view of nature as always congruent with truth, cannot find that security which can be found in "the knowing insecurity of the wisdom of man."¹⁰ Put another way, scientific knowledge does not provide all the knowledge that is necessary for survival. There is a degree of security for man in awareness of his limitations.

Man, then, possesses a freedom that he denies in giving himself entirely to the weapon of science. In the exercise of his freedom, he may err, but he may also as a hero achieve a victory in a struggle that the searcher for scientific truth might never have undertaken, particularly were he in a cynical, pessimistic phase occasioned by defeat in terms of the scientific formulas he espouses.¹¹ The hero will recognize that struggle is never ending and will not be abashed thereby. He will know that one episode is concluded, only for another to appear, on a continuum leading into the perhaps tragic future. By reference to this continuum, the grandeur of man and his fitness for his freedom may be measured, as it cannot be measured in terms of the inadequate constructs of science.

This is not to say that Morgenthau will not assert truths in large generalizations, suggesting even the formulas for his opponents. He can write that "democracy is superior to Bolshevism in the truth which it contains and in the

good of which it carries the promise and in part the fulfillment.”¹² This appears to be nothing more than an affirmation of Morgenthau’s preference for democracy, based upon the more-than-science basis. But it is enough to warrant the conclusion that the survival he seeks to promote may be described in terms of democratic process, although his system recognizes the concurrent historical validity of the national interests of non-democratic states.

Morgenthau contends that a real distinction must be made between philosophy and politics. Philosophy is concerned with discovering the absolute good which is everywhere the same. A realistic politics is concerned with discovering the relative good “that is good only under particular circumstances.”¹³ Philosophy has mainly a contemplative function. Politics must not only understand the relative good but must make use of it in the struggle for survival. All men participate in a “community of psychological traits and elementary aspirations,” but, in Morgenthau’s world, I believe these do not significantly weigh against “the absence of shared experiences, universal moral convictions and common political aspirations.”¹⁴ The philosopher is consigned to reflection upon a future, far-off, divine event, toward which he can but hope the whole of creation moves. The student and practitioner of politics may attempt to fashion means for survival out of a material that is both defective and sufficient, if his sights are properly set upon that to which a realist may aspire.

The Nature of Idealism

Against this background, we may come closer to grips with the national interest, assumed to be realistic, with which Morgenthau is especially concerned. In doing so, it is important to present his view of the nature of contemporary idealism or utopianism against which he has arrayed his forces. This idealism or utopianism has been modified in the course of its history. As depicted by Morgenthau, the history of utopianism is the history of rationalist thought and practice, manifesting all the effects of “scientism” upon it, especially since the eighteenth century. Utopianism is part of a tradition which, “From the Church Fathers to the anti-Machiavellian writers of the eighteenth century, international politics was made the object of moral condemnation.”¹⁵ The modern version goes even further and, although it may not deny the existence of power politics, denies that it has any “inevitable connection with the life of man in society.”¹⁶ In this process the political and legal principles that had been formulated to protect the freedom of individuals were applied to nations, with the anticipation that they would serve to defend nations as surely as they defended individuals within organized domestic societies.¹⁷

In the early modern and optimistic period, this type of theory, with some warping of principle, could justify wars to bring the blessings of liberal idealism “to people not yet enjoying them or to protect them against despotic aggression.”¹⁸ It was not a long step, in fact it was an entirely consistent one, to Wilson’s plea for participation in a final war “making the world safe for democracy” . . . and ‘the culminating final war for human liberty.’¹⁹ This was a closing development in the early period of liberal virility; when the promise was not fulfilled, a period of liberal decadence set in, in which the only alternative available was non-action or drift. In Morgenthau’s view, these alternatives illustrated the inevitability of inconsistent application of the abstractionist and formulas which were the main stock-in-trade of idealist-utopian thought and action.²⁰ In the process, the ideological war of the liberal was proved to be a “self-defeating absurdity,” but this was a lesson the liberal never learned. He continued to believe that the formulas contained the truth; the resistant reality, part of which was the perversity of man and nations, was blamed.²¹ It would be an oversimplification to place all liberals in the same class in their reaction to changing events. His attachment to old slogans weakened, the disappointed liberal might refuse to fight for beleaguered nations under attack by aggressors. The “good” liberal, harassed but untroubled by doubts concerning his truths, would still continue to fight. But neither variety came to grips with the fact that the real issue was “the influence upon the national interests, expressed in terms of power politics, of violent change” in the configuration of power relationships.²² Neither type would fight any cause for other than liberal ends.

The interwar period, particularly in its early phases before disillusionment and skepticism had set in, saw the inception of “the age of the scientific approach to international affairs.”²³ Conferences, congresses, treaties, research, and publication proliferated. The goal was the scientific, simple solution to international problems, especially that of war. The pessimistic period of the thirties was survived and the end is not yet. Following World War II, for example, the Western concern for democracy in the Balkans revealed the perseverance of utopian attachment “for abstract slogans rather than political interests.”²⁴ This perseverance was natural and inevitable, for by their very abstractness slogans and formulas are bound “to be kept alive after they have outlived their political usefulness.” The fact that the realities of international politics are “concrete, specific, and dependent upon time and place” is not clearly seen or not seen at all.

Morgenthau’s realist can see that the problem of the “abolition of war is . . . the fundamental problem confronting international thought.”²⁵ But the non-rationalist mind recognizes the difficulty of the solution of this problem

because of “the variety of causes which have their roots in the innermost aspirations of the human soul.” The rational-utopian-liberal would reduce this variety to a single cause. He is often a person with a “social and political conscience,” but he is singularly capable of relying upon “a relatively innocuous outlet for his longing for reform.” His reformism may be sincere, but it accepts an unheroic outlet, neglectful of the total and complex reality. International society was not organized, therefore international organization would be provided on the basis of a scientific formula. Or, if this were not the emphasis, the accent might be on simple, material remedies. In any case, the utopian advocates a short cut that in Morgenthau’s view is doomed to fail, especially in achieving final solutions to the problems presented by power politics.

The idealist will not see that there must, of necessity, remain a permanent gap between his formulas and political reality. The formulas assert that the problem may be met with technical, scientific responses. Since technical, scientific, or legalistic responses have final answers to problems in other fields, it is expected that they can and will do so in the field of international politics. The liberal-idealist will not accept the fact that the problems are political, always to be solved temporarily on the basis of the prevailing distribution of power among contending nations. Morgenthau assesses this failure to meet the challenges as taking refuge in illusion, as a catastrophic unwillingness to confess political failure. Let the formulation appeal in its logical consistency to reason, and perfection in reality would derive therefrom. Thus, let the rule of law be finely drawn by technicians of competence, and “insecurity and disorder [would be transformed] into the calculability of a well-ordered society.”²⁶ Failures and the perseverance of conflict do not distract nor deter the utopians. The survival value of this type of thought is testimony not only to the ruggedness of its protagonists in the face of failure, but also to the simplicity and logical appeal of the panaceas offered. An easy road to perfectionism is ostensibly opened. “There are many . . . perfectionist devices by which Western civilization has tried during the past one hundred and fifty years to escape the facts of political life.”²⁷ Of them all, it was “the political philosophy of Woodrow Wilson which provides the classical example of this kind of perfectionist escapism.”²⁸

Power and the National Interest

To this, Morgenthau would oppose a frank awareness and formulation of the predominant role of power and the outstanding fact of power politics. In his

system, “A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.”²⁹ “Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exerted.”³⁰ This is a relationship that has a configuration that is worked out as men, born in chains, either are forced to accept their chains, or, responding to the universal desire for power and hegemony, succeed in becoming masters. This reversal of Rousseau’s formula places Morgenthau without qualification outside the utopian camp (using his terms). The fact of power (and therefore of power politics) cannot be removed by wishing, nor may men legislate it out of existence through any institution, or by evoking a formula as a vehicle for doing so. Morgenthau starts from the “assumption that power politics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to all men, is for this reason inseparable from social life itself.” Contempt for power politics cannot provide a master for politics by attempts to make it a science. Man cannot control political reality by assuming that that reality is less complex than it is. The establishment of dichotomies between the good and the true, on the one hand, and the bad and the perversion of truth, on the other (substitute society vs. state, law vs. politics, men vs. institutions, reason vs. tradition, order vs. violence) cannot obviate the fundamentally tragic facts of political existence. Seeking survival man must make the best use he can of these facts; he cannot make perfect use of them.

The simple dichotomies are especially dangerous since they provide a polar position of rectitude, intellectual and ethical, in which the utopian liberal will take refuge, even when his politics have been unsuccessful. Our survival is not served by taking refuge in abstractions, says Morgenthau; it may be served by recognizing that international politics are and will remain an unending struggle for power. Only by facing the truth can man avoid the full consequences of the tragedy of his existence. Organized violence has been the rule rather than the exception in human affairs. In this age when man has developed the capacity for prodigious destruction, it is especially important to avoid the path to easy virtue that has signally failed to prevent the outbreak of organized violence in the past. Man should not bury his head even further in the sands of confusion of a vast, simple, intellectual desert. With time growing short, he must finally stand erect, look about himself, face the awful world, and really make a change in the methods of controlling reality, since he cannot change the reality himself.

This reality will be more easily or certainly controlled if the national interest of each state is so defined as to be accommodated within a pattern of national interests among all states. Morgenthau states in the revision of

chapter I in *Politics Among Nations* that the national interest must be defined in terms of power. In further elaboration he would presumably say that the natural interest is an interest in the production or maintenance of certain events or situations in the historical continuum. These events or situations are a structure of power relationships which can only be produced or maintained by the maintenance, enforcement, or demonstration of power by each nation in realistic congruence with the national power interests of other nations. Some have contended that Morgenthau is an unqualified champion of the interests of the nation without regard to the interests of other nations. This, I think, is a misreading of his case. First, he assumes that the realistic approach gives full attention to power limitation as well as power potential. Second, his theory recognizes historical continuity and change and discountenances ego-centric belief in the special mission of particular states to remake the world in a special and final form. The realist perspective is a perspective in breadth and depth; it strives to see the realities of the situation immediately and in historical perspective. And, in fact, a higher morality is implicit in this perspective than in the perspective of the utopian-moralist.

It is apparent that the national interest must be given substance through definition. Some source must be found for an authoritative statement of the situations or events that each nation may or should seek to produce or maintain. In Morgenthau's scheme the statement will be one that is realistically limited to permit an accommodation of all other national interests similarly defined and realistically limited. With statesmen generally working on the basis of realistic assumptions, there would be less likelihood of conflict over interests. For example, such an approach would provide the best circumstances under which Hungary and Rumania could work out a settlement of their conflict over Transylvania. Desire for the same piece of territory on the part of two nations would, of course, persist, but the realistic approach would stimulate the statesmen involved to assess the power factors more objectively. And the approach would likewise influence those statesmen to apply a principle of limitations eschewing total accomplishment of national aspiration. But we are still safe in assuming that the problem of defining the national interest in each such case remains, even though it is more consciously faced by the realist. Each situation presents unique value factors. And the realist will be influenced in his own values as well as by what may be community values in defining the national interest in each case. Morgenthau's thesis assumes that the realist approach will result in definitions thereof that will be the source of less conflict than would be the case when men are moved are moved by moralistic-utopian

formulas. This is assumption is, of course, open to evaluation. The complex pattern of national interests envisaged here assumes the less-than-perfect operation of a balance of power always in process of achievement, but incapable of perfect achievement. To wish for the latter would be to wish for the removal of the one constant factor in history: change.

Given the problem of definition and the necessity for giving concrete application of the national interest in time and place, it is natural that Morgenthau's reference to the national interest should show a change in emphasis. Perhaps these changes reflect the difficulty of finding the particular application and therefore substance of the concept in the abstraction "national interest." In *Defense of the National Interest*, having particular reference to the national interest of the United States, conveys the impression of clear, obvious national interest, discernible, no doubt, by more-than-scientific wisdom. This national interest is that which will be sought by the realists opposed to the goals of the utopian, which will be moralistic or legalistic. If the latter goals are nonetheless in the national interest, that fact will be fortuitous rather than a product of an awareness of the nature of reality. In the goals of Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, there is a reflection of the ineluctable demands of the national interest, in his case the interest of preserving the balance of power in Europe.

In the article "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," Morgenthau appears to change pace or emphasis. This is reflected in the following statement: "It has been frequently argued against the realist conception of foreign policy that its key concept, the national interest, does not provide an acceptable standard for political action. This argument is in the main based upon two grounds: the elusiveness of the concept and its susceptibility to interpretations, such as limitless imperialism and narrow nationalism, which are not in keeping with the American tradition in foreign policy. The argument has substance as far as it goes. But it does not invalidate the usefulness of the concept."³¹ Here we have a reference to the concept as not being capable of precise definition and unquestionable substance. It is analogous to the modification made by Engels in the concept of economic determinism when he declared that it was a tool for the understanding of the historical process rather than a single cause of explanation of every aspect of that process. And in the revision of chapter I of *Politics Among Nations* the emphasis falls on the larger problem of political realism, and the national interest defined in terms of power becomes the "main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics." The

national interest is no longer a luminescent fact or goal which wise men and the statesmen of genius will see clearly without fear of being wrong. It is an emphasis or rhetorical tool the employment of which will safeguard men and nations from dangerously aspiring for the millennium or for the final victory of good over evil. The view of the national interest as rhetorical tool may be opposed by some interpreters of Morgenthau; it may be justified in the following manner. As Morgenthau points out, very often the utopian-moralist will support or adopt policies that are basically in the national interest. But he is not influenced by his theory to apply a principal of limitations. He thus seeks a complete victory over the enemy. The realist, on the other hand, with his theory constantly in mind will know that complete victory will always be denied to him. His problem is to find the pattern of accommodation, which is the best that the situation can produce. Men with this theoretical emphasis in mind will seek viable solutions in the historical continuum; they seek continuity and growth, rather than a disjunctive state of excellence or good beyond their reach, in the course of reaching for which they may achieve chaos, the product of their basically catastrophic assumptions.

Now Morgenthau's accents are upon the larger problem of developing a realistic theory of international politics coming as close as possible to the "is" without asserting more than can be asserted by the finite mind. This theory asserts "that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature." It emphasizes, as noted above, the importance as a tool of the concept of the natural interest. It emphasizes that the term down not have a meaning that is fixed once and for all. A realistic theory to Morgenthau now assumes a tension between moral command and political action, whereas formerly he would refer to a political action as successful because it was taken without moral consideration, but rather in terms of the national interest. It will refuse, as always, to identify the moral aspirations of one nation "with the moral laws that govern the universe." These last sentences state in highly condensed form the main aspects of Morgenthau's realistic theory as presented in the new chapter I of *Politics Among Nations*. They indicate, I think, that he is moving away from the idea of a hard-and-fast dichotomy between national interest and morality. The national interest is conceived as a conceptual tool, a device, an abstraction that Morgenthau prefers to other abstractions, such as collective security, the rule of law, and the like. In this theory morality and moral command make a contribution to a realistic appraisal of a situation rather than confuse such an appraisal. And society presents a subject matter concerning which significant abstractions in the form of descriptive laws may be stated in the name of science.

Evaluation

It is possible to criticize Morgenthau's theory in its old as well as its new form. There can be no doubt of the corrective value of Morgenthau's political "realism," not least of all the value of the theory in what I presume to be its old form. It was, in that form, perhaps even more challenging than it is today, and, as he writes his present theory, "there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political." Morgenthau has stimulated a great debate. He has also been executing a small, if not great, retreat from the rather extreme position that originally stimulated that debate. He is to be lauded for his part in accenting these issues; we are much in his debt for his untiring attempt to put consideration of international politics on a basis of realistic appraisal. And the retreat is testimony to the indefatigable energy that he brings to the cause and is further testimony to a candor that is, if not explicit, at least present by implication.

The retreat has been on two fronts. First, he now writes of politics in terms of objective laws derived from human nature. These laws are ones that man may observe in a scientific fashion. And having to do with politics, they are laws discernible to and important in the social sciences. In *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* Morgenthau's thesis is that the social sciences are different in method from the natural sciences because of the position of the observer in the situation observed, making it necessary to go beyond science in arriving at wisdom and knowledge in this area. This stand was, I suggest, like saying, on the one hand, the deity is inscrutable, on the other he commands thus and so. The subject is very large, but it is possible to sketch objections to this position. Scientism may have involved a foolish assumption that man could "create a gigantic social mechanism [which could be placed] at the command of the scientific master." But pessimism concerning man's capacity to do this does not require rejection of the thesis that understanding the laws of nature involves the employment of the same methods as understanding the facts of society. That the results in the social sciences are less precise and conclusive does not support Morgenthau's former thesis. Nor does the fact that man is at once observer and observed, for techniques are available for producing some objectivity in the observation of the observer. The social sciences do not deal with situations that are clearly typical but rather with situations of which the uniqueness is a dominant feature. But the natural sciences cannot produce unqualified constancy of conditions in experiments, nor could the social sciences produce any significant generalizations if the situations with which they deal are entirely unique. Each situation has a basic novelty or uniqueness. It has

not occurred before in exactly the given form. But there are aspects of similarity with preceding situations warranting the suggestion of causal relationships with assurance, if not with the definiteness found in the natural sciences. The differences between the two areas are difference of degree and not of kind. Morgenthau found the method of science inadequate and he counseled going beyond science in the social sciences toward a knowledge based upon a kind of spiritual insight or intuition. I submit that to go beyond the data made available by science is to go into an area of irreducible abstraction, a result that Morgenthau cannot but abhor. Abstraction in the name of science entails the obligation of continuously testing the abstraction, but abstraction like Morgenthau's, in the name of something very like intuition, is not verifiable. On admittedly inadequate evidence, it appears to me that Morgenthau has now modified this position. He is claiming more for science and less for processes of cognition beyond science. This does not significantly weaken his attack upon the excesses of naïve rationalism (influenced by scientism), for it remains possible to point out the dangers in assuming that an abstraction is capable of easy scientific demonstration satisfactory for all time. Modern scientific method is based upon an awareness of the irreducible gap that will remain between scientific law as description and a reality that is always approached but never fully described. At the same time, a determinism may be reappearing in scientific assumptions (for instance, on the basis of Einstein's unified field theory) that will militate against reserving an area in the social sciences within which understanding will not be sought primarily in terms of the principle of causality. Morgenthau's retreat is in keeping with this trend. Moreover, he is getting away from the paradoxical conclusion that more-than-scientific man is realistic and nothing-but-scientific man is utopian. By the same process he gets away from the apparent contradiction of asserting the validity of the more-than-scientific approach to political problems while at the same time counseling a kind of superscientific calculation of power relationships in, for example, a balance of power situation.

The second front of retreat has been with respect to the conception of the national interest. In his initial use of the term, he was not sufficiently aware of the fact that the term "national interest" is an abstraction that will be given differing content depending upon the value preferences of the observer. Even though national security or national survival will be the abstract goal posited, the statement of the best ways of achieving this goal—i.e., the national interest in certain circumstances—will vary depending upon the individual observer. The national interest, even as defined by Morgenthau, cannot be given content without the intrusion of values or personal moral views. Thus,

although there may be a higher morality involved in pursuing the national interest as calculated in realistic terms, there is also the manifestation of morality in the very act of definition. Morgenthau's own conception of the national interest has no special claim to validity. There certainly are Americans who do not define the national interest as requiring the preservation of the balance of power in Europe or Asia, or as requiring the hegemony of the United States in the Western hemisphere. Given our particular conception of the role of this nation, we may not regard them as good Americans. They may picture survival in a warped and negative way. But there is no scientific method, even in Morgenthau's own system, by which their preferences may be demonstrated to be inferior or his to be superior. He may assert that he, defining national interest in terms of power, seeks survival of this nation in realistic, and therefore viable, terms. But others who do not define the national interest in terms of power may just as cogently proclaim the validity of their preferences, even though this validity is not determined by scientific test.

There are other criticisms of Morgenthau's theory. He is correct in pointing out the danger in relying upon abstractions as a safeguard of peace. We would be well-advised, however, to note that *Realpolitik* has also been inadequate to achieve a permanent peace in a world of nation-states. *Realpolitik* is probably a stronger safeguard of peace than utopianism, but a third alternative exists. With a full realization of the difficulties in the way man must, in my opinion, seek to build an international world community. Until recently Morgenthau had not made a contribution to the maintenance of peace or helped us to see the difficulties to be encountered. In the revision of chapter I of *Politics Among Nations* he agrees that we must grasp every opportunity to achieve this end, but this is a new, albeit welcome, development. Until recently then, Morgenthau has not offered anything new as a means of understanding reality and controlling events. Since we are in a situation that is *sui generis*, absolutely demanding, in the interest of survival, resolution of conflict before general war begins, more than conceptual means are required. If they are not available, then indeed we may say that the condition of man is tragic.

A high degree of faith is required for the acceptance of Morgenthau's conclusion that the superscientific calculations of a realist will correctly reveal the relative strengths of nations in a balance of power situation. Given Morgenthau's own earlier assumptions concerning the limitations of science, it is difficult to see how his realist could assess the significance of the military factor in a power equation. In fact, the preoccupations of the realist may be so thoroughly with naked power that he may be obsessed with its accretion or with preventing its acquisition by others and thus precipitate the very catastrophe

he seeks to avoid. The trouble is that all realists are not on the same level of wisdom or efficiency. And a utopian may be less dangerous than an inefficient realist. It may be countered that an inefficient realist is a contradiction, but I can only retort that tests of efficiency in this area are likely to be the very results his policy is supposed to avoid. An iron law may demand having regard for the national interest in fashioning foreign policy, but it is an odd iron law that is honored as often in the breach as in the performance. Utopians may more frequently neglect the national interest than do realists (as realists define the national interest), but the difficulty of calculating being what it is in international politics, the realist may conceivably fail where the utopian succeeds. And the tragedy would be that one would not know until the results were in. In fact, one may develop a suspicion that he will be accounted a realist by the test of success or failure. This may be a *bona fide* test, but it is often too late in the game, if one wishes to take preventive action.

On his altered ground, however, Professor Morgenthau seems to me no better prepared to go forward in the more effective service of national survival. Whereas, while once in attacking abstractions, he employed one of his own, the “national interest”; whereas, once, in attaching over-reliance upon science as incompatible with necessary scientific humility, he went beyond science to make statements about what he implied was inscrutable; now, he employs the “national interest” as a tool and asserts both more for science and less about our capacity to know the world beyond science.

I know not that Professor Morgenthau would agree with all that precedes. I know only that it is what he seems to be saying when he attempts concretely to communicate his views. Concerning the changing emphasis on the national interest there is little doubt. Concerning his attitude toward science, the question is not so clear. I have, therefore, included in this paper the main body of the thesis with regard to science that he sets forth in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, while at the same time suggesting that he may be modifying it. Until he does so explicitly, it remains an important part of his attack upon the rationalist-utopian-idealist-liberal.

Digest of Discussion

The chairman called the meeting to order and proposed that the group first take up Morgenthau’s contribution to international relations theory and then proceed to the more general theoretical problems relevant to Morgenthau’s approach. The chairman called upon Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.

The Theory of Hans J. Morgenthau

Mr. Lipsky remarked that, in line with the procedure agreed upon at the previous meeting, the working paper before the group attempted to present a brief exposition of Morgenthau's theory and then proceeded to a critique of that theory. Morgenthau's claim to the group's attention was, in part, due to the positive, provocative point of view he has presented and the great debate which he has stimulated among academicians.

In defining the basis of Morgenthau's theory, Mr. Lipsky continued, one should return to his earlier work *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* rather than the more recent *In Defense of the National Interest*. Morgenthau asserts that his theory comprises an organic unity and in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* one finds the basis for Morgenthau's critique of the utopian school. It is there that Morgenthau develops the conception that "scientism," as he defines it, leads, in the field of international politics, to utopianism and moral dogmatism. Morgenthau finds such "scientism" inadequate for producing answers to questions of foreign policy. Rather, Morgenthau asserts the existence of a reality beyond the application of the scientific method to politics. In *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* the "realist" (as opposed to the "scientific utopian") possesses an insight and wisdom based upon intuitive values and preferences. The more-than-scientific man offers policy advice designed to protect or further these values.

With regard to the national interest, which is a basic concept in the "realist's" position, Morgenthau seems to be shifting his position, Mr. Lipsky observed. Originally he believed the notion had tangible and clear content. But in the galley proofs of chapter I of the forthcoming revised edition of *Politics Among Nations*, he regards the concept as a tool for understanding the phenomena of international affairs. Moreover he places this concept in the context of the larger problem of developing a realistic theory of international politics.

Thus Morgenthau has modified his views. As originally stated, the national interest is self-defining and self-evident to the "realistic" political scientist. Fundamentally, this version of the national interest was concerned with the protection of the territory, population, and welfare of the state. Hence, "national interest" meant the security of the nation. But it is apparent that the national interest, so stated, is a subjective abstraction that will receive differing content depending on the outlook of the individual employing it.

In conclusion, Mr. Lipsky said, Morgenthau has performed a useful service by steering academic thinking toward a more realistic appraisal of the nature of world politics and by focusing attention on the very basic problem

of national aspiration. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Morgenthau's more-than-scientific man operates on the basis of value preferences and that the dichotomy of scientific-utopianism vs. realism is not a clear one. In this sense, Morgenthau is subject to the same criticism that can be levelled at Carr.

The chairman thanked Mr. Lipsky for his introductory remarks. He asked whether Mr. Thompson cared to add anything to Mr. Lipsky's appraisal.

Mr. Thompson observed that the problems raised by Morgenthau's analysis had doubtless disturbed all of those present, as well as Morgenthau, because they were decisive problems. It would appear fair to say, Mr. Thompson continued, that Morgenthau regards the problem of the national interest in two distinct ways and it would be misleading to conclude that Morgenthau has shifted ground if by that is meant the abandonment of either notion.

The first notion is the assertion that the concept of the national interest possesses a certain, recognizable, objective content. Professor W. T. R. Fox, in his study of international relations research in the US between the wars, points out that it was considered to be almost a mark of infamy for a political scientist to be concerned with problems of national security. Virtually all academicians were devoting their attention to transnational subjects and preferred to study, for example, collective security rather than national security. The content of world politics was divided into "good" international subjects and "bad" national subjects. In this context, Morgenthau has served a useful purpose by emphasizing the elementary urge of the nation-state to seek survival. Morgenthau has insisted that this is a valid subject for national inquiry.

Morgenthau bases his contention that the national interest concept possesses objective content upon historical experiences with reference, for example, to British and American foreign policy. Mr. Thompson recalled a recent remark by Mr. Dean Rusk to the effect that every action of the Eisenhower administration to date has been a continuation of the policies of the Truman administration, the current desire to reduce global troop commitments being a case in point. Thus domestic political passions and alleged partisan approaches to the conduct of foreign policy fade away when the party in opposition assumes responsibility. The continuity of British foreign policy through Conservative and Socialist regimes is another case in point. Historical experience therefore points to the existence and persistence of an objective national interest which is recognizable and capable of being pursued.

The national interest, Mr. Thompson said, is therefore more than an intellectual tool. It has objective, rational content. Great Britain best illustrates the nation that pursues its national interest; Germany, in twice ignoring the hazards of a two-front war, illustrates the nation which has violated its national interest.

Secondly, Mr. Thompson noted, Morgenthau does not focus attention on the national interest as such, but rather argues that it is a persistent continuing factor in international politics. Just as domestic policy revolves about group or regional interests, the national interest is a concrete example of the political process at the international level.

The chairman thanked Mr. Thompson. He remarked that, in his opinion, a few problems relating to Morgenthau's theory remained to be clarified. One was Morgenthau's concept of realism as it applied to theory. A second was Morgenthau's concept of the national interest in terms of its pre-suppositions, rather than in terms of attacking or defending the concept.

Professor Strausz-Hupé did not think that an inherent contradiction existed between science and intuition as postulated by Morgenthau. Morgenthau's need to transcend science is, in fact, a resumption of the scientific method he had just attacked. Professor Holborn expressed disagreement with the statement in the working paper to the effect that the scientist cannot repeat some of the characteristics of the German philosophical tradition with its distinction between the natural and cultural sciences. Probably Morgenthau would be more at ease if he could express himself in German terminology.

Scientism and Realism

Professor Wolfers remarked that when Morgenthau came to America the utopian school dominated American academic thinking. Morgenthau evidently felt that the school based its orientation on a theory grounded in the scientific method. He rebelled against this, pointing out that political decisions cannot be reached by simply applying abstract generalizations to problems of foreign policy. In this, Morgenthau is correct, although he designated the utopian orientation as "scientism" because he is addressing his critique to people who he thinks regard themselves as being scientific.

Mr. Thompson felt that Morgenthau's juxtaposition of science and politics could be clarified by redesignating it as a juxtaposition of metaphysics. Mr. Thompson illustrated the point by a quotation from Burke which Morgenthau was fond of referring to. Mr. Thompson believed that an ultimate reliance upon prudence, common sense, and mature wisdom was central and intrinsic to Morgenthau's thought. General precepts and aspirations will only be of minor help when it comes to choosing specific alternatives. Wise judgment must play a role, although there is a tendency to write this off in *ex post facto* studies of decision making. But in examining history one finds that the political assumptions made by the solitary statesman really partake of a special kind of de-

cision making. Mr. Henry L. Stimson has remarked, Mr. Thompson recalled, that it was his experience that the State Department conducted lengthy deliberations on unimportant matters and decided major issues in periods of abrupt crisis. While it is always useful to perfect knowledge and methodology, sound decision making must contain an indispensable measure of prudence in the last analysis.

Mr. Niemeyer remarked that Morgenthau's theory seemed to lead to reliance upon the political judgment of the great man. There can only be recourse to the great man because, according to Morgenthau, his prescriptions for policy are the national interest.

The National Interest

Moreover, Mr. Niemeyer continued, Morgenthau never defines the national interest in terms having clear implication for policy. He never states why, for example, the neutralization of Germany is more in the national interest than some other policy toward Germany.

Mr. Niemeyer also doubted whether the historical experience previously cited provided adequate criteria for determining when a nation was pursuing its national interest. If Britain is the prime example of single-minded devotion to the national interest, was it pursuing that interest at the time of Munich? Is Britain strong and wealthy now because of her success in serving its national interests? How can one choose policy as being in the national interest?

Professor Strausz-Hupé ventured that it was easier to define the concept negatively. One can assert, for example, that it is not in the interest of a nation to commit suicide. But when one tries to define the concept in positive terms one runs into conditioning factors which make a clear-cut description most difficult. As for defining the national interest by allusion to British diplomatic history, this does not satisfy the question as to whether Britain pursued a certain policy because it was in its national interest or for some other reason.

With reference to the observation that Great Britain furnished an example of the successful pursuit of the national interest while Germany illustrated the opposite, the chairman wondered whether Hitler did not believe he was serving Germany's interest when he attacked Russia. Could it not be argued that, with Britain isolated and driven from the continent, with his armies flush from successive victories, the moment had come to eliminate his last European rival? The chairman therefore wondered if judgments as to whether a decision was or was not in the national interest were not *ex post facto* evaluations depending upon the consequences of the decision.

Mr. Thompson, addressing himself to Mr. Niemeyer's remark on the neutralization of Germany, stated that Morgenthau did not hold that such a policy defined America's interest with regard to Germany. Rather, Morgenthau felt that it was in the American interest to create and maintain a balance of power in Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The question thus reduces itself to a rational discussion of the best of several alternatives for implementing this objective. Statesmen will, of course, differ on that point but such differences will have a common point of reference—the national interest in preserving a balance of power.

With regard to the continuity of Great Britain's pursuit of its national interest, Mr. Thompson observed, this can be examined by reviewing the many common elements in the speeches of successive British statesmen from Pitt to Churchill, by the fact that modern Britain has never been invaded, nor with the exception of the past two wars, seriously threatened. These facts indicate something about the wisdom of British policy over the long run. The citation of a few obvious exceptions does not invalidate a general proposition.

Political Motivation

Professor Wolfers believed that two general points could be made about Morgenthau's analysis. First, Morgenthau sees the political process as the conflict and resolution of interest, whether on the domestic or at the international level. People are motivated by interests and seek to promote their interests. The central government, in turn, is the agency for promoting the national interest through its foreign policy. Diplomacy is therefore the process of defining and pursuing the national interest and not, as Morgenthau interprets the utopians, of serving "good" or defeating "bad" moral aspirations.

The second point, Professor Wolfers went on, is how can one determine what these interests are. It is possible, perhaps, to define certain irreducible interests—the interest to survive, for example, or the interest of holding onto what one has. But these interests do not exhaust the possibilities. Some nations are willing to withdraw and make concessions while others pursue acquisitive policies. Thus while Morgenthau was correct in his criticism of American academic utopianism, it is also questionable how far one can go in analyzing the behavior of nations in terms of interests. Beyond the quest for survival, the concept is elusive and open to a variety of alternatives.

Professor Strausz-Hupé agreed and pointed out that while a certain irreducible national interest exists for each nation, great difficulty arises in attempting to apply the national interest concept to concrete decision making.

Most foreign policy decisions are ad hoc estimates based on ad hoc circumstances and not on any abstract notion of the national interest.

Professor Wolfers felt that, for practical purposes, the national interest concept had an immediate if not inclusive validity. Policy makers in Washington are clearly concerned with the problem of not being defeated in a war. If someone should propose to solve the German problem by handing Western Germany over to the Soviet Union, their immediate reaction would be “we simply cannot afford it.” This is an interest evaluation. Thus, within certain limits, the issues are fairly clear and policy conclusions fairly recognizable.

Mr. Niemeyer observed that the desire of the US to survive *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union might, in the context of the present discussion, be implemented in two ways. The utopian school would view the Soviet threat as an ideological one and would propose countermeasures aimed at undermining communist ideology. The national interest school, on the other hand, would view the Soviet Union as an imperialist power which was using ideology as one of a number of weapons in pursuit of an expansionist policy. At issue are two interpretations of the world political situation. By what process does Morgenthau claim the latter view to be the correct one?

Mr. Thompson said that the question involved an evaluation as to whether ideology *per se* had political substance or whether it became politically relevant only when it was embodied in a nation-state. Mr. Thompson felt that Morgenthau failed to appreciate that ideology is more than just a weapon. Rather ideological-moral factors can become vital components of a national power complex.

Mr. Lipsky held that the group’s discussion had been progressing on an alarming number of levels. He raised the question as to whether Morgenthau’s views met the test of being a complete theoretical system. Any exposition, regardless of its form, must be submitted to the test of philosophical adequacy, primarily some test based on a theory of knowledge. Any discussion of such an exposition, e.g., that of Morgenthau, should be primarily concerned with applying such a test.

Mr. Thompson expressed the view that such an approach would not contribute significantly to an understanding of Morgenthau. Morgenthau himself maintains that he is not a philosopher and hence not engaged in building a theoretical system. Morgenthau operates below the level of true political philosophy.

Professor Wolfers felt that even if one conceded Morgenthau’s analysis of political motivation there remained the problem of interpreting the national

interest. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, believes that individual freedom is the basic issue of world politics while Morgenthau insists that survival is the important criteria. With the growth of an international community, Professor Wolfers remarked, Morgenthau may become obsolete. As the nation loses importance as the custodian of human interests, transnational interests will become controlling.

Mr. Wasson pointed out that the “nation” part of the phrase “national interest” should be clearly defined. History has shown, as in the separation of Belgium and Holland, that the survival of the nation is not necessarily the expression of the minimum popular desire and that dissolution may be in the interest of each part. Mr. Wasson imagined that similar sentiments could be found in the Ukraine, for example. Thus there should be a clearer understanding of the “nation” as well as the “interest” in evaluating Morgenthau.

Transnational Interests

Miss Fosdick questioned Morgenthau’s assumption that national interests inevitably bring nations into opposition to one another. This, she felt, resulted in a false realism. Morgenthau overlooks the factors which bring nations together in pursuit of their separate interests. He does not recognize the fact that nations can share interests or the existence of common interests. The community of interest which the US shares with Western Europe is a case in point. Morgenthau’s theory seemed to be inadequate for sound policy planning.

Mr. Thompson noted that since the interests of even the closest allies do not run parallel, the job of statesmanship is that of bringing them together. Morgenthau, however, devotes so much emphasis to the study of the US interest that he does not sufficiently consider the interests of other nations. Moreover, he did not treat the subject of collective security adequately. In Mr. Thompson’s opinion, such action was more than mere transient accommodation to an ad hoc situation. The community of interest which has been built up between this nation and Western Europe has more substance.

The chairman wondered whether Morgenthau viewed a nation’s share of a common interest as that nation’s national interest. Professor Wolfers observed that Morgenthau dealt with a billiard-ball world in which the nation is a self-contained unity and in which morality is limited to the nation. Miss Fosdick felt that in protesting against the utopian presupposition of a universal morality, Morgenthau had gone too far to the other direction.

Political Power

Professor Strausz-Hupé expressed the opinion that Morgenthau's "national interest" might be more meaningfully expressed by the phrase "raison d'état" or the reasons given by a ruling group for its continued existence. Professor Wolfers agreed but felt that the state should be substituted for ruling group. Morgenthau, in this sense, is a theoretical descendent of Machiavelli's theory of the Prince which subsequently, at the hands of Hegel, became the State.

Mr. Thompson pointed out that with the emergence of democratic states the factor of popular consent appears. The chairman wondered whether the interest of the people was included in the national interest and whether a distinction existed between the national interest and the interest of the government. Professor Wolfers observed that Morgenthau was insufficiently versed in Lasswell. If one says that a nation "wants" something the expression is clearly metaphysical. Furthermore, people are not, as Morgenthau assumes, wholly preoccupied with the preservation of their nation's sovereignty, nor with a craving for power. While it may be true for certain nations at certain times it is not the psychology of people everywhere at every time. Mr. Wasson noted that a power motivation theory certainly seemed to correctly explain phenomena like Napoleon or Hitler.

Mr. Niemeyer referred to Morgenthau's assumption that nations wish to survive and therefore attempt, through foreign policy, to produce conditions conducive to survival rather than to further any particular ideals. In Mr. Niemeyer's opinion this juxtaposition of realism vs. idealism was false since in defining a particular national interest one is always presented with a moral problem involving moral choice.

Mr. Thompson remarked that many seemed to assume that because Morgenthau discussed power he must like it. This attitude often implied that power is evil. The liberal position, according to Mr. Thompson, is that the moral content of power depends on the ends for which it is used. Anyone who has raised a child knows the dangers of abusing power. Morgenthau's viewpoint that human existence includes a struggle for power among individuals seems to be correct, and is just as apparent on the university campus as elsewhere. On the international level some nations simply wish to survive while others are striving to expand. Diplomacy is the craft of recognizing and finding ways of accommodating these conflicts.

In response to a question concerning whether Britain was seeking to maximize its power at Munich, Professor Holborn stated that Chamberlain certain-

ly believed that he was advancing Britain's national interest and conserving British power. This remark prompted the query, "What, then, is power?"

Criteria for Theory

Upon reconvening, the chairman proposed that the group consider issues behind Morgenthau's approach, especially with reference to the problem of constructing an informing theory of international relations. He called upon Professor Kaufmann.

Professor Kaufmann estimated that Morgenthau was about as useful as Carr for the purpose of analyzing the international relations process. Morgenthau confuses, Professor Kaufmann felt, his position as an observer with that of a would-be policy maker. Some of the questions which a theory of international relations should attempt to handle include the nature of the political process, the forces which influence its development, the indeterminate which must be recognized, the latitude which remains for the exercise of choice, and the values to be served in weighing alternatives.

The chairman called upon Mr. Church, who suggested that the construction of a realistic theory of the forces which determine the national interest might begin with an examination of the decisions and the steps that were taken to promote this country's interest over a period of its history, say from 1800 to 1820. A study of this sort would give the theorist a series of facts which would be susceptible to analysis and development in terms of a theory. The national interest could be surmised from the decisions which were taken and the end results that were sought.

In response to a question from the chairman, Mr. Church expressed the view that a realistic theory first had to begin with the facts and proceed to concepts and conclusions. Mr. Diebold thought that the question as to how the national interest was conceived during a given period was essentially a historical problem. The national interest at one period would not necessarily hold true for another. Mr. Church and Mr. Diebold agreed that study of that kind ought to proceed on the bases of the facts as then known to the policy makers.

The chairman observed that John Dewey had once used the same method and had devoted the first chapter of a book to a study of the facts. However, the theory he developed in the subsequent chapters bore no relation to the opening chapter.

Conflicts of Interest

Professor Wolfers, referring to a study of interest groups and the Saint Lawrence seaway project, noted that every group had justified its positions as being in the national interest. In fact, several groups had reversed themselves yet in both instances had maintained that their position served the national interest. The late Professor Beard had thus concluded that the national interest is a metaphysical expression and that only group interests have validity. But still, toward the end of his book, Beard implies that a national interest does exist but is extremely resistant to definition.

In theory, Professor Wolfers continued, the president is responsible for the nation as a whole and makes decisions in the common interest. But by what process does he reach decisions; how does he weigh conflicting pressures? Moreover, Americans expect him to advance the interest of the nation, yet are not transnational interests also involved?

Mr. Niemeyer said that while the people support group interests, the president is in the unique position of being responsible to the people as a whole and is therefore capable of acting in the common interest. The chairman wondered whether the president was also interested in seeing his party returned to office. Mr. Diebold felt that while the president may rise above partisan considerations in reaching a decision, the decision may be to the advantage of particular groups as well. Mr. Thompson believed that the president makes decisions in a political context composed of two elements: first, the partisan one which any negotiator faces; and second, the abstract one of serving the commonwealth.

Mr. Roberts remarked that in his own thinking about the problem, he had found the following model to be helpful: a father is seated with his family in a crowded theater when smoke is smelled and the suspicion of fire grows among the increasingly restless audience. The problem confronts the father of whether to seek to quiet the growing panic and encourage the orderly withdrawal of the audience, including his family, or whether to insure the safety of his family at the expense of everyone else, creating a panic in the process wherein many perish. Statesmen often face such situations and their first obligation is toward the nation. Yet in carrying out this obligation they may cause the total situation to deteriorate. . . . In international affairs one always seems to be in the theater and there is always smoke in the air. In the last analysis the decision seems to depend upon the use of judgment because no particular general observation seems to provide a solution to the dilemma.

Professor Wolfers observed that political scientists would like to be able

to perform two functions: the capacity for fairly accurate prediction and the capacity to make constructive political choice. In the present example, however, the government has no choice; it must always act egocentrically. He also pointed out that Mr. Roberts' illustration contained a third alternative in which the father created a panic and, in so doing, sacrificed his family as well.

Professor Wolfers asked whether the king of Belgium had been justified in surrendering to the Germans, thus relieving his country but jeopardizing the Allied cause. Here was a conflict of national and transnational interests. Mr. Niemeyer felt that the issue could also be argued solely in nationalistic terms since Belgium's national honor was also involved. Mr. Niemeyer raised the question as to the extent to which a government is responsible to the values of the people. He felt a dichotomy existed between the physical powers of the nation on the one hand and its moral values on the other.

It was observed that Hitler, perhaps the most nationalistic ruler of this era, insisted on continued German resistance and sacrifice long beyond the point where it served German welfare. Professor Wolfers suggested that Hitler probably felt that survival was worse than defeat. The chairman noted that Hitler, in the early edition of *Mein Kampf*, scorned the German people and applauded the race. He conceived his role as that of leading the people back to their racial destiny. Thus Hitler viewed the military defeat as Germany's punishment for radical failure. In general, the chairman observed, fanatical leaders and philosophers care more for abstract ideals than human beings.

Conclusions

Professor Kaufmann posed the question, apart from Morgenthau's approach to the problem of national interest, as to what constitutes the specifications of a basic theory of international relations. The chairman felt that the group was approaching an answer through a critique of existing theories and the problems which they raised. Professor Kaufmann thought that the existing theories provided the group with such convenient targets that a danger existed of not moving ahead constructively. The chairman wondered whether a theory of the national interest would not necessarily be one of the pillars of any informing theory of international relations.

Professor Holborn expressed the view that there had been little direction to the group's discussion that evening. While it is common to assume, as Morgenthau does, that the formulation of a theory of foreign policy involves an assessment of the interests of the nation-state, the phenomenon of the nation-

state is limited to about two hundred years of man's historical experience. This suggests the need for a broader interpretation of political behavior. Earlier political concepts are relevant to modern political theory. One such concept is the ethical sanction, which forms the basis of government. The concept implies that political obedience is not enforced by threat or actual violence but by persuasion in a religious and ethical sense. In the Middle Ages politics did not concern the majority of the community. Government was sanctioned by religion. Thereafter policy had to be justified by reference to an ethical ideal.

The utopian academicians, referred to by Morgenthau, are dealing with the ideals and nostalgia of their age when they assert a relationship between ethics and politics, Professor Holborn continued. Moreover, to distinguish between ethics and politics is completely artificial. The problem of ethical ends and the realistic conditions for the realization of ideals is a continuous one. Morgenthau's theory is weak because, in the rationalist tradition, he attempts to separate the two. No government could possibly convert its people to imperialistic or altruistic policies were it not able to arouse the loyalties and ideological commitments of the people involved. Hence a theory of international relations must deal with operative ideal factors. The chairman agreed. Government must be able to evoke at the least values, if not ideals. Mussolini, for example, did not call upon the Italians to sacrifice themselves to him but for Italy.

Mr. Thompson asserted that Professor Holborn's remarks had reached the root of the problem and pointed up a defect in Morgenthau's theory. General moral principles affect the pursuit of the national interest in three ways, he believed. (1) They place limits upon the range of choice open to a state; hence the most expedient policy may not be a morally feasible one. The impossibility of America precipitating a preventive war can be cited as an example. (2) Moral principles fortify the policies of nation-states. President Grayson Kirk is correct in stating that they have indigenous power. The Atlantic alliance, for example, has an ethical core which increases its substantive strength. (3) Moral principles tend to filter into the policies of nation-states, giving them direction and moral content. While it is easy to exaggerate the influence of morality on policy, it does make a difference when Churchill can affirm that the West fought for a principle in the war.

With reference to Professor Kaufmann's doubts as to whether Morgenthau's analysis constituted a theory, Professor Wolfers felt that Morgenthau's investigation into the nature of the national interest had the elements of a theory. A theory need not be complete. Professor Holborn and Wolfers discussed the differences between history and theory. They agreed that one

was primarily concerned with empirical investigation and the other metaphysical.

Mr. Thompson, referring to the relatively short historical era of the nation-state mentioned by Professor Holborn, noted that Toynbee had found that the ancient city-states had behaved in many ways similar to their modern counterparts.

With regard to the doubts expressed by some members that the discussion was not progressing in a sufficiently cohesive and purposeful manner, Mr. Thompson felt that the group should not attempt to be too self-conscious about its objectives. Moreover, most of the theoreticians under review were not methodologists. Professor Kaufmann felt that the group was devoting too much attention to analysis of theories of lesser importance. He did not think that the discussion of the national interest concept had advanced matters very far in terms of elaborating a better theory.

The chairman believed that the present discussion had been useful if only that it enables one to avoid easy conceptual traps such as "realism." It is necessary, in a task of this kind, to clear the ground a little and to clarify one's terms and know their ambiguities. He remembered reading a passage in a book by Professor W. T. R. Fox in which the author had treated international politics as analogous to that of a forest populated by elephants and squirrels. But in what sense, the chairman wondered, was a nation an "elephant" or another a "squirrel"? This only held true for power relationships but what did it mean in terms of national interests and objectives?

Mr. Niemeyer expressed the view that economic theory might provide an indication of the task which confronted political theory. Modern economic theory has evolved from its moral-philosophical origins of two hundred years ago into a system of considerable success, especially in terms of capacity for reasonably accurate prediction. If one starts with the presupposition that economic theory is the theory of allocating scarce resources to economic ends then political is the theory of allocating scarce resources to moral ends, or in other words, the relation of proposed actions to proposed values. This is the tentative task of political theory.

At this point, the chairman brought the discussion to a close. After consulting with the group, it was agreed that the next meeting would be held on February 4 and take up Lasswell. The group would next meet on March 4 to discuss Marxism and Schumpeter.

John Blumgart
Rapporteur

Notes for Working Paper No. 2

1. Percy E. Corbett, "National Interest, International Organization and American Foreign Policy," *World Politics* (Oct. 1952): 46.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, "International Organization and Foreign Policy," *Foundations of World Organization* (1952): 377.
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1951).
4. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 202.
5. *Ibid.*, 2.
6. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4.
7. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 9.
8. *Ibid.*, 220.
9. I am aware that in some subsequent works Morgenthau leaves an impression that he might write *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* differently today.
10. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 221.
11. *Ibid.*, 223.
12. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Positive Approach to a Democratic Ideology," *Academy of Political Science Proceedings* 24 (Jan. 1951), 79.
13. *Loc. cit.*
14. *Ibid.*, 80–81.
15. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 43.
16. *Loc. cit.*
17. *Ibid.*, 61–62.
18. *Ibid.*, 51.
19. *Ibid.*, 52.
20. *Ibid.*, 69.
21. *Ibid.*, 71.
22. *Ibid.*, 74.
23. *Ibid.*, 95–95.
24. *Ibid.*, 72.
25. *Ibid.*, 95.
26. *Ibid.*, 112.
27. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Escape from Power in the Modern World," in *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture*, ed. R. M. MacIver et al., 7–8 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947).
28. *Ibid.*, 6.
29. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 21.
30. *Ibid.*, 14.
31. [DM—The archival transcript includes some errors here. There is no footnote 31 in the text but there is a 32 located here. The missing reference 31 is to Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, 9–10. The appropriate reference here is Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States," *American Political Science Review* (Dec. 1952), 971.]

Third Meeting: The Theory of Harold D. Lasswell, February 4, 1954

The third meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Relations was held at the Harold Pratt House, Thursday, February 4, 1954, at 5:30 p.m. The topic was the theory of Harold D. Lasswell. At the end of the discussion, the group also considered next steps, and had a short discussion about the general nature of the theory of international relations. Present were: Hajo Holborn, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; William W. Kaufmann; Grant McClellan; Charles Marshall; Isidor I. Rabi; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Arnold Wolfers.

Working Paper No. 3

Prepared by George Lipsky

The critic is almost disposed to refer to the writings of Harold D. Lasswell as Sir Desmond McCarthy referred to those of James Joyce when he contended that Joyce had devised a special vocabulary and syntax for communicating only with himself and a limited group of *cognoscenti*. There is no doubt that Lasswell's purpose has been to increase his capacity to be meaningful to the audience to which he addresses himself by many refinements of language and definition presumed to be working toward economy and logic of connotation. Despite an impression that he sometimes creates of having embodied simple truisms in needlessly technical language, Lasswell on the whole is engaged in a process of refinement of language valuable to himself and to those whose rapport with him perhaps derives from similar sources, not least of which is interest in the psychic basis of human relations.

Lasswell's basic emphasis is upon the tools (symbols) men employ in the process of thinking and upon how those tools may be manipulated for the better achievement of the goals (values) Lasswell deems to be good. In this context symbols are words and values and are, quite conventionally, situations (Lasswell calls them events) upon which assessments of goodness or badness may be made. In his earlier career, Lasswell as a scholar hesitated to state what the goals of the scientist should be, but he has now developed a methodology which makes it not only appropriate but essential to state values that it is the scientist's aim to create or to realize. The reasons for this conclusion are manifold. Surely one is that Lasswell has a personal preference for the social situations he wishes to create and maintain. Second, whatever those goals might be, it is important to state and work for them in the development of a social consensus and attendant security. These are themselves values, since they enhance survival. He seeks a scientific validation of values, although he remains positivistic in his basic philosophical position.¹

Through the social sciences Lasswell proposes to tell society what policies ought to be pursued. He also says that "the political scientist [can] offer reliable advice concerning the means that ought to be used to achieve" the goals that a society posits for itself. The advice that the social scientist can give on both these matters possesses a "higher degree of truth probability than the uncommon common sense of the statesman."² Lasswell is, therefore, at a pole apart from Morgenthau, for he makes the most extreme claim that can be made on behalf of science. Whereas his earlier phase was a conventional one in which he concentrated upon the study and description of power, now he appears to "convert political science to a policy science . . . , in terms of new referential principles." Even more, "there appears in embryo the further claim that even the goals upon which social policy must be based can be established with procedures of a fully developed science of man."³ This position has a pedigree of at least three centuries; it perhaps runs the risk of becoming a closed system that excludes relevant factors, but its challenge can hardly be denied.

In the current global struggle, Lasswell would have the social scientist manipulate political society with a full awareness of the available techniques at his disposal. The achievement of world organization, representing a real world community, is absolutely essential for human survival, although he does not prophesy the exact form that must appear. He states merely the contingent possibilities. At all times the social manipulator must be aware of the factor of timing. If he presses too vigorously for world organization and, therefore, "out-runs the growth of strong sustaining elements in world society, collapse will merely follow."⁴ The social manipulator should also foresee that before this

collapse of world organization comes, “the political elite, fearful of secession and revolution [will almost certainly create] a state which is not only a world garrison state, dominated by the military, but a world prison state dominated by the police.”⁵ On the other hand, if men are slow in working toward the goal of world organization, that is if they lag behind the condition that can be achieved by political skill “at any particular time, humanity will remain under the shadow of atomic disaster.” Several emphases must be pointed out here: One is, of course, the belief that an international organization of an effective type can and must be achieved. Second is the view that the achievement thereof must be in accord with certain underlying configurations in society. Third is the assumption that decision making can take the necessary conditions into account and achieve the desired results. Lasswell appears to be moved by apprehension concerning the threat of the police or prison state and a high degree of optimism concerning the capacity of wise men to meet this threat.

In the Lasswellian system politics becomes enlarged. Its scope is suggested by the definition that “politics is the science and art of management.”⁶ The political scientist or the policy scientist must direct his attention and apply his science to all those processes that involve the management of human affairs. This undertaking appears gigantic and at first glance would assume that Lasswell is looking for or presuming to be a universal, omniscient philosopher-king. After inspection, that impression may remain. But Lasswell provides the philosopher-king with a key to understanding man’s nature, his past, present, and future. Politics is all-inclusive, but it can direct its attention to employ means “related to the three levels of personality structure.”⁷ The policy scientist must recognize the extent to which the impulses (id) of man must be given scope and how they may be controlled, the nature and employability of conscience (super ego), and the significance and power of the rational faculties (ego). It is true that “no institutional pattern falls into any pigeon-hole with any more than an approximate fit”;⁸ nothing is pure id, ego, or super ego. One cannot but feel in reading Lasswell that he really believes that men are equipped to “see more clearly how to meet the incessant and perplexing issues of private and public policy with a confidence capable of contributing to the best because it has foreseen the worst.”⁹

Lasswell writes, therefore, in terms of foreseeing the future. He states this future by means of a series of what he calls “developmental constructs.”¹⁰ Some of these constructs suggest the worst that could happen, tested by Lasswell’s values. Others are neutral and quite congruent with the developmental pattern through which freedom may be preserved and extended in the future.

One such construct (which seems to be belaboring a truism) is “that human beings will continue to be affected, and affected to an increasing extent, by one another.”¹¹ This is “the trend toward *interdetermination throughout the world community*.”¹² The trend is based upon both external factors of technology and psychological factors working to fulfill the trend itself and also to counteract it. I shall not attempt here to employ Lasswellian language at its knottiest, but such a sentence as the following states the point: “increased exposure to individuals with whom one is not already identified brings about more intense preoccupation with those with whom one is previously identified (including the primary ego).”¹³

A second developmental construct is “bipolarization.” At first glance one would assume that this would be even in Lasswell’s system related primarily to factors only incidentally psychological. But every problem in this system must fundamentally be stated in psychological terms. Therefore, “Bipolarity is a function of a continuing high level of expected war.” A basic characteristic of world culture today is the expectation of violence. Institutions, therefore, assume a pattern in great measure conditioned by this expectation. The expectation favors the perpetuation of war and those institutional arrangements designed to forestall it or win it once it begins. Though Lasswell considers world organization essential, he believes that the best condition we can hope for some time to come is a continuing condition of bipolarization. He writes, “the prospects of continued peace depend upon maintaining the expectation among the elites of both camps that they have more to gain by continued peace than by any alternative policy, and eventually that they will gain more by extending the area of peaceful co-operation on a global scale than by war preparation.”¹⁴ Lasswell seems optimistic that this process can be worked out if sufficient skill is manifested on both sides.

Closely related to the foregoing is the developmental construct, “militarization.” He states that war may be the outcome of this trend, but he contends also that peace has as often been its product. He, again thinking in psychological terms, suggests that the militarization that results in weapon parity between the two sides in a bipolar world may enhance the prospects of peace.¹⁵ That is to say, weapon parity may convince the elites that accommodation rather than war is the appropriate alternative. On the other hand, militarization (the garrison state, etc.) does not lead to those political conditions that Lasswell supports as good values.

Finally, he sees as a trend the increasing subordination of society to government. To the extent that “centralization is a function of perceived common threat,”¹⁶ this is likely to be the trend in all countries in greater or less degree

depending upon the nature of the political tradition. Elites have acquired the knowledge of how to remove or abolish human privacy including the privacy of the unconscious. An insecure elite in a time of great crisis is impelled to search out secrets “in order to perceive common threats in time for defensive action.” In such a situation the one hope for the defense of freedom may be the tendency of tyrants to fall out among themselves.

Up to this point, no Lasswellian theory of international relations has been depicted in precise terms. Lasswell, in fact, does not present a theory of what the present is producing as a future, except in terms of alternatives. The prospect that he does offer is of a world that can be peaceful, free, and democratic, if men but use the knowledge and the techniques that are available. It will remain a world in which power is a central factor and condition. Lasswell denies that power is inevitably evil in its portent or substance.¹⁷ He asserts no ideal of perfection by reference to which the accomplishments of power must be judged and found evil. “Some of the men of power are among the culture heroes of mankind, the ‘great men’ of history, the ‘lawyers,’ ‘liberators’ and ‘nation founders’; in a word, the statesmen. In this perspective, government and personality . . . [can be] favorably judged.”¹⁸

Lasswell has a “socio-political objective:” to learn and to state how knowledge concerning the interrelation between power and personality can serve human dignity. The social scientist need not remain merely contemplative: he may and should pass to a manipulative phase wherein he devises “ways and means of putting power in the service of a democratic society, a society in which power and respect are shared, and in which other values are made more abundant and accessible to all.”¹⁹ His special problem is, therefore, the study of democratic leadership, the democratic elite. He hopes that that leadership will acquire the techniques necessary to serve democratic survival and, indeed, expansion. His desire is to “make recommendations with more confidence regarding the development of an elite appropriate to the needs of a society that aspires toward freedom.”²⁰

Morgenthau asserts that all men desire power. Lasswell denies this and is at pains to develop a rationale justifying a power drive among those who aspire to leadership in a democratic society. Morgenthau proceeds easily from his exclusive emphasis upon power to a derived emphasis upon power politics. Lasswell’s analysis of human relations is more complex and justifies the use of other, secondary terms in place of the term “power.” This analysis makes plausible the search for an early supernational democratic commonwealth, in which the wielders of power will not possess the characteristics of Genghis Khan, Alexander, Cyrus, or the ruthless restorers of order after a

time of troubles. The task for the manipulative social scientist is to cultivate or create those institutions that will create democratic forms of advocacy. The power holder in a democratic society may have sought power to compensate for his own feelings of inadequacy, but that fact does not prevent his seeking conditions essential to the maintenance of a democratic order. In international politics such a democratic leadership will think more often of shared values than of domination. Within the democratic community there must be a sharing of power and a subordination of it to the dignity of human personality. "The principal expectation contained in democratic ideology is that it is possible to attain universal democracy by bringing into existence on a global scale the equilibrium that has repeatedly been achieved in more parochial communities."²¹

On this score again, Lasswell differs from Morgenthau and Carr. He believes there is a fundamental psychic good health in a situation of democratic equilibrium. It is the duty and task of democratic leadership to enlarge the equilibrium until it becomes global in extent. Such an equilibrium would be freer of destructiveness and therefore of many of the scourges of mankind. In this doctrine there is a plea for a social psychiatry. "It becomes one of, if not coterminous with, the developing sciences of democracy, the sciences that are slowly being evolved in the interest of democratic policy."²² To recognize that this social psychiatry has its *terminus a quo* in value judgments does not undermine the authority of the physician. He will not be merely matching biases with those who may differ with him. In fact, Lasswell's fundamental tenet is that a society maintaining democratic preferences represents a psychically healthier society and, therefore, group of individuals. In a world where those preferences are more and more threatened, a strategy must be developed for using our "limited intellectual resources for the defense and extension of our [democratic] values."²³ "The pressing need, however, is for the mobilizing of motive and skill for the purpose of elaborating the missing links in the chain of analysis and observation which bears most directly upon the maintenance of the social equilibrium of democracy."²⁴

Lasswell is therefore a social (policy) scientist who wishes to instruct democratic and potential democratic elites on how they may "sustain more optimistic expectation of value fulfillment than non-democracies." These elites must learn how to bring the entire community "to the level of equilibrium that sustains democracy."²⁵ "They must construct myths working and crystallizing moral sentiment in favor of democracy as against another form of government and society."²⁶ The democratic personality is the good personality in which low estimates of the self have not been permitted to develop. Demo-

cratic personalities esteem themselves enough to esteem others.²⁷ Democratic man is free because he is free of social anxiety.²⁸

The policy scientist must learn how to reduce social anxiety. The perhaps basic essential is the reduction of fitful bolts and starts in social trends, producing insecurity in terms of safety, income, and deference (status). For example, "Scientific study of the dynamics of business cycles can discover the strategic points where controls can be applied for the purpose of reducing the excessive swings of business and of sustaining high levels of productive employment."²⁹ Thus security or, as Lasswell puts it, high value expectancy can be assured on that level and many related levels. This intermediate goal is of course paramount in those countries where the democratic way is already paramount. In the arena of international politics where the struggle will persist until the victory of one side or the other is achieved, the task is doubly important and much more difficult. But Lasswell has a prescription of sorts in two parts: "Physical Defense, Psychological Offense." Of the two, I assume that his main concern is with the latter. We must vigorously construct or improve an appealing myth structure that can defeat Marxism, "which for a century has won its way not merely by the force of its propaganda but also because it seemed to be vindicated by so many facts."³⁰ The question is how to widen the "socialization of retaliation" (rule of law) in a world of mutual provocation, especially where the prescription used calls for the psychological offensive. The strategy of the democratic policy scientist and statesman "is to arouse and maintain expectations of effectively shared values."³¹ This is especially difficult where the application of the strategy is subject to such interference as the authoritarian opposition can produce.

Lasswell does not see the issue as one between capitalism and socialism, as if these words were interchangeable respectively, with democracy and tyranny. This issue is capitalism *and* socialism against either annihilation or serfdom "in a world of the garrison-prison state."³² The fulfillment that Lasswell desires or that the achievement of democracy requires is the progressive democratization of the world community.³³ This progressive democratization "depends upon finding the ways of dealing with children which do, in fact, aid in the formation of democratic character, transmit democratic perspectives and foster the acquisition of democratic skills."³⁴

Lasswell has been particularly interested, as his bipolarization construct indicates, in the relations between the United States and Russia.³⁵ Earlier he dealt with the "interrelation of world politics and economics in his book *World Politics Faces Economics*.³⁶ In that book he states three major economic goals: (a) high levels of productive employment; (b) a rising standard of well-being;

(c) the attainment of these goals by means compatible with freedom and security.³⁷ The achievement of these goals will in great measure depend upon the world environment. This environment the United States must be prepared to manipulate, even by war if necessary, although when “we engage in war, we do so, not from joy in destruction, but from the overwhelming pressure of conditions that we are determined to abolish.”³⁸ At the same time, if American economic goals (essential to democracy) are to be achieved, there must be no next war.³⁹ (This appears to be a contradiction.) Once upon a time, in the time of cheap wars and even large, although nontotal wars, the expansion of industry and commerce was stimulated by armed conflict.⁴⁰ This is no longer true today. But this fact does not obviate the likelihood of war. In fact, in the presence of too high an expectation of war, war is made more certain. In the face of too low an expectation, aggression is invited. The expectation of violence becomes one of the variables affecting the employment of violence. There is a middle ground, which a policy scientist in control would seek (although Lasswell recognizes it would be difficult to maintain), and that is a firm, composed, and disciplined attitude.⁴¹ The policy scientist can practice a kind of preventative politics, which suggests a rare comprehension and capacity to see the simple psychological key in the complex situation. To be sure, Lasswell does not accent exclusively the psychological factor, but to the degree that he emphasizes psychological security as the key, all other factors become important in relation to that central one.

He speaks conventionally, also, of such conditions as the balance of power and differentiates between the process of balancing and the doctrine of the balance. This distinction is natural and to be anticipated, for in referring to the process, Lasswell can emphasize psychological expectations. “The process of balancing occurs whenever the expectation of violence is important.”⁴² The “doctrine” is the operational theory of those who seek a balance of power. Lasswell writes of the other problems faced by statesmen in a rather conventional and surely not definitive manner. What is important is the extraction from his writings of certain fundamental conclusions that set him apart from important schools of thought in the theory of international relations. For example, he anticipates that a league can be established that “can pass gradually into a legal order in which the expectation and practice of violence occupy a minor position. There can be a frame of security based on consent and sanctioned by force that it is seldom necessary to apply in practice.”⁴³ However, for the near future, he recognizes that America and Russia dominate a global balancing of power.⁴⁴ “They will tend to face one another throughout this globe

on practically every issue.” “America and Russia are the ‘fixed points,’ the ‘polar opposites,’ in the world balancing of power.”⁴⁵ On the whole, starting from his psychological point of orientation, Lasswell achieves considerable success in short-range prophecy and in the description of events. It is not necessary or possible in this paper to indicate the details of such prophecies or descriptions. What is more important is to indicate the manipulative techniques that Lasswell believes may be employed in achieving peace and democratic victory.

A key or a beginning may be indicated by his statement that the “future course of world politics will be affected by feelings of self-respect.”⁴⁶ Self-respect is in considerable degree a function of security. Security can be present only when the impact of factors working upon the world environment does not produce an erratic result. Relating this proposition to economics, Lasswell writes that “unbalanced (predatory, exploitative) industrialization may build up war industry and thus directly exert a deleterious effect on world security.”⁴⁷ On the other hand, balanced industrialization tends to close gaps between government and people. “Social unrest stays at a manageable minimum.”⁴⁸ If we in the United States are able to keep social unrest at a minimum there will be less fear of conspiracies, particularly Russian. The Russians will feel more secure, and, if they feel less menaced, democratic tendencies will be strengthened inside that country.”⁴⁹ In short, we win against the Russians not only through a psychological offensive, but through reducing the Russian sense of insecurity so that the pluralizing forces inherent in any large-scale society can make themselves felt.⁵⁰

All of the above, the process of healthy democratization and consequent improvement in the psychic health of individuals and the nation, will “*improve the efficiency of private choice as an instrument of the common good.*”⁵¹ Throughout these analyses there is Lasswell’s stress upon planning to improve the psychic health of individuals so that they may participate in constructive, democratic decision making on the basis of a sound equilibrium among the three factors, id, super ego, and ego. This equilibrium expresses itself politically and has its foundation also in the economic system: “The system of competitive private enterprise, when actually in operation, provides a decentralized economic basis for freedom.”⁵² Democratic leaders suffer the disadvantage of not being able to manipulate effectively over the entire globe, but they can make beginnings. They may operate directly upon their own societies. There are intermediate areas where much can be done. And there are indirect ways, referred to above, of influencing conditions in the citadel of the enemy himself.

Lasswell’s goals, in the final analysis, are global in extent: “In the long run

a secure, hence a free, America depends upon a secure world, which implies a free world commonwealth.”

“We do well not to conceal from ourselves the drastic nature of the conditions that must be fulfilled if security for free institutions is to be realized on a world scale. Any social process can be conveniently described in terms of *man* pursuing *values* through *institutions* or *resources*. The all-embracing objective of a free society is a commonwealth in which the dignity of man is realized in theory and fact. Values (or categories of preferred events) are the human relationships which are sought and protected. A representative, though not necessarily definitive, list of values includes power, respect, rectitude, and afffection; enlightenment, well-being, skill, wealth.⁵³

Democratic societies do not survive without great energies being directed toward planning for their survival both internally and with relation to other, competing systems. But they are inherently the systems in which the healthiest sharing of values may be accomplished.

Evaluation

As a system, at least as one may judge by the multiplicity of ideas, Lasswell's has too many facets to comprehend in a short paper. His major purpose is to contend for the psychological factor as the underlying one. He regards the social sciences as sciences in the traditional sense, and believes they quite properly can establish goal values as a basic datum in terms of which the means they devise may be judged. These goal values, for example democracy, may be stated as preferences, but his system provides arguments on behalf of certain preferences. Democracy, for Lasswell, is a large term describing a condition of challenge as well as of opportunity to produce other values important to the development of the healthy human personality. Democracy is essentially an equilibrium of sharing on the basis of which destructiveness is reduced to a minimum and human life is preserved under the best circumstances.

I shall not further labor the point, so often made, that Lasswell's style is needlessly pedantic and recondite. It certainly does provide a barrier to understanding and the implementation of his ideas. But a fundamental proposition in his system is clear enough to bear inspection. That is the proposition that the democratic system, as defined by Lasswell, is more compatible than any other with the fully and soundly developed human psyche. Lasswell and Fromm have striven to found ethical systems on a psychological or psychiatric

basis. The approach is essentially Aristotelian in nature; that act or condition is judged good that works for the sound or healthy development of the human personality. However, in my opinion there is no way of determining by empirical verification what is rational, impulsive, or inhibitive in human action. The terms id, ego, and super ego are convenient abstractions suggesting division in human personality that should not be made too precise. In short, there is no test sufficiently precise for determining when the human personality is soundly developed. There probably is a personality that may be described as democratic. I agree with Lasswell that it must love itself enough to love others and therefore desires to serve human dignity. But an authoritarian philosophy could provide reasons why individual men need not hold themselves or others in high esteem, and surely the positivist, Lasswell or any other, must be first to agree that the preferences held by authoritarian personalities are on the same level of validity as those held by the democrat. Destructiveness may be reduced in democratic society. However, the positing of nondestructiveness as an absolute good is not warranted in any fundamental sense, unless some metaphysical grounds are found for asserting absolutely that life is good and the opposite thereof of evil.

Finally, there is suggested in the Lasswellian system a degree and type of symbol and, therefore, of human manipulation that may have democracy as its goal but that may itself be incompatible with democracy as the process of manipulation is pursued. Imagine a group of policy scientists, academic and governmental, self-consciously manipulating conditions, presumed to conduce to democratic values, as well as the minds of men. Such policy scientists, although striving for universal comprehension, remain human. Can we be sure that their brand of democratic brainwashing can remain democratic? With the best will in the world, they may find the material they are using intractable. In their moments of frustration, the manipulative element will become predominant. This will be authoritarian in implication. I should, therefore, like to see Lasswell concentrate now more simply and directly upon the problem of how decision making among the policy scientists can be made compatible with large-scale decision making in the pluralized society.

Despite the above criticism, Lasswell's contribution is or could be enormous. At least here is a forthright attempt to embody a discipline in the social sciences within the framework of science in the conventional sense.

Digest of Discussion

The Theory of Harold D. Lasswell

Mr. Lipsky noted that the first impression gained from reading Lasswell—his use of an unnecessarily abstruse and recondite language—was not substantially modified by more intensive readings. Nevertheless, Lasswell has been attempting to devise a vocabulary having an internal consistency and based on psychiatric terminology. Lasswell's closet ideological kinsman is Erich Fromm, who has also tried to find a psychological basis for ethics. This search is, of course, not a new project despite its contemporary prominence and importance. Aristotle first raised the problem when he postulated that acts may be judged good if they contribute to a healthy personality development. Nevertheless, the problem is reflected in a new form in the writings of these two thinkers.

A fundamental proposition with Lasswell, Mr. Lipsky continued, is that a democratic society is more conducive to the development of the complete and well-rounded personality than other forms of society. The democratic community emphasizes a sharing of values essential to the furtherance of human dignity. Among such values are power, respect, rectitude, affection, enlightenment, well-being, skill, and wealth. Democratic leadership seeks to promote these values and does so through the exercise of power. Hence Lasswell disagreed with Morgenthau's assumption that power, per se, is evil or that the motives of power seekers are necessarily evil. Lasswell therefore appears as a strange kind of positivist. He emphasizes relations rather than substance. He begins with the assumption that men choose life over death and in so choosing must seek psychological fulfillment.

Mr. Lipsky wondered, parenthetically, whether psychiatry could be considered an empirical science by assuming that the results of its application are verifiable. In other words, can a hypothesis be empirically verified by the consequences it produces or must it also be susceptible to direct investigation? Lasswell assumes the former, and he makes skillful use of psychiatric studies to underline his points.

Mr. Lipsky noted that one critic had asserted that Lasswell makes the most extreme possible claim for the validity of the scientific method, namely, that the political scientist can offer reliable advice as to the ends and means of social policy. In the early part of his career, Lasswell was primarily descriptive and felt it was up to the student to draw his own conclusions. Lasswell has not abandoned this method in favor of the formulation of a policy science for

assuring democratic results in national and international affairs. In this sense, and contrary to Carr and Morgenthau, Lasswell offers a complete, informing theory of international relations.

Professor Holborn thanked Mr. Lipsky. He felt in concordance with agreed practice, that the remainder of the first session should be devoted to an analysis of Lasswell's psychiatric approach to the theory of international relations.

Individual and Group Behavior

With regard to Lasswell, Professor Holborn continued, the question has been raised as to whether psychiatry is really a science. He felt that the question, for the purpose of the present discussion, might rather be posed as two questions: (1) is there a science of psychiatry which is relevant for dealing with the individual personality; (2) is psychiatric theory applicable to the social process in general and to international relations in particular? Lasswell's theory assumes that the answer to both questions is affirmative. Mr. Lipsky agreed with this reformulation of the problem and noted that Lasswell claims scientific validity for both concepts.

Professor Strausz-Hupé thought that empirical verification exists for psychiatry as applied to individuals but not as applied to nations.

Professor Holborn felt that since there were no psychiatrists or psychologists present, the group could not answer the first question, which was, moreover, outside its scope of interest. However, the applicability of psychiatric theory to national behavior is a relevant question for the group. He noted that at the time of the Nuremberg trials, a number of psychiatrists, such as Gilbert, had made studies of some of the defendants and had tried to define a "totalitarian mind" which, as a concept, could be projected into international affairs as an explanation of certain types of political behavior.

Professor Wolfers felt that to apply a theory of individual behavior to national behavior is a *non sequitur*. What Lasswell attempts to do, on the other hand, is to break down and analyze the international political process from abstract concepts of national behavior to the behavior of multitudes which make up the nation. He is concerned with group and individual behavior on the plausible assumption that it presents political data which is more readily observed and analyzed and has greater validity and relevance to understanding national actions than a deductive method which attempts to generalize from historical descriptions of national behavior. This type of analysis is especially valuable and appropriate in the field of communications where groups are

constantly using symbols to communicate with one another. By employing a psychological approach to the political process, Lasswell seeks to throw light on that part of international behavior which can be explained with reference to individual or group activity.

Professor Strausz-Hupé doubted the utility of attempts to define a “totalitarian mind.” An analysis of Hitler’s personality would, he felt, give little information susceptible to generalization as, for example, the elaboration of a “German totalitarian mind.” Lasswell, however, seems to make the leap from the individual to the mass.

Professor Wolfers, noting Professor Strausz-Hupé’s use of the concept of “the natural aggressor,” felt that for such a personality to exist it must have validity in terms of psychiatric concepts and if the concepts are valid they will have an impact on political behavior. Professor Wolfers believed that Lasswell’s attempt to analyze human drives and project these drives into the international arena was of more than marginal significance.

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered whether it is possible to arrive at collective concepts through the study of individuals.

The acting chairman remarked that the psychiatric approach, involving an attempt to break down the human personality into its component elements, had often in the past been used as a method for analyzing human behavior. But at the level of social action, is not the psychological influence merely another “drop in the bucket” among a multitude of social factors which guide human behavior? When human behavior is studied at the level of national society and, further, at the level of international society, is not the influence of individual psychology even more remote?

Mr. Lipsky pointed out that Lasswell continually emphasizes expectations as a “core factor” in human behavior. He felt that it is correct to assume that Lasswell believes psychological influences are the most fundamental factors in influencing the political process.

Professor Wolfers believed that this constitutes “pinning down” Lasswell too much. Lasswell is fully aware of multiple determination in human behavior. With regard to expectations, Lasswell has made a real discovery and contribution to behavior analysis. He has also tried to develop the technical means of ascertaining public attitudes. Sampling methods for obtaining generalizations on public viewpoints are now being carried out with considerable success. In these ways Lasswell is moving from the convenient but metaphysical “people” to the more complex but realistic “peoples.”

Analyzing Group Behavior: Elites

Professor Kaufmann added that Lasswell had also made an effort to analyze the decision-making process. By focusing attention on the elites of a pluralized society, he helps to limit the groups which need be subjected to analysis.

Professor Strausz-Hupé felt that there are still serious limitations to polling techniques despite the fact that some progress has been made. He questioned the reliability of attempts to quantify the political process. Second, while it may be convenient for Lasswell to relate a theory of individual behavior to the political process by speaking of elites, at the international level elite interrelationships are far more complex and operating influences are far more numerous. Hence resultant action is far more variable and difficult to predict.

Professor Wolfers pointed out that a number of worthwhile discoveries are being brought out by a group at MIT which is studying elite communication. For example, preliminary results of a study of the basis upon which business groups react to tariff reduction proposals has yielded serious information which is at variance with traditional concepts. Many responses indicate that these groups do not behave in accordance with accepted, rational, interest-motivation concept, but rather on the basis of misconceptions, myths and prejudices. It would appear, therefore, that elite groups often do not know what their best interests are. What strikes a person like Lasswell about this kind of information is the lesser or greater degree of invalidity of accepted categorical postulates about group behavior. We assume that "the French want X," but is it true? Lasswell is trying to penetrate such abstract explanations and find out how and why groups really behave.

Professor Strausz-Hupé noted that many attempts to assess public opinion have long preceded those of Lasswell. Napoleon III ordered his provincial officials to make surveys of public sentiment on national issues and discovered that the results did not always coincide with what his advisors believed was on the public mind.

Professor Holborn felt that the MIT study bore out what history had also shown to be true, namely, that businessmen do not always act in accordance with their economic interests. The English business class, for example, clearly acted against its interest in not attempting to prevent British participation in the First World War. Norman Angell was right when he said that war with Germany would be a disaster for British capitalism. Similarly, in the interwar period, although acting differently, it still was not being guided entirely by rational economic considerations. But having said this, where does a theory of individual psychology help in obtaining a more accurate explanation of such a

behavior pattern? Psychological considerations may have had some influence but probably not a decisive one. One would have to examine, among other things, the social development of British capitalism and the political organization of British management before one could answer these questions. Therefore, while Lasswell's approach is not to be rejected, the weight which Lasswell assigns to the psychological aspect of the group behavior may be questionable.

Professor Wolfers observed that psychology is basic to all human behavior in that all action must originate in the psyche. One speaks of geography as a basic determining factor in foreign policy formulation, yet, this presupposes an evaluation process in the mind of the policy maker as he looks at his country's position on the map. Lasswell sees human behavior as the result of interplay between "objective" factors and the subjective interpretation which they receive in passing through the psyche.

Mr. Lipsky felt that Lasswell's writings indicate the priority of importance to be accorded to these determinants. In the final analysis Lasswell always assigns priority to the psychological factors. He is thus able to conceive the policy scientist as capable of manipulating the political process in accordance with a psychologically oriented theory of human behavior.

Implications for Policy

In response to a request from Professor Rabi for an example of Lasswellian advice as a policy scientist, Mr. Lipsky noted that Lasswell would caution the US political elite to play down the threat of the Soviet conspiracy to the US. This would tend to reduce expectation of violence and would yield a greater sense of security on the part of both countries. It would also have a tendency conducive to the development of democracy in the Soviet Union, for as that country feels less menaced, the pluralizing forces inherent in any large-scale society will make themselves felt. Mr. Lipsky felt that a basic, if not fundamental, aspect of Lasswell's theory is the function of the policy scientist to influence, through self-conscious manipulation, the political process toward democratic values in a more cohesive and organized manner than has heretofore been thought possible or desirable.

Professor Strausz-Hupé thought that Lasswell's prescription for spreading democracy to the USSR constitutes manipulation twice removed. He approved the prescription with regard to the administration in Washington but doubted its validity with regard to Russia. The Soviet Union's sense of security

is determined by US capabilities as well as its own attitudes, hence extra-psychological factors are also operating at the international level.

Mr. Lipsky observed that a basic assumption of Lasswell's seems to be that all men react similarly to certain stimuli, hence the theoretical capacity of the policy scientist to extend his scope of operations to the international scene, as in the example previously cited.

Professor Rabi wondered whether this idea approximates reality in international relations. Mr. Lipsky recalled a recent speech by General George C. Marshall in which the general referred to an inalienable ideological conflict between the two countries. Lasswell, on the other hand, believes that tensions can be reduced by influencing popular attitudes.

Mr. Marshall noted that attitude is not the only factor susceptible to manipulation; geography can be manipulated as well. When the US acquired the Louisiana Territory or the Panama Canal or bases in North Africa it was manipulating the geographical component of its relationship with foreign nations.

With regard to the psychiatric orientation of Lasswell's theory, Mr. Marshall continued, he has found that every professional group tends to analyze the political process in terms of its own training and approach. The military man views the situation in terms of capabilities and will insist that the establishment of a certain base is essential to American security; the economist will see the Cold War as one in which investment and technological assistance to exposed, underdeveloped areas will be the determinant of victory. Lasswell evidently sees psychological relationships as meriting first priority. The conclusion would seem to be that there are many mainsprings operating, all of which must be watched.

Psychological Aspects of Human Behavior

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered whether Lasswell views the human psyche as a kind of sieve through which pour the phenomena of actuality. Professor Wolfers felt a more appropriate simile to be that of a sensitized photo plate which accepts some phenomena, but ignores others. With reference to Mr. Marshall's comment, Professor Wolfers pointed out that even geographical manipulation has its psychological implications.

Mr. Marshall said that Lasswell's theory of psychological determinism reminded him of accounts of insurrections in Cuba. At first it was considered necessary to subdue the Havana garrison in order to force the regime in power

to capitulate. Succeeding revolutionary leaders learned that it was just as effective to seize the telegraph and radio networks and “manipulate” the government to leaving office. This worked for a while until later regimes stopped taking revolutionary radio messages at face value.

Professor Wolfers agreed that the psychological element is often of decisive importance. For example, if those connected with the plot to assassinate Hitler had been able to seize the Berlin radio at the time they struck against the dictator, they would probably have been able to seize power even though they failed to kill him. The fact that Hitler had been able to communicate his survival to the nation and give orders for taking countermeasures had been instrumental in crushing the coup. Professor Holborn agreed. Actually Hitler had been right when he stated in 1940 that Britain was defeated; British temperament and spirit simply refused to acknowledge the fact.

Professor Wolfers noted also that the psychological aspect could be carried too far. The present administration seems to have believed originally that the manipulation of symbols can accomplish most anything in foreign policy. He was glad to see that the board of experts appointed to study the problem had come up with a much more moderate view, namely, that psychological warfare is a means of communicating policy rather than a substitute for it.

Professor Holborn wondered about Lasswell’s theory of communication. The role of elite communication is a crucial one in Lasswell’s theory of policy making. On the other hand, Lasswell’s theory of elites is not psychological but social and hence his description of the process of elite communication is not in harmony with his psychological theory of human behavior.

Mr. McClellan felt that a sound critique of Lasswell requires some understanding of the principles of Freudian psychology. He disagreed with the characterization of the psyche as a static recipient of phenomena such as a sieve or photo plate. The psyche is a dynamic process composed of id, super ego, and ego. By employing psychiatric concepts, Lasswell seeks to call attention to the profound emotional element in human behavior. The jump from a theory of individual behavior to that of the group has often been badly executed by social psychologists but some, such as Gorer in Britain, have been able to predict group behavior patterns.

Professor Strausz-Hupé expressed reservation concerning Lasswell’s teleological approach to the question of morality. Lasswell evidently equates psychological health with good and psychological maladjustment with evil. Such an equation does not hold true for many aspects of human behavior, art being a case in point. Lasswell then goes further and proceeds to equate psychological health with democratic values.

The Task of the Policy Scientist

Professor Wolfers observed that Lasswell's thinking on the psychological-manipulative aspect of human behavior originated with his analyses of the processes by which dictatorships are capable of manipulating public opinion. This has led him to inquire as to whether democratic values might not also be served through conscious manipulation and communication by the elites of a democratic society. Professor Wolfers remarked that acceptance of psychological methods have even spread to the curriculum of the Yale Law School, where stress is placed on the conscious use of symbols in litigation proceedings.

Several group members questioned whether totalitarian techniques are applicable to a democratic society or the furtherance of democratic values. The problem of control over the manipulative activities of the policy scientist was also raised.

Mr. McClellan said that Lasswell has made a fundamental contribution by insisting that the irrational psychological forces in human behavior be taken into account. Lasswell also poses the problem as to the implication of these forces for the political process. Mr. Lipsky suggested that Lasswell's answer to the problem is that by furthering economic, political, and social democracy one furthers the development of sounder, healthier individuals. Professor Wolfers agreed and felt that Lasswell was attempting to base his beliefs on scientific certainty. Lasswell claims that the policy scientist can and should manipulate attitudes and behavior toward democratic views.

Professor Rabi doubted whether people would continue to respond to the manipulations of the policy scientist once they understand the cause-effect relationship involved. Miss Fosdick agreed. She expressed skepticism with regard to a theory of an elite, within a democratic society, possessing such powerful influences over the psyche of the individual citizen. It is doubtful, for example, whether the present political elite in Washington has the capacity to manipulate along the lines Lasswell seems to suggest.

The citizen is usually a member of many groups—social, economic, political—and has overlapping loyalties. Thus he is bound to resist the exertions of a single elite. In general, Lasswell's theory does not seem to fit the realities of pluralistic, complex society; his concepts of elite and fellowship are oversimplified.

Professor Wolfers said that some aspects of Lasswell's theory are being greatly exaggerated. Lasswell certainly does not conceive the policy scientist as capable of manipulating human behavior toward a world democracy, for example. But Lasswell does believe that certain things could be done which

would contribute toward a democratic order and certain things antithetical to democracy could be avoided.

Mr. Lipsky had the impression, after going through Lasswell's works in some detail, that the concept of self-conscious manipulation on the part of the policy scientist is a fairly emphatic and basic one in Lasswell's theory.

Mr. Marshall noted that many members of the "new team" in Washington refer to Lasswell as an authority for their views on how policy should be articulated and communicated.

Professor Kaufmann felt that the group should not stress the Freudian aspect of Lasswell to the neglect of the sociological. He further felt that it would be a mistake to conceive Lasswell as preoccupied with a theory of elites and followers. This is simply a focus within a larger context.

Mr. Lipsky thought that, while Lasswell does not deny the existence of the context, he believes that the context can be abstracted and the remainder manipulated.

Professor Kaufmann expressed the opinion that it would be more profitable for the group to concern itself with the systemic aspect of Lasswell and less with the manipulative.

Professor Strausz-Hupé drew a comparison between Lasswell's idea of social elites and the eliteless society of Riesman. Miss Fosdick felt that any democratic society is made up of competitive elites, each attempting to manipulate its public. Professor Kaufmann noted that Lasswell recognizes this fact and stresses the existence of multiple elites—political, economic, communications, and so on. Mr. Lipsky suggested that the end result of such a theory might be an amalgamated elite. Such an elite is not necessarily compatible with the growth of world democracy which Lasswell favors so strongly.

Miss Fosdick observed that there seems to be something very unreal about Lasswell's theory and this unreality appears to spring from an erroneous view of human psychology. His implication that people are so easily manipulable would seem to be a faulty interpretation of stimulus-response relationships. For example, it is hard to imagine a group of children in Bronxville being strongly influenced by manipulators in Washington. In this connection, Professor Holborn noted that the educational system of a democracy exercises the most powerful influence toward strengthening or weakening the democratic content of that nation's society. Miss Fosdick acknowledged this observation but felt it could be ascertained by better means than Lasswellian theory. Mr. Lipsky quoted a passage from Lasswell in which he emphasizes the need for inculcating children with democratic values.

Professor Kaufmann expressed the view that the group had not sufficiently

observed two points in its discussion of Lasswell: first, it had confused Lasswell as a thinker with Lasswell as a manipulator and, second, it had overstressed the lack of novelty in Lasswell's work. Professor Kaufmann felt that originality is not relevant to the problem since the group is necessarily confined to talking about international relations theory with reference to existing theorists. If a thinker is able to use non-original ideas and apply them in a way that offers a better understanding of the international political process, that is more relevant than the source of his ideas.

At this point the acting chairman recessed the meeting.

Procedures and Future Meetings

Upon reconvening, the acting chairman felt that the group should devote a few minutes to examining its methods to date and determining its agenda for the future. He noted that the group had resolved the question as to whether to emphasize personalities or problems in the field of international relations theory by deciding to discuss the theories of leading publicists before dinner, thus clearing the ground for later discussion of more general problems suggested by the theorist in question.

Mr. Lipsky pointed out that the group had previously decided to devote the next meeting to Marxian interpretation of imperialism including references to Schumpeter's critique. Mr. Lipsky noted that in drawing a work paper on this subject he was not concerned, as in previous papers, with a single individual but with a host of theorists. It is an important subject because, for some, the phenomenon of imperialism is the central problem of international relations. Certainly any worthwhile theory must be able to offer some interpretation of it. Mr. Lipsky felt that he was, in one respect, at a disadvantage with regard to Marxian theories of imperialism in that he was without extensive training in economic analysis and some of the theories were based on economic concepts.

The following session, Mr. Lipsky continued, had been allocated, according to a previous decision, to geopolitical theories with Spykman as a point of departure.

Professor Holborn noted that the evening of March 4 (changed since March 17), then would be devoted to imperialism and that of April 1 to geopolitics. He asked for suggestions with regard to the remaining sessions. Mr. Lipsky wondered about Toynbee. Professor Holborn expressed the opinion that Toynbee should be tentatively passed over, although this question should be brought to the chairman's attention at the next meeting. The acting chair-

man felt that the group had adequately covered the historical approach to international relations theory in its discussions of Carr.

It was generally agreed that the group would continue to devote the opening session of each meeting to the approach of a particular theorist and the closing session to the problems raised by this approach and their application to the starting points for a theory of international relations.

Mr. Lipsky asked whether Wilsonian theory would be dealt with. Professor Holborn thought that the relation of ethics to international relations is an extremely important one. If the group felt that the field was not sufficiently covered with the number of meetings originally scheduled, it might be worthwhile to raise the question of having its life extended.

Mr. Marshall observed that Wilson's theory did not seem to have much application to the international relations until Wilson became president and then the theory was elaborated to meet the circumstance of policy. Professor Wolfers agreed but felt that there were certain basic concepts and assumptions to Wilsonian theory which remained consistent throughout.

The group agreed with Professor Holborn's suggestion that the final meeting should be let open for the purpose of drawing together some of the basic ideas which had been expressed during the previous discussions and with a view to reaching some conclusions.

A Theory of International Relations

The acting chairman then opened the meeting for discussion on the general problem of developing a theory of international relations.

Professor Rabi expressed the view that one problem is the need to devote some time to cases and empirical materials. He would like to hear more discussion on how "this animal" works and know more about the actual conditions under which nations communicate with one another, including both the physical conditions and the psychological circumstances. Moreover, he was also interested in getting an idea of the size of the field encompassed by the title "international relations." Does it not include international commerce and investment? Finally, he would like to have a sharper idea of the kind of theory the group was aiming at. Is it primarily a descriptive theory? Is it a theory which attempted to define what was good and bad in a global sense? Or is it a theory which would be suitable for guiding a policy maker?

The acting chairman called upon Professor Kaufmann, who felt that before too much could be said about how "the animal" behaves it would be necessary

to agree about what “the animal” is. The first step, therefore, is to attempt to define what constitutes the field of international relations. In doing this it might be profitable to begin with the idea that one is dealing with a system or society. Within this system one finds all the activities which one is accustomed to associate with a decentralized national society. Allowance must of course be made for the new elements which are introduced at the international level, but it is important to begin with the concept of a system and then to proceed to analyze the relationships which take place within the system, always allowing for developmental aspects.

Mr. Lipsky asked whether attention should not also be paid to the philosophical roots of a theory in attempting to explain that theory’s content. Professor Kaufmann said he was primarily interested in a theory’s content. Professor Kaufmann said he was primarily interested in a theory which attempted to explain and define the processes which actually operate. Such a theory should be able to isolate the variables and should be useful as a basis for prediction. Moreover, the question of manipulation should only be considered if it is thought to be useful in attaining desired ends.

Professor Rabi observed that the subject matter of international relations encompasses an area containing some sixty-odd nations, hence one characteristic of the problem is the relatively small number of units in the field under study. Would it not be sound first to examine the content of the field before attempting to theorize on how it behaves? The units in the field differ widely from one another, but do they not have elements in common from which principles can be drawn?

Professor Wolfers felt that it is misleading to base a theory of international relations on a conception of nations as a peculiar species of individuals. One is rather, dealing with thousands of acts in a field in which thousands of forces are interacting and realigning. If, indeed, one conceived of a sixty-unit field, then one must be recognize that each and every unit is unique.

Professor Rabi wondered whether each nation acts differently from the rest. Do they not merge into constellations? One must first describe how they act and then attempt to deduce the theory.

Professor Holborn felt that two problems exist: first, the construction of a theory of international relations is not just a problem of drawing conclusion from the actions and reactions of sixty-odd nations; second, such a theory is concerned with the study of one form of action and reaction.

Professor Rabi thought it necessary to establish a number of intellectual constructs if a field of such complexity is to be brought into some of kind of order.

Mr. McClellan expressed the opinion that the concept of a system or field is a useful beginning for a theory of international relations. The first problem is to describe this field. It is not just a static system of some sixty units. These units are in contact with one another, cooperate, and come into conflict with another. This gives one a conception of the complexity of the system and leads one to draw a first intellectual construct, namely, that the field is characterized by relationships. While noting certain similarities with the domestic political process, the analogy cannot be carried too far since there is no sovereign power over the units in the field. The absence of a sovereign arbiter might be a second intellectual construct. A third might be recognition that three or four centers of power do exist in the field. If one then refined the relationships between these centers of power by applying Lasswell's analysis, one might have the rudiments of a theory of international relations.

Professor Holborn noted that a theory of international relations has to recognize another set of problems as well. For example, US defense and foreign policy is presently being heavily influenced by the desire of the Republican Party to cut governmental expenditures. Hence, the conduct of international relations is not simply that of intergovernmental relations; domestic forces and ideologies play a vital role in determining one nation's relations with the rest. Professor Rabi thought that intergovernmental relations can be conceived as synonymous with international relations if one interprets relationships between governments as being the resultants of the various forces—domestic or otherwise—that are working upon each government.

Professor Wolfers observed that the problem can also be handled by study of the decision-making process with relation to the thought that different types of value patterns will affect the choices of alternatives. Professor Rabi wondered if the decision-making process did not vary with each nation. Professor Wolfers felt that this is true to a point but that there are features common to all nations. Professor Rabi thought this offered some hope for elaborating a theory of international relations.

Criteria for the Adequacy of Theory

The acting chairman noted that at the group's first meeting Professor Rabi had expressed doubt as to whether Carr's analysis constituted a theory. He wondered whether Professor Rabi would give the group the benefit of his definition of theory.

Professor Rabi said that, from his own point of view, a theory starts with a

number of concepts elaborated to simplify the material with which the theory is concerned. Relations between these concepts are also an inherent part of a theory. The concepts are then tested with reference to their predictive value for the future or their predictive value in the past.

Mr. Lipsky wondered whether a theory can exist apart from the record of the material. Professor Rabi felt that the function of theory is to order or organize the record in meaningful terms. Mr. Lipsky asked whether this meant that Professor Rabi considered theory to be synonymous with explanation. Professor Rabi said that theory is rather an organization of knowledge and the creation of a pattern from which further knowledge can be learned. Mr. Lipsky inquired about the interstices within the scope of knowledge provided by theory; do they not explain the function value has for theory? Professor Rabi believed the question of value to be an aesthetic one rather than one related to the problem of knowledge. Mr. Lipsky believed that the function of value is related to the incompleteness of knowledge. If the theory is complete, if it explains all phenomena, then value is irrelevant since absolute predictability exists and one would not value or desire that which one knows is impossible. Hence value can be equated with ignorance.

Miss Fosdick thought that the material of international relations is of a nature which does not lend itself to a high degree of predictability. Professor Rabi pointed out that predictability is highly overrated in the physical sciences. Most so-called prediction is merely extrapolation on the basis of previous experience.

Professor Holborn asked Professor Rabi to clarify this observation. He noted that he had been under the impression that the physical sciences had discovered fundamental laws which provided a basis for precise predictability.

Professor Rabi stated that physicists are able to note the existence of certain patterns which give rise to the probability that, under certain similar conditions, these patterns will recur. One "predicts," for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow morning, but this is merely a statement of high probability based on previous observation. One cannot really make a prediction because man does not know enough about the forces which govern the phenomena. Actually, the theory of physics is not in good shape at present because physicists are constantly finding evidence which tends to refute previously accepted principles. This has given rise to a search for new concepts. Therefore, predictability may be an overly ambitious test for the adequacy of a theory of international relations.

Professor Kaufmann thought a sounder criterion is that of operational utility; that is, a theory which would furnish the observer with a greater capacity

for understanding the political process and hence the ability to “predict” in a more limited sense.

Mr. Lipsky said that he is concerned with the theory of knowledge which each author offers in the field of international relations. Marxism’s claim to absolute predictability rests on its epistemology. If the gaps of ignorance in a given field can be closed, then one can predict with certainty and value would be relegated to a minimal role.

Professor Rabi doubted whether this would be a feasible approach. In physics, for example, a theory explaining the characteristics and behavior of plutonium molecules had been elaborated. It regarded the molecule as a particle with a certain mass traveling at a given velocity. This theory was thought to offer a basis for prediction until it was discovered that the particle did not exist. The concept of the particle had been an extrapolation from the properties and behavior of known data. Hence, it may not be possible, in the field of international relations, to know enough about the material to afford prediction with certainty. It might therefore be better to seek more modest objectives, one being an attempt to arrive at concepts which clarify and create some order out of the material at hand.

Mr. McClellan thought that it is also necessary to avoid oversimplification and to appreciate the very complexity of the field. In this connection, an approach which postulates nations as units does not appear to be a fruitful one. Professor Rabi acknowledged that there might be a better approach.

Evaluation of Lasswell

Professor Wolfers noted, returning to the theory of Lasswell, that concepts are often the product of schools of thought rather than of individuals. Usually these schools merely reformulate old ideas in new contexts. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the ascendancy of nationalism while the twentieth century has witnessed the rediscovery of the irrational facet of man’s behavior and his attachment to myths and symbols. This truth has been vividly exemplified and exploited by the anti-democratic forces of the twentieth century but there are those who realize that no inherent relationship exists between myth and fascism. Authors like Arnold and Lasswell have pioneered in pointing up the myths held by democracy and capitalism and have created a theory based on the proposition that those forces can serve democratic ends. On the other hand, history has shown that in the wrong hands, the techniques

advocated by Lasswell can be used to serve anti-democratic purposes as well. Mr. Lipsky felt that it is fortunate for this country that Lasswell is the chief spokesman for this school of thought.

The phenomenon of elite and followship is most striking, Professor Wolfers continued, even within a strongly democratic society such as ours. It is noteworthy how, on the university campus, for example, leadership seems to assert itself, taboos are created and accepted with surprising passivity by the fellowship. This process is not overt; there is no demonstrable compulsion. Professor Holborn agreed and thought the difference between press coverages in the UK and the US offered a good illustration. One finds a range of opinions and viewpoints expressed in the *Manchester Guardian* for example, which are entirely overlooked or dismissed by, say, the *New York Times*. Professor Wolfers thought he noticed a sharp trend toward uniformity among the younger generation. Miss Fosdick thought it was especially evident among the teenage group.

Professor Holborn said that Lasswell contributed a great deal with regard to the problem of social communication. Trends toward greater uniformity may be symptomatic of the fact of greater homogeneity in the elite that controls US organs of communication. But with regard to developing a theory for explaining events in international politics, Marx seems to offer more than Lasswell.

Mr. McClellan held that much of Lasswell's work is based on Freudian concepts of the nature of the human personality. The basic emotional forces which shape human behavior have political relevance in that they help to explain patterns of national behavior. The psyche's quest for self-fulfillment offers much material for judging motivation in the political process.

Professor Holborn alluded to Germany in 1938 and 1939. A large body of the German people were unsympathetic to the policies of the dictatorship but had no means whatever for expressing their disapproval. Hence there are certain situations in which the political process, as expressed by Lasswell, becomes totally inoperative because other factors have been called into operation.

Miss Fosdick wondered to what extent Lasswell considers that he is describing the realities of politics and to what extent he is describing the political world he desires. Mr. Lipsky thought that Lasswell considers himself to be a realist.

Professor Wolfers pointed out that Lasswell had been among the first to foresee that a bipolar international situation would create a tendency toward garrison-state conditions within the US.

Professor Holborn expressed concern with the fact that in most societies a large majority of the people seem completely indifferent to politics. In Germany in 1933 some 20 percent of the people seemed to be actively pro-Nazi, of which about half were fanatics; on the other extreme about 5 percent were ardent anti-Nazis and another 5 percent held strong anti-Nazi opinions. The great majority, in the middle, were largely indifferent.

Professor Kaufmann, in conclusion, stated that it would be misleading to consider that Lasswell excludes the other obvious variables which affect the political process, such as economics. Second, he felt that Lasswell regards elite communication and manipulation for democratic ends as a separate problem and that his more general theoretical approach stands on its own feet.

Professor Holborn remarked, in bringing the meeting to a close, that the group had tested Lasswell's theory by focusing greatest attention on its most extreme positions.

*John D. Blumgart,
Rapporteur*

Notes to Working Paper No. 3

1. D. Easton, "Harold Lasswell: Policy Scientist for a Democratic Society," *Journal of Politics* 12 (August 1950): 453.
2. *Ibid.*, 451.
3. *Ibid.*, 476–77.
4. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Interrelations of World Organization and Society," *Yale Law Journal* 55 (1946): 889.
5. *Loc. cit.*
6. Harold D. Lasswell, "The Triple-Appeal Principle: A Dynamic Key," in *Analysis of Political Behavior* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1947), 180.
7. *Loc. cit.*
8. *Ibid.*, 189.
9. Harold D. Lasswell, *The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework For Basic Policy Research* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1951), 39. I confess that I shall have to study this volume perhaps many more times before I shall realize its full purpose.
10. *Ibid.*, 29.
11. *Loc. cit.*
12. Italics in original.
13. Lasswell, *The World Revolution of Our Time*, 31. Italics in original removed.
14. *Ibid.*, 33.
15. *Loc. cit.* Italics in original. Lasswell, "The Interrelations of World Organization and Society," *passim*.

16. Lasswell, *The World Revolution of Our Time*, 39.
17. Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: Norton, 1948), 9.
18. Loc. cit.: "Power is participation in the making of decisions." *Ibid.*, 223.
19. Loc. cit.
20. *Ibid.*, 19.
21. *Ibid.*, 108.
22. *Ibid.*, 118–19.
23. *Ibid.*, 122: By laying the accent on policy we are not attacking objectivity. On the contrary, objectivity is put where it belongs, which is in the service of goal values: *Ibid.*, 122–23.
24. *Ibid.*, 123: "Human beings behave on the basis of expected next indulgences over deprivations, unconscious as well as conscious."
25. *Ibid.*, 146.
26. *Ibid.*, 149.
27. *Ibid.*, 162.
28. *Ibid.*, 166: "No one can look at the psychological structure of the tyrannies of recent world politics without recognizing that such political leadership is juvenile delinquency on a colossal scale."
29. *Ibid.*, 175.
30. *Ibid.*, 178–79.
31. *Ibid.*, 188.
32. *Ibid.*, 216.
33. Loc. cit.
34. *Ibid.*, 221.
35. Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics Faces Economics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945), vii.
36. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935). [DM: There is no note 36 in the text, which moves from 35 to 37.]
37. Op. cit., ix.
38. *Ibid.*, 1.
39. Loc. cit.
40. *Ibid.*, 3.
41. *Ibid.*, 4.
42. *Ibid.*, 8.
43. *Ibid.*, 10.
44. *Ibid.*, 12: He does not neglect, however, the reality of high levels of insecurity when "all powers tend to be drawn into hostile combinations that attempt to overcome one another by frontal attack, flanking, encircling, and infiltration."
45. *Ibid.*, 16.
46. *Ibid.*, 23.
47. *Ibid.*, 29.
48. *Ibid.*, 47.
49. *Ibid.*, 51–52.
50. *Ibid.*, 52: It would be unfair not to point out the Lasswell sees the democratizing process following an erratic course.

51. *Ibid.*, 53.
52. *Ibid.*, 65.
53. *Ibid.*, 83. Harold D. Lasswell, "Conditions of Security in a Bi-Polarizing World," *American Society of International Law Proceedings* (1950), 5.

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Fourth Meeting: Marxist Theory of Imperialism, March 17, 1954

The fourth meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Relations was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, March 17, 1954, at 5:30 p.m. The subject was Marxist theories of imperialism. Present were: Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur, John P. Armstrong; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Charles Lichenstein; Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Isidor I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Arnold Wolfers; Paul Zinner.

Working Paper No. 4

Prepared by George Lipsky

The use of the Marxist theory of imperialism as a point of departure in the consideration of the whole phenomenon of imperialism is warranted by the appearance of success that the Marxists, old and new, have attained in putting the facts of world development and history into their schema. Superficially, the Marxist theory seems to be capable of absorbing easily all particular cases and using them to establish its own further support. It has become a social force stinging millions into action. Yet its theoretical support is weak and inadequate. The general Marxist view of imperialism as mainly a product of export surplus, monopoly, parasitic moribund capitalism is either an oversimplification, a meaningless tautology, or both. It is an oversimplification if, by definition, it excludes imperialist phenomena of other periods than the present. It is tautological if, in finding imperialism to be the equivalent of expiring

capitalism, it states that the present is that age of imperialism because those conditions are to be presumed (as they can only be presumed) to exist. But it is a tautology that works in the war of ideas, as do so many, because it offers such a large opportunity to draw contrasts with other systems and conditions, which the Marxist theory holds superior and with respect to which, therefore, it may wish to avoid the disadvantage of identification as imperialist.

A major premise of this paper is that imperialism is one of the very few points of departure from which all the phenomena of international politics, and in fact of human relations, can be considered. Marxist theory of imperialism is, by and large, Marxist theory of contemporary international relations. And a rejoinder thereto may be even more thoroughly a theory of international relations, especially if it avoids the oversimplification of the Marxist theory.

Theories of imperialism may take many forms but from the historical standpoint, they are of three types: (1) those which hold that imperialism is only now being experienced or is to be experienced in the future; (2) those which look upon imperialism as atavistic and, therefore, almost certain to wither away, very much as the state withers away as the Marxist millennium is approached; and, (3) those which hold that it is a perennial phenomenon. The orthodox Marxist theory is of the first type; it quite naturally emphasizes the economic factor, and in analyzing the inexorable evolution of economic institutions (particularly relations of production) it applies the term "imperialism" to particular conditions of those institutions. There have been many theories of atavistic imperialism, held not least by those who idealistically believe that we are inevitably moving into a millennium of the perfect commonwealth, perhaps on a global scale. However, the main theory, which I shall outline and use as illustration here, is that of Joseph A. Schumpeter. His theory is mainly to be found in his essay on "The Sociology of Imperialism" in *Imperialism and Social Classes*.¹ The third type of theory is equally varied, but I shall be content here to set forth my own concept of imperialism as a perennial phenomenon, without indicating where it overlaps other, similar theories of the type.

As Paul Sweezy has indicated, Schumpeter was subject to criticism by "Economists who conceive of their science in traditional and rather narrowly restricted terms" for his essays on imperialism and social classes. They could be considered "brilliant forays into other fields perhaps, but essentially unrelated to his main work on business cycles and the theory of economic development."² The scope of the problem is such that any one concerning himself with it in brief compass must resort to large generalizations and a high degree of selection of materials. Schumpeter's essay on imperialism can be considered suggestive rather than definitive. It goes without saying that this paper can

only be an attempt to sketch the problem. Some points, however, can be made with great assurance. In keeping with the various definitions referred to at length in this paper, war and military power must be considered as factors concomitant or coeval with imperialism,³ since by those definitions imperialism is essentially an act of aggression meeting the resistance or finding opposition among those upon whom the imperial power is applied. This is not an unconventional view, contrasting with the definition of Hans J. Morgenthau in which imperialism involves a policy of altering the status quo. Morgenthau's definition appears to me essentially inadequate for a variety of reasons. It refers largely to national motivations rather than conditions of fact. It cannot take into account the cases of satiated imperial powers who may be applying a principle of limitation because they are aware of the strain that further territorial acquisition would place upon them.⁴ In this light, Lenin's definition appears more appropriate than that of Morgenthau.

Marxist Theory of Imperialism

In dealing with Marxist theory of imperialism, it is necessary to decide what particular Marxist theory will be considered representative. Marx himself did not develop a complete and conscious theory of imperialism. Despite his stress upon economic determinism, there exists some ground for asserting that imperialism was to him a product of policy decisions reflecting the desire to exercise brute strength. The neo-Marxists found in Marx most of the foundation in economic theory they needed for their own highly developed theory of imperialism, although Marx did not stress monopoly and the resulting development of protectionism.⁵ The stress upon the economic factor among Marxists assured the existence of a potent source of doctrinal conflict.⁶ This was a conflict already made certain by the dogmatic nature of the Marxist approach. And the opportunity for conflict was no doubt a great advantage to those who sought to achieve leadership of the movement. We must make a selection among many: Rosa Luxemburg, Otto Bauer, Rudolph Hilferding, Karl Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, and V. I. Lenin. In the light of the latter's success as the leader of a successful revolution, the position he established can with reason be called orthodox. Moreover, the view is plausible that Lenin is more consistent with Marxist premises than were the others whom he labeled, in his cavalier use of epithets, opportunists or social chauvinists. Among them he found some reason to bestow praise upon Hilferding, but he reserves his

greatest praise for a non-Marxist, the English economist J. A. Hobson, whose study of imperialism he praised highly and referred to at length.⁷

This is not an appropriate point at which to outline in detail the controversy on economic points involved in this building of a triumphant neo-Marxist theory of imperialism. The main point at issue was whether on this score capitalism was subject to reform or inevitably subject to such contradictions that it must produce its imperialist form as a prelude to its demise and the advent of the socialist revolution. Despite Lenin's attacks upon the imperialist war, it is quite certain that he did not abhor war as such, for it was to him part of the historical process by which the new order would be established. And the so-called "social chauvinists" or "opportunists," although charged by Lenin with being in favor of the prosecution of the First World War by their own nations, may very well have become reformist because of their rejection of war, particularly the inevitable war(s) promised by Lenin's theory of imperialism.

The heroic time of colonial expansion would appear to the average observer to have antedated the twentieth century, but to Lenin the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries saw the inception of the imperialist era. This was a period witnessing "the enormous growth of industry and the remarkably rapid process of concentration of production in ever-larger enterprises."⁸ This development involved the "transformation of competition into monopoly."⁹ Free competition, in fact, leads naturally and inevitably to the concentration of production and, eventually, monopoly.¹⁰ By the turn of the century giant combines and cartels of various types have developed in a wide zone. Even more, "Cartels became one of the foundations of the whole of economic life. Capital has been transformed into imperialism."¹¹

The major significance of this process is that it involves "immense progress in the socialization of production," particularly in technical invention and improvement. Therefore, in this period capitalism is preparing inevitably in this positive way for its own destruction. Other activities are developed which foreshadow large-scale planning. Raw material sources are estimated, even on a global scale. These sources are captured by large-scale monopoly alliances. Market estimates are made, and the trusts and cartels divide the markets among themselves. The monopolies destroy those who do not submit to their yoke.

Another major fact in the epoch and in the development is that the basis of economic life has ceased to be "commodity production." The real power has gone "to the 'genius' of financial manipulation." Socialized production is the product of his activities, but the benefit goes entirely to the speculators. Only petty bourgeois, social-chauvinist opportunists "would dream of taking a step

backward,” for Lenin it would be backward. And, as Lenin contends, competition, to which they wish to return, is itself the source of the abuses of which these dreamers wish to rid us.

Gigantic problems arise as this development proceeds. There is an overflowing of capital and a corresponding increase in technical progress which gives way “more and more to disturbances in the co-ordination between the various spheres of industry, to anarchy and crisis.”¹² These in turn reinforce the tendency toward concentration and monopoly. In this process the part played by the banks must be accented. They cease to be modest intermediaries. Banking power, controlling most if not all capital, becomes concentrated in a small number of large-scale monopolistic establishments. “The transformation of numerous intermediaries into a handful of monopolists represents one of the fundamental processes in the transformation of capitalism into capitalist imperialism.”¹³ A handful of banking monopolists know the exact position of the various capitalists and come to control them and determine completely their fate. There is a fusion of banking and industrial capital; banking institutions acquire a truly universal character. The domination of capital in general makes way for the domination of finance capital.

Under the new arrangements, it is possible for comparatively small capital to dominate “immense spheres of production,” says Lenin. Particularly in those countries of the, say, “one pound share” it is possible to bring about this separation of ownership from control.¹⁴ The *rentier* becomes separated from the *entrepreneur* and the former becomes the new ruler. A financial oligarchy has appeared working through the power of a small crystallized nucleus of financially powerful states. Whereas formerly the typical economic feature was the export of goods, under finance capitalism the typical feature is the export of capital.¹⁵ This is a product of an enormous superfluity of capital in the advanced countries. The export of capital is made possible “by the entry of numerous backward countries into international capitalist intercourse.”¹⁶ The elementary conditions for their industrial development are created. Finance capital spreads its net over all countries. Spheres of influence among the monopolist combines are created. International agreements among them tend naturally toward the formation of international cartels. Political alliances between states are created parallel to these economic alignments, working toward a territorial division of the world. A struggle for colonies comes, or, put more significantly, a “struggle for ‘economic territory.’”¹⁷ By the beginning of the twentieth century this fact had to be connected with the fact that the world had become completely shared out. New partitions were possible, in fact inevitable, but territories must now pass from one “owner” to another. The

evolution from capitalism, to monopoly capitalism, and to finance capitalism “is connected with the struggle for the partition of the world.”¹⁸

Naturally the struggle for territories in this period becomes especially bitter. This is a period of imperialism *par excellence*, in Lenin’s view. The imperialism and the colonial policy of capitalism in *previous* stages and the imperialism of precapitalist periods are essentially different from the imperialism and colonial policy of finance capital.¹⁹ There is a necessity about the latter that did not exist with the same intensity before. As capitalism passes through its various stages, the need for raw materials becomes more intense, competition more bitter, the hunt for raw materials more feverish, and the struggle for colonies more desperate. The giant machine must be fed more and more; it outruns its supply and finally begins to feed upon itself. “Imperialism [emerges] as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental attributes of capitalism in general.”²⁰ Lenin writes flatly that “imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism.”²¹ It embraces all the conditions that have been referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

As the stage is passed through, “the struggle of world imperialism becomes more aggravated.”²² Parasitism and decay, however, are also characteristic of this period of great expenditures of energy. The *rentiers* clip their coupons and live without making any contribution; the monopolies tend to stifle technical progress, a condition that has produced them. Here we can see a structure of contradictions. With great energy the system is preparing for the future, yet it produces a class of enervated parasites. Technical progress is at the core of the new development, yet it is slowed down by the system it produced! These and other contradictions are working for the new day.²³ Embryonic imperialism has become full-fledged imperialism and is the stage immediately prior to proletarian revolution.

While the contradictions should not be depreciated in picturing the capitalist swindle, they are inevitable and should be made use of in the struggle for a better world, according to Lenin. Only the lackeys of the imperialists, the social chauvinists, will tone down their references to these facts. Only such individuals will fail, on the one hand, to oppose imperialist war from its inception, to expose it for what it is, to work for the defeat of their own government in such a war, and thus to take advantage of the opportunity such a war provides.²⁴ Such a war is reactionary, but it gives an opportunity to foment revolution and to coordinate in terms of mutual aid “the revolutionary movement in *all* belligerent countries.”²⁵ It was especially important for the Russian party to agitate against its own government during the war, because Russia was the most backward of the major participating powers and an immediate socialist

revolution was possible there. The prospect was real that this could be the beginning of the process of transforming the imperialist war into an international civil war.²⁶ Blows against government from their own oppressed classes must accompany “a series of military reverses and defeats” in order to produce this result.²⁷ High treason must be the order of the day for the proletarian determined to produce the “*disintegration* of ‘his’ imperialist ‘Great’ Power.”²⁸ The revolution must be general, a revolution in the West; the revolution in Russia must be merely the inception of that larger development. Revolution must not be undertaken in those places only where the purpose of defeating a particular enemy, labelled the aggressor, may be fulfilled. All the imperialist powers were on the same level of guilt. A “proletarian international revolutionary” could not discriminate among them.”²⁹

A major goal of this revolution would be the establishment of the principle of national self-determination and the right of free, political secession from the oppressing nation. But “the more clearly the democratic system of state approximates [through revolutionary change] to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the striving for secession be in practice.”³⁰ There was the great advantage economically in large states for economic progress. Lenin was not in 1916 a protagonist of the principle of federation. He surely did not believe in its practice, although he might support it as preferable to national inequality and “as the only path towards complete democratic centralism.”³¹ Classes can be abolished only through dictatorship of the proletariat; mankind can become a unified whole only through passing through a period of complete liberation for oppressed nations, their freedom to secede. The subsequent unity would not be imperialism, for the bulk of the peoples would be united in common interest free from oppression by class and state. By the Leninist definition, imperialism could not exist under those conditions, for imperialism is finance capitalism with all its oppression and aggressions. Utopian proclamations of desire to see these conditions accomplished under a “peaceful” capitalism, a reformed imperialism, were philistine and opportunistic. Imperialism, when it exists, implies an “inevitable division between oppressing nations and oppressed nations.”³² There is only one road to freedom from such oppression: a successful international civil war under the leadership of the proletarian internationalist revolutionaries.

Schumpeter's Critique of the Marxist Theory

Joseph A. Schumpeter was probably not the ardent defender of capitalism indicated by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter.³³ He was willing to accept partially

the picture of the evils of monopoly, protectionism, etc., described by Lenin. Capitalism was not, however, dying of its own inherent defects. Its decline, if it occurred, would be the product of an irresistible myth-drift ranged against it, i.e., the pressure of ideology and propaganda. In connection with imperialism, Schumpeter made many favorable comments on capitalism. The wars of this epoch, held by Lenin to be the natural accompaniment of imperialism, or finance capitalism, were not clearly the product of capitalism as such. For war was, just as imperialism, a product of institutions and techniques antedating capitalism: “modern pacificism, in its political foundation if not in derivation, is unquestionably a phenomenon of the capitalist world.”³⁴ “Wherever capitalism penetrated, peace parties of such strength arose that virtually every³⁵ war meant a political struggle on the domestic scene.”³⁶ The imperial worker created by capitalism is everywhere anti-imperialist. The capitalist age has been especially vigorous in devising or attempting “methods for preventing war, for the peaceful settlement of disputed among states.”³⁷ Among all the states the one least burdened with precapitalist survivals and elements, the United States, is the one least likely to exhibit an imperialist trend.³⁸ In fact, capitalism is “by nature anti-imperialist.”³⁹ “Rather, imperialist and nationalist literature is always complaining vociferously about the debility, the undignified will to peace, the petty commercial spirit, and so on, of the capitalist world.”⁴⁰ Where free trade exists “no class has an interest in forcible expansion as such.”⁴¹ Even protective tariffs “do not basically change this situation as it effects interests,” although they may move the nations economically farther apart, making it possible for imperialist tendencies to become dominant.⁴²

Where an aggressive economic policy on the part of a country exists in terms of a unified tariff, with war preparation in the background, the economy is only apparently and not really served. The economy becomes rather a weapon, “a means for unifying the nation, for severing it from the fabric of international interests, for placing it [*sic*] at the disposal of the state power.”⁴³ “Where protective tariffs appear without monopoly, agreement is possible; where monopoly appears, agreement is very difficult to reach . . . for it would require self-negation on the part of the new rulers,” and economic conflict can easily turn into armed conflict. But these are dangers not necessities. The capitalist system does not produce them from necessity, nor does it make “its continued existence impossible by its own growth and development.”⁴⁴ But it may produce the results Marx and Lenin described as inevitable: economic aggression, military aggression and struggle for the securing of markets. Capital may be organized to achieve these results and realize the interest that may appear in rising wartime consumption. At the least, diversionary tactics (war)

may be employed to confuse those who are in opposition to special capitalist interests that are making use of the state for selfish purposes.

These possibilities should not be overestimated. Deep down the real community of interest among nations never completely disappears, “The normal sense of business and trade naturally prevails. Even cartels cannot do without the custom of their foreign economic kin.”⁴⁵ Essentially a believer in men’s capacity to reason, Schumpeter stressed that men will know that the “hope of a future of dominion, to follow the struggles of the present, is but poor solace for the losses in that struggle.”⁴⁶ What is more, “Export monopolism does *not* grow from the inherent laws of capitalist development.”⁴⁷ The automatism of the competitive system can never explain the rise of trusts and cartels.⁴⁸ Neither does it explain the growth of protective tariffs. These excesses “are the fruit of political action,” not reflecting the objective interest of all concerned, but really impossible when those whose consent is required recognize their true interest. The excesses which Lenin describes as imperialism do not stem from capitalism as such. They are the product of precapitalist factors that capitalism failed to sweep away. The bourgeoisie did not completely conquer the citadel, and, therefore, it has remained in part the servant of state and the state interests rather than its own.

Schumpeter’s Theory of Imperialism

Imperialism in Schumpeter’s theory is a product of the autocratic state, “the outcome of precapitalist forces which the autocratic state has reorganized in part by the methods of early capitalism.”⁴⁹ It would not have been evolved by an inner logic of capitalism itself. Precapitalist elements in our society may have great vitality and may be revived from time to time to greater energy in producing imperialism, “but in the end the climate of the modern world must destroy them.” Capitalism itself will certainly, Schumpeter contends, survive much longer than essentially untenable export monopolism, admittedly a concomitant of modern imperialism. But other factors that are even more important as components of imperialism, such as warlike instincts and structural elements and organizational forms oriented toward war, “will be politically overcome in time, no matter what they do to maintain among the people a sense of constant danger of war, with the war machine forever primed for action. And with them, imperialism will wither and die.”⁵⁰ Unfortunately there is truth in the statement “that the dead always rule the living.”⁵¹

These are the highlights of Schumpeter’s thesis that imperialism is atavistic. As to the content of imperialism, he says that imperialism has been histor-

ically the product of “objectless” tendencies toward forcible expansion, without definite, utilitarian limits. Irrational, instinctual inclinations toward war and conquest have played a large historical role. Most wars have been waged without adequate justification from the standpoint of reasoned and reasonable interest.⁵² There has been a will to war, a product of situations that have “molded peoples and classes into warriors.”⁵³ Such “psychological dispositions and social structures acquired in the dim past in such situations, once firmly established, tend to maintain themselves and to continue in effect long after they have lost their meaning and their life-preserving function.”⁵⁴ Imperialism “is an atavism in the social structure, in individual, psychological habits of emotional reaction.” The vital needs that created it have passed away, and it too must pass away although every “warlike involvement . . . tends to revive it.”⁵⁵ Imperialism and its source are absolute autocracy; with the disappearance of the latter, the present imperialism can pass away.

Evaluation

It appears to me that imperialism is misrepresented in considerable measure in both the Marxist-Leninist and Schumpeterian systems. In both cases, an assumption is made that there can be a time when men’s aggressions will not be expressed in terms of the domination of one people over another against the will of the latter and involving a clash of interests. In the one case, the Marxist position holds, by virtue of a special definition, that precapitalist imperialism or imperialism in the early stages of capitalism is embryonic, but that an inevitable historical process produces imperialism as the product of capitalism in its final stage. This historicist position selects facts to fit the theory with great plausibility, but it insists on an inevitability that it cannot be given to man really to know. Moreover, if non-economic factors are brought in, as they must be, then imperialism cannot be related simply to a given stage of capitalist development. In the other case, Schumpeter assumes too easily that “Social imperialism” (fascism) does not and cannot exist, and relates imperialism to the condition worked by the absolute state, particularly when it was clearly dominated by a few, especially a small class of warriors. This theory suggests that a high degree of rationality in decision making will supplant the previous pointless and instinctual decision making, expressing love of conflict, and perhaps mere desire to expend energy.

On the contrary, I think men will be more thoroughly safeguarded against danger if they will realize that there is and will be always a tendency among them to attempt to foist upon other men their values. Even those who ac-

knowledge that their values are mere preferences, especially the Machiavelians, will not permanently restrain themselves from imposing their values. The best defense against abuse is the permanent recognition of its imminence. Imperialism is, in this view, a perennial problem. It should not be thought of as offering no opportunity to be transformed into another, a higher, form. The so-called Roman Empire appears to have been really a commonwealth in most respects during the major part of the period of the Caesars. The test was, as it should be, the degree of acquiescence with which the non-Roman peoples accepted the myth, values, and institutions of Rome and came to identify themselves with her. The test was not whether or not Rome remained expansionist, as Professor Morgenthau would have it.

Today many people, ordinarily perhaps rather empirical in their approach, are doctrinaire on the question of imperialism. They would identify some contemporary complexes of political relationships including many and disparate peoples and cultures and insist that those systems have to be broken up. They do not inspect closely enough the possibility that these systems may be transformed into commonwealths, that through sound policy, emphasizing equality of capacity to share in the distribution of human satisfactions, resistance may be transformed into cooperation and acquiescence. Instead, too often, they, pursuing their doctrinaire course, strive to create new political vacua that can only give opportunities to the really imperial order today, one that is all the more objectionable because it rationalizes itself though a fantastic feat of rhetorical legerdemain. In the clashes of cultures and values that will persist as long as men inhabit this planet, orders will arise that will be basically imperialistic. Such strife is inevitable. But certain values, in achieving victory, may form the foundation of a new and more widespread peace. We could do worse than to maintain our confidence that Anglo-American values could form the foundations of a more widespread peace. At the very least, a strong Anglo-American community is the antithesis of that political vacuum upon which contemporary, candid authoritarianism feuds. Man's success story will be told in terms of his ability to transform relative evil into relative good on the basis of relative values.

Digest of Discussion

The chairman called the meeting to order and suggested that a later date be fixed for the next meeting in view of the unavoidable delay which had

occurred in holding the present meeting. After a brief discussion, Thursday, April 8, was agreed upon.

The chairman went on to note that the topic for the present meeting was a “double-barreled” one in the sense that the two approaches to an important subject would be under consideration. He thought that an analysis of these approaches offered a great deal for developing the group’s own thinking with regard to international relations theory. The chairman called on Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.

Marxist-Leninist Imperialism

Mr. Lipsky said that while he had found the subject of imperialism one of the most interesting aspects of international relations theory, he felt less satisfied with the present working paper than with previous ones. Be that as it may, Mr. Lipsky continued, he has always objected to the naïve and doctrinaire tendency, often found in this country, to dismiss imperialism as evil per se and to advocate the elimination of “imperial” systems regardless of political vacuums thereby created. Such vacuums will always constitute a strong temptation to the real imperialist power of this era.

These considerations prompted him, Mr. Lipsky continued, to include a final section to the working paper setting forth a few generalized personal concepts on the nature of imperialism. This view assumes power as the basic factor. In the course of history, a more powerful people will inevitably tend to impose their values and culture upon less powerful people. Imperialism is therefore a perennial phenomenon and a phenomenon open at both ends. For just as there is a tendency to impose, so also is there a tendency for the subject people to acquiesce and accept the new cultural pattern and, in so doing, to form the basis of a cooperative international commonwealth.

With regard to Marxism and Schumpeter’s theory, Mr. Lipsky felt that it is a grave mistake to assume that imperialism is either an atavistic relic from the past or an economic “necessity” of the present. The latter theory effectively serves propaganda purposes and is a convenient vehicle for making accusations against the Western powers. On the other hand, it is somewhat surprising to note Schumpeter’s view that imperialism is essentially behavioral residue from the precapitalistic, authoritarian era, thus excluding a whole host of factors which any comprehensive theory of imperialism must account for. It is also disappointing to note the extent to which Schumpeter agreed with Marx. For example, Schumpeter believed that Marx was methodologically sci-

entific. There is also a certain parallelism between the two theories which is illustrated by the broad generalizations each was willing to make. Schumpeter, for example, predicted a steady decline and termination of imperialism.

The chairman suggested that the group first turn its attention to clarifying the significance of certain features of Marxist theory of imperialism. The group could then proceed to the application of those problems as they relate to developing a theory of international relations which encompasses a world, large areas of which are under communist domination. Schumpeter's theory, he thought, should only be treated in passing and might best be used as a foil for analyzing Marxian theory.

The chairman remarked that, strictly speaking, there is no Marxist theory of imperialism but only subsequent interpretations of Marx as applied to that phenomenon, the leading interpreters being, of course Lenin and Luxemburg. Lenin's interpretations pose significant problems. For example, Lenin based his theory of imperialism on the development of industrial concentration in the capitalist states and the glutting of home markets, leading to a search for new markets overseas. Rivalry between these states for third markets would lead, in turn, to imperialistic wars and, finally, to "civil wars" between capitalist and proletariat classes within the advanced industrial countries. However, the problem is, why should concentration of industry, in Marxist logic, lead inevitably to the breakdown of the capitalist system?

Professor Holborn thought the answer is not to be found in Marxist theory but outside that "camp," that is, in Hobson's theory of imperialism. Of course, postulating the development of monopoly capitalism from competitive capitalism is good classical Marxism. Concomitant with the growth of monopoly is the growth of surplus capital and the increased exploitation of labor. Hobson added the notion that, in seeking a higher rate of return than that found on the domestic market, capital is exported to overseas areas. This was very useful to Lenin, who needed an explanation for the failure of capitalism to collapse along the lines predicted by Marx. Lenin used Hobson's theory to build a "new floor to the house of Marx" through which capitalism must ascend before its final plunge.

Professor Wolfers added that, according to Lenin, even this expedient is doomed to failure because of the ever-decreasing opportunities for profit in the overseas market as these markets become glutted and as rival capitalist states expand into similar markets. Thus the capital-exporting states are each faced with an ever-increasing surplus of capital which cannot be profitably invested. Hence they are under increasing pressure to force their way into markets already pre-empted by their rivals.

Professor Rabi felt that this line of reasoning still did not make intracapitalist war inevitable. If monopoly concentration is possible within the nation, why can it not develop across national boundaries as well?

The chairman pointed out that by “imperialism” Lenin did not mean the acquisition of territory but simply the penetration of markets for the export of capital and goods. Mr. Niemeyer wondered whether political control is not necessary to assure economic control. The chairman thought the political aspect is a corollary but not a precondition of the economic aspect. Professor Holborn felt that imperialism, from the Marxist standpoint, means protectionism at home and colonialism abroad. In other words, it means the exclusion of rival capitalist states from the home and overseas markets of the imperial state.

The Relevance of Economic Theory

Professor Strausz-Hupé believed that Lenin had borrowed much from Hilford as well as Hobson in developing his theory of imperialism. In any case, an understanding of Lenin’s theory pivots, he thought, on a comprehension of Marx’s surplus value theory. Given the assumptions of the value theory and the desire to maximize profits, the competitive process is confined to a lowering of wages and, hence, to an ever-increasing exploitation and subjugation of the proletariat. This process also explains capitalism’s need to win new markets overseas.

Mr. Niemeyer wondered whether the economic aspect of Leninist theory was really a relevant matter for discussion. The relationship of Lenin’s analysis of imperialism to international relations theory appeared, he believed, to offer quite different problems. One such problem is whether or not imperialism, as Lenin assumed, defines the entire content of international relations and offers an explanation for the international political process as a whole. A second problem is whether or not imperialism, as Lenin assumed, contributes to an understanding of the phenomenon of war; does it explain why wars arise or why they are more apt to start at one particular time rather than another? These questions can be discussed without recourse to the economic structure of Marxism, just as Marx’s and Lenin’s theories of government can be analyzed without references to the surplus value theory.

Professor Strausz-Hupé noted that Lenin’s theory of imperialism constitutes the operational theory of Soviet foreign policy. To understand the mind of a Soviet diplomat such as Vishinsky one must be aware of his doctrinal ori-

entation. This applied with equal force to evaluating the probable course the Soviet government will take in a given situation. One must have a grasp of the whole theory in order to understand its application to policy.

Mr. Niemeyer wondered whether the Soviet leaders really believed their own theories. Professor Strausz-Hupé acknowledged that there is some uncertainty on that point. The chairman felt that Soviet leaders must be aware that capitalism *per se* does not breed intracapitalist wars since such an assumption implies a Soviet policy of waiting for capitalism to destroy itself. That is obviously not true of Soviet policy today. Professor Holborn noted that historical examples exist in which Soviet foreign policy operated on the basis of Marxian doctrine. In the 1920s, for example, the Communist line was hostile to the Social Democrats in anticipation of a major economic crisis in the capitalist world as predicted by Varga. During that period there was a marked parallelism between Soviet foreign policy and certain economic assumptions. Unfortunately, those assumptions proved to be correct.

Professor Strausz-Hupé felt that Marxism had made a significant contribution to economic theory in general. Keynesian theory, for example, borrowed heavily from Rosa Luxembour's teachings. Thus Marxism has had practical as well as ideological consequences. On the whole, Marx offered a superbly intelligent theory. Given the limitation inherent in generalizing on the basis of an ideal model, Marx's predictions could be described as brilliant.

Mr. Niemeyer disagreed. He held that Marxism, on the whole, had failed to predict major economic and political developments in the West. The chairman noted that every major prediction made by Marx had failed to materialize: namely the shrinking of the middle class, the lowering of wages, the increased exploitation and subjugation of the workers. Something, he thought, must be wrong with a theory having a record of so many erroneous predictions.

Mr. Zinner expressed the view that it might be profitable, from the group's standpoint, to distinguish between the economic and political elements in Marxist theory and to analyze them independently. He doubted whether one could be as categorical in dismissing Marx's political prediction as one could with regard to Marx's economic forecasting. Italy and France today, from a political and social standpoint, appear to have a close resemblance to the Marxist concept of a capitalist state.

The chairman felt that the surplus value dogma could be dispensed with for present purposes. The fact that those countries now ruled by communist governments have never gone through a capitalist phase of development seems to indicate the theory's irrelevance. Mr. Zinner agreed. Actually Lenin

was mostly concerned with the political aspect of Marxism and its applicability to the revolutionary situation in Russia. In that sense, Lenin could be said to have turned Marx upside down.

Value of Marxist Theory

Professor Holborn said that while he was, of course, by no means a Marxist he had the feeling that Marxism has been, in some respects, underrated. As a theory of history, or perhaps of political sociology, it had created certain insights which were an advance over previous concepts. One of these was the concept of social classes. Liberal theoreticians had viewed classes as an agglomeration of individuals while Marx showed that they possessed a certain organic unity and particular interests and patterns of behavior. Although Marx's theory of class warfare is now antiquated, it opened the door to a more effective interpretation of society.

Marxism also has contemporary relevance, Professor Holborn continued, when one notices the extent to which US foreign policy appears to be based on perverted Marxist notions. This country's economic and technical assistance programs seem to be largely predicated on a theory of economic determinism, yet US policies fail to recognize the power of ideas and the interrelationship between ideas and material welfare in attempting to influence behavior abroad.

Mr. Niemeyer emphatically agreed with professor Holborn's observation on US foreign policy. The Marxist assumption of economic motivation in human behavior appears to have become an operational theory of foreign policy in the US and nowhere else. He also agreed that the Marxian analysis of society has produced greater insight into the workings of the political process which are beneficial to both Soviet and non-Soviet rulers. However, it is doubtful whether imperialism constitutes a complete explanation of the international relations process.

Mr. Thompson noted that most modern political theorists have passed through a phase of development in which they are intrigued by Marxism. But this enchantment contains the seeds of its own destruction. Usually the phase originates with a rejection of the oversimplified concepts of nineteenth century liberalism. One such idea, for example, is the postulate that social groups pursue universal interests while pursuing group interests. More particularly, there is the notion that the middle class was working for the liberation of all

classes when it challenged the rule of monarchy and aristocracy. Marx pointed out that universal interests are not necessarily served by the pursuit of particular interests and this was a step forward.

However, Mr. Thompson continued, the notion of the supremacy of particularized class interests is often carried to perilous lengths. It has reached a point where a Western statesman can hardly make a policy statement without its being construed in terms of special group or class motivations. Although class conflict is a real aspect of the political process, it is undoubtedly exaggerated and too rigidly defined by some theoreticians influenced by Marx. This had led to their failure to understand a program like that of the New Deal with its idea of a collective good as a clue to a nation's economic and political growth.

Moreover, Mr. Thompson pointed out, those theoreticians who have been influenced by Marx are inclined to view political power as merely a corollary of economic power and not as a problem in its own right. With the growth of state functions and powers under the New Deal and the war, there has been an increasing awareness of the problems which centralized political power poses for democratic government.

Professor Strausz-Hupé expressed the opinion that Lenin derived the causal factor for his theory of imperialism from Marx: namely from the concept of oversaving. He thought the group would have to come to grips with that basic notion if it were to be able to evaluate the theory as a whole. The chairman held that oversaving had not been a causal factor for Lenin in *State Revolution*. Certainly oversaving was not a causal factor for imperialism in the Keynesian sense of the term. Rather Lenin had postulated a general accumulation of capital and a falling rate of profit on the home market.

An important feature of Marxism, the chairman continued, is its dynamics—its appeal as a spur to action. It is pretty well established, at least in the field of political theory, that there is no necessary relationship between the importance of an idea and its truth. The essential concept of Marxism is the notion of class antagonism, which is, to say the least, a remarkable simplification of human behavior.

Professor Wolfers thought that the only fact about Lenin's description of imperial motivation is that it happens not to be true. On the other hand, Marxist theory of imperialism is also an explanation or justification for pinning guilt on the capitalist countries for international exploitation and war. It is, in addition, interesting to note the parallelism between Schumpeter and Marx in that both were trying to fasten the guilt for imperialism on a particular class, be it capitalist or precapitalist. Neither theorist viewed the phenomenon as being inherent in the state.

Professor Wolfers thought that Mr. Lipsky had “played down” imperialism somewhat when, in his working paper, he described it as an age-old phenomenon in which the strong extended their values over the weak. Professor Wolfers held that imperial conquerors are more concerned with exploiting people for economic gain than with spreading values.

Professor Wolfers noted that history has seen the rise and fall of many empires. Were these simply cases of international gangsterism? Would it simply continue under new forms? Are its origins to be found in a particular class pattern or did it spring perhaps from the political organization of man into nation-states?

Mr. Thompson suggested that three major theories have, over the years, been formulated to answer Professor Wolfers’ questions. None of them is wholly adequate. First, there is the economic theory of imperialism which can be traced back to the *laissez-faire* theorists who held that imperialism and war was an inevitable result of the absence of free trade. The munition makers’ theory is also a branch of that school. A third is, of course, the Marxian approach to imperialism with its many subsequent reinterpretations and ramifications. All of these schools see a particular economic configuration as the root cause. A second school of thought holds that imperialism springs from the existence of particular political systems. Thus Bentham maintained that control over colonies inevitably leads to war. Others have maintained that autocracy is inherently imperialistic and war-bent. Today the ideological theory of imperialism has become popular. Thus one hears that nations holding communist or fascist ideologies will inevitably attempt to conquer other nations. None of these schools asks, Mr. Thompson observed, whether there is something inherent in man’s nature which is the root cause. None has speculated as to whether war and imperialism are simply mass manifestations of behavior found in subnational life.

The chairman thought that while it is certainly true that human beings seek power they also seek other things as well. The problem is, he thought, whether certain conditions tend to bring out the power urge in preference to other values and, if so, what those conditions are.

Mr. Zinner wondered whether the group had not shifted the discussion away from Leninism to a generalized theory of imperialism in which one organized society has dominance over another. He suggested that it might be valuable first to examine fully the content of Leninist theory of imperialism, as well as the validity of that content, before taking up the more generalized subject. In this connection, he thought three questions came to mind: (1) To what extent is imperialism motivated by economic causes? (2) To what extent

do Soviet leaders believe Lenin's theory of imperialism? (3) To what extent has that theory been invalidated by advent of the USSR and the behavior of the USSR during the interwar period and after?

With regard to the content of Leninism, Mr. Zinner continued, the basic and essential concept offered by the theory of imperialism is that of conflict. Lenin postulated imperialism as a historic era characterized by conflict at three levels. First, between the proletariat and capitalist classes in the advanced industrial states; second, among the capitalist states in their rivalry for markets; and third, between the colonial peoples and their capitalist exploiters. Thus Lenin saw the existence of international and interclass struggle. Lenin's theory of imperialism was therefore not only relevant for rationalizing the necessity for a proletarian revolution in Russia but as a guide for exploiting tensions and conflicts created by imperialism, once the Soviet Union came into being.

The chairman noted that Lenin held that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism, yet offered no inherent reason for the absence of further stages. Mr. Zinner agreed that Lenin's interests as a revolutionary politician often interfered with building a consistent theory. Lenin could not see how capitalism could develop further after the imperialist stage nor did he desire that it do so since that would have postponed his own political ambitions.

With regard to an observation made by the chairman concerning the refutation of Lenin's theory of imperialism, Mr. Zinner expressed the view that the theory has also been refuted by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a proletarian state and its subsequent dominance over other nations. He felt that these developments have introduced new elements into the subject of Marxian interpretation of imperialism.

Professor Holborn questioned this conclusion. He referred to Malenkov's speech before the last Party Congress in which Malenkov stated that this disappearance of large areas of the world from the capitalistic orbit would make capitalism's economic contradictions even more acute. Mr. Zinner remembered that both Malenkov and Stalin had reiterated their faith in Marxism on that occasion but at no time has the USSR taken for granted that intracapitalistic wars make a capitalistic war against Russia an improbability. Mr. Niemeyer thought that Stalin had made it clear that he regarded an intracapitalistic war as probable within the foreseeable future.

Professor Strausz-Hupé noted that a refutation of Lenin's theory of imperialism lay in statistical studies of the imperialistic process. For example, the flow of capital to underdeveloped countries actually moves much slower than Lenin thought and earns a return much less than Lenin indicated. A French study shows, as a case in point, that the rate of return on French colonial

investments averages 1.2 percent while the rate of return on domestic investments averages much higher. Professor Strausz-Hupé said that statistical analysis of that type are the best means of indicating the validity or non-validity of Leninistic concepts.

Marxist Theory: Gospel or Tactical Weapon?

Professor Wolfers doubted whether Leninism is considered “the gospel truth” even in the Kremlin. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the Soviet leaders really believe that the policies of the Axis powers represented an outburst of capitalism in those countries. Although Stalin might say that the coming years will witness a renewal of intracapitalistic wars, one can write the pronouncement off as a calculated move to weaken the Western coalition. How better could he have attempted to sow suspicion than to predict such a war? Many Soviet statements appear to be no more than conscious attempts to manipulate attitudes and behavior in foreign nations, especially in uncommitted nations like India.

Professor Strausz-Hupé suggested that the US sometimes gives the USSR aid and comfort by lending a little substance to communist propaganda. This country’s foreign assistance policies, in certain instances, lent credence to the Soviet doctrine of economic saturation in capitalist states. With regard to whether or not the Soviet leaders believe Marxist theory, Professor Strausz-Hupé felt that the Nazi experience was fairly conclusive on that point. The records show that Hitler really believed his fantastic ideology. In fact, one might say there is a tendency for dictatorships to become victims of their own propaganda.

Mr. Lipsky thought a distinction could be made between fanatics such as Hitler who sincerely believed in Nazism and cold-blooded leaders such as Goebbels, who manipulated the ideology without taking it very seriously in terms of personal belief. Several group members felt that Goebbels was a poor example of the latter type of leader.

Mr. Thompson pointed out that a number of specialists on Russian affairs have addressed themselves to the significance of successive purges which have largely eliminated the old Bolsheviks and the more cosmopolitan diplomats from the Soviet diplomatic corps. These representatives possessed broader backgrounds, traveled more widely, and could “speak the same language” as their Western counterparts. The influx of Soviet-trained diplomats, such as Gromyko, is reflected in behavior which adheres more rigidly to Marxist dogma.

Professor Rabi made the point that even if a theory is known to be wrong or imperfect it is used and improvised upon until a better theory can be elaborated. The tendency is not to discard it but to patch it up and correct it on the basis of empirical observation and to continue to regard it as a theory. Thus the classical theory of physics was known to be wrong for a considerable period of time, yet it continued to be used and taught until a basic advance was made. Therefore, Professor Rabi observed, the Soviet leaders probably believe Marxist theory but only as they use it, not as it is laid out in their writings.

Mr. Thompson felt it would be erroneous to consider Soviet foreign policy as relying entirely on theory. There has always been a dichotomy in Soviet policy as between its Russian and its Marxist aspects—reliance on theory alone would tend to lead the Soviet down blind alleys. The USSR's current overtures to France have little theoretical justification, especially when one remembers the Marxian stricture that the future of the world revolution lies in the colonial areas, yet such overtures are quite intelligible when viewed in terms of traditional Russian national policies.

Mr. McClellan said he was finding it difficult to follow the trend of the discussion. Returning to the phenomenon of imperialism, he thought those present would agree that the phenomenon is expressive of a will to power as Lenin and his followers had argued. It is noteworthy, however, that with the coming of age of the USSR, the Soviet leaders have not turned their own ideological discipline upon themselves in terms of a theory of revolution but not in terms of a theory of imperialism. Mr. McClellan stated that he was thinking especially of Soviet relations with other communist countries and in terms of the Tito problem and the problem of relations with China. The USSR is now coming up against relationships for which their theory can furnish little guidance. Mr. Lipsky noted that the Marxist held their theory to be complete. This might be an indication that it was incomplete.

Miss Fosdick expressed the opinion that US foreign policy is more lacking in the understanding of realities than Marxist. Marxian orientation stresses active support of insurgent forces in foreign countries. This tends to give the USSR the advantage in competing with the US for popular support abroad. This country, on the other hand, seems to place emphasis on structure and form.

Professor Wolfers felt it would be useful for the group to leave aside the theory of surplus value in discussing Marxist theory of imperialism and examine more fully why the USSR has been able to use the theory so effectively within the context of current social forces and dynamics.

Mr. Niemeyer thought that the essence of the theory is the concept of

conflict. However, the theory tends to encourage or produce the very conflicts it postulates, hence the theory tends to become self-confirming.

Professor Strausz-Hupé held that the Soviet leaders “play it by ear” rather than relying on theory in making decision. Miss Fosdick thought that the US also seems to operate on the basis of theoretical assumptions which tend to block off large areas of reality.

Historical Causes of Leninist Theory

Mr. Roberts expressed the opinion that one of the reasons why a theory of imperialism was developed was to explain why a series of events took place in the period after 1870. Hence one criterion for a theory might be its usefulness in explaining history. In that sense, Leninism seems to be more relevant than a theory which ascribes imperialism to atavistic tendencies in the human psyche. In determining whether or not a theory has usefulness in explaining history, one must also determine whether the phenomenon is a suitable object for theorizing or whether it is too particular for that purpose. In general, Lenin's theory seems to offer a sounder explanation for why the phenomenon began at that time rather than before or after 1870.

Mr. Lipsky thought that the era of imperialism with which Lenin was concerned antedated 1870. Mr. Roberts thought that it was generally acknowledged that the sudden and rapid rise in extra-European expansion began around 1870. Mr. Lipsky felt that nineteenth-century imperialism was but another assertion of a perennial phenomenon in human behavior. In response to a question by Mr. Roberts as to the cause of imperialism, Mr. Lipsky held it to be the tendency of men to foist their values upon other men. In answer to Mr. Roberts query as to why nineteenth-century imperialism began around 1870, Mr. Lipsky thought that the Leninist theory of surplus capital accumulation appeared to have validity in explaining that point.

Mr. Zinner felt that Leninist theory was a poor explanation for German imperialism. Professor Holborn thought that much could be said for the Marxist theory of history but little for its theory of imperialism. In general, he found the word “imperialism” too ambiguous and too subjective to be of any value as a descriptive term. The chairman suggested that if Professor Holborn refused to use the term he would have to find another equally suitable for describing, say the British conquest of South Africa. The point is, the chairman thought, whether such conquests are motivated by those interests which Lenin postulated.

Professor Strausz-Hupé observed that the expansionist plans of some states have largely been reactions to expansionism of others.

Professor Holborn felt that it could be said, in general, that human beings have the capacity for great lust for power and enrichment. The rise of nineteenth-century capitalism gave certain groups an obvious opportunity to express such desires. The chairman wondered whether that was an adequate explanation for the desire for colonial acquisitions at that particular time.

Mr. Zinner thought that differing motivations impel different nations. The reverse is also true: namely, that the same nation is motivated by different interests during various periods. One motivation is that of preclusive occupation—to deny the territory in question to other powers. Prestige motivations are also of great importance. Professor Strausz-Hupé suggested that much of British colonial expansion was prompted by the desire to acquire naval and other bases.

Professor Holborn, citing the example of German colonialism, noted that no more than two-thirds of one percent of Germany's balance of trade had been with her colonial possessions. On the other hand, the bulk of German trade had been conducted with the US and Great Britain. Moreover, German plans for the Near East, as embodied in the Berlin-Baghdad railroad project, were largely political in motivation. Actually, German financial interests had wanted to share the burden of financing the railroad with foreign bankers but had been prevented from doing so by the government. Hence the German imperialist experience was completely at variance with the Leninist model.

Mr. Thompson wondered whether there might not be more plausible theories than the Marxian for explaining imperialism. He thought that a politically oriented theory might be relevant. By 1870 any further territorial changes in Europe could only have been carried out with great difficulty and only at the risk of a general war. The focus of European rivalries had therefore gradually shifted to the "empty spaces" of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, where expansion could proceed without as great a risk of general war. Overseas expansion therefore worked as a kind of safety valve but did not fundamentally alter the balance of power which had been created in Europe.

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered whether such a theory sufficiently emphasized conflicts which developed out of colonial rivalries, as illustrated by the Fashoda Crisis. Such conflicts are, he thought, the essence of imperialism. Professor Holborn believed, on the other hand, that the importance of those conflicts has been exaggerated. At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck indicated to the French that Germany would support French ambitions in Tunisia. France's subsequent advance touched off a race for territories in Africa. While

there is no doubt that rivalry for colonies tended to increase tension among the European powers and that colonial disputes served as testing grounds for European foreign policies, there is little evidence to support the claim that the First World War resulted from imperialist rivalries.

Mr. Diebold suggested that the Leninist theory of imperialism could be criticized on the theoretical as well as the historical level. Lenin's theory was, presumably, based on economic "necessity," yet intracapitalist conflict does not appear to be inevitable even under his assumptions. There seems to be no reason why the capitalist ruling groups of imperialist countries cannot come to an agreement to parcel out the markets of the world for joint exploitation. Mr. Zinner agreed. He ventured that Lenin would not have admitted the possibility of a resolution of imperialist rivalry through international cartels. Such an admission would have cut the roots from under the "inevitable" proletarian revolution, and Lenin was loath to concede that this revolution was anything but imminent.

Professor Strausz-Hupé observed that Leninism ignored the infinity of causes which propel any massive historical phenomenon. He expressed the opinion that the English novel of that period furnishes excellent evidence of the causes for British empire building. Some Englishmen left home to escape their wives, others were searching for adventure in such pursuits as lion hunting.

Professor Wolfers expressed some skepticism as to the lions. He felt that imperialism usually occurs at periods of history in which ruling groups see great opportunities for personal enrichment and advancement through colonial expansion. Once the process begins other factors tend to enter the picture—such as security, prestige, and so on. But the original impetus, he believed, is economic and has been so from the time the nomads left the mountains and descended into fertile valleys. Professor Strausz-Hupé held that Genghis Khan did not create his empire for personal enrichment or for the enrichment of his people. Conquered towns were destroyed, not looted. Mr. Zinner suggested that Genghis Khan somewhat predated the period of imperialism about which Lenin had theorized.

Toward a Definition of Imperialism

The question as to the precise meaning of the term imperialism was raised. Professor Holborn felt it has a special, distinctive meaning: namely, the Marxian description for a specific phase in the development of capitalism. The term makes certain assumptions and predicts certain consequences. Historically,

the term outdated Lenin and had quite a different meaning in the context of the French Second Empire.

The chairman wondered whether the term could not be further defined as the theory which Lenin developed to explain why Marx's theory had not been borne out.

Mr. Thompson thought that the principal weakness of Leninist theory was equally applicable to most theories of imperialism save, perhaps, the so-called "diplomatic" theory. Most theories ascribe a certain moral opprobrium to imperialism, be it the national character of the offending nation or its social or economic structure. It would appear to be more plausible, he thought, to analyze it on the basis of historical facts. The Truman Doctrine furnishes an example. In that instance the US was attempting to prevent Soviet expansion into vital areas. Such expansionist aims, if successful, would have caused a fundamental alteration in the balance of power as a result of basic territorial changes. The USSR thus can be termed imperialist when it follows policies having those characteristics.

Professor Holborn disagreed with that interpretation on the ground that it is broad enough to designate the US as imperialist. He asserted that the term only has meaning if one accepts the Marxian interpretation of capitalist exploitation.

Mr. Thompson felt that it is fairly clear that groups or nations tend to rationalize their own interests as promoting more general values. Professor Holborn agreed. Marx had shown mankind the sin that resulted when class interests and social philosophies were confused. Perhaps Marx had made men better Christians as a result.

US "Imperialism"

In response to a question as to why American foreign policy might not, at times, assume imperialist characteristics, Professor Holborn said that US foreign policy is basically oriented toward protecting American security. Imperialism at least implies an aggressive policy of domination.

Mr. Thompson felt, on the other hand, that in opposing the USSR, the US runs the risk of adopting imperialist methods and objectives. In attempting to stop communism there is a tendency for this country to become authoritarian in its relationships with others. Professor Holborn disagreed. He thought one might lose all faith in US foreign policy if such conclusions appeared to be valid. He felt convinced that US policy is devoted to protecting those interests

necessary for the nation to survive. It could be acknowledged, indeed, that this country lies under a grave temptation to sacrifice the interests of its allies in its own behalf; one must always try to avoid running roughshod over one's allies in providing for the nation's security. Yet he could scarcely believe that the US was not continually seeking to harmonize its own interests with those of the free world especially those of Europe and the Commonwealth.

Mr. Thompson recalled that the writers of the *Federalist* had understood the threat of imperialism, in the sense that groups or institutions tend to aggrandize themselves at the expense of others, and had created the system of checks and balances to neutralize that tendency. Professor Holborn agreed that power is always a great temptation to a group or nation but he saw little value in attaching to it a label borrowed from a discredited philosophy.

Professor Wolfers felt that this country could not be characterized as imperialist since it does not seek to dominate other countries. Mr. Lipsky thought that the US might and probably should seek to dominate a country, such as Guatemala, if that country fell under communist rule. If domination occurred, he saw no reason why this country's relationship with Guatemala should not be characterized as imperialist. Professor Wolfers thought the US and the UK seek to carry out their policies short of domination. Mr. Lipsky felt that if a situation necessitated imperialist methods in order to protect American survival, this country would use them. He cited the possibility of American military intervention in Italy in 1948, had that country elected a communist majority.

Mr. Armstrong suggested that there might be a difference between domination and control. This country might dominate another country in the sense that it would deny them the choice of establishing a communist government but the US would not seek to control a country in the sense of deliberate exploitation. Mr. Lipsky agreed. He thought there were a variety of situations which the US would not allow to deteriorate beyond a certain point. Beyond that point the US would probably intervene in the interest of its own survival and would be forced to use techniques which could aptly be described as imperialist.

Mr. Lichenstein questioned the theoretic value of so broadening the meaning of a term as to cover an infinite variety of relationships. He preferred Professor Wolfers' definition of imperialism: namely, domination for the purpose of exploitation.

Mr. Thompson observed that if imperialism is defined as an alteration of the status quo, then direct action in countries like Italy or Guatemala could be termed imperialist providing such action involved a change in the previously existing distribution of power. Miss Fosdick questioned whether US intervention for the purpose of liberating a nation which had succumbed to commu-

nism could be termed imperialist. Mr. Thompson felt that the employment of US troops for such purposes would tend to alter the distribution of power and hence could be termed imperialist.

Mr. Zinner said he was appalled at the ease with which the group had drifted into a discussion of US-Soviet relations. As for the meaning of imperialism, he thought that Lenin described it explicitly enough: namely, the monopoly phase of capitalism with its attendant assumptions and predictions. With regard to Leninist theory, he felt that the central notion of class and international conflict was most useful for purposes of analyzing the international relations process.

Professor Holborn noted that one aspect of Leninist theory which had not received much attention was Marx's and Lenin's challenge to the idea that the area of international affairs is that part of the field of political science which is concerned with relations among nation-states. Marxism assumed a decisive underlying reality of an international community in terms of economic classes. This concept raises important considerations of the study of international affairs. For example, if no one assumes a static nation-state system, then international treaties would not be broken. But one has only to recall the meaningless reciprocal pledges embodied in the interwar Franco-Soviet pact to understand that treaties which do not reflect dominant class interests of the contracting nations are worthless. US foreign policy in particular is only intelligible in terms of group, class and institutional interests. In general, the Marxist stress upon class influence is a decided contribution to the theory of international relations.

The chairman asked what further conclusions Marxist theory might have for international politics. He suggested that one such conclusion involves Marxism's confident anticipation that capitalism is inherently contradictory and that the capitalist world is doomed to conflict and destruction. If the capitalist countries can maintain themselves and cooperate with one another over a respectable period of time, it would inflict a damaging blow to Soviet ideology.

Mr. Zinner believed that in examining the matrix which holds the Western community together, an effective refutation of Marxism might emerge. Mr. Thompson felt that such a refutation would include recognition that there is some political wisdom to the Western tradition. Such qualities as moderation, prudence, and accommodation are essential aspects of coalition and consensus.

Mr. McClellan recalled Mr. Truman's final message to Congress in which the former president argued that Marxism was a pre-atomic philosophy. That

viewpoint seems to be influencing even Soviet policy at the moment. The chairman agreed that the atomic age tends to make Marxism obsolete. Marxism and Leninism assumed that wars are inevitable because of the inherent make-up of capitalism, but the destructive power of atomic weapons has placed a premium on avoidance of a general war. Mr. Zinner thought that Malenkov's recent speech on the topic seemed to indicate a growing awareness of the possibility of mutual destruction.

John D. Blumgart
Rapporteur

Notes to Working Paper No. 4

1. Edited and with an introduction by Paul M. Sweezy (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1951). The other sources that I have found of particular help in inspecting the problem of imperialism are Schumpeter, *Ten Great Economists: From Marx to Keynes*; E. M. Winslow, *The Pattern of Imperialism*; and V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*.

2. *Ibid.*, xi.

3. E. M. Winslow, *The Pattern of Imperialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 3.

4. Of course, Morgenthau does not accept the idea of a satiated imperial power, for a power that remains imperialistic retreats or holds what it has only to prepare for a subsequent advance. He believes in "the simple fact that in the exercise of power there is no limit and that the more an imperialist acquires, the more he has to have to hold what he has." Winslow, *The Pattern of Imperialism*, 71. Yet in Morgenthau's own system there are status quo powers, but such powers are by this definition non-imperialistic. The test must be whether there is a desire to alter the status quo, and this is certainly a difficult test to apply.

5. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, 63.

6. V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in *Selected Works*, vol. V (New York: International Publishers, 1943), 13. Lenin made it quite clear that he was aware of the existence of "non-economic aspects of the question . . ."

7. J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York: Pott, 1902).

8. Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. V., 14.

9. *Ibid.*, 15.

10. *Ibid.*, 18.

11. *Ibid.*, 19.

12. *Ibid.*, 25.

13. *Ibid.*, 27.

14. *Ibid.*, 44.

15. *Ibid.*, 56.

16. *Ibid.*, 57.

17. *Ibid.*, 68.

18. *Ibid.*, 70

19. *Ibid.*, 74–75.
20. *Ibid.*, 80.
21. *Ibid.*, 80–81.
22. *Ibid.*, 89–90.
23. Some contradictions work against Lenin's end, perhaps. For example, the conflict between privileged sections of the proletariat and the mass thereof may retard the emergence of that day. *Ibid.*, 98.
24. Lenin, "The War, The Revolutionary Crisis, and the Tactics of the Party," in *Selected Works*, vol. V., 142.
25. *Ibid.*, 143–44.
26. *Ibid.*, 145.
27. *Loc. cit.*
28. *Ibid.*, 146: italics in the original.
29. *Ibid.*, 150.
30. V. I. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in *Selected Works*, vol. V., 270.
31. *Loc. cit.*
32. *Ibid.*, 271.
33. Schumpeter, "Foreword," in *Ten Great Economists: From Marx to Keynes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), ix.
34. Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, 92.
35. *Loc. cit.*
36. *Ibid.*, 94.
37. *Loc. cit.*
38. *Ibid.*, 94–95.
39. *Ibid.*, 96: He does not deny that it is in the nature of a capitalist economy that many people stand to gain in a war.
40. *Loc. cit.*
41. *Ibid.*, 99.
42. *Ibid.*, 101: At another point, he does agree that the alignment of interests may be changed. *Ibid.*, 104.
43. *Ibid.*, 102.
44. *Ibid.*, 108–9.
45. *Ibid.*, 111: And a social imperialism, a people's imperialism, according to Schumpeter, is today an impossibility. *Ibid.*, 114–15.
46. *Ibid.*, 115.
47. *Ibid.*, 117–18.
48. *Loc. cit.*
49. *Ibid.*, 128–29.
50. *Ibid.*, 130.
51. *Loc. cit.*
52. *Ibid.*, 83–84.
53. *Loc. cit.*
54. *Loc. cit.*
55. *Ibid.*, 85.

Fifth Meeting: Political Geography vs. Geopolitics, April 8, 1954

The fifth meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Relations was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, April 8, 1954, at 5:30 p.m. The subject was political geography vs. geopolitics. Present were: Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur, John P. Armstrong; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Charles Lichenstein; Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Isidor I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Arnold Wolfers; Paul Zinner.

Working Paper No. 5

Prepared by George A. Lipsky

Introduction

The considerations of main importance in dealing with the contrasts between political geography and geopolitics are considerations of methodology. The major issues of methodology in any discipline or in any analysis may be drawn out as questions of epistemology. That is to say, the data of any investigation will be defined and will be employed according to the investigator's view of what one knows or can know concerning the nature of reality. Therefore, it seems suitable to preface this discussion of geopolitics with a brief statement of the author's view of these epistemological matters. This view has been part of the underlying argument of previous working papers and is especially relevant

to the discussion of the nature of a theory of international relations planned for the final meeting.

A major premise of this position is that all metaphysical assertions involving an assumption that thinking can be identical with being are beyond science and, therefore, are not subject to scientific evaluation except as the assertions are themselves data. A metaphysical position is certainly a representation of a particular type of epistemology.¹ But it may be contended that a position that holds epistemology to be the core philosophical area from which one should begin will incline to eschew metaphysics and refer to apparent relationships rather than the so-called substance of things.

It may reasonably be asserted with Bertrand Russell that philosophy “in . . . [the] historically usual sense, has resulted from the attempt to produce a synthesis of science and religion, or, perhaps more exactly, to combine a doctrine as to the nature of the universe and man’s place in it with a practical ethic inculcating what was considered the best way of life.”² Put more strongly, and yet I think fairly, most philosophers have been at pains to enshrine their value preferences as absolutes in a structure of thought expressed with culture and logic, complex and complete enough to confuse or entreat their audience, especially those whose similar value preferences require support. An essentially nominalist position, on the other hand, demands a strict separation between knowledge and virtue (a quality attributed to situations, and persons as parts of them, deemed good). It has been mainly the success of some modern philosophy to achieve this separation, although the emphasis is under severe assault in this century from quarters that no doubt wish to maintain the conventional philosophical support of authority.

More and more, however, it becomes difficult to establish a single orthodoxy giving security even for a limited period. The most that a universalist, intuitive, or dialectical position can do is produce, in a world that will be growingly secular and therefore questioning, an orthodoxy among warring orthodoxies. To proceed from a principle established *a priori* by authority is today to choose the road to conflict. Besides being scientifically and philosophically correct, the nominalist approach is, I submit, the only one that can in the long run reduce national and international tensions and make change possible in the context of peace.

The position taken in these pages bespeaks a fundamental humility, implying toleration of varieties of points of view. The question is customarily asked whether, in the interest of consistence and attachment to principle, this toleration has to be total or complete, whether the nominalist has to accept any and/or all results of the contest of ideas in the marketplace or the opera-

tion of political institutions working in terms of majority rule. The answer is clear that, before the contests are over in the marketplace or in politics, the nominalist, if he values the intellectual freedom that should be his most important means, and almost certainly his highest value, must struggle with great vigor and energy against his opponents. After the results are in in the political and social contest, there are no compelling logical, philosophical, or practical reasons why the nominalist's toleration should be extended to give aid and comfort to those proceeding from non-nominalist positions. The victory of authoritarians, whether universalist, intuitive, or dialectical, must be the signal in this last extremity for civil war, national or international. Otherwise those whose philosophical premises reject the conception of an authority in nature, having its spokesmen among men, prescribing virtue and the proper way of life, must accept this authority for a dreadfully long time, particularly in this century wherein technology has made the barricades almost obsolete. In the final assessment, then, toleration need be extended by the nominalist only to those multitudes of conceptions of the nature of reality and value that are compatible with his position. A nominalist may with consistency choose not to fight, but if he values the intellectual processes he asserts, modern conditions make struggle against the abridgement of those processes a real, if not an absolute, imperative. And the interval between the formal and the real victory of the authoritarians may be so short that the action of their opponents must be decisive and quick. That our contemporary experience does not give much cause for hope that such action will be decisive and quick is part of our present tragedy.

The position asserted in the paragraph immediately above calls for the running of real risks and dangers, but this fact cannot be an effective appeal to inaction, for every human action or decision involves risks and dangers. The nominalist may find through experience that he moved against the authoritarians before a clear and present danger had appeared. He can only hope that time will educate him to be more sensitive to his needs. The call to national or international civil war may temporarily enthrone naked power as the exclusive arbiter of human affairs, and power historically inclines toward an exclusive intolerance even on the part of those who wield it in a supposed good cause. The attempt must be made to see that institutions are preserved that prevent power from becoming its own reason for being. Nominalists should not be constrained to inaction for these reasons; partial success is all that can attend the affairs of men; sin is always with us.

It may be asked what in the nominalist position is so compelling as to warrant the counseling of such a vigorous defense, a defense some will call contra-

dictory. To the last charge some answer has been given above. Briefly, until a nominalist can be shown an authority in nature, upon whom all can agree, by whose fiat an end or value or situation can be known to be unqualifiedly good, he must reject the conception of an obvious or self-evident identity between thinking and being (external nature). In this view, all statements of ends are attempts to freeze a status quo, a situation, on the time continuum. This is an impossible task at best, and there is no scientific basis for asserting the goodness of such an illusion. At most, every situation is a means or an inadequately described complex of events on the time continuum, about which science may only venture a description of causal nexus.

In this light, single or multiple causes, long-range explanations, or predictions of what will occur are highly questionable ventures, especially in history and the social sciences. To the extent that long-range predictions are undertaken in these areas, they tend to admit value preferences under the guise of science.³ What man predicts in history, beyond his scientific capacity to know, is what he wishes to happen. And like the orthodox philosopher he is palming off his conception of goodness and virtue under false and pseudo-respectable colors. The twentieth century especially tends to be victimized by such attempts. Admittedly attempts at distinguishing between long-range and short-range predictions cannot be sure and certain. Prediction of a sort is necessary and inevitable. Pure description serves no adequate purpose if it is unaccompanied by some attempt to forecast at least possibilities. A sound methodology can propose to do no more than provide a dynamic guide to assist the analyst in distinguishing between the suggestion of possibilities and the prophecy of the course of history.

As we have previously suggested, a theory (or explanation) must be a combination of description (classification) rather clearly representing or reflecting the observable, physical world and description [word missing] assumption. Every theory is incomplete, since it has interstices correlative in scope with ignorance. Within the interstices values function and assist in suggesting hypotheses (theories in their most incomplete condition) and in guiding the selection of data by which hypotheses appear to be transformed into theses. There is no process by which the cognitive subject can be made certain that its classifications unquestionably represent real classifications in the cognitive object. For this reason, as well as because the history of culture and science indicates analogically that all theories are incomplete, total theories, presuming to forecast the course of history, are presumptuous and usually the products of fanatics and those who are not disposed to inspect closely their own first principles and the possible contradictions among them.

Not the least important step is to insist upon the precision of definition and classification in accordance with the soundest observation of phenomena. Few would deny that mankind lives in an age of transition or hurried change. Theorists and philosophers, as part of this process of acceleration, seek simple explanations of or causes for change. In most cases their intellectual product becomes a part of the process and we have at least the illusion of ideas functioning independently and without predetermination to alter and condition history. It is not necessarily a conservative position to suggest that men should meet the need for social change (demanded by their accumulated preferences) without recourse to the *ex cathedra* pronouncements of those who find it easy to see an authority in the empyrean or in history to support their wishes and desires. By trial-and-error adjustment it may be possible to preserve a modicum of social consensus, the context of a people's political education. And we may thus not become victimized by those who presume to know more than they can know about what is good for and virtuous in their fellow men. Theories of class conflict, parochial theories of imperialism, and theories of geographical determinism, the writer submits, are part of the revolutionary pressure and acceleration whereby men seek to rationalize their demands for change.⁴ The task is one of worsting the fanatics, many of them perhaps given their opportunity by a democratic environment that has cultivated the idea of popular wisdom and that by its basic tenets cannot insist that generalizations be submitted to a sound process of scientific verification.

Intellectual activity would be arid indeed if men were not encouraged to attempt broad adventuresome generalizations suggesting historical cycles, movements, pulsations, trends, parallels. To the degree, however, that we know that these generalizations are difficult to verify, it is important to avoid acting upon them as if they were unquestionably true. It is possible that, true or not as they are used to suggest the past, they may move men to action that is successful in fulfilling their ambitions. I believe, however, that democracy is more certain to be preserved by sounder, even though less ambitious, evaluations of reality.

Definitions and Classifications

Applying these views to the subject of this paper, I should say that political geography represents sound description and allowable short-range prophecy while geopolitics—in its usage and associations—represents scientifically unwarranted, grandiose historical generalizations and long-range prophecy, em-

bodying, in the main, the wish fulfillments of either fanatics, or those who accept the fiat of an external authority speaking through a church or a political regime, or an external authority implicit in a historic automatism (e.g., a concept of economic man based upon a Philistine rationalism).

A reading of the literature reveals an unfortunate confusion in the use of the two terms. In this paper “political geography” is used strictly to refer to the genuine descriptive science, which avoids gigantic generalizations embodying long-range prophecies cloaking a kind of religious aspiration. “Geopolitics” on the other hand, is used to designate the pseudo-science of geography applied in the single-cause explanation of human affairs. Some writers make this distinction with great care.⁵ Others use the term “geopolitics” as a more convenient term than political geography and keep within proper methodological bounds for the most part.⁶ Still others make use of the term “geopolitical” in preference to “political geographical” and yet rather carefully eschew the excesses of the former and speak of its misuse by some theorists.⁷ At the same time they may, as in the case of Hans W. Weigert, counsel a geopolitics that is freed from abuse and yet not a political geography.⁸ Finally, some do not face the problem at all.⁹

Weigert’s assertions do not appear orderly and some seem, in fact, eccentric. In the final evaluation it is not possible to be certain concerning his views, probably because he is not systematic in his analysis (in the philosophical sense). The title of his work discussed here is *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics*. It is not clear from the text whether he is suggesting a fact by the title or indicating a wish that geopolitics should go into eclipse. He deplores the fact that we, particularly in the West, are overlooking “the bearing of space-configurations on history and politics.” This language is ambiguous; it might be that either of a political geographer or a geopolitician. He refers to Sir Halford Mackinder as a political geographer, although the correct classification of his work is not so certain.¹⁰ Weigert’s stand on this latter point reveals that he is enlarging the area of what is properly called “geopolitics.” He seems to bestow even an accolade upon the German variety when he points out that Germany under Hitler did not enjoy the exclusive advantage of a well-ordered and developed geopolitics and quotes Haushofer approvingly in placing English and American geopolitics ahead of continental geopolitics.¹¹

His confusion is worse confounded in the following extract:

If we compare “political geography” and “geopolitics,” it becomes obvious that political geography is a child of geography, while geopolitics belongs to the realm of political science. The geographer who ponders over the space-

relationships of states becomes a political geographer; the political scientist—and, we might add, the statesman—who learns to use geographical factors for a better understanding of politics, becomes a geopolitician. Theoretically, political geographer and geopolitician should meet. The fact is that they do not.¹²

First, it is difficult if not impossible to see the distinction between evaluating the space relationships of states and considering the relationship between geographical factors and politics. Second, it is impossible to see why the political scientist and the statesman should be placed in the same category as having the same purpose in considering geographical factors. The suspicion that the political scientist is indirectly being charged with using his data to accomplish political purposes is confirmed by later contentions of Weigert that geopolitics is concerned with “conflict and change, evolution and revolution, attack and defense,” that geopolitics “aims to furnish the weapons for political action,”¹³ and that geopolitics “by linking all historical development with the conditions of space and soil, and by regarding history itself as determined by these external forces, . . . attempts to *predict* the future.”¹⁴ Is Weigert condemning geopolitics for its attempts at prognosis, and, in so doing, is he condemning political science for its involvement with this rather “juvenile” science?¹⁵ His view of the purposes and methodology of geopolitics is probably unexceptionable; his reaction to the propriety of this methodology is ambiguous at best and in error at worst. The devoting of these paragraphs to Weigert is warranted because a reading of the literature of the field reveals great paucity of system and inadequacy of method, both among those who would describe the fields and those who would be practitioners therein. If more system and sounder methods had been employed, the excesses of geopolitics would probably not be so widespread, but, on the other hand, this particular type of philosopher would not have had such an opportunity to purvey his wares (values). That would be an advantage difficult to give up. Weigert is typical of the inadequate expositors of these fields.

The stringency of the criticisms here requires an attempt to set out sounder definitions. Political geography is that descriptive and largely observational science that proposes to see the state and other political orders in relation to geographical factors as they are classified in terms of an informing theory combining as always both a high degree of certainty of knowledge and areas of ignorance (primary spheres of values). The designation of political geography will make description his starting point. He will establish criteria, some conventional and others personal, through the use of which natural geographic regions, both real and hypothetical, may be determined. He will recognize,

however, that his own values will be instrumental in bringing him to a definition of such regions. Since he is particularly interested in the relationship of states to geographical environment, he will be influenced to delineate regions in terms of the purposes and needs of states. For example, in terms of some imaginable purposes a region might be declared to be a mountain range combined with its slopes to their outer limits. For the purposes of the state, however, this kind of region might not make for survival (defense, unity), either physical or cultural. The political geographer will be particularly conscious of the functioning of the “ought” in his theory, and he will be safeguarded against allowing it so to dominate description that the “is” becomes inextricably confused with it. These two areas of theory, ends (“ought” or values) and means (“is”) will be inevitably related, but they must not be confused. Their nature and relationship will be essentially a matter of statement, but systematic statement and careful handling will safeguard the political geographer against establishing his ends as the appropriate ends for all men without question. So safeguarded, he may remain a scientist and avoid becoming a medicine man.

Not only will the political geographer be most careful to observe the functioning of informing theory in his classification of states, he will also employ historical analogy, biological analogies, and cyclical conceptions in a gingerly fashion. An Arthur Koestler, influenced by geopolitical conceptions and looking for the locus of world anticommunist leadership, may visit the United States to try to discover whether we are a young or old nation, therefore whether we are capable of vigorous or only decadent leadership. If he wishes hard enough and does not face up to his great methodological problems, he may easily discover that the United States is young and, therefore, the hope of the future. A political geographer, on the other hand, might conclude that it is worthwhile to use such analogies as guides to analysis, but with great care. The United States might then be viewed as vigorous (young-like) in some spheres, enervated (old-like) in others, reviving (no direct biological analogy, if we omit the use of monkey glands) in still others. In this view, the *ecumene** of the United States is not an internal, pulsating organ, the size of which contributes only to strength and not to weakness. To the political geographer, the *ecumene* will be simply the basic inhabited and exploited area in the United States in terms of population size and skills (manufacturing power and strength of market) and complexity of communication facilities. Avoiding biological analogy, there will be less tendency in the political geographer to ar-

*The primary exploited and inhabited region of a country; a complex based on resources and communication.

rive at oversimple conclusions, such as, for example, confusing size of ecumene with strength or survival value. Looking for complex answers or hypotheses as well as simple ones, he may more easily tally the elements of weakness as well as those of strength.

Similarly, the political geographer will be most chary of seeing the state's frontier as a kind of peripheral organ (analogous to the human skin), if the tortuous employment of such an analogy is largely the rationalization of some philosophy (religion) of expansion. These cautions are safeguards against assertions of mystical or occult attractions or repulsions implied within statements perhaps superficially descriptive of geographical phenomena. Such statements as that the Rhine is part of the natural peripheral organ of France without which France is crippled would be viewed with great care and skepticism.

Geopolitics, as it is viewed in these pages, may be compared to Marxism. They both look for single causes, in the one case, the geographical factor (asserting a determinism in, for example, the possession of the "heartland"), in the other the economic factor (asserting a determinism in, for example, the working out of the class struggle). They both suggest a teleology, if not of a controlling deity, at least of nature itself, with goals (millennia) promised by that nature which, although they may not be eternal (even in the Marxist view), cannot have dimension put upon them.¹⁶ Conceptions range from one hundred to one thousand or even five thousand years.¹⁷ The geopolitical or Marxian theorist, attuned to this unfolding purpose because he sees clearly the operation of the single cause, may predict for today, tomorrow, and for the long-range future. Since he asserts more than he can know, he is projecting his values and forcing them upon history. They become the major part of his prophecy. History may seemingly or actually appear to bear him out, but the largest possibility is that history's underwriting of the theory is fortuitous, even though the ideas themselves may have contributed to the result which appears. The primary consideration here is that the theorist has asserted more than he can know. The coincidence that may appear between his creed and practice has sources far more complex than any explanation his theory may present. There is a religious drive, if not a religiosity, underlying both types of theory. It comprehends a willingness or drive to know the nature of reality without preserving the corrective of establishing the limits of knowledge. The assurance of rectitude may be so great that men may be liquidated, or even nations, if they do not fit the formula or perspective of the creed.¹⁸

Both geopolitics and Marxism present theories for a time of revolution wherein men are particularly disposed to seek the clear way to a better future as they define that future for themselves or their community. There is

a definite sense of satisfaction that can come to those who feel they have found the magic words, the way. It is as though they have been admitted to the Arcanum, after which the doors can be thrown open to permit the light therefrom to chase away the last remnant of shadow and doubt. Historical parallels become more than parallels; they become deeply suggestive. Historical parallels working upon and with geographical parallels become a confirmation of revealed mystery. The way men react historically to the obstacle of the African promontory being so much like the way, at least superficially, they reacted to the obstacle of the Hellenic promontory, a law of history may be derived therefrom, although it may be stated at first with diffidence. Since so frequently the nomads have moved in upon the sedentary sowers—moved for the geopoliticians by the pulsations and ebb and flow of climatic change, for the Marxists by the vicissitudes of economic development—on the basis of these particulars a law of historical evolution can be stated. The geopolitician will see the historic importance of a vaguely defined “heartland” as a base of conquest and depredation. The Marxist will see a confirmation of a thesis of class conflict, with rule and political power being established by the violence of one invading class or group exercised upon another. While many theorists, moved by non-nominalist patterns of thought, will be only vaguely a part of a revolutionary ferment, they are all potentially the “doers” or organizers who wish a formula of easy rationalization to justify the course they counsel. Even the revisionist socialists, giving sincere loyalty to democratic process, take a delight in doctrinairely scrambling the eggs and constantly throw off from their insecure fringes more “doers” who have had enough of restraint. And some academic but certain geopoliticians would rip apart their political maps and remake them, in keeping with their favorite theory and single-cause explanations.

I take this stand against them for methodological reasons, because my values reject the violence they portend, and because I think they cannot recreate soon the context of evolutionary change within which we may preserve the valuable test of a conditioned historical experience.

Illustration and Example

As we have proceeded in our definitions from political geography to geopolitics, so we might follow that course with our illustrations and examples. Both Gyorgy and Strausz-Hupé in their descriptive and analytical references to geopolitics show that they perceive the nature of the distinction,¹⁹ although

Gyorgy in lumping many authorities together in the tradition of those who stressed the geographical factor indicates a possible confusion on the methodological question.²⁰ He likewise refers to Ratzel's "serious *Anthropogeographie*, [as] a dignified branch of political geography," as some would not do. But his reference to geopolitics in Germany as "the science [sic] of a new, totalitarian, state, seeking eventually to achieve a geographic and political domination of the world" indicates insight into the problem, if we apply the rule *inclusio unius, exclusio alterius*. We are left in some confusion by such a statement as "It [geopolitics] is human geography adapted to modern totalitarian politics."²¹ However, in all fairness, it must be admitted that as environmentalists even the German geopoliticians did a great deal of constructive work and provided insights. I suggest that in this respect they are not geopoliticians but rather mainly descriptive political geographers. On this ground, Gyorgy is weak in asserting that we must begin in looking for geopolitical thinking among the Greeks by noting Aristotle's stress on the influence of climate, soil, and topography upon the Greek *polis*. It is difficult to count Aristotle as more than a political geographer on these grounds. That Aristotle is capable of historicist thinking is clear, as Popper points out,²² but in this connection he is not a historicist.

It appears to the writer that Strausz-Hupé is close to the truth in referring to geopolitics as a political strategy, proposing to answer the question of what to conquer (therefore comprehending values in a dominant position).²³ It has not been defined as a science, he writes (and I presume he means it cannot be), and "it cannot be put down as political geography or political science in the conventional sense."²⁴

Isaiah Bowman shows in the use he makes of geographical knowledge that he can safely avoid a presumptuous theory. The burden of his point of view is that by "viewing our geographic position narrowly," we may succumb to the influence of geography.²⁵ We can succumb to the effects of our manipulating geography by such "geographical surgery" as the Panama or Suez canals.²⁶ The importance of geography is stressed, as well as the central role of power, dynamic and changing in configuration, requiring balance to be even temporarily subdued. But the realities having been recognized in order that they may be dealt with, there is some prospect of transferring the power clash into the council chambers.

Nicholas J. Spykman took a kind of cathartic and grim delight in stressing the omnipresence of the power political struggle. This is suggested in the line, "One of the charms of power politics is that it offers no opportunity to grow weary of one's friends."²⁷ He may be compared with the geopoliticians with

their ostensibly non-moralistic stress upon power, although the latter create a new, historically relativistic morality of their own. However, Spykman wrote *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942) to point out that we can wisely manipulate our power and our geographical position to our own strategic advantage and to serve our survival value. Power can be put in relative equilibrium and some factors, generally considered geographical, may be changed in their meaning either by being consciously and directly manipulated by men or under the impact of other forces (developing technology, changes and shifts in population balances, etc.). His references to the geographical factors are generally restrained and cautious: "Because territory is an inherent part of the state, self-preservation means defending its control over territory." Or, he will be content with a generalization that the power of a state depends upon, among other things, size of territory or the nature of frontiers, or a statement that a "hegemony that has access to the sea can become a menace to far distant shores," or that "A small state is a vacuum in a political high pressure area."²⁸

Frederick S. Dunn in the introduction to Spykman's *The Geography of the Peace*, refers with great praise to Mackinder's article "The Geographical Pivot of History," published in 1904, and he expresses regret that it remained for the German school of geopolitics to take over the geographical approach and distort it "into a pseudo-scientific justification for a policy of territorial expansion."²⁹ Spykman would almost certainly have accepted this view. It remains for us to consider, however, how much such praise of Mackinder may involve one in a geopolitical position. Professor Dunn contends that Spykman believed as a derivation from Mackinder that the "most important single fact in the American security situation is the question of who controls the rimlands of Europe and Asia."³⁰ The important consideration is not here that the rimlands emerge as equally significant as, if not more significant than, the heartland, but whether the same pattern of thought is employed in both Spykman and Mackinder. Were they political geographers, or geopoliticians, or both? The writer's conclusion is that, quantitatively, Spykman does not manifest a geopolitical type of thinking to the same degree as Mackinder. A quantitative measurement, however, is not so important as a qualitative measurement in this case.

Spykman did not deny himself the use of the term geopolitics, although the definition is quite different from that employed in this paper: "It should be possible, then, to consider the security problems of a country in geographic terms in such a way that the conclusions can be of direct and immediate use to the statesmen whose duty it is to formulate foreign policy. Just such an

analysis is implied by the term geopolitics.”³¹ Geopolitics in this sense is not incompatible with political geography; there is no reason why the political geographer cannot advise the statesman concerning the best means of achieving security. But Spykman describes political geography as “merely a branch of the general science of geography describing the structure of individual states, and the world in terms of its political subdivisions.”³² Geopolitics, he writes, may be used as a synonym for political geography. This is true, but it is the thesis of this paper that it should not be. Moreover, there is no methodological reason why political geography should be limited to consideration of individual states or should emphasize political subdivisions. The political geographer is within proper bounds when he suggests alternative means or the means that should be employed to achieve security. He can and should assist in planning the security policy of a country, and he does not become a geopolitician when he does so, if he limits himself to short-range prophecy. It is when prophecies become long-range and all-encompassing and begin to take on the aspect of “a whole philosophy of history” that he becomes a geopolitician and becomes suspect from the standpoint of method.

Spykman notes the various approaches satisfactorily, but he should have attributed more significance to political geography and supported a narrower definition of geopolitics. His objection to geopolitics as a philosophy of history is not, so far as the writer can determine, based upon methodological grounds, but rather on the grounds that that philosophy contains a “doctrine supporting the need and desirability of territorial expansion.”³³ In fact, even a political geographer, once his ends have been set up for him, can properly advise as to the best means of achieving territorial expansion, which may in the particular case be considered an essential of security. It is only when he goes beyond and insists that security and the full life of the state can only be realized through expansion and prophecies that such expansion will certainly be achieved that he exceeds proper bounds. A close inspection of his works does not indicate that Spykman employed a geopolitical cast of thought, even though he runs the risk of appearing to do so by his rather indiscriminate use of the term geopolitics.

Spykman was aware of the multiplicity of factors that condition the policy of a state; “they are permanent and temporary, obvious and hidden; they include, apart from the geographic factor, population density, the economic structure of the country, the ethnic composition of the people, the form of government, and the complexes and pet prejudices of foreign ministers.”³⁴ This was no single-cause philosophy of history, with all other factors immersed in the geographical and given meaning through geography, the unfolding mean-

ing of which could be foreseen for the far distant future. Spykman's use of such geopolitical conceptions as "heartland" and "rimland" must be seen against the background of his eclectic approach. When they are so evaluated, they cease to be geopolitical in the sense in which that word is used in this essay.

Mackinder has been referred to in the paragraphs above. His importance can scarcely be overestimated, particularly since his influence has been so great in terms of particular items of doctrine, upon other contemporary and succeeding theorists. Determinism was not so apparent in his thinking as among the Germans. He represented rather a possibilism similar to that emphasized in some French writing. A major aspect of his thesis was that something could be done to forestall the movement of the historical glacier. Is Mackinder to be rescued from the epithet "geopolitics" because there is to be found only a modified determinism in his writings? Certainly he is geopolitical in his assertion of the central and core importance of geographical configuration as controlling the pattern of history. Moreover, he cannot be completely rescued because he implies the existence of alternative possibilities rather than a certainly determined future. Admittedly Mackinder's position is more ambiguous than that of the German school, less certainly geopolitical. No clear-cut answer can be given, but, all things considered, Mackinder should be denoted basically a geopolitician.

Those who have followed him have assumed that he has uncovered a "cold and terrifying logic" in the geography of the world island, at least in this historical epoch, which makes the possession of the "heartland" or core of that world island the *terminus a quo* of an inevitable march to total global power.³⁵ No doubt Mackinder wrote with some hope that the heartland could be prevented from falling into the hands of a single power or a combination of powers able to collaborate to gain a single end. He was not optimistic, however, if we may judge by his persuasive use of historical analogies controlled by geography. Once the heartland becomes so dominated, he was persuaded, the relentless process of developing world domination would get under way. This is geopolitical historicism. A whole host of reasons and factors may work to disprove Mackinder's Cassandra voice intoning:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the world.³⁶

A technological revolution may emanate from another hemisphere. Internal political troubles may come to the heartland powers. The rimlands, assuming

the soundness of such concepts, may prove stronger for many reasons than the heartland. The disadvantages of heartland geography may outweigh the advantages. In a generation it may be seen clearly that Mackinder's views are as much limited by the conditions of his time as those of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Mackinder writes, "Unless I wholly misread the facts of geography, I would go further, and say that the groupings of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single world empire."³⁷ True, these factors only "lend" themselves, but Mackinder almost certainly means to imply that they make empire practically inevitable, even though in the next sentence he counsels taking steps to "counter their influence." Aside from the question of prophecy, the broad sweep of his generalizations referring to a single cause suggests geopolitical reasoning and a historicist pattern of thought. He counsels "marrying our new idealism to reality,"³⁸ but there is no sense of conviction that it will be done. Indeed, the question may be asked here, as in the case of Carr: Why should reality be diluted by something beyond or less than reality? In this view, the great organizer or doer is the real fashioner of history, the real realist, whose imagination deals with "'ways and means' and not elusive ends." He succeeds, not by resisting history, but by accommodating himself to it and assisting it. He may be a bad supreme master, but he has better survival value than other masters, because he perfects the art of using men rather than frittering away his energies on considerations of rights and ethics. Mackinder's charge that we resist the organizer and his "ways and means" mind seems to cancel out the claim that he is a historicist,³⁹ but the whole context suggest little promise of success. Maps may be the preoccupation of a "ways and means" *Kultur*, but the greatest stimulus to a consultation of maps has come from Mackinder himself. The whole Mackinder thesis is based upon the depicting of grandiose parallels and historical analogies, burgeoning in size as the central action and drama move, say, from the locale of Hellas until they encompass the globe in the continuing struggle of the landmen against the men of the sea. The history of man can be told in terms of the alternating hegemonies of one or the other. Such broad general sweeps cannot be verified. They are useful as keys to understanding. They are dangerous if they are the source of imprisoning stereotypes suggesting to men an inexorable fate which they cannot have even the illusion of altering. Mackinder should be used for the advantages that his insights may offer, but guardedly so that the destiny he feared does not become the destiny we are assured. There is a kind of mesmerism in such conceptions; men become entranced by what appears to be the inevitable unfolding of the

promise of such simple theorems. What is promised may come to pass, but all the more certainly if we accept the promise as already verified.

Mackinder must in all fairness be distinguished from the German school of geopolitics. It is not appropriate here to describe the intricacies of developing doctrine from Ratzel and before, through Kjollen, to the Haushofers and the working group associated with the *Institut für Geopolitik*. We can assume that these people were predominantly geopolitical historicists, confusing the “is” with the “ought,” identifying thinking with being, the conscious instruments of an aggressive statecraft. As Dunn points out, they discovered much but their discoveries became unwarrantedly and unscientifically the verification of a presumptuous philosophy of history. Captivated by the promise of the “heartland” theory, they could offer no conclusive reasons why its advantages could be enjoyed more in collaboration with than by conquering the Russians. For all their complexity, the data of the German geopoliticians became the foundations of a single-cause theory which was no clear guide to action. Wishes produce theories promising millennia; the tragedy of man is that history always falls short of what it appears to offer. And the pain is probably greater because we have been led along the way by men whose patterns of thought promised so much that when disappointment comes the necessary readjustment is the more difficult.

This paper has been written to provide a statement of a thesis. There has been no intention of surveying geopolitical thought or the conclusions of political geography. Space and location are important for both. Various doctrines with regard to these factors, giving them content, are available for survey. The bibliography that follows contains several citations that will provide the reader with a quick view of these doctrines.

Digest of Discussion

Upon calling the meeting to order, the chairman suggested that to avoid the danger of becoming involved in a “metaphysical bog” it might be best to take up the subject of geopolitics first before proceeding to the more generalized considerations presented in the opening pages of the working paper. He asked Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.

Mr. Lipsky agreed that the metaphysical questions, which are relevant to geopolitics as well as to other theories of international relations, might best

be deferred until later on. By way of background, Mr. Lipsky noted that his first serious contact with the geographic approach to international relations theory had taken place as a student at City College through the teaching of Professor Renner. There, geography had been presented as the basic causal factor which molded historical development, and as the indispensable key for understanding world politics. The idea was not only intriguing, Mr. Lipsky said, but he had been impressed by the appeal it had made to the emotions. It was more revelatory than analytical, attempting to define the pivot upon which the future hinged.

His exposure to this particular rendition of history and his subsequent criticism of it had led him to conclude that, within the body of theorists who concern themselves primarily with the geographic aspect of international relations, some recognize the geographic factor as one relevant condition to be considered among many elements; other theorists assign a determining role to geography. The first group might best be termed “political geographers” while the latter school deserves the term “geopolitician.” Political geographers can be considered as within the tradition of Western social science, emphasizing the role of geography as an influence on history. Their methodology is primarily descriptive, although they do not deny themselves the opportunity of making predictions, primarily of a short-run nature.

Mr. Lipsky acknowledged, parenthetically, that he knew of no precise means of distinguishing between “long-run” and “short-run” prediction. It is mostly a distinction in emphasis and a matter of assigning influence to one or more factors in a given situation. K. R. Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* also fails to make a precise distinction between long and short-run prophecy. But to the degree that a theorist tends to be dogmatic he is also inclined to make long-run predictions. Haushofer once stated that the geographic influences accounts for some 25 percent of the effective forces operating upon the international political process, yet it is fairly obvious from the context of Haushofer’s writings that he attributed a predominant role to geography.

Many authors, Mr. Lipsky continued, use the terms geopolitics and political geography loosely, yet a burden of the present working paper is that they should be used with care and with precision. Some authors, such as Walsh, don’t examine the underlying methodological problem at all. On the other hand, the extreme geopoliticians, such as those of the German school, postulate that the Louisiana Purchase and the Monroe Doctrine were acts resulting from keen geopolitical insight. In other words, the extremists are apt to interpret any political move which relates to space and/or location as within the field of politics and to be judged accordingly.

The present working paper does not attempt to survey the geopolitical approach to international relations. But if one were called upon to draw a few principal conclusions concerning that approach, one might note that the political geographers have a great deal to say about space as a factor—and as a central factor—in a given power complex. Location has a secondary emphasis as compared with space. In addition, some geopoliticians stress organic theories of the state, point to national “life cycles,” and classify states as “young” and “old.” Such theorists ignore the possibility that a declining nation might revive.

It is apparent, Mr. Lipsky concluded, that geopolitical concepts are little more than crutches which are conveniently used as substitutes for hard-headed factual research and description. Although the German school has industriously gathered data, the results had merely been fitted into a simple monistic theory of international behavior. That school also illustrates the effect of a rigid, unpliable theory upon statecraft. By reducing the complexities of international life to a few static stereotypes, German *geopolitik* offered a rationale for a policy which has led a people to disaster.

The chairman thanked Mr. Lipsky. He noted that the group was fortunate in having with it a scholar who has given much attention to the relationship of geography to politics. The chairman asked Professor Strausz-Hupé to say a few words on that problem.

Geopolitik: *The Haushofer School and Mackinder*

Professor Strausz-Hupé also thought it would be fitting to mention how he had happened to become concerned with political geography. He recalled that he had begun his career as a geographer and as a surveyor when he had first become acquainted with the Haushofer school of *geopolitik*—around the fringes of which, he had noticed, Spengler was “floating”—and had considered it to be primarily concerned with military geography. This military emphasis, he thought, formed much of the substance of *geopolitik* as enunciated in Germany and elsewhere. It was essentially based on the notion that geography is the least variable factor influencing world affairs. The geopoliticians had clutched at this fact and built a theory in which geography become the key to understanding international relations.

Professor Strausz-Hupé recalled that he had forgotten about the Haushofer school until several years later, when geopolitics was “imported” into the US and became something of a fad. To set the record straight, he had written a

paper on the subject. At that time international relations was treated pedagogically as an aspect of international law or of international economics or of diplomatic history. The introduction of geopolitical thinking into American academic circles had a healthy by-product in that it had helped to bring the teaching of international relations “down to earth.”

It was useful, Professor Strausz-Hupé ventured, to distinguish between those who regarded the subject primarily as a branch of geography and those who strove to build it into a distinct school of thought. Mackinder might be regarded as the greatest exponent and founder of the former group. Mackinder was not only a learned geographer but equipped with a profoundly intuitive mind possessing an incisive understanding of the “texture of history,” which expressed itself in a dynamic florid style. It was noteworthy that Mackinder attracted considerable attention, but largely outside of Great Britain, the country to which he was addressing himself. Certainly his theory had made a valuable contribution to the interpretation of history and of international relations. For example, if US statesmen had been more fully aware of the geographic factor many of the mistakes made in the postwar settlements might have been avoided. This was especially true with regard to China and Korea. Mackinder’s observation regarding the movement of the Russian people from west to east and from south to north has also proved to have been basically correct. Indeed, the perspectives on history which he was able to perceive were the work of genius; the man had a poetic grasp of history and of its relationship to statecraft.

Now the question arises as to whether this body of thought can be elaborated into a discipline of the social sciences. Professor Strausz-Hupé doubted it. If it were divested of its intuitive perception it would become little more than a series of rather trite platitudes, such as the observation that the construction of the Suez and Panama canals had a decisive effect on the history of Japan by enabling the Western maritime powers to challenge Japanese naval power, which is the backbone of Japanese imperialism.

Therefore, Professor Strausz-Hupé concluded he does not believe that geopolitics has much to offer from a metaphysical point of view. Actually the great contributions have been made by people who were entirely unaware of the metaphysical aspect of geopolitics. Weber’s studies of the significance of location is a case in point. Secondly, geopoliticians have made a contribution to international relations theory by forcing theorists to study the obvious as well as the esoteric aspects of world politics as, for example, recognition that small size makes for small power. This has had a healthy affect and one for which academicians concerned with international relations could be grateful.

The chairman thought that Mackinder had offered little that was new but had brought a new perspective to bear on old problems. Professor Strausz-Hupé agreed. For example, Mackinder was the first to recognize that the maritime age was ending and that the basis of British sea power had changed. This was an event of importance to world history comparable to the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Parenthetically, Professor Strausz-Hupé remarked that no historian had ever drawn full attention to the impact of the fall of Constantinople on the development of the West. Turkish occupation of the Levant and the overland trading routes to the East had forced the Portuguese to search for new means of access. That search had resulted in the discovery of the Western hemisphere.

An event of similar importance occurred with the growth of the railroads on the Eurasian land mass, Professor Strausz-Hupé continued. This made it impossible for Britain to enforce the balance of power on the continent through the exercise of naval power. Thus a historical era had come to an end with the development of effective and rapid inner lines of communication on the part of the major continental powers. Indeed, this is the root of the strategic problem facing the West today. Thus, to some extent, Mackinder's heartland-rimland prophecy has been borne out: the first and decisive element of Russian power today is the possession of inner lines of land communication. Mackinder was the first to understand the significance of these developments, yet his understanding was not so much derived from a knowledge of geography as from a certain intuitive feeling for the sweep of history.

Mr. Lipsky expressed a certain reservation concerning the numerous references being made to unverifiable propositions. How could such postulates, as postulates, be verified? Referring to chapter 5 of Professor Strausz-Hupé's *The Zone of Indifference*, Mr. Lipsky wondered whether the references to historic parallels were not of the same order of unverifiability. It was his feeling that grand generalization must be always employed with great care.

Professor Holborn felt that Professor Strausz-Hupé had expressed himself fairly clearly on that point. The heartland areas have produced the major civilizations of mankind: Greek, Roman, Arabic, Turkish, and Christian. But to postulate that this is bound to happen is geographically unverifiable, and for many reasons unconnected with geography. The same applies to the industrialization of Russia which, he thought, is a more accurate descriptive phrase for expressing the transformation than simply alluding to the development of Russian railroads. If he understood Professor Strausz-Hupé's position correctly, the professor had noted that the power of the Soviet Union depends in large part on the relationship between its level of technology and its geographic

position. He certainly agreed with that viewpoint and felt that German history offered another example of the same proposition. Between 1815 and 1855 Prussia was relegated to a secondary role in European affairs, one of the reasons being her unfavorable geographic position in relation to British sea power and the prevalent level of technology. The development of railroads and industry turned an interior position on the continent from a liability to an asset and it could be predicted after 1855 that Prussia was likely to be a major power until the areas to the east also underwent industrialization. Professor Holborn remarked that while there was a large amount of intuition in Mackinder's prophecies, there was also an element of geographical soundness to them.

The Applicability of Geopolitical Insights

Professor Strausz-Hupé ventured that the geographic factor is of major importance in making recommendations for policy. It argues for example, against a policy designed to provide for a neutralized Germany. An agreement to withdraw forces from Germany would move the Russian army back to the Vistula and the American army back to Staten Island. The significance of space and location to policy is often vital. Again, for example, if the Western powers withdraw from Western Germany it is questionable whether there would be sufficient space remaining to provide for the defense of Western Europe.

Professor Holborn remarked that Mackinder's theory seemed to have a high applicability to present-day military geography. The strategic planning of the Air Force is largely in terms of Mackinder's theory. This country's effort to build a crescent of bases around the Soviet Union, as further indicated by the pact with Pakistan, is another indication. Professor Holborn observed that at the previous day's press conference, the president, in outlining the country's stake in Indo-China and Southeast Asia, had noted the area's abundance of raw materials, its population of 100 million, but had placed special emphasis on its strategic location, pointing out that communist domination of the area would place Australia in grave jeopardy.

The chairman thought that the practical applications drawn from geographic notions are primarily of value in the field of military strategy. Professor Strausz-Hupé agreed. Both the Germans and the French had seized upon the insight which Mackinder's theories provided in devising their military strategy.

Professor Holborn wondered whether political geography is not also useful in defining the boundaries of national security. Thus, does it point up those areas—such as the Panama Canal Zone—which are of such importance to na-

tional security as to be defended at any cost? Professor Strausz-Hupé felt that even such generalizations must be examined with care. For example, a major geopolitical maxim of British foreign policy has been that no major power should control the channel ports of the Low Countries; yet the best channel ports in terms of given access to Britain are those located in France.

Professor Holborn felt that political geography could not be considered a theory of international relations in itself. It is simply a facet of the truism that man is conditioned by nature and that his survival depends upon his capacity shrewdly to explicit geographical configurations to his advantage. The chairman thought that the significance of political geography went a little further, namely the effect land configurations have upon man's political attitudes. Geography is an ever-present factor in political calculations; although economic and technical conditions might alter the political significance of geography, the geographic element always remains and has to be reckoned with.

Mr. Thompson thought there was some merit in thinking of the elements of international politics as a pyramid with the geographic element constituting its base. Although the significance of geography is altered by developments occurring at the other levels, it would be fallacious to conclude that such developments completely transform the geographic element. Oceans separating American from Eurasia are still important despite jet transportation; Western Europe still largely ends at the Pyrenees; and it is of continuing importance that the mountains of northern Italy permit entrance into Italy more readily than they allow penetration from Italy into Central Europe.

Spykman viewed geography, Mr. Thompson continued, as a conditioning factor in foreign policy rather than as a determining factor. Failure to take account of this conditioning factor would be, of course, harmful to sound policy planning. On the other hand, it is not difficult to use the relatively static geographic factor as a stepping stone for analyzing the dynamics of policy itself. Professor Sprout, for example, is at present engaged in a study of the role of geography as an influencing factor in foreign policy but within the social and cultural context of the nation concerned. It makes a decisive difference in a nation's foreign policy, to cite an example, if the government in question is cognizant of the presence of oil deposits within its territory. One could set up a whole range of hypothetical situations showing the interrelationships between material assets, the cultural context, and policy. In general, the geographic influence is of an importance warranting the closest consideration; not just the Germans should be interested in its applicability to foreign policy.

Mr. Roberts drew attention to the critique of the Mackinder quotation on page 21 of the working paper. He thought that the qualifications cited

therein were of two different orders, the first two being extreme contingencies and extraneous to Mackinder's thesis unless one assumed that Mackinder was attempting an all-embracing prophecy. The latter two qualifications, Mr. Roberts felt, were valid in that they strove to question the burden of the thesis itself. What interested him as a historian in Mackinder's thesis was the extent to which it offered, barring fortuitous developments, a valuable working hypothesis. Citing the example of the geographically oriented claims of Roumania and Hungary to Transylvania, Mr. Roberts wondered which, if either, had greater validity in terms of political geography. At some point, he thought, one must ask whether geographically oriented theses shed additional light and meaning for understanding world affairs.

The chairman ventured that if the geographic factor is treated in a restrained manner it would often prove useful to understanding international relations but that it should never be regarded as a "magic key" which holds the secret of the political process. The burden of Mackinder's approach seems to indicate that geography is the controlling factor. On the other hand, Mackinder argued for the use of countermeasures to prevent the realization of his predictions. Hence, as the working paper pointed out, there is a basic contradiction in Mackinder's theory.

Geography and Public Policy

Mr. Marshall remarked that the opinion expressed above, to the effect that a better understanding of political geography would have helped the US to avoid mistakes made in the postwar settlement, reminded him of the story told of the harbor pilot who, while bringing a ship into port, was boasting to the ship's captain that he knew every reef in the harbor like the palm of his hand. Just then there was a sickening crash, whereupon the pilot exclaimed, "see, there's one of them now!" Continuing, Mr. Marshall said he sensed that some held the view that a thorough knowledge of geography would equip statesmen with an ability to predict and avoid "mistakes" such as Korea. Actually, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had viewed Korea as an "unsatisfactory peninsula" and had argued against making a commitment there since Japan was so much more viable and insufficient resources existed for making commitments in both areas. The withdrawal of American troops from Korea had been a geopolitical but not a diplomatic decision. Yet when the invasion occurred, it was clearly necessary to recommit American troops because of overriding non-geopolitical considerations.

Professor Strausz-Hupé indicated that he had been thinking of decisions affecting Korea at the end of the Second World War which seemed to have been taken without adequate consideration of geographic factors. Mr. Marshall thought that the best solution might have been to avoid going into Korea at all. In any event, he did not feel one could decide that a certain mistake would have been avoided if a certain fact had been known. The complex context in which policy decisions are taken prevents drawing simple cause-effect relationships.

Professor Holborn remarked that, from the Russian point of view, Korea in the hands of an unfriendly power constitutes a thorn in Russia's flesh since it provides an avenue through which her maritime provinces and Manchuria could be threatened. Thus an American force in South Korea is bad enough from the Soviet standpoint but the decision to advance to the Yalu brought this country, with no territorial aspirations in Asia, even further down what is essentially a "blind alley."

Mr. Thompson noted that the London *Economist* seems often to follow Mackinder's line of reasoning. For example, the periodical argues that a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe is an essential precondition to a settlement in Germany.

Professor Holborn thought that the relationship of geography to technology raised many political problems. For example, until the First World War it was possible to exercise predominant control over large continental areas through sea power. Great Britain, by possession of relatively small outposts at Singapore, Hong Kong, and Canton was able to exercise predominant influence in China. The rise of the Hanseatic League in the Middle Ages was a parallel illustration of the effectiveness of maritime communication and power in comparison to that on land. In both instances the time lag in civilization as between maritime and continental societies made maritime power so predominant that it could keep large land masses under control by pinpoint occupation of strategic centers. The industrial and political integration of the Eurasian land mass has produced an entirely new situation. There is no doubt that geography constitutes a basic element in international relations but one which must be viewed in conjunction with the human and technological elements.

Mr. Diebold thought that Mr. Lipsky was not challenging the importance of the geographic element. But having said this, Mr. Lipsky was contending that there was a range of non-geographic factors which must also be accounted for and, further, that by constructing a rigid framework of geographically ori-

ented postulates, one was bound to elaborate a theory having a strong sense of predetermination. Mr. Lipsky added that it “worked both ways:” the very sense of destiny imparted by a theory, if widely and closely believed, would tend to make that destiny be realized.

Professor Strausz-Hupé suggested that political geography offered certain tools by which the political scientist and statesman could sharpen his observation of the political process. Weber observed, for example, that Europe could be logically divided into two parts, densely populated France and Northern Europe and sparsely populated peripheral Europe. From this he was able to embark on a more subtle analysis and undertook to explain the character of peoples as a condition of locational factors. For example, the German policy has been severely conditioned by such factors. Germany, being strategically located at the hub of Europe, was for a long period of history the battlefield of Europe. The repeated mixing of the local population with those of foreign countries gave rise to a populace without a distinct racial origin, hence subsequent German agitation and insistence upon racial purity when Germany became a unified state. The Scandinavians, geographically removed from West European conflicts, have retained a certain racial purity but are rather bored with it.

Professor Holborn said that while he does not deny that location is a factor in shaping a nation’s history, the point could be overstressed. He suggested that the facts of nature might throw some light on the basic discrepancy between the relatively rapid advance of European civilization as compared to that of Asia. The fact of nature which appeared to him to be of most consequence was the indentation of the European continent by bodies of water such as the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. This permits easy communication and facilitates commercial intercourse as compared to Asia. Britain is, of course, the best example of this process, no part of this island being very far removed from coast-bound or river traffic. This creates a stimulus to political integration at a more rapid pace than that found on the continent.

With regard to the influence of mountain and rivers, professor Holborn continued, the political geographers have offered a valuable contribution. They have viewed mountain passes as links between areas rather than as barriers. The same applied to rivers. Therefore, Professor Holborn concluded, the main effect of location is the advantage it has conferred upon European civilization by providing relatively easy means of communication. This advantage has, of course, decreased with industrial and technological developments and much of it no longer applies. But he doubted whether geography had the effect on Germany as that just previously suggested.

Limitations of the Predictive Sciences

Mr. Lipsky said he wished to register a plea for consideration by the group of the pattern of thought expressed by geopoliticians. With regard to long-term factors operating on the political process, he thought that they could only be tentatively defined.

Professor Rabi noted that on the basis of present information concerning wind action and soil erosion, it could be confidently predicted that within ten million years the Rocky Mountains would be swept away and the US would be under a shallow sea. While this is an absolutely long-range prediction, it certainly has no immediate importance nor any relations to subjective preferences.

Mr. Lipsky felt that one could toy with the hypotheses which are offered by the geopoliticians and that such hypotheses might furnish insight in certain situations but that the social scientist should not allow himself to be victimized by tempting generalizations.

Mr. Roberts noted that in the case of the Roumanians it was generally felt that their exposed and strategic location has lent itself to numerous foreign invasions which, in turn, have affected their national character. Thus one of the maxims of folk wisdom in Roumania concerns the survival value of "bending with the wind." These popular attitudes have had an effect on Roumanian politics, the partisan movement during the war being a good example. It leads one to ask whether there is a correlation between exposed, strategic location and policy as expressed in national habits. While it seems to be a useful concept with regard to Roumania, it has little validity for a nation like Poland which also has been exposed to repeated onslaughts. Similarly, the hardy, individualistic qualities of mountain-dwelling people, as typified by the Montenegrans, break down when applied to the Slovaks.

Mr. Thompson said that despite the fact that the German school of geopoliticians has employed geographic concepts for developing a theory in support of an aggressive policy, it would be mistaken, he thought, to underrate or look askance at theories which attempt to emphasize the role of geography in international politics. The development of international relations theory has been in the direction of closing the gap between the real world of politics and academic postulation and projection. There is little doubt that this country has suffered from failing properly to appreciate the geographic factor.

In this connection he was reminded of an incident which occurred when, during the last presidential campaign, he submitted an article to the *Reporter* magazine containing a passage demonstrating that Eisenhower had made er-

rors of judgment in his appreciation of problems of postwar policy. The editor rejected the criticism on the ground that “the liberals had been equally blind to the problem.” It could be said, Mr. Thompson remarked, that Americans of all political persuasions had tended to overlook the hard factors of national power while placing confidence in the assumption that new, international institutions would somehow supplant power politics; overoptimistic belief in human progress has also contributed to this unrealistic outlook.

Thus, while rejecting the determinism of the geopolitician, one should not, Mr. Thompson held, be contemptuous of the statesman who attempts to evaluate the geographic factor in formulating policy. Moreover, Mr. Thompson wondered whether the distinction implied in the working paper that statesmen and political scientists operate at different levels of awareness is a valid one. He also questioned the usefulness of basing a critique of geopolitics on a dichotomy of fact vs. value.

Mr. Lipsky did not feel there was any contradiction between most of Mr. Thompson’s observations and his own theses. He felt that in the interest of sound statesmanship, geographic postulates should be handled in a particular way and, in the working paper, had striven to suggest how statesmen might make proper use of the conclusions offered by geopolitics.

Professor Strausz-Hupé doubted whether most statesmen would be concerned with theories of geopolitics. For the most part statesmen are of an intellectual caliber which precludes deep understanding of the problems involved, besides being far too occupied with day-to-day activities to have the time to consider such theories even if they could.

Mr. Lipsky felt that statesmen should not be captivated by theories which, by their oversimplification, seem to promise easy answers to problems of policy. Rather, statesmen should be exposed to the significance of geography along the lines of Mr. Thompson’s observations.

The chairman wondered whether political geography simply deals with the facts of geography in their political setting or whether it offers a distinct theory of its own and, if so, how that theory different from geopolitics. Mr. Roberts wondered whether there is not a residue of reality which could be gleaned from geopolitical assertions. Mr. Lipsky thought that Professor Strausz-Hupé had pretty well covered that point when he had remarked that once the intuitive content of geopolitical theory had been removed not much remained except a few platitudes, such as the value of inner lines of defense, the role of river systems, the function of distance and so on.

Professor Rabi wondered whether every large land area such as Africa or North America could not be considered a “heartland” for the purpose which

the theorist in question happened to have in mind. Drawing a U-shaped figure on a piece of paper to represent a figurative line of battle, Professor Rabi noted that it could be considered either a “salient” or a “pocket” depending on how it was viewed.

Mr. Lipsky thought that the geopolitical school offered criteria for defining the heartland area. A group member commented that the heartland might shift from one locale to another as changing technological conditions conferred greater power on one area at the expense of another. Mr. Lichenstein observed that this reduced the concept to a tautology, namely, that the heartland is where power resides and Mr. Lipsky noted that Spykman’s *Geography of the Peace* contained two diagrams illustrating the comparative strategic relationship of Eurasia and North America; arrows radiated from Eurasia to show how it might threaten North America but no arrows radiated from North America in the second diagram.

Mr. Thompson thought that the pocket-salient illustration was a good example of the fact that it is impossible to think of political geography in non-policy terms. Spykman applied geographic concepts to the problem of formulating a realistic American foreign policy; thus the relevance of theories of political geography await their concrete application in terms of the nation. Spykman, for example, formulated the concept of the danger of double envelopment of North America by a Eurasia under the control of a single power. From this he deduced the corollary that a key objective of American policy was to maintain the balance of power on the Eurasian land mass. Thus America should support friendly powers located on the rimlands if a hostile power arose in the heartland. Spykman’s approach was centered on the outlook and needs of a given nation and that approach, Mr. Thompson thought, was probably the most useful one in terms of contributing to international relations theory.

Mr. Lipsky felt that this was compatible with his thesis that every theory, including geopolitical theory, is incomplete and hence can be manipulated in the interest of the nation. Some might even assume that North America is the heartland from which power radiated. Mr. Marshall said he did not understand concepts which picture power radiating in one direction or another. Power relationships between nations always go both ways. Most power situations are too complex to be characterized by vector diagrams. The trouble with thinking in metaphors, Mr. Marshall remarked, is that in time people tend to think more in terms of the metaphor than in terms of the reality which the metaphor is supposed to represent—the metaphor “takes over.” Americans tend to think of international affairs in terms of sports, especially baseball and football, with one side winning for a while and then the other team going to

bat. Actually the only illustrative sports are possibly “seizing the initiative” or “seizing the offensive.”

Mr. Zinner said that it was only with great reluctance that he ventured to offer a few points with regard to the pre-dinner discussion. (1) With regard to geography per se, he pointed out that it could not be disregarded in any conceptual approach to international relations—“It’s simply there.” It could, of course, be endowed with too much importance and one task of international relations theory is to determine just how important it is at a given time. Geography is a continuous as well as basic factor in international politics although its importance varies in relation to other factors, historical, technological, economic, demographic, and so on. Perhaps with the advent of super-weapons its importance will diminish. Summarizing his first point, he would say that geography is basic to the international political process though the importance which should be assigned to it will vary from time to time.

(2) Turning to geopolitics as a conceptual framework, Mr. Zinner felt that Mr. Lipsky had overstressed the point that geopolitical theory merits serious attention only to the extent that it mirrors the reality of the political process. Regardless of this consideration, geopolitics has a relationship to human action. If it were widely accepted, then regardless of its accuracy, it would tend to become self-fulfilling and merit serious attention as a source of political behavior.

(3) Finally, Mr. Zinner suggested that there should be further consideration of the question as to the elements which an informing theory should contain. This leads to problems of methodology. The working paper before the group distinguished between fact and value, yet he questioned this dichotomy, especially since it did not meet the problem of *a priori* value. Actually, is it possible to separate fact and value; is not value built into fact; are not so-called factual analyses couched in value frameworks?

The Fact-Value Dichotomy

Mr. Lipsky agreed with Mr. Zinner’s first point. He also agreed with the second point and had indicated in the working paper that the geopolitician’s theory in itself constitutes part of the data which must be evaluated. Hence geopolitical concepts, and the phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy, must be taken into account in analyzing political behavior. But having said this, there remains the fact that the real political scientist must be especially wary of theories whose content is so largely value and not the result of data-supported conclusions.

The political theorist should be able to define and recognize the function of value in the theory he is propounding or examining; that is certainly not the case with the geopoliticians. The result is an established tendency to assert long-range prophecies and sweeping generalizations. Furthermore, it is hard to escape the conclusion that what the geopolitician asserts “must” happen is precisely that which he wills to happen. Value is an essential element in any theoretical structure, man’s knowledge being finite, yet it is important to be able to point to the role of value in shaping a theory’s hypotheses and guiding its conclusions.

In response to several questions Mr. Lipsky defined value as “an assertion that a given situation is good.” The nominalist theorist is aware of the role of value, including his own set of values. Hence the nominalist is highly tentative in making predictions.

Mr. Diebold questioned Mr. Lipsky’s assertion that values are by definition eternal in nature. Could not some values be relative to time and circumstance? Mr. Thompson thought it important to consider the existence of proximate values—situations in which the good outweighs the bad. The Marshall Plan, for example, despite the hypocrisy and selfishness which accompanied it, had a proximate objectively good value. The chairman thought that Mr. Thompson’s observation confused value with policy. The Marshall Plan was a policy designed to further certain values. Mr. Lipsky considered policy to be a part of a given data situation while the chairman felt that policy is expressive of value through a given mode of action. Both agreed that values are simply preferences.

Mr. Thompson noted that rigid adherence to embedded value systems is often a deterrent to accuracy and understanding of historical situations. For example, the more doctrinaire American Socialists saw the New Deal purely as an act of capitalist hypocrisy and were blinded to policies having such social values as improving standards of living and reducing inequities in the distribution of income. Decisions on such policies could not be made without reference to values, but values which arose from the social needs of that historical period.

Mr. Zinner agreed that there is no difference between value and preference. With regard to the faultiness of long-range prediction on the basis of theoretical analysis, he felt that a distinction should be made between teleology and prophecy. If the geopoliticians endow geography with a decisive role in directing history toward predetermined goals, then the problem is a teleological one. But the problem of prediction is of a different order. True prediction in the social sciences rests on non-teleological elements.

Mr. Lipsky wondered whether the distinction was a valid one since prophecy, and especially long-ranged prophecy, is embedded in the value preferences of the prophet. This is a well-established fact of human psychology. Mr. Lichenstein pointed out that Professor Rabi's prediction concerning geographic change in North America after ten million years was a long-range prophecy in which preference was an irrelevant factor. Mr. Lipsky wondered whether that prediction did not go beyond the limits of knowledge. Professor Rabi said it was based on known data of rainfall and other factors; in terms of known information it was a fairly precise prediction.

Mr. Lichenstein agreed that, given the conditions set forth in Mr. Lipsky's working paper, total prediction is a theoretical impossibility but this hardly exhausts the possibilities of theorizing. Mr. Lipsky agreed and thought that any prophesying in the social sciences should be extremely tentative and cautious. Marx, for example, claimed to see the unfolding sweep of history as propelled by the class struggle; in other words, he claimed to have a total theory furnishing a basis for total prediction.

Professor Rabi remarked that the group's discussion with regard to the problem of prediction seemed to bear a resemblance to that of a group of fortune tellers advising some Wall Street bankers on how to play the stock market. He felt that little progress has been made toward the question of what should constitute the elements of a theory of international relations, particularly as a guide to statecraft.

The chairman thought that much could be salvaged from the discussions and that the task of gleaning such material might be reserved for the final meeting. Mr. Thompson was also inclined not to take such a bleak view of the "Harvest" issuing from the group's labors. A distillation of concepts and approaches has taken place. From discussions of Morgenthau, Spykman, Marx, and others, one begins to sense that international politics is not an area in which absolute values function and that a fairly specific picture of the international political process is emerging from the discussion.

The Nature of Value

Mr. Lipsky thought that absolute values could and should function in defense of the preservation of democratic society. The justification for such values is that only in a democratic society can the war of ideas and values freely take place. The chairman felt that the problem of values is an expression of the psychology of the person making the value judgment. In the statement "I want

democracy to persist” the value judgment is not in the wanting but in the thing wanted—the objective.

Mr. Thompson thought that Mr. Lipsky had, in the exposition on methodology presented in the working paper, leaned perhaps too heavily on the Lasswellian approach, an approach which is just as incomplete as those of the other authors under review. The international marketplace is one in which the quest for power is central and fundamental. By heavily stressing the value aspect of international politics one runs the dangers of distortion, just as one’s view of domestic politics become distorted if power and interest motivation are overstressed. In the latter connection, Mr. Thompson was reminded of the comments at Chicago University where many, influenced by Lasswell, tended to interpret each of Mr. Stevenson’s campaign speeches simply as appeals to sectional or social interests.[†] With the possible exception of the Taft-Hartley speech, Mr. Stevenson seemed to be expressing his personal political values, Mr. Thompson thought. Furthermore, there was a risk in Mr. Lipsky’s approach which by emphasizing the impossibility of any standards of good and bad, might wind up in something close to a nihilistic position.

Mr. Lipsky affirmed that Mr. Thompson had pointed up a dilemma of his theoretical position. The only answer is that democracy has an absolute value because it constitutes the indispensable condition under which the struggle of democratic and anti-democratic forces can proceed.

Mr. Diebold’s main point was that Mr. Lipsky and the majority of the group seemed to be in disagreement about a basic issue that was not being explicitly discussed. Mr. Lipsky took the view that a given theory of international relations is the product of a certain epistemology and that a different epistemology leads inevitably to a different theory. Furthermore, Mr. Lipsky believed that different theories lead to different policies in international relations. The majority of the members of the group, on the other hand, appeared to take it for granted that the theory of international relations is separable from epistemology. His own inclination was to say that people with different theories of international relations might often agree on desirable policies and that disagreements on policy could occur among those holding the same theory and sharing a common epistemology. One of the questions about the nature of a theory of international relations that ought to be discussed next time is whether epistemology, theory, and policy are intimately linked, or whether there are (or can be) sharp breaks at the junctures so that one can discuss

[†][DM: Adlai Stevenson, Democratic Party presidential candidate in 1952.]

the theory of international relations without venturing into epistemology and without implying a certain view on policy.

Mr. Thompson, with reference to whether democracy has inherent value as a mechanism for serving other values, thought that the Lasswellian school sees the moral justification of democracy in its being the institution best suited for the development of the sound, balanced personality. Essentially, this is a defense of democracy in terms of its efficiency. Yet democracy has often been attacked, as in the interwar period and especially during the Depression years, on the very ground that it does not compare favorably with totalitarian societies in being able to provide efficiently for the needs of its citizenry.

Professor Holborn thought that Mr. Lipsky had, in effect, equated a certain epistemology position with democratic ideology. While epistemology presupposes the existence of corresponding metaphysics, he doubted that a justification of democracy could be drawn from epistemology, as Mr. Lipsky had tried to do.

Professor Rabi thought that Mr. Lipsky meant that he had been conditioned to certain attitudes which had led him to express certain preferences, one of them being a preference for democracy. Mr. Lipsky affirmed this and pointed out that since others have similarly been conditioned to prefer certain hypotheses, there is no scientific method of demonstrating whose hypotheses have the greater validity.

The chairman wondered whether the conditioning process, as asserted by Mr. Lipsky, furnished the individual with values as well as preferences. Mr. Lipsky thought the question implied a definition of values; for his purpose he would define value as "a position beyond which one could not be driven," regardless of the means by which one had accepted that position. Mr. Thompson observed that this is and continues to be a subject of controversy in the social sciences.

Mr. Lichenstein wondered whether the group was concerned with philosophical or theoretical problems of international relations. He thought the first eight pages of the working paper were excellent but doubted their relationship to the group's task. Mr. Diebold thought he understood Mr. Lipsky's position to be that a strong relationship exists between a given theory and its underlying philosophical position. The chairman expressed the opinion that the group would have a hard time reaching agreement unless it avoided metaphysical questions. Mr. Lichenstein said that philosophy concerned itself with explanations of reality in an all-embracing sense while theory dealt with more specific elements of reality having a high relevance to contemporary problems, and in terms of limited areas of reality.

The chairman suggested that the group redirect its attention to the subject of geopolitics and ask itself whether the heartland concept contains any significance and whether there is any basic validity to the geopolitical approach to international relations. He felt that a nominalist position might not be essential for answering such questions. Often one could not ask the ultimate questions about a particular theory or social problem and, when one could, the answers might turn out to be irrelevant. He was reminded of an interdenominational conference on education he had attended. The conference had bogged down amidst conflicting theological points of view when it had attempted to define the goals of education in a free society, but when it moved to more concrete problems agreement was readily achieved. Professor Holborn agreed. The group had been convened to discuss theory of international relations, not theory of knowledge.

The Relevance of Geography to International Relations

Mr. Thompson thought that three basic points might be made on the relation of political geography to international relations theory. (1) Geography is the most static factor of the various elements conditioning international political behavior, hence it is convenient to think of it as constituting the base of a pyramid of elements. Geography sets certain limits to the choices and actions of nations in their relations with one another. However, this conditioning role should not be constructed as being all-determining.

(2) Any given foreign policy problem, Mr. Thompson continued, contains a number of more or less strategic-geographic elements which should be considered. Thus, if it were possible to hold a few strategic areas in and on the periphery of Indo-China, that aspect of the situation should be given due account in terms of the free world's approach to the problem. The strategic significance of geographic configurations and channels of communication often play a crucial role in international relations.

(3) The concept of the heartland has much validity to it, the increasing importance of Asia and Africa notwithstanding. It still makes a tremendous difference which power controls the heartland. Spykman has sketched a rough picture of the elements which he felt should be considered in arriving at a postwar settlement, especially the need for an equilibrium of power in the heartland, and warned that a primary task of US policy was to prevent a single power from controlling the heartland. This maxim is still not in dispute de-

spite the technological changes which have occurred since then, Mr. Thompson concluded.

Mr. Lipsky thought, with regard to geopolitics as opposed to political geography, that Professor Strausz-Hupé had aptly summed up the former's value when he remarked that after geopolitics is stripped of its unverifiable hypotheses little remains except a few trite truisms.

The chairman did not think that Mr. Thompson's first point was a truism. Geography, aside from its intrinsic importance, is by its very static nature a useful means of relating other factors in the political process. As such, it might be relevant to developing a theory of international relations. Mr. Lipsky noted the extraordinary lack of system which prevails in the writings of the geopoliticians. The chairman agreed that system is important but felt that a theory's content must also be good to warrant serious consideration.

Mr. Zinner, referring to Mr. Thompson's first point, noted that while geography could be viewed as a constant expression or influence on the actions of states, the point, if overstressed, could be misleading and confusing in theorizing about international relations. For example, it is often said that Soviet foreign policy closely parallels the policy followed by imperial Russia because the Soviets are seeking to acquire the same lands as those coveted by the Tsars. Hence many observers hold that there is no difference in aims between the two regimes, a conclusion which Mr. Zinner held is quite mistaken.

Mr. Thompson thought it would be equally misleading to conclude that there are no common features to the policies of the two regimes. The American assistance program to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine was, in many respects, a reiteration of the West's historic resistance to Russian penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, he felt that it would also be misleading to regard the communist menace as a discriminate threat divorced from the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union. By disregarding that relationship, one damages one's ability to meet the threat.

Mr. Zinner said that he had not meant that there is no common meeting ground between Soviet and Tsarist policy. But the Soviet threat cannot be understood or adequately handled without reference to its disincarnate aspects. To do so is seriously to underestimate the extent of the threat which confronts the West.

John Blumgart
Rapporteur

Notes to Working Paper No. 5

1. See Karl Pribram, *Conflicting Patterns of Thought* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1949), *passim*.

2. Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy and Politics," in *Unpopular Essays* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1950), 3, 4.

3. K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London: Routledge, 1952), *passim*.

4. John E. Kieffer, *Realities of World Power* (New York: David McKay Co., 1952), 17, 35 *et passim*.

5. Andrew Gyorgy, *Geopolitics, The New German Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), *passim*; Andrew Gyorgy, "The Application of German Geopolitics: Geo-Sciences," *American Political Science Review* XXXVII, no. 4 (August 1943): 677–86; Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics, The Struggle for Space and Power* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), *passim*.

6. Derwent Whittlesey, *The Earth and the State, A Study of Political Geography* (New York: Henry Holt, 1939), 1, note 2.

7. Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers, The Twilight of Geopolitics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), *passim*.

8. *Ibid.*, 3.

9. E.g. Edmond A. Walsh, *Total Power* (New York: Doubleday, 1946), *passim*.

10. Weigert, *op. cit.*, 4–5.

11. *Ibid.*, 11–12.

12. *Ibid.*, 13.

13. *Ibid.*, 13–14.

14. *Ibid.*, 14–15, 16.

15. *Ibid.*, 13.

16. I hasten to add that not all theorists whose theories present geographical overtones, if not substance, forecast a precise future. The references are to the extreme cases.

17. I am not aware that Marxists or neo-Marxists refer to any particular time span for the Marxist millennium. They have referred to that millennium as existing in time and have even suggested a *terminus ad quom*.

18. I submit that even geopoliticians fit easily into the camp of the fanatics, some, of course, more than others. It cannot be said how much they should be held responsible for the Nazi extermination camps. Major General Professor Karl Haushofer might personally have drawn back from such excesses, but there is no incompatibility between his theory and the triumph of one people over another even by means of the incinerator. War is, of course, for the zealot an acceptable means. Even Professor Renner's counsel that the map of Europe be remade through the elimination of buffer states (which technology has rendered obsolete) is in keeping with this capacity to make great decisions upon the basis of single causes.

19. *Op. cit.*, note 5, *supra*.

20. Gyorgy, *Geopolitics*, vi. He puts Aristotle, Bodin, Montesquieu, Buckle, Ritter, Kjellen, Mackinder all in the same tradition, and all together with a broad, vague category of "present-day German, French, and American scholars."

21. *Ibid.*, 141.
22. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. I, *passim*: Aristotle is, of course, much less the historicist than Plato.
23. Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics, The Struggle for Space and Power*, vii.
24. *Ibid.*, vii–viii.
25. Isaiah Bowman, “Review of Spykman’s *America’s Strategy in World Politics*,” *Geographic Review* 32 (April 1942): 352.
26. *Loc. cit.*
27. As quoted in *ibid.*, 351.
28. Spykman, *America’s Strategy in World Politics*, 17.
29. *Ibid.*, 18–20.
30. Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), ix.
31. *Ibid.*, x.
32. *Ibid.*, 5.
33. *Loc. cit.*
34. *Loc. cit.*
35. Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy I,” *American Political Science Review* XXXII, no. 1 (February 1938): 28.
36. Sir Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality, a Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (New York: Henry Holt, 1942). Foreword by Major George Fielding Eliot, ix.
37. *Ibid.*, 150.
38. *Ibid.*, 2.
39. *Ibid.*, 7.

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Sixth Meeting: Wilsonian Idealism, May 18, 1954

The sixth meeting of the study group on the Theory of International Relations was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, May 18, 1954, at 5:30 p.m. The subject was Wilsonian Idealism. Present were: Robert M. MacIver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; Dorothy Fosdick, secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur, John P. Armstrong; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; William W. Kaufmann; Charles Lichenstein; Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Isidor I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Arnold Wolfers; Paul Zinner.

Working Paper No. 6

Prepared by George A. Lipsky

The expression "Wilsonian idealism" refers to more than conceptions of foreign policy. It refers to a whole body of thought having influence upon domestic politics, society and personal relationships. Moreover, Wilsonian idealism may with sound reason be considered larger than Wilson himself, if for example we think of all those influenced by and contributing to the New Freedom. Wilson's own ideas were a product of long evolution. Very often they did not achieve precise formulation until the need to solve some problem evoked them or until a personal experience or encounter elicited self-conscious speculation. Other men played important parts in the political ferment and in the particular tradition whose ideas, with greater or lesser conformity, found a focus in Wilson. He became an object of deep veneration for Josephus Daniels, Burleson, Houston, Carter Glass, Herbert Croly, Tumulty, House, and others from various walks of life and station.¹ It would be impossible within the scope

of this paper to evaluate critically this whole movement with its intellectual and ideological aspects. It will be worthwhile to consider Wilson primarily, to see why he was a response to the needs of the time and to suggest the quality and viability of his ideas, particularly as related to foreign policy.

In my view the most significant component of Wilson's thought was a deep religious conviction. This Scotch Covenanter's religious faith, profound and unquestioned, gave a stern quality to moral conviction and, I think, raised him to the level of statesmen in domestic as well as international politics. Some idea of this faith may be gained from the following sentences written by Wilson in 1923, when death was pressing close, but reflecting his lifelong faith bred of generations of sternly religious forbears: "By justice the lawyer generally means the prompt, fair, and open application of impartial rules; we call ours a Christian civilization, and a Christian conception of justice must be much higher. It must include sympathy and helpfulness and a willingness to forego self-interest in order to promote the welfare, happiness, and contentment of others and of the community as a whole. . . . The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually. It can be saved by only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ and being made free and happy by the practices which spring out of that spirit."²

Wilson's life and career reveal his deep commitment to the Christian ideal, his high optimism concerning the possibility that men and nations might live in accord with a high moral standard founded in the religious faith. Such a faith is not so unusual in the politician or statesman, but it is not the emphasis we would expect in the academician, the professor of political science. It is what made him content with broad generalizations and sweeping moral charges with which his audience, desiring to know the concrete unfolding of events in which he had participated as their representative, was often dissatisfied.³ He found nothing wanting in such generalizations; they were real and concrete to him. As I survey them in an inspection of his life and thought, they often seem to be little more than a tissue of bromidic clichés. One is counseled to avoid sin by the sincere but stern schoolmaster. To politicians whose stock in trade is generalization in which an audience cannot find too specific commitments, this talent could and did appear to be of a higher order.

Of course, as the successful leader, Wilson had to produce results as well as inspire loyalty by his word. As governor of New Jersey he led liberal forces to the legislative enactment of his promised reform program in every detail. He did this by the application of a strong and positive executive leadership, a product as much of his professional speculation as

of his recognition of the political necessity of freeing New Jersey from the exploitation of entrenched and corrupt privilege. This initial success in the state had been foreshadowed by an early brilliant record as president of Princeton University in bringing a more modern light into an institution living under the shadow of alumni and faculty orthodoxy. As President of the United States his original successes, particularly in fashioning a domestic program, were startling and brilliant. In his last role, the global one, as symbol of the world's peoples' aspirations for a life, spiritually, physically, and materially secure, he achieved an initial accomplishment that had never before been seen. In all the roles he filled, teacher, university president, governor, president, and world leader, Wilson was only an unqualified success in one, that of teacher. Perhaps it is because students can rest largely content with inspiration and are not usually prepared to evaluate critically a teacher's intellectual system.

In every case except this latter the brilliant beginning was doomed to find its denouement in bitter frustration, all the more poignant because Wilson was not generally and intellectually prepared to make those adjustments to events that might have entailed a pragmatic modification of creed. Where he did make the attempt by accepting the Versailles treaty with its compromises of his previously announced principles in order to get his league, he was belabored from all sides, from the doctrinairily liberal *New Republic* to the reactionary Henry Cabot Lodge. His experiences with both consistency and tactical inconsistency were grim and bitter. The reasons seem somewhat obvious. Wilson had an inordinate capacity to offend those who were of Machiavellian temper with his public sense of moral rectitude. After the first inrush of success for his program, the old forces of compromise, bargain, and casuistry would reassert themselves and Wilson's position was too clear and prominent to fail to be the chief target of the reaction. This result was a product of his dogmatism. His was the tragedy of the intellectual faced with politics who appears naïve because, particularly in his case, the truth he held to was rather more a rigid stricture than a process.

Wilson was the intellectual type referred to by E. H. Carr. As the latter writes, "To establish a general principle, and to test the particular in the light of that principle, he has been assumed by most intellectuals to be the necessary foundation and starting point of any science."⁴ With his ringing phrases and rhetoric, the intellectual "has an immense role to fill as the leader of public opinion."⁵ He may, in fact, be prophetic, particularly to the extent that he exhorts men to avoid real dangers. But although he has a great capacity to lead public opinion, nature and temperament make it difficult for him to keep

in touch with it. He can inspire, but he consistently outstrips and perhaps finally bores those whom he once inspired. Wilson could inspire the many with his broad program and his vision of the future. "He [even] spoke with unchallengeable realism when he said that isolationism had been repealed by the forces of history; he spoke with prophetic vision when he said that if we did not set up an agency to prevent war, another and more terrible holocaust would engulf the next generation."⁶ There was realism in his prophetic vision. Nevertheless, his rigid sense of rectitude and principle prevented him from making those adjustments that would have facilitated the final and continuing implementation of his program.

Wilson may be compared in pattern of thought with John Quincy Adams more than any other president.⁷ Both believed that if reason were employed with force and logic, truth would stand out with luminescent clarity. It was the leader's function to reveal to the people truth through reason. If only the people could be appealed to directly, they in their innocence and goodness would see the truth and pursue the right course from which they were constantly being turned by disingenuous and evil men. The people so moved, if their vision were unwarped by evil influence, might even be unanimous in their decision to do right. John Quincy Adams appealed to the people for a second term; forces of evil defeated him. Woodrow Wilson appealed to the people of the United States on behalf of the treaty and the League, to the people of the world in support of principles of high morality in international affairs, to the people of Italy over the heads of their political leaders; the principles he spoke, deriving ultimately from nature and nature's god, could not control, for men evil by his standards preferred the old and tragic ways. Wilson and Adams were doomed to fall short of their ideal in life; for they could not be satisfied with much short of perfection.

He set the tone of his administration in his first inaugural address wherein he said that the occasion was one of "dedication" rather than "triumph." The words were not mere rhetorical gestures. They meant to him a response to what he identified as his duty to express the new stirrings of the American peoples against privilege. In this response his function was beyond individuals and parties and meant expressing the conscience and needs of the plain people of the nation.⁸ In foreign policy he conceived of a similar purpose. It was his duty to assist the Mexican people to achieve their rights. He thus refused recognition to the usurping tyrant, Huerta, and at the same time refused to be pressed into war against Mexico, even under the severest provocation. The Mexican people should be given an opportunity to put their own house in order. They should be taught by this statesmen-schoolmaster to

choose sound and honest leaders, but intervention would mean that he was acting as an agent of special American and local interests rather than as President of the United States. His entire Latin American policy was designed to serve a higher common interest, rather than merely the interest of the United States. In fact, the highest interest of the United States could only be served by the development and support of a larger, common international interest. In his speech at Mobile, on October 27, 1913, addressed largely to the Latin American people, Wilson was not disregarding interest, he was attempting to inject a conception of higher service into foreign policy. It had immediate and practical effect upon our foreign policy, especially our Latin American policy. He was attempting to do the twin jobs of reacting soundly and hardheadedly to particular political issues and problems, and at the same time to provide an ideal of concord. Call it legalistic and moralistic if you will but his rationale was not merely a cover-up for a selfish American purpose.

One may illustrate the point with his handling of the Panama tolls question. The Taft administration had concluded that the legislative exemption of United States coastwise shipping from the tolls was not a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty since the treaty's guarantee of equal payment of tolls by "all nations" did not apply to the United States. This was a possible interpretation of the words, but it did not express the spirit and intent of the treaty. Despite the certain political repercussions and pressure from professional British haters and the shipping interests, he pushed for legislation rectifying this situation. His domestic political interest demanded or suggested that he take no such action, but he was attempting to serve a higher cause, to gain for the United States a reputation for honor and stern fulfillment of international engagements. This was in the interest of the United States and of the goal of building an international structure of law, the only possible framework within which nations might remain free and secure and yet dynamic. To refer to Wilson's words as a hypocritical disguise of national interest or as moralistic rhetoric often concealing the real interest in our statecraft, as Carr and Morgenthau do, is to neglect the fact that there may be a higher selfishness that can accommodate the aspirations of others. Findings of a naivety in Wilson should not be allowed to obscure the real, articulated goal he had in mind of a sounder international community.

The neutrality policy was spelled out over a long period to clarify the rights of the people of the United States under international law. The attempt to maintain the policy in the face of German violations was designed to face the German government with a clear legal order, the continued violation of which would entail final American participation in the war on the side of

the Allies. The American people were educated in their rights. The concept of an international legal order was maintained. A larger justification of our participation in the war was provided than isolated events such as the sinking of the *Lusitania*. And in final consistency with the neutrality policy, we were led into war on the side of the Allies not alone for reasons of moral affinity but because the president had seen from the beginning the interest we had along with Britain and France in preventing the overturn of the balance of power in Europe, although he announced his distaste for going to war solely for such reasons. He saw the need for a united country on the war issue; it would have been difficult to unite the people on a slogan calling for a redressing or maintaining of the old world balance. He perhaps used words of sincere conviction when in his war message he stressed rather the fact that “there . . . [were] no other means of defending our rights,” meaning our maritime rights in terms of our cherished principle of freedom of the seas.⁹

Taking this emphasis into account, and, in addition to other direct or implicit evidence, I am of the opinion that this does not suggest the entire conception in Wilson’s mind. Even though he did not propose to enter the war to establish anew a European balance of power, he did counsel our entry because of the threat to the United States in the destruction of the old balance that would have been occasioned by German victory. Even this would not have been enough by itself. I submit there was even then in Wilson a higher type of realism in a recognition of the meaning to us of a victory of German militarism and a potential universal European German monarchy. He had already a determination to alter the European system so as to prevent war through concert rather than through the balance of power. The latter was surely better than German hegemony, or the situation of conflict of powers with an attendant arms race such as had preceded the outbreak of war in 1914 for almost a generation, but balance itself had proved a delicate mechanism. Wilson recognized the changed and revolutionary nature of modern war and the catastrophe that impended if it could not be brought under control.

This is the most important issue upon which Wilson’s quality as a realist must stand. This question or the answer is not clear-cut. Authorities and writers on the subject differ. Perhaps no final answer can ever be given that does not in some degree depend upon definition of what, for example, one means by “realist.” I would contend that Wilson was a real realist, that, put another way, he illustrated the realism of idealism, a realism far more penetrating than that of a Clemenceau standing before a Chamber of Deputies sarcastically referring to Wilson’s *noble candeur* and calling for the re-establishment of the balance of power in the old sense.

Professor Bailey contends that the United States did not enter the First World War “to save the Allies and redress the balance of power.”¹⁰ In this stress he is at odds with Walter Lippman¹¹ and Spykman.¹² He contends that this reads the present back in to the past, that it appears so plausible, because the theory so clearly fits the situation in 1941. Wilson, he states, abhorred the balance of power.¹³ Moreover, the people of the United States in general did not conceive of themselves as entering the war to aid the Allies or redress the balance. In support of the latter contention, he points out that the Allies were not generally considered to be in jeopardy in February and March of 1917. Baghdad was captured on March 11, 1917. The Germans had withdrawn to the Hindenburg Line in mid-March, giving up 1,300 square miles of French territory, the submarine toll was heavy but not especially alarming. The Allies’ financial situation was not brought to the attention of the United States government by Hines’ telegram of March 5, five weeks after the Germans had announced their intention of forcing us into the war. In fact, the real danger of Allied collapse became apparent only after we entered war. Prior to that, many Americans had even thought of carrying on a war of limited liability until we had achieved the vindication of our maritime rights, following which we might have withdrawn from the war.

The importance, however, of considering Wilson’s views apart from those of the American people is clear. Historical development showed that important segments of the American people were not in step with the president in the periods after the tides of idealistic enthusiasm had receded, particularly prior to our entry into the war and following the Armistice.¹⁴ But after the revelation of the Zimmerman note, even the American people, and certainly Wilson, saw the nature of the German threat. Wilson’s thinking must be considered separately from those of the people. He remarked to Tumulty on the day of the delivery of the war message,

Tumulty, from the very beginning I saw the end of this horrible thing; but I could not move faster than the great mass of our people would permit. . . . In the policy of patience and forbearance I pursued, I tried to make every part of America and the varied elements of our population understand that we were willing to go any length rather than resort to war with Germany. As I told you months ago, it would have been foolish for us to have rushed off our feet and to have gone to war over an isolated affair like the *Lusitania*.¹⁵

True, he asserted that Germany had to be made to understand that we had rights that must be respected. Wilson, however, from the beginning did not

see merely that we would have to go to war to protect our maritime and neutral rights, as rights important alone to the American people. He was thinking of the force of international law and the stability of the structure of treaties, a part of general international law.

Moreover, as Tumulty points out, in late 1916 “the President was convinced that we were now approaching a real crisis in our relations with Germany and that unless peace could be quickly obtained, the European struggle would soon enter upon a phase more terrible than any in the preceding, *with consequences highly dangerous to the interests of our country*.”¹⁶ During the first two years of the war he frequently made statements to his intimates that showed a concern for Britain’s interests and French interests against the threat from Germany to the European balance that had given them political, although short-lived security. The determination to resist ruthless submarine warfare was a determination to resist a threat to the maritime and naval power of the United States and Britain, which had been a major means of maintaining the European balance. It was a larger view than the perspective of the necessity to protect maritime interest which caused him to say in a campaign speech in 1916: “This is the last war of its kind of any kind that involves the world that the United States can keep out of. I say that because I believe that the business of neutrality is over.”¹⁷

Bailey, is, I think, wrong in referring to the whole American people, if he meant to include the president and certain important sectors of American opinion and certain other individuals in high places, such as Walter Hines Page in London. Lippmann and Spykman almost certainly do not sufficiently qualify their contentions so as to indicate that Wilson was leading a people reluctant and poorly educated to see their interest in the turn of the struggle in Europe. If the American people had seen clearly, they would not have deserted the president when it came time to construct the peace.

Wilson’s Manchester speech on December 30, 1918, in which he stated, replying to Clemenceau, that we were not interested in supporting the old balance of power is not inconsistent with his recognition that the threat to and attack upon the old balance had placed American security in jeopardy. Rather than manifesting the “noble simplicity” imputed to him by Clemenceau, he exposes the simplicity of the so-called realists who can, even in this critical epoch, believe that the best road to the future leads along the stark way of *realpolitik*. The question may be asked today whether the present stress in foreign policy upon realistic, *ad hoc* reaction to day-to-day problems without the guidance of a larger ideal than mere political necessity is serving our interests. Wilson saw the devices of the past with some, if not sufficient, clarity. He saw them as wanting and deficient, and proposed to lead the world into a time of

concert and agreement in which balance and politics would not be ended but contained within a larger ideal. The tragedy of his failure derives from the fact that realists insisted we cannot expect so much and most idealistic followers expected too much and found it easy in their disappointment to fall back into despair.

I find it easy to see naïveté and noble simplicity in Wilson, on occasion perhaps ill-suited to meet his problems. But what more can Professor Morgenthau ask for than Wilson's call for a peace without victory,¹⁸ which would have left a political foundation upon which to construct or to continue to build an international political consensus? This was no seeing of the struggle as between good and evil without shadings. Later, to be sure, Wilson demanded an overturning of the political institutions of the enemy that made it certain that the end could only be total surrender, but his record at the peace conference shows that he fought vigorously to temper the peace with consideration for the sensibilities of the defeated peoples. He resisted going to see the French devastated areas so as to avoid the emotive impact the sight would have upon him.

The weaknesses of Woodrow Wilson are clear for all to see. The candor of the man did not disguise aspects of character or personality or thought under a cloak of mystery. But it is all too easy whilst inspecting the weakness to overlook the viability and significance of Wilsonian idealism as containing a promise than man can go beyond the present stage. Politics will not end, and Wilson did not promise that. He urged the necessity that in the international sphere they placed on a higher level of concert and agreement. If that is a condition of survival, who then is the realist?

Realism, Idealism, and the Nation-State

Bertrand Russell lists three alternatives before mankind:¹⁹

- “I. The end of human life, perhaps of all life on our planet.
- “II. A reversion to barbarism after a catastrophic diminution of the population of the globe.
- “III. A unification of the world under a single government, possessing a monopoly of all the major weapons of war.”

Finding no way to increase the number of these alternatives, I suggest that both the idealism of Wilson and the realism of, for example, Morgenthau be

inspected to discover the means they may suggest in the search for the survival of human life. Both so-called idealistic and realistic approaches should be inspected and means eclectically selected from them, particularly those means that may be employed to take men beyond the stage of power political relations between states. For it is obvious that Russell's alternatives assign no role over the long haul, or long decline, to the national state as we now know it. Both approaches should be inspected, therefore, for the purpose of determining how much they continue to assign a continuing function to the nation-state. If Russell is right the degree to which they do so may be a measure of the irrelevance of the means they suggest to the present critical epoch.

Professor Morgenthau appears to me to call for a continuation of candid power politics among nation-states or loose associations among them. Over the long haul, this promises the first two of Russell's alternatives rather than the third, which I take it we all would prefer. Since we have dealt with Professor Morgenthau at length in another place, it suffices to refer to him here for two reasons. First, he presents a persuasive case for his so-called realistic position, if we neglect to note what the end product is almost certain to be. Morgenthau's misfortune is that, since his promises make him unable to counsel the adventuresome and novel response required to meet a unique situation, he cannot advise more than too little, and that almost certainly too late. Second, he makes a direct attack upon Wilsonian idealism; this, at least negatively, is the core of his argument.

A critical evaluation of Wilsonian idealism is prompted by more than Morgenthau's attack. The tradition of which Wilson's thought and action are a part remains an important one, even though today it must compete against even stronger views and conceptions of *Realpolitik* than those parochial views that occasioned its defeat following World War I. In the light of our premises here, the evaluation of this idealism should be critical, that is, close, analytical, and objective. The Wilsonian view does not reduce the emphasis on the nation-state and its politics, although a higher morality is presumed to be capable of keeping excesses and frictions under control. Indeed, a fragmentation and multiplication of states as a product of the principle of national self-determination occurred to confound the best devices, in particular the League of Nations, erected to secure peace under this higher morality. But considering the Morgenthau type of realism and Wilsonian idealism together, one may contend that the latter looks more definitely beyond today to that condition which our statement of alternatives makes essential to survival, that is the development of a general supernational and authoritative global government. The question arises, who then is the sounder realist, Morgenthau or Wilson?

The frame of reference for testing the merits of the realist and idealist approaches must include more than the condition of survival, i.e., the emergence of a single world government. The means of achieving this condition are equally important. Russell contends that only a quick and early war or show of force, precipitated by the United States or the Soviet Union, could produce this recognition or situation. He prefers that the United States should calculate wisely and take this preventive action, and he assumed at the time of writing that we had a preponderance of strength so clear for the other side to see that they would rationally decide to capitulate before war was actually begun. Failing that, our preponderance would be so decisive in war that the conflict would be determined or terminated on the constructive side of Armageddon. The question at present is whether Russell's margin of safety in time has been consumed. If it has, then in terms of his construct we have no alternative to a decline to barbarism or total destruction. But constructs have a way of proving to be overly rigid under the corrosive impact of time. They prove to be not revelations of truth, but guides to action and understanding. It may remain true that Russell's third condition is the condition of survival in the long run. The means he counsels for bringing about that condition are more problematical. Moreover, the last opportunity to employ them may have disappeared, for the essential preponderance of strength on one side probably no longer exists. It would nevertheless be too early in the game, for philosophical and emotional reasons, to accept counsels of despair as controlling. It is reasonable for us, therefore, to continue to weigh and evaluate the available means on the ground that there is some constructive advantage in doing so.

Morgenthau does not look forward in the discernible future to the establishment of an authoritative world political order. His system maintains that justice is the result of the application of effective power. But he also counsels the maintenance of the interaction of political forces in a way that may, given self-restraint on the part of statesmen and nations, produce the global consensus necessary to the development of an authoritative world political order. Should it appear, it will not be because Morgenthau himself foresaw such a development; but he does at least call for the building of the structure from the ground up. On the other hand, Wilson's moralistic charges demanded a leap into the future on the assumption that a luminescent moral order would sustain a new international system. The analogy is rather that of the builder who attempts first to construct the roof rather than the foundation. With respect to the means, Morgenthau and Wilson may again be compared. The question arises as to who is the sounder realist. On superficial glance at least, Morgenthau, although his vision is not so much upon the future, may make

the more constructive contribution. That is, if we may today be content with conventional devices. If, on the other hand, we require an entirely unique course of action, perhaps nothing sort of what Wilson demanded will suffice. The fact that the challenge cannot be met is not an effective argument against the thesis; it is merely a measure of the tragedy of the situation.

A theorist must claim to be a realist. The conventional idealist is, therefore, asserting the realism of idealism. The conventional realist asserts that the data his realism regards as describing the truth are sufficient as guides to political action, if not to metaphysical speculation. The analyst must inspect the assertion of the realism of idealism and not rest content with the surmise or the charge that idealism (or moralistic or legalistic thought) does not or cannot face up to the political challenge. It is especially required that we face the problem in this way today, since there is no reason to believe that conventional, realistic approaches to political issues cannot solve our unique, contemporary problems. Possibly at last we must either leap into a new world or perish. If that is true, who then is the realist?

The burden that we can place upon the idealist is that he makes every attempt to square his idealistic views or goals with sound views of political possibility. This does not necessarily mean that he must accept power politics as the dominant and exclusive factor forever in the international sphere. He may entertain the hope and belief that power politics among nations may be controlled eventually as they are domestically to a degree. Power may be so defined as to be the essence of every human relationship, but in my opinion such a definition does not take full account of variations in the quality of human relations or of the capacity for a mutual understanding of the obligations that may be imposed upon all parties by an accepted moral or legal system. Critics of Wilson's idealism often refer disparagingly to his address at Mobile before the Southern Commercial Congress.²⁰ We can agree with Morgenthau that "moral judgments and political actions show wide divergencies."²¹ It is not necessary to accept the view that, since there is so there are principles of political action, entirely apart from morality, that should be the exclusive guide of statesmen. Nor is it necessary or wise to neglect such principles in favor of a high-flown morality. Somewhere between there is a position that may be stated in general terms. Specific applications must wait for the unfolding of events.

Wilson in the Mobile address asserted that "Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interest is the issue which we now have to face."²² The United States had reached the fulfillment of its territorial ambitions and would not "seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." He thus could turn to support of a higher interest, that of the Western hemi-

sphere as a whole, in terms of the interest of the people generally in human rights and the integrity of nations. He was not abandoning the concept of interest, but he was calling for loyalty to an interest higher than an egocentric, national, material power interest. Granted that his language lends itself to support of a smug sense of national rectitude and misuse by those who think that interest can be abandoned in favor of a vague superior law, the context of his thought indicates that he was attempting to go beyond the national interest to a general interest among nations. His rhetoric does not show that he had thought the problem through, but his language and his actions together show he did not lose sight of the conditions of national survival, on the one hand, whilst he rested discontent with a purely parochial national view, on the other. The national integrity that he posited was not merely that of small nations but also that of the United States, a concept that could comprehend the idea of national interest. It was his good fortune to be the leader of a nation that by the blessings of history could be considered satisfied, if not surfeited. It was easier for him therefore, on this ground, as well as by virtue of the special sense of mission that America's geographical and historical detachment helped to produce, to proclaim a new day for the international community. Power politics is a device for working change in history and change is the most constant factor in history. Wilson's plea on behalf of national integrity and settled processes under law did not amount to a conservative defense of an unnatural status quo. His political career, particularly his advocacy of the League of Nations, demonstrates that he was concerned with producing, on a higher level than that of pure power politics, the means of accomplishing peaceful change.

Wilson "disparaged a foreign policy inspired by egotism."²³ By that he meant a foreign policy that did not regard for the common good. He perhaps naïvely thought that such a policy could be devised that "would no longer be moved by calculations of power."²⁴ The latter conception was not adequate but the aspirations he demanded are perhaps the minimum conditions of survival. As some have pointed out, "the utilization of a *national interest concept based upon a moral appeal* as the firmament of our foreign policy, holds out the greatest promise for meeting the challenge of events that lie ahead."²⁵ Working from historical analogy, which does not indicate that power politics can avoid war, the alternative is an attempt to substitute for war a higher moral aspiration with a full awareness of the difficulties. The very existence of Wilson is proof that power politics may be diluted by a different motivation on a higher level of moral aspiration. This does not mean that statecraft may escape egotism, but national egotism can come to serve a general rather than a purely parochial interest.

In preceding papers, I have asserted that no observer or analyst may consider the data of his field except in terms of an informing theory. Such a theory will be compounded of knowledge of which one may be highly certain and areas of ignorance and doubt in which values will function. Even Morgenthau cannot assert that he is the unqualifiedly real realist, for his informing theory is certainly highly personal. His value causes him to be the self-proclaimed realist, and his realistic theory is a spectrum through which he views the world about him. And certainly the same must be said of Wilsonian theory. The questions that are relevant with respect to both are as follows: The theory of which of them mostly nearly explains or describes the real world as being and process? Which theory as a manipulative tool gives higher promise of serving man in seeking to survive?

All morality must be in the beginning personal, as Professor Warner Fite asserted in his lectures on "Individualism" delivered at the University of Chicago in 1909, "for consciousness of personal aims . . . [is] the beginning of morality."²⁶ Neither Morgenthau nor Wilson could escape, with the beginning of such consciousness, the beginning of a personal moral system; and "there can be no higher standard of obligation for individuals than that set by personal ends and ideals." The viability of a social order will depend upon how much those ends and ideals call for a commitment "to the ends of each of the others."²⁷ Woodrow Wilson had a higher degree of confidence that this commitment could be enlarged to apply to relations between nations and states. This idealism depreciated the view that states are fundamentally beyond morality or must inevitably fall short of a morality that has its inception in the individual.

Digest of Discussion

The chairman called the meeting to order and, after noting the Wilsonian position was up for discussion that evening, suggested that a useful approach might be that of identifying the major points of contrast between Wilsonian idealism and so-called *realpolitik*. This might lead the group into a discussion of the basic points of issue existing between the two approaches, and beyond, to the tacit or conscious assumptions which lay behind those points. He was thinking of the assumptions which each school made with regard to such problems as the nature of human behavior, the nature of power, the national interest and its relation to power, and so forth. What he hoped would emerge

was a clarification of the real underlying beliefs, attitudes, and interpretations which characterize the two schools. Such a procedure might give the group some idea of what is essential to a theory of international relations. The chairman called upon Mr. Lipsky to open the discussion.

Mr. Lipsky noted that there had been a period in his life when he had been rather sympathetic to Morgenthau's approach, especially with reference to his critique of Wilsonian idealism. Subsequently his attitude toward Wilson has become more ambivalent although he is still impressed with the high content of religious conviction which permeated Wilson's theory and with Wilson's tendency to express himself in "bromidic clichés" and sweeping generalizations.

On the other hand, many critics tend to dip into expressions of Wilson's thought to support their so-called realism. The dichotomy of realism vs. idealism might be a basic issue for international political theory. In any case, it seems obvious that both the idealist and the realist must view international politics through an informing theory. Thus Morgenthau's realism cannot be divorced from his underlying system of values and, hence, Morgenthau works at the same level of operation as did Wilson. The main issue as to which is the realist therefore reduces itself to a determination as to which theory or theoretical emphasis is most conducive to a man's survival at this critical juncture in world history. In terms of the alternatives posed by Russell, noted in the working paper, the realist approach does not provide adequate answers for avoiding a holocaust. This conclusion can be confirmed by reference to historical analogy. Therefore, there seems to be practical as well as theoretical grounds for reinterpreting Wilson in terms of idealism and realism.

The main critique offered by the realists, Mr. Lipsky continued, is that Wilsonian theory, in the last analysis, is an attempt to find a substitute for politics in the sense that interest motivation is the basic force in the political process. Such critique is in error, Mr. Lipsky thought. Wilson was not trying to find a means for ending the political process but was rather urging a kind of politics in which considerations of interest are placed on a higher, more generous level. Wilson was urging the raising of politics to the level of the international community in which statesmen would regard the community's interest as a vital factor in their policy calculations. Wilson felt that the idea of a community interest must be created to avoid a community catastrophe.

The realist position is, of course, that no such community exists—that it is a myth accepted to be a viable guide for human behavior. But to maintain that the international community neither exists nor can be created in the near future is synonymous with maintaining, in view of the development of

atomic weapons, that one of Russell's first two alternatives is unavoidable. Thus the critical question, in terms of realism and idealism, is whether the political process can be moved to the higher level of the international community through international organization. Since Wilson urged this course there are good grounds for maintaining that the idealists are realists and the so-called realists do not furnish sufficiently realistic answers for avoiding their own destructions.

Definitions of Idealism and Realism

Professor Wolfers felt there should be some clarification of the term "realism." He thought there were two ways of defining realism. Mr. Lipsky had defined it as a solution guaranteed to assure survival on the ground that it is unrealistic to advocate a course leading to catastrophe. But realism is not the elaboration of the perfect theoretical solution. Every member of the group would no doubt agree that world government is the answer to war, but the realist must ask whether the world as he knows it can reach a state of organization sufficiently cohesive to support world government in the near future.

In terms of both definitions, Professor Wolfers continued, Wilson seemed to be disqualified as a realist. In the first place, his proposals for international security fall far short of the theoretically perfect solution to the problem of survival since world government was never his ultimate objective. In the second place, Wilson's assumptions about international political behavior do not conform to the realities of life.

Professor Holborn suggested that if Wilson was an idealist, he voiced a peculiar type of idealism—an ethical type of idealism. The professor doubted whether Wilson's approach could be adequately discussed in terms of idealism vs. realism. He felt that Wilson's real position had not been sufficiently recorded in the working paper. It is true that Wilson was Christian, but he believed in a special type of Christianity—a Christianity which placed great faith in the basic morality of men and the progress of mankind. That faith is certainly not true for many variations of Christian belief, including Calvinism. What Wilson proposed was the mobilization of the vast latent moral content inherent in man and so to raise history to be a higher, more "Christian" level of behavior. To do so meant first to defeat the "Devilish" forces such as autocracy and monopoly which led men astray from their truer instincts. Those forces must be swept aside and in their place must be rooted democratic institutions

through which the real aspirations of mankind could be realized. In that way governments would pursue cooperative, rational, and non-acquisitive policies and war would no longer be a problem.

Mr. Niemeyer remarked that Wilsonian idealism was very close to Marxism in its analysis of human nature.

Mr. Lipsky said he had Wilson's views with regard to the mobilization of morality and the realization of democracy very much in mind when he wrote the working paper. With regard to Professor Wolfers' comment, he thought that political realism might be considered in three different ways: first, as the nature of politics as it currently operates; second, as the employment of means for achieving certain defined ends; and third, as suggesting what must be done to assure man's survival. On the final point a continuing debate could be developed between the realists and idealists. Historical analogy is fairly conclusive as to the inadequacy of the means suggested by the so-called realists for avoiding atomic war.

The chairman thought it more realistic if the group limited itself to abolishing the use of the terms "realism" and "idealism." Actually, the idealist position could be argued on quite different grounds than those offered here. World government could only be constructed on a more durable consensus than that existing today—for example, the consensus that might grow if the world were invaded by forces from another planet. In any case, he suggested that the group move on to a discussion of the basic differences and assumptions of the two schools.

Mr. Zinner agreed. He described himself as being both fascinated and perplexed by the discussion to that point. He felt that the chairman had started matters off on the right track as the focus of the discussion for that evening but now wondered whether the group was attempting to analyze Wilsonian idealism and its assumptions or whether it was attempting to formulate a solution to avert an imminent catastrophe and survive the threat posed by Soviet Russia or, finally, whether the assumption that world government is a substitute for international politics but rather an objective of international politics. In any case, he thought it might be useful to have a "ruling from the chair" on which of these questions might be most fruitfully discussed.

The chairman said Mr. Zinner's remarks touched a sympathetic note in him. He thought it would be useful for the group to seek to examine how much it could do by way of constructing a theory of international relations. The first question which arises, naturally, is what is meant by a theory of international relations. The chairman ventured that a theory of international relations is one concerned with the conditions and presuppositions of an organization

in which nations are related for accomplishing certain purposes. Throughout history some order of relations has existed among nations, whether expressed in terms of concerts, balances of power, or other systems. A theory of international relations must deal with more than such types of relationship; it must deal with more important purposes than such things as assuring international telecommunications and the transit of mail. It should be a theory setting forth the condition for reasonable intercourse among nations—a theory under which an international order of some endurance could exist.

Mr. Zinner remarked that the dichotomy of atomic war vs. world government might be a false one. A world war might itself lay the basis for a world order established by the victor. Mr. Lipsky noted that Russell himself had advocated a preventive war in 1950 but would probably not do so now since the margin of safety then assumed by Russell has subsequently disappeared. Professor Holborn questioned Russell's position and the value, in terms of discussing Wilsonian theory, of referring to Russell at all.

Wilson and World Government

Professor Wolfers questioned whether Wilson had ever suggested or implied the need for world government. Rather, he felt, Wilson had suggested that with the growth of democracy, nations would operate in harmony; hence there would be no need for world government. Mr. Lipsky believed that Wilson had hinted at impending catastrophe if the old ways were followed and at the need to develop institutions capable of coping with the situation. Professor Holborn noted that Wilson had explicitly rejected the French proposals for establishing an international police force to maintain the Versailles system as simply a façade for French imperialism and an attempt to freeze the status quo. The League system of collective security was to be a reasoned, *ad hoc* response by the world community to the threat of an occasional transgressor. Professor Wolfers agreed. Wilson, he held, believed that if people were given their freedom, enjoyed democracy and self-determination, the basic conditions for world harmony would be satisfied, except, perhaps, for an occasional irrational retrogression—and even these would eventually die out.

Continuing, Professor Wolfers wondered whether the group should assume that the only solution to the basic problem of international relations is in the establishment of a monopoly of violence in the hands of a world state and that solutions of a lower order of magnitude are not worth considering.

Mr. Lipsky pointed out that Secretary of State Lansing had parted ways

with Wilson because he, Lansing, considered that Wilson was moving dangerously close to the idea of a world state.

Types of International Relations: Theory

Mr. Thompson said it was obvious that Wilson was a person endeavoring to match his philosophical commitments with his practical political responsibilities. With regard to the chairman's remarks on the nature of a theory of international relations, Mr. Thompson recalled some suggestions which Walter Lippmann had made, during a recent discussion,^{*} on types of theories of international relations. Mr. Lippmann had suggested three kinds:

First there is what might be termed an operational theory of international relations dealing with the assumptions and attitudes of given statesmen and the relationship of those to foreign policy. It might be useful, for example, to draw up a series of studies on successive secretaries of state along analytical lines and discover what, if any, relationship existed between the man and the conduct and aims of US foreign policy for that period. Certainly the role and responsibility of the statesman is a peculiar one and not the same as that of the scholar—the statesman must temporize and accommodate and he is subject to diverse pressures. Studies of the way statesmen react and behave might be a source of international relations theory.

Second, Mr. Thompson continued, Mr. Lippmann referred to rational theories of international relations by which he meant theories which seek to provide a rational picture of the international scene. Such theories attempt to identify the elements of uniformity and continuity in the international political process while at the same time giving proper attention to the variables. Interests are a major element of uniformity in international relations and patterns of interaction develop. Pressures of interest result in such configurations as a particular balance of power or, more generally, in the development of international organization and law. The permanency of a particular configuration is dependent upon the endurance of the interests which underlie it. US–Canadian solidarity is an example of a relatively long-term configuration.

Finally, there is what Mr. Lippmann described as the normative approach to international relations. Wilson might be considered to be within this grouping yet with Wilson, norms and practices were often confused. Certainly

^{*}[DM: Thompson is almost certainly referring here to the Rockefeller Foundation Conference on International Relations Theory, 7–8 May 1954. See Guilhot 2011.]

some of those were a conviction of progress in the affairs of men, a humanitarian, Christian interpretation of human behavior, and a failure sufficiently to distinguish between the city of God and the city of men. Similarly, Niebuhr has a normative approach to international relations. He relates such norms as justice, liberty, and equality to the international environment and determining the extent to which they are realized or not realized.

With reference to Mr. Thompson's remarks, the chairman expressed skepticism as to whether Lippmann had really defined three levels of theory. The first is simply a methodological approach, the second is simply a descriptive picture, and the third is simply a collection of postulates. The chairman suggested rather that a theory of international relations is one which is concerned with a structure of international relationships, organized to serve certain purposes. The definition of those purposes is a major problem in constructing a theory, but the structure should be strong enough and durable enough to assure that any international conflict will be brought before a court of law. In concluding, the chairman doubted whether one could advance very far in formulating a theory of international relations except in terms of a structure.

In response to an observation by Mr. Thompson, the chairman suggested that both Carr and Morgenthau seem to be arguing against a particular structure. Professor Wolfers thought that Lippmann's second approach was one designed to move from the data to a conceptual idea of the structure while his third approach was to establish the structure first and then proceed to evolve a theory from it.

Mr. Niemeyer ventured that a theory of international relations might be concerned with two basic questions: first, a description of the international political process as it actually operates, and second, an explanation of that process, with an economy of thought, in terms of a central concept. The concept need not be related to a particular structure. Mr. Niemeyer feared that if one confined one's terms of a reference to structure, one "stacked the cards" in terms of arriving at a theory of world government.

The chairman thought that his use of the word "structure" might have been misunderstood. What he meant was a nexus or a system of accommodation. Professor Holborn suggested "pattern" or "configuration." The chairman agreed and went on to note that the theory must go beyond mere description of patterns of relations which have existed among nations in the past. Mr. Thompson concurred that descriptions should provide the basis for analysis. He thought such analysis would reveal certain irreducible and continuing elements in international politics. The chairman agreed and remarked that Mr. Thompson was now "theorizing" rather than simply describing.

In response to a comment made by Mr. Lichenstein, the chairman thought that no useful analogy could be drawn between the theory of physics and social science theory. Mr. Lichenstein felt an identification of methodology between the natural and social sciences might be useful. The chairman asserted that the inductive method has never worked in either the natural or social world; that is, theory is never derived from a background of information. Mr. Niemeyer thought that, methodologically, one should begin by forming a hypothesis. However, if one were to begin with structure as one's hypothesis, the hypothesis would be "loaded" in favor of world government. He personally felt out of sympathy with such a hypothesis.

Mr. Thompson noted the development of a so-called "realistic" trend in American political science. He thought it was related to the development of the idea of interest in relation to international political behavior. But it was also wise, he felt, to point out the operation of purpose in international politics. Different nations have different purposes and these purposes—such as the preservation of individual freedom in this country—themselves vary through time. Purpose and interest operate and interact in a complex way in international politics. He was reminded of the former US diplomat who once remarked that he gathered enough information, in the course of private conversations with Jacob Malik, to be able to ruin Malik as a Soviet diplomat. Yet even if it had been in the US interest to remove Malik from the scene, the American could not have revealed that information, for doing so would have been inimical to his personal code of ethics. No doubt, Mr. Thompson continued, a case could have been made five or so years ago for a "preventive war" against the USSR, yet such a move was unthinkable in terms of America's national purposes. Thus every nation's foreign policy is a complex of specific interests and moral purposes.

Professor Wolfers noted that Plato and Locke could be characterized as normative political theorists. Both speculated on the preconditions of good government. Some international relations theorists think the same approach can be applied in their field. As applied to international relations, the question often takes the form, "what are the minimum conditions necessary to prevent international anarchy?" Such notions as world democracy, free trade, and world government have been suggested. As distinct from this normative approach, Professor Wolfers continued, there is the scientific approach which begins with the question, "how does the world of international politics really operate?" and proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework or a tentative hypothesis for answering that question. Such concepts or hypotheses are, of course, discarded if they do not sufficiently conform to the facts of international life.

Mr. Lichenstein wondered whether there was much difference between the two approaches. Both are dependent on a full understanding of the international political process if they are to avoid becoming sheer abstractions.

Professor Holborn suggested that a lesser, but perhaps more practical objective of international relations theory than that suggested by Professor Wolfers is the counseling of shorter-range improvements in relationships among nations.

The chairman suggested that particular attention be drawn to the fact that the field is characterized by relationships; that is, patterns or contexts. These patterns can be described as they develop through history. Such a survey would be a vast job. Moreover the international relations theorist does not have the material to work with in the same sense as the physicist has. The international relations theorist is obliged to work from sources of relations or different schemes which have arisen through history. A given scheme of relations is operative today. One might begin by asking how well does that scheme relate to changing interests and changing demands of peoples and governments. It would seem that the fact of change is primary in the field and one might inquire as to how well this existing scheme accommodates change and facilitates adjustments.

Professor Wolfers wondered how it is possible to theorize about changing demands when not a great deal is known about the nature of those demands. The chairman ventured that it is pretty well known, for example, that mankind fears war more than ever before. Mr. Zinner remarked that men also seem to fear despotism more than ever before and would usually prefer war to despotism if given the choice. Professor Wolfers thought there is also a greater fear of insecurity than has previously ever existed, so much so that this nation is, for example, willing to contemplate war because of the increased insecurity which would result from the loss of Indo-China. Mr. Thompson recalled that during the interwar period many publicists in international relations thought that the price of war had risen to such an exorbitant level that rational people would never consider it.

The Role of Value in Theory

Mr. Zinner remarked that while he apparently represented the “muddled end of the table” a few concepts did appear to be emerging from the discussion. In any theory, fact and value are hopelessly intertwined. There is perhaps a more or less normative approach and a more or less scientific approach, but it is commonly taken for granted that no theory is entirely devoid of value judgment. What is important, however, is that value should be kept to a minimum, or at least, be identified.

With regard to the question “what is theory?,” Mr. Zinner continued, the following definition might be considered appropriate: “a theory is a generalized explanation pertaining to a set of related phenomena.” The first question which therefore arises is: what are the phenomena about which one is attempting to theorize and how are they related? Other questions which arise concern what the theory explains and how the theory attempts to do so. Further, one might ask, what does the theory propose to do; how does it help man understand himself and his environment? In asking such questions, two factors might be borne in mind: first, what are the limitations of theory—that is, how much can be explained by theory; and second, are the phenomena which make up the field of international affairs such as to permit a theory at all?

Mr. Lichenstein thought that an objective of international relations theory might be able to enable nation-states to behave more rationally in their international relationships, that is to achieve greater consistency between their objectives and their means. This is also, he noted, one sense in which theory can be said to be value-free. Mr. Zinner observed that both the US and the USSR could be pursuing their respective foreign policies quite rationally and yet be diametrically opposed to each other.

In response to a comment by the chairman, Mr. Zinner said that empirical verification of an international relations theory is never fully possible. The chairman agreed and thought that no theory in the social sciences can ever be fully verified. The most one can hope for is a higher probability in one direction or another.

With regard to a reference made by Mr. Zinner to the allusion to “inevabilities” found in Leninism, the chairman felt that a distinction should be made between theory and dogma. With regard to Wilson, the chairman thought there were elements of both, with the dogmatic element relatively high. Professor Wolfers believed that Wilson not only had a notion of the world as he would have liked it to be but a notion of the world as it was. Wilson’s idealism might be termed “reality around the corner.” By introducing the League, he hoped to produce in fact what he thought was normatively desirable.

Professor Holborn remarked that Wilson’s belief in the power of the free individual was probably more correct in 1913 than in 1918 or 1919. Historic forces had been set in motion by the war, especially nationalism, the identification of man with the nation, and Bolshevism. Wilson himself was eventually defeated by US nationalism.

Mr. Niemeyer expressed the idea that insofar as theory might be considered a mental process by means of which nations can act more rationally toward one another, theory should select out those facts and forces operative in

the international field which advance the purposes of “the good life.” By this he meant not the good life in terms of nations but in terms of individual men.

Mr. Roberts noted that the statement “the balance of power is now forever discredited” is a normative statement while “the balance of power is the way nations operate” is a descriptive one. But Wilson’s statement can be altered: “If the balance of power is played long enough there will be no one left to play it.” If this last statement is wrong, that would be duly noted by political science; if it is correct then it, together with the second statement, poses an immense normative problem.

Professor Wolfers remarked that Wilson would probably have added that if his sins were put into effect there would no longer be a need for balance of power relationships since all nations would behave as a family. Generally speaking, in posing the question “how can I get to my goal,” one might quarrel, on the other hand, with the questioner’s goal or, on the other, with the procedures he advocates for reaching that goal.

Professor Holborn observed that Wilson rejected the balance of power relationship and wished to substitute for it a community of power. Moreover, Wilson saw only a loose community of power as being necessary since, with the spread of democracy and world public opinion, an occasional aggressor would immediately be confronted by an aroused and outraged world. Actually, the UN was merely an attempt to improve upon the Wilsonian idea—hence the new international organization was to be exempted from the responsibility of peace making and it recognized the necessity of great power unanimity.

Mr. Niemeyer expressed puzzlement over the distinction between prediction and normative judgment. Wilson’s predictions contained postulates or normative elements. That is to say, there was an arrangement of facts as motivated by a norm. Wilson’s rebuttal to non-believers, like that of the Christian religion, was “you can’t know unless you have tried.” To the extent that one makes this the basis of policy making, one converts politics into a religion.

Mr. Thompson commented that nations tend to identify their own national purposes with common, universal purposes. Thus the US tends to identify its own security purposes as serving the common objectives of law and order while equating those threatening its security with lawbreakers.

The Substance of International Relations: Moral Purpose

Professor Holborn stated that, in reflecting upon the pre-dinner discussion, he was still concerned about the problem of what was made up the field of study

known as international relations. The definition that international relations is concerned with the relations between nation-states he regarded as inadequate. The existence and influence of transnational ideologies and class communities certainly make themselves felt in the world of international behavior. They also make the picture much more complex.

A second and even more serious problem from the standpoint of historical understanding, Professor Holborn continued, is the tendency to discuss politics in terms of a dichotomy of realistic analysis or idealistic norms. History just does not operate that way. People do not act on the basis of realistic interpretation but on the basis of moral ideals and ambitions. Moral ambitions are often diluted by other considerations but are, nevertheless, very real elements in any given situation. For example, in the case of the Marshall Plan, the realists interpreted it simply as a good policy for fighting communism, yet the program was made possibly largely because certain moral, Christian motivations were set in operations. These moral aspirations were very real “realities” and he, for one, was glad this was so.

Therefore, Professor Holborn concluded, policy is based on moral feelings as well as national interests. Such moral feelings cannot be adequately described by the expression “national purposes” but are an intrinsic part of the “wholeness of human life” which includes an expression of moral purposes. Although men always tend to fall behind their moral aspirations, these aspirations are not imposed upon men but are rather part of human existence.

Mr. Niemeyer agreed. He suggested that it might be possible to study international relations in terms of patterns of convictions. The following patterns come immediately to mind:

First, the pattern of international relations as a whole appears to follow historical phases. The present pattern took shape in 1942 and no one can study it for as long as it persists. Second, certain patterns appear to have a religious basis. The French and Italian situations can largely be explained in terms of Catholicism. Third, patterns of conviction emerge in terms of left and right. Political parties in the West align themselves in these terms while, and at the international level, nations themselves can often be designated as left or right in orientation as, for example, India and Spain. Fourth, patterns of convictions exist with regard to race relations, the Union of South Africa being a good example.

Now, continued Mr. Niemeyer, these patterns of conviction cannot be rounded out as concepts for a theory of international relations unless they can be expressed in terms of affinities and hostilities among groupings of states. In the present era there seem to be three such groupings—the Western nations,

the Soviet bloc, and the uncommitted countries. These groupings have to be analyzed in terms of the pressures—as expressed in military and economic power, for example—which operate within and between groups. These pressures can be conceived as the price nations must pay for maintaining their patterns of convictions. Moreover, it should always be kept in mind that such patterns go through historical phases, come to an end, and are supplanted by new patterns.

Mr. Thompson remarked that Secretary Dulles' Christian conviction does not seem to offer much toward an understanding of his statesmanship. Similarly, not much can be said about the foreign policy of the Labor government in Britain in terms of socialist or capitalist criteria. Therefore, would not a theory which began with patterns of convictions become misleading when Christians did not behave as Christians and socialists did not behave as socialists?

Mr. Marshall thought the group's discussions regarding the criteria of international relations theory often wandered from one yardstick to another. Sometimes a theory's function is held to assist in understanding international politics while, at other times, as an aid to the statesman in making decisions. Mr. Marshall referred to the fact that many people study human anatomy—doctors, artists, ballet dancers, coroners, ju-jitsu wrestlers, and athletic coaches, for example. The interest of the coach, the wrestler, and the doctor in the human body is most akin to that of the policy maker with regard to international relations; the artist's to that of the scholar; and the coroner's to that of the historian.

Although all of these occupational groups study anatomy, Mr. Marshall continued, their approaches are quite different. The artist tends to idealize the human body while the doctor recognizes its imperfections and tries to cope with them. He himself thinks of international relations as a physician would, that is, he asks the question "what can I do to keep the wretched being alive?"

The policy maker is up against limitations in his work which are much narrower than that of the scholar. Wilson seemed to have had a foot in both camps; he thought of perfectionist solutions in situations which called for limited expedients.

Mr. Lipsky said that the group ran the risk of thinking in Aristotelian rather than Alexandrian terms. Aristotle's theory was stated largely in terms of the existing Greek city-state while Alexander thought in terms of a new political basis for mankind. Mr. Lichenstein felt that Aristotle had a continuing usefulness in a variety of circumstances. If a theory is broad enough to be able to take in an enormous number of variables, then it will be useful for a large number of situations. And, methodologically, there is a further level of contemporary relevance.

Mr. Lipsky thought that Morgenthau's and Carr's theories, while hinting at the eventual prospect of a more durable world order, see the millennium as fairly far removed from the present, and their prescriptions for policy certainly do not lend themselves to a rapid advance in that direction. Professor Wolfers wondered where Mr. Lipsky could find Wilson advocating a millennium. Mr. Lipsky thought it could be inferred, for example, in Wilson's Mobile speech in which Wilson had explicitly championed the sovereign equality of nations but implicitly attacked that concept.

Mr. Thompson suggested that world government was little more than a goal toward which one could aim by means of international organization and law. Indeed, the international organization is currently being re-examined with the idea of relating it more closely to the political environment in which it operates and re-evaluating its usefulness in terms of its value as a forum for negotiation, as a means for making adjustments in the balance of power, and as a source of moral values.

Political scientists, Mr. Thompson continued, have tended to accept abstract Wilsonian principles regarding international organizations and international security but often run into difficulty when attempting to apply them to concrete situations. For example, Wilson stood for maximizing national independence and self-determination, but in the present era rapid application of those principles in the Far East would create vacuums into which communism would surely flow.

In response to a comment regarding the relation between social science and natural science theory, the chairman felt that the methods of the natural scientist could be utilized by the social scientist. The fields of investigation are not analogous. The state, for example, which is the chief object of inquiry in political theory, is not a datum in nature but rather a construct for serving certain ends. Hence the concept of the state is shot through with value elements. The same applies to other social institutions—they exist only to the extent that men think they exist. They exist and have developed through history because human beings have construed that they should exist.

Mr. Zinner wondered whether knowledge has a cumulative quality in international relations as it seems to have in physics. Mr. Marshall thought it did but only to a very small extent. With regard to the chairman's comments on the state, Mr. Marshall expressed the opinion that the word is a shorthand expression for a complex of procedures and pressures which in themselves are real in nature.

The chairman noted that the state has a central organ called government. No one has ever touched a government, or any other social institution for

that matter. These are simply concepts created by men to accomplish certain purposes and hence are not comparable to natural facts.

With regard to Mr. Niemeyer's comments on patterns of conviction as a conceptual basis for a theory of international relations, the chairman thought that such a theory should also allow for technological and economic forces which help to make developing patterns an ongoing process. Otherwise, he thought Mr. Niemeyer had made a promising start. Professor Wolfers thought that one difficulty might be that many of the convictions identified by such a theory would have no relevance for purposes of foreign policy. In response to a comment by Niemeyer, Professor Wolfers asserted that it would be necessary to assign priorities to the convictions in terms of their applicability to the area under consideration.

Mr. Thompson agreed. He was reminded that Dr. Kirk, in his work on the study of international relations in the US, noted that American scholarship at one time considered all interests to be equally important in the formation of policy. However there now seems to be a trend in the opposite direction: one major factor is selected and other factors are related to it in hierarchical order. Such procedure allows for differentiation between the more and the less important.

Mr. Lipsky, with regard to the chairman's remarks on the state, questioned whether it did not exist as a fact in nature. The chairman thought not. It exists simply in the minds of men. The very things with which the group is concerned are themselves value products. The state is conceived in order to serve objectives considered useful. Professor Wolfers agreed. The state makes no sense except in terms of what it does for men.

Mr. Niemeyer thought the same true for survival. Survival has little meaning except in terms of values for which one wishes to survive. Mr. Lichenstein agreed. International relations theory should direct attention to those values which people held dear above all else, including survival. Mr. Lipsky thought most members of the present group would prefer Siberia to extinction if given the choice, but Mr. Thompson thought that the problem of national survival was a very contingent one. Men often hold some things more dear to themselves than survival, yet people living in totalitarian states often seem to prefer survival to a suicidal resistance. The question cannot, he felt, be answered in an *a priori* manner.

Professor Wolfers noted that, in the working paper, Mr. Lipsky postulated that men are now confronted with a new situation in which bare survival is at stake. However, Professor Wolfers felt it questionable whether that consideration is an operative force in foreign policy today. Mr. Lipsky felt that, as

a realist, he was forced to consider survival the overriding problem of world politics at this juncture. Mr. Lichenstein felt that if Americans were confronted with the choice of a Soviet America or war, they would overwhelmingly choose war.

The chairman noted that war has traditionally been regarded as a means of advancing foreign policy but no longer could be so regarded; the consequences of war are now incalculable and unpredictable in terms of specific foreign policy objectives.

Mr. Thompson agreed and thought it underlined the futility of a policy of massive retaliation. That kind of approach is quite different from one which contemplates the use of naval and air support in Indo-China, for example. Mr. Lipsky noted that Russell had advocated a preventive atomic war because he had felt, at the time, that the West enjoyed a margin of safety. Mr. Thompson thought the US would risk major war in terms of local engagements but would never risk a “preventive war” no matter what current military advantage it might seem to have. Professor Wolfers agreed. He doubted whether the government had ever seriously thought in terms of preventive war.

Mr. Roberts, returning to Mr. Niemeyer’s comments on patterns of conviction, thought two problems might be fruitfully explored. First, the problem of identifying historical phases characterized by coherent patterns. This point is related to the problem of whether knowledge is cumulative in international relations. Second, there is the problem of relating these patterns to foreign policy and vice versa. Convictions held to influence foreign policy would have to be traced back to their source. Moreover, since there appears to be an inability to build up knowledge for more than a given period, there is also the problem of identifying the beginning of a successive period.

Mr. Thompson noted that a number of members had emphasized the uniqueness of the current international scene. Although international relations is characterized by a diversity of purpose and values, he did not feel a theory of international relations would be very helpful unless it gave consideration to a few basic factors. First, there is agreement on the importance of interests and values and how they tend to complicate the picture. There is also the problem of mutuality and conflict of interest and the problem of accommodation. Although one historical pattern might be supplanted by another, these problems continue to operate.

Hence, Mr. Thompson continued, international relations can be thought of as an interplay between constants and variables. Real progress, he thought, can be made through research aimed at identifying those constants. Although there is not much kinship between international relations and the natural sci-

ences, some patterns and forms appeared to recur through successive historical eras in a fairly basic way. Such constants might provide a skeletal framework upon which the variables can be hung.

Mr. Zinner agreed but pointed out that a single constant might vary in influence from one period to another. Nevertheless, he thought the methodological problem is to refine analysis in an effort to determine what are the common denominators and constants.

The chairman added that it should be borne in mind that one is dealing with an ongoing process marked by industrial and technological change. Therefore, international relations is not just a dialectic between constants and variables but is characterized by trends. Given this ongoing quality to the field, he thought it would be fair to add that certain objectives are politically advanced by such trends; otherwise the field would appear to be “pretty chaotic.”

John D. Blumgart
Rapporteur

Notes to Working Paper No. 6

1. See the personal *memoir* of Alben W. Barkley, first serialized in the *Saturday Evening Post*.

2. Woodrow Wilson, *The Road Away from Revolution* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly, 1923), 12–13.

3. See Woodrow Wilson, “Addresses Delivered in Boston, February 24, 1919, and in New York, March 4, 1919,” *International Conciliation* (March 1919): 52–63, 64–77. Wilson, having just returned from his first visit to Paris, was expected by many, perhaps unrealistically, to give a detailed account of his experiences abroad.

4. Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 1940), 20.

5. Edward H. Carr, “Public Opinion as a Safeguard of Peace,” *International Affairs* 15 (November 1936): 854.

6. Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), vi.

7. See George A. Lipsky, *John Quincy Adams: His Theory and Ideas* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1950), 69–70.

8. Joseph F. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Page, 1921), 141.

9. Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), 14.

10. *Ibid.*, 12–13.

11. Walter Lippman, *United States Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1943).

12. Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Hareon Brace, 1942).
13. Woodrow Wilson, *War and Peace* (New York: Harper's 1925), I, 257, 353, 410, 411.
14. Tumulty, *Woodrow Wilson As I Knew Him*, 257.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Ibid., 248; italics added.
17. As cited in ibid., 225.
18. Speech to the Senate, January 22, 1917.
19. Bertrand Russell, "The Future of Mankind," in *Unpopular Essays* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1950), 34.
20. See the reference to the address in Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910–1917* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 183–183, and especially the contention that this address foreshadowed the Good Neighborhood policy. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951), 23–24.
21. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Positive Approach to a Democratic Ideology," *Academy of Political Science Proceedings* 24 (January 1951), p. 228.
22. Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910–1917*, 183.
23. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Germany and the Future of Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 79.
24. Loc. cit.
25. Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, "Foreign Policy: The Realism of Idealism," *American Political Science Review* 46 (June 1952): 351, italics added.
26. Byron Dexter, "Warner Fite's Individualism," unpublished essay, 1.
27. Ibid., 7–8.

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Seventh Meeting: The Problem of Theory in the Study of International Relations, June 22, 1954

The study group on the Theory of International Relations held its seventh and final meeting at the Harold Pratt House on June 22, 1954, at 5:30 p.m. The subject was the problem of theory in the study of international relations. Present were: Robert M. Maclver, chairman; George Lipsky, research secretary; John Blumgart, rapporteur; William Diebold Jr.; Hajo Holborn; Charles Lichenstein; Charles B. Marshall; Grant McClellan; Gerhart Niemeyer; Henry L. Roberts; Robert Strausz-Hupé; Kenneth W. Thompson; Paul Zinner.

Working Paper No. 7

Prepared by George A. Lipsky

This essay in working paper form (with modifications, it will form an initial portion of the volume that I am preparing) presents a conception of theory with which, no doubt, many will disagree. It is offered as a point of departure for the group's discussions. The contentions of this essay must be tentative because I admit the impossibility of absolutely rejecting other philosophical premises. But I nevertheless engage to discuss theory in as rigorous a fashion as my capacities and the scope of a short essay permit, aware that some will question the relevance of the study of international relations and others the soundness of taking such a definite position because of the danger of stimulating some readers to strong negative reactions. With regard to the former contention, I can only hope that the essay that follows will provide an answer. As to the latter, some good will come from stimulating some to think about

theory. It would have been a forlorn hope to begin by assuming that a theory could have been devised upon which all could come to agreement.

Introduction

A basic concern with theory in international relations may have a variety of sources. Too many scholars and pundits in the field were until recently eternally concerned with hod carrying, descriptive tasks behind which lay conscious, or unconscious, theoretical assumptions, poorly articulated and little above the level of primitive commonsense conjectures, that certain institutions and processes were good and others bad. They gave themselves little inspiration and guidance for deeper speculation and constant refinement of view through a mature recognition of the nature and function of theory and the relevance of philosophical speculation. The differential between their method and that of the intelligent layman could largely be measured in terms of the additional time the scholar might devote to hod carrying the facts, as if the latter were self-evident and capable of organization into constructs, themselves self-evident and not requiring verification.

In reaction against the above attitude frequently accompanied by wishful thinking, often misreading the deeper import of such men as Woodrow Wilson—whose taxonomy, although not adequate, was more sophisticated than they knew—other schools became important, especially those emphasizing the central significance of power. The emphasis on power is often an accompaniment of a deep disillusionment with the failure of the promise of the first decade of this century, and above all the devices of the 1920s, to achieve fulfillment in greater political stability and a more lasting peace. The disillusionment was felt by those whose optimism had been rudely disturbed by the turn of deteriorating events. It was natural for them, if they did not accuse the events and those ostensibly fashioning them of being out of step with principles of truth, to decide that there must be a deeper reality that must be viewed coldly and objectively, without flinching and with a grim determination to achieve survival under the best terms possible. This impulse was almost certainly associated with a sense of catharsis, a feeling that at long last the needless and extra baggage of confused utopian aspiration had been cast aside and survival pursued within the context of a theory of limits and possibilities. A kind of exhilaration and exaltation can accompany the feeling of viewing life and man's problems as they supposedly are and perhaps finding the best results in a security foreseen perhaps only a few months ahead. A sense of working

with the tools at hand gives an impression of superiority over those who seem to be pursuing will o' the wisps of political and public reform for which men are not psychologically ready and lack the means of achieving.

The theoretician-idol of the power theorists, whether admitted or not, must be Machiavelli. The statesman-idol will almost certainly be Bismarck. The two worked within a scheme of moral and practical limits and, above all, they worked with a fine sense of the tools and devices at hand, a deep conception of what the human psyche makes possible and denies. They suggested the existence of a power calculus by means of which a particular situation might be judged, out of which means might be selected for the achievement of goals, at once possible yet requiring a basic change in their older dispensation. The power theorist is not always, is perhaps not even generally, the conservative, unless the desire to maintain the best of old institutions must be judged inherently conservative. Very often associated with this desire is a drive to create a new order, a new matrix within which much of an older order may carry forward.

The theoretician may be distinguished from the practitioner of power for some purposes. They should not be distinguished for all, or even main, purposes. The knowledge they work with is or should be basically the same: this is knowledge to be understood in terms of scientific systematics. As much as I find to admire in the theory of theories of David Easton, I cannot agree that he is asserting a significant distinction between the scientific knowledge of the political or social theorist and the so-called prudential knowledge of the statesman.¹ I have no way of discovering what prudential knowledge is, nor has any theorist ever presented me with any test for separating qualitatively the kind of knowledge that the scientist gathers and the kind that the statesman should act by. If the scientist's knowledge does not suggest sufficiently the nature of the world within which the statesman acts, that knowledge is simply incomplete or it has not sufficiently strengthened any one hypothesis through a process of verification so as to make it commanding. A main distinction between theoretician and statesman is that the former does not have to make decisions as to the means that are to be employed to achieve particular value goals or situations and the latter *does* have that most difficult task.

Having that task, the statesman must think of consequences without being deterred from his duty by fear of them. Moreover, he does not operate within the calm and quiet of what passes for the social scientist's laboratory. Often he is submerged under an avalanche of data for which there is no time to provide adequate classification. A decision is demanded by the here-and-now; if he chooses well and achieves a fair measure of the goals that the processes of

society vaguely or precisely define, he is called prudent and wise. The process of reaction that produces the results called decision making seems so unique that men call its source prudence, prudential knowledge, intuition, or wisdom. The adequate statesman surely must be psychologically adjusted to situations which the average theoretician would find intolerable, or to situations that will not tolerate the theoretician. He must keep his eye open upon the immediacy of things and drive through to some sort of decision—whether absolute or temporizing—without being deflected or immobilized by all the qualifications that experience or experiment make reasonable or relevant. He usually cannot run the risk of constant experimentation; he must be quick to read the experiment that exists in the historical experience itself. The theoretician would be, if not confounded, at least confused by the haphazardness of the experiment that must be found implicit in the unclassified life experience.² A simple analogy, not too exact but suggestive, may be the contrast between the competence of the professional military drill instructor and the incompetence of the intellectual-turned-soldier on the parade ground. The former may navigate a platoon through the most intricate patterns of coordinated maneuvers. The latter may have the drill manual thoroughly in mind but his thoughts will be on the possible, or the impossible, situations into which his power of command may bring his unit. It is not only a matter of familiarity; it is a matter of the difference of mental process that differing experience has produced. The essential knowledge is the same. The drill instructor has a “feel for the job”; such expressions have their place, but they should not express more than the fact that his conditioning has produced a capacity to react almost unconsciously to all the demands of a familiar situation.

Having made the assertion that the knowledge used by the theoretician and the statesman is the same, I may now suggest that it appears to me dangerous for either one to assume that he can be a power political realist without giving sufficient attention to the methodological problems that must be encountered and overcome in the process of acquiring the data upon which decisions as to means will be based in the search for posited ends. If he fails in this the theoretician will fall farther short than is necessary of the scientific ideal as to procedure and results. He may arrive fortuitously at some generalizations as to causal relationships, appropriate means, and acceptable ends that appear subsequently to have been sound. Without a clear-cut and adequate regard for the theoretical problem, his success can only be fortuitous even though he enjoys a lifetime of it. The statesman is more concerned with devising action than with publicly producing meaningful and valid generalizations, but his actions will be taken inevitably in conformity, real or ostensible, with a structure

of short- and long-range generalizations. If he succeeds, it will be partly because his causal theory is sound or because his actions accord with what would be an adequate causal theory though they violate the theory he thinks he is following.³ In any event, his actions cannot be taken in the absence of a theory, subarticulate or articulate, simple (perhaps commonsensical), or complex.

Neither the statesman nor the theoretician can willfully run the risk of proceeding without knowing as much of what he is doing as the situation permits. This is not possible without an adequate conception or theoretical frame of reference. As suggested above, some may run the risk successfully, but they must be the exceptions unless we are to conclude that man has not succeeded by knowing but rather through ignorance. The theoretician should not be content with being a better than average amateur in his field. The statesman cannot be content with Sermon-on-the-Mount, *ad hoc*, or haphazard conceptions and methods. Bismarck in editing the Ems telegram was not basically an artist but rather an astute analyst of cause and effect in a situation for which there was historical analogy or the nature of which he could understand through the educational results of his life's experiences. The artist's forte is presenting impressions concerning the nature of reality in language (or another medium) into a large and emotive agency. The generalizations of the artist in words are valid to the extent that they contain, with some precision, hypotheses concerning reality. They are more than that, for they must provide a means of stirring men emotively into a mood responsive to the truth they suggest. The statesman making decisions is primarily employing a calculus of cause and effect and is only secondarily concerned with the emotive effects of words and deeds upon those who must act in terms of his decisions. The emotive effect anticipated should be introduced as far as can humanly be done into the calculus. The situation within which he operates, especially today, may not permit the statesman to perfect and refine his calculus and therefore his scientific progress and method. One of his goals should be so to alter and restrain the course of events as to permit him to employ longer-range scientific and rational judgments about it. The sense in which he is the artist is not in his use of a qualitatively different kind of knowledge but in the fact that he wishes to move men emotively as the artist does. How men are moved emotively is itself a subject of scientific investigation. The theoretician-scholar must desire to move men, or some men, but not to the same degree through the emotions. If he does, the possibility will arise that his poetic or literary flair may cut across his scientific communication. This is why the debate will continue as to whether Santayana was a philosopher or poet and, if the latter, whether that quality has not interfered with his standing or accomplishment

as a philosopher, who, above all, must be a synthesizing scientist. If the law has any effect as a definable entity beyond an instant case, the question arises as to whether the spare prose of a Warren or the poetic prose of a Cardozo is the best vehicle for it.

Both the theoretical and research scholar and the statesman must wish to be informed as far as possible concerning what they are doing. This is a scientific enterprise concerning primarily the giving of proper attention to the methodological and epistemological problems. It is a problem of improving systematics, of refining theoretical awareness. There is tragedy in the fact that the scholar does not take time to make this emphasis and that the statesman may not have time to do so. These facts do not alter the validity of the proposition nor do they permit the assertion that the scholar has another function called descriptive or reformist, or that the statesman can or must rely upon another kind of knowledge.

Philosophical Position

One is tempted to assert that a search should be undertaken to find a final theory of international relations. This could only be achieved in the presence of total knowledge. Man will not achieve this result in the foreseeable future. In fact, in terms of the premises of this paper, there is an unbridgeable hiatus between the kind of knowledge given to men to know and total knowledge or comprehension of essence. A universalist in pattern of thought will assert the identity of thinking and being. Essence in this view is immediately revealed and subject to the classificatory capacities of the mind. Revealed truth and scientifically gathered data reflecting truth do not convey merely the appearances of things to the sense but their inner reality. This reality may be ideal or material, but it is inherently knowable, and as men proceed forward in the quest for truth they approach the condition of total knowledge. Knowledge is knowable, in effect, because it has dimensions, dimensions understandable and meaningful to the mind.

On the other hand, if it is assumed that all things are not inherently knowable, then there can be little or no justification of the contention that one can build a final theory of international relations. This proposition does not at all conflict with giving major emphasis to theory of international relations. The nominalist position or pattern of thought denies the identity of thinking and being. The cognitive process involves ways of thinking about reality that you can only assume exists. The dimensions that are found in reality are dimen-

sions given meaning and relationship by the cognitive subject, but it can only be assumed that the dimensional statements made are the most meaningful statements that can be made about the aspect of reality under consideration. And meaning itself is related to the mind and not to what is observed, for meaning has relation only to human existence and purpose. If these propositions are true, there cannot be a theory of international relations that will be sufficiently operational for all men as to deserve the designation *the* theory of international relations. From the nominalist position there can be *a* theory of theories of international relations, but *the* theory of theories of international relations can only be discovered by those of a universalist or similar pattern of thought, who assume that they can know a revealed essential truth or that they may scientifically gather the data of an essential truth. Their theory of theories is either revealed in terms of an authoritative natural law or is implicit in their philosophical postulates. The nominalist, on the other hand, must at the very least recognize that there are no grounds of authority upon which he may assert the unquestionable validity of his theory of theories. Nor has he evidence to support the assertions of authority made by others of a different persuasion, or made by those who believe their science reveals the essential truth. The very fact that there remains more to be discovered demonstrates that we have not achieved essential truth. It is meaningless to use the term except to suggest the totally elusive confines of areas of future discovery. Even the data we have concerning causal juxtapositions can always be increased as we view events contemporaneously; when events become history the problem of verification is formidable, so much so that presumptions or categorical generalizations are unwarranted.

In this paper, proceeding from this generally stated philosophical position, we may stress the utmost importance to be attached to an inspection of what one is doing in making generalizations concerning international relations. Some analysts will not welcome or accept this proposition, if we may judge by the methodology they employ in their work. It is possible to accept the view that the methodological and theoretical counsels supported are the road to madness, particularly if one is initially too optimistic about what may be accomplished. If that is the case, the future of the social sciences is bleak and the prospect of their making a significant contribution as policy sciences weak indeed. But it would be premature in the light of present knowledge, before the advent of madness, to assume that it is inevitable. Therefore, one should conclude that a maturation of the social sciences will go on just as such a process has characterized the natural and physical sciences. This process will witness the refinement of their method and classification of the role they can

fulfill in advising those in positions of political and social authority how they may select means to their ends.

Theory of Theories

David Easton, cited above, makes a powerful plea for a determined consideration of the problem of theory as the means of developing a scientific awareness of what one is doing in research, advising as to appropriate means, or setting forth social goals.⁴ He begins with a distinction between value theory, which is concerned with statements of political goals or values, and causal theory, which attempts to show (I should prefer “to state”) the relations “among political facts.” Although Easton is at pains to make it clear that the “distinction between these two classes of propositions is logical only,” I believe that the effect of separating them for the sake “of convenience in discourse is apt to be misleading. I should prefer to state at the outset that a theory proposing to explain or describe physical events in terms of causal nexus on a time continuum is of necessity compounded of both value elements and descriptive elements (generalizations related to fact or the ‘is’).” Political philosophy cannot be concerned solely, therefore, with value. If it means the attempt by referring to absolute conditions of goodness, it refers to conditions in an empyrean that cannot be known to man in this world. Its concern becomes metaphysical and non-scientific. Verification becomes impossible; the data of the field are the elaborations of human aspiration. On the other hand, if political philosophy refers to events in history, events presently unfolding, or events desired or promised in the future, it must be descriptive and, therefore, concerned with relations presumed to be causal. But a theory cannot be exclusively descriptive or causal. As long as knowledge is not or cannot be total, the process of refining the knowledge we have or acquiring new knowledge must continue. Interstices of ignorance remain; these are the primary areas within which values may function to shape and influence hypotheses and even to influence the course of verification.

Easton suggests that it is important to refer to a type of theory as causal in order to have a “device for improving the dependability of our knowledge.”⁵ In other words it is important to bring to the level of consciousness the logic “behind the selection and accumulation of facts.” This latter contention is true, but it is questionable whether the purpose is pursued best by establishing an artificial dichotomy between value and fact. Considering all theory as descriptive and yet compounded of value preferences and more obvious statements of

fact, one has presented an even stronger case for refining “the techniques for collecting and collating data” in order to reduce the areas of ignorance. There is a more definite charge, not only to see that a description of a “fact” can never be complete, but also to see that there are always gaps in our present knowledge, or that the scientific process cannot produce knowledge upon which to base easy assurance or dogma. In addition, the risk is reduced that scholars will assume that there is a descriptive function through the performance of which “facts” are produced that speak for themselves. This latter conclusion is important for pedagogy, pure scientific research, or the policy maker. The pedagogue will more candidly recognize the function of values. The scientific researcher will have a sounder theory and subsequent stimulus to clarify methodological problems. The policy maker, without losing decisiveness, can more easily avoid undemocratic dogmatism and those adamant, fanatical postures breeding conflict. The dichotomy between realism and utopianism is transformed into a relationship, as with the definitions of Carr it cannot be, much as he might desire it. This is a necessary concomitant of our conclusion that every generalization can only be theoretical, that is, “a statement of a relationship which is only probably, not certainly and finally, true.”⁶

Easton properly asserts that scientific theoretical formulations “attempt to bring to the surface what common sense leaves permanently concealed.”⁷ In the social sciences, as in the natural sciences, the aim must be a form “in which all propositions are logically or mathematically connected by laws or principles.”⁸ Every scientific theory then is not only empirical and inductive, but it must else aim to enlarge significant and valid generalizations and make them applicable to as large a number of particular cases as possible; that is, the theory must aim to provide deductive points of departure for the judgment and evaluation of particular situations about which decisions must be made. In every theory there must be some opportunity to deduce some significant relationship between the variables in a situation. The caution must be emphasized, however, that the social scientist proceeding from the nominalist position must be careful to keep the scope of his generalizations under control so that he does not prophesy more than can be verified in terms of the relevant particular cases. If he does not do this, he passes beyond the function of the social scientist (or the democratic statesman) and becomes the religious leader, metaphysician, or political fanatic preoccupied with imposing his values upon reality. He will not be so much concerned with hypothetical statements of fact as with conversion. The interstices of his theoretical generalizations have become so enlarged that these areas within which values become predominantly operative allow value to override the impulse to verification. In fact, plausible

statement comes to take the place of verification, for the reason that the generalizations have become so enlarged that they do not submit to verification in terms of the research tools and procedures now at man's disposal. The so-called social scientist of a non-nominalist persuasion who is content with or intent upon such large-scale generalizations must be criticized by the nominalist on this account; from the nominalist premise it is justified to point out the risk he runs of coming to sell nostrums rather than stating facts hypothetically.

Theories (descriptive, or as Easton would have it, causal) may be classified in terms of the number of variables (cases) they are concerned with as embodied in statements of uniformity of relationship or causal connection. The number or complexity of the variables or cases has direct bearing upon their importance for men on the basis of their values. In each case some deduction may be made from the generalization in terms of a sufficient number of instances to permit an anticipation of a similar or identical result whenever variables of a like nature appear. For example, theory may refer rather easily to "two isolated and easily identified variables," to the synthesization of the "data in an unorganized body of scientific generalizations," or to "the conceptual framework within which a whole discipline is cast."⁹ No qualitative difference exists between the various levels of theory; the distinction is as to the number of variables and the line of distinction will be placed in terms of classification of problems or research activity that have been rather fortuitously established in the history of a discipline or the history of the study of a problem.

Theories are not only important in presenting hypotheses proposing explanations of particular segments of reality. They will suggest lines of future investigation by indicating what is left unexplained. Explanation of one part of a situation, a trend, or a discipline is, in effect, a revelation of the variables for which meaningful classifications have not yet been attempted. The same impulse for the improvement of the reliability and the extent of their knowledge must exist in the theoretician-scholar and the statesman if not for the same reasons. Knowledge should not be random and haphazard; only sound theoretical classification can give it understandable order. The order in the social sciences will not be so precise nor will the results be so revealing as in the natural or physical sciences, but they will be an improvement over those that have gone before.

Easton makes a distinction between pure theory and applied theory. Pure theory is concerned with establishing conceptual frames of reference and indicating causal relationships. It is descriptive, then, in the best sense. Applied theory is concerned with determining what are or should be consensus as to social goals and with generalizing concerning the appropriate means of

achieving them.¹⁰ This distinction is superficially useful for it at least refers to actual distinctions of historical research activity. But it is questionable if it implies that applied theory, in generalizing about means, is not basically concerned with generalizations about causal relationships. The search for means is, of course, the search for such relationships. Referring again to the historical sources of this distinction, we may assume that applied theory usually has referred to those areas where social engineering has been deemed feasible and, therefore, where the variables are sufficiently simple and few in number to permit meaningful generalizations that have been or can be subject to verifications. This is probably why so much descriptive and applied theory has seemed to deal with trivia, perhaps involving entire lifetimes devoted to the study of the victualing of the British Army in the thirteenth century. The young scholar, perhaps early filled with grandiose ambitions to be significant on a grand scale, comes face-to-face with the difficulty of theoretical precision and learning and applying new techniques for suggesting or establishing causal relationships. He comes early to terms with his own abilities and, finding a long, self-righteous tradition of what is called scientific, empirical investigation, he does not pass on to the more important or equally important task of improving his deductive generalizations which are the means of getting sights on what remains to be done. Descriptive theory on a larger scale (or causal theory in Easton's terms) must, it seems to me, do the hod carrying of stating goals and demonstrating the validity of means within those areas where experience and techniques show we may anticipate some success. It must also set itself the task of enlarging the area of experiment concerning which generalizations may be proposed or attempted.

Easton, to recapitulate, divides theory into types as follows: value theory; causal theory, which is what political scientists have been working with mainly, a fact forming a basis of criticism and an item of failure. The second type, causal or synthetic theory, is what he says must be emphasized, particularly the second of three levels on which such generalizations as Michels' theory of elites are constructed, as well as the third level on which is constructed the conceptual frame of reference for determining the data relevant to a given discipline.

For the reasons suggested in the foregoing paragraphs I would categorize theory in a different manner. Theory for all fields, but particularly in international relations, may be classified as follows:

- (1) A theory of theories, or a statement of broad classifications into which ways of dealing with or thinking about the phenomena of international politics may be fitted. In effect this whole essay is the presentation of

a theory of theories. More directly, the refinement of the nominalist position herein is the presentation of a theory of theories, basically concerned with the problem of epistemology. Knowledge is hypothetical; values are preferences. Reality is viewed in terms always of hypothesis and accompanying values, which can intrude because of the omnipresence of ignorance. The practical importance of this level of theory for the study of international relations may be illustrated very simply. On the basis of this conception I can reject Morgenthau's and Carr's easy conclusion that there is a realist position, apart from values, that leads to sound conclusions and actions because it supposedly eschews moralistic aspiration and applies a kind of realistic principle of limitations. By suggesting this corrective to Morgenthau and the so-called statesman of *realpolitik*, I can suggest the possible realism of idealism through pointing out the functioning of value preferences in every generalization concerning reality. And I may suggest the partial but inescapably subjective quality of every descriptive generalization and calculus of possibilities. The result is a charge to the self-conscious realist to proceed with caution and humility and, above all, to keep the scope of his generalizations under control so that he does not go dangerously beyond empirical realism into the realm of metaphysics, wherein he allows his science of discovering the "is" to be warped by his determination to embody the subject "ought" in history. There will be less tendency, also, to deny without inspection the remedies proposed by so-called idealists for establishing and maintaining international or intergroup peace and stability.

- (2) A second class of theories is that of the general explanation of what is, what has been, and what will or ought to be. This is the level upon which the theorist of whatever discipline is examining or hypothesizing causal relationships with regard to larger trends or developments in history. Easton emphasizes the importance of establishing a frame of reference for determining the confines of each discipline. It is certainly necessary to maintain disciplines to facilitate the handling of data, but it is equally important to recognize the unity of knowledge. In fact, it would be a mistake to consider the theoretical classifications establishing disciplines to be of the first order of importance. The study of international relations transcends any confining discipline and is an area where data find focus with relation to particular problems that cannot be called exclusively or even basically political. In fact, this paper is meant to suggest that basic philosophical problems are immediately involved in this field.

The major danger to be encountered, at least from the nominalist position, is that in the name of science or some sort of transcendental idealism the theorist on this level will seek meaning and security in gigantic generalizations and abstractions. He will neglect the fact that as a scientist he is pushing the boundaries of knowledge. Of course, his theory of theories may justify generalization suggesting unequivocal truth and stating its unfolding in terms spanning centuries. The point of view supported in this paper is that such a theory of theories is in error and such a descriptive theory is therefore unwarranted, regardless of whether history appears to validate the generalizations. Given the human mind and available techniques, the validation can only be fortuitous. Marx and the Marxists come immediately to mind as the major transgressors in our epoch, and they reveal how in the name of science and presumptuous generalizations monstrous tyrannies are made real and inevitable. Even Easton in calling for an improvement in our techniques on this large level of abstraction comes dangerously close to suggesting that the political scientist and theorists in other fields should anticipate a future in which their generalizations can span and forecast conditions for centuries ahead. No one should charge social scientists with confining themselves to niggardly piecemeal and short-range generalizations. As techniques are improved the resultant generalizations may be enlarged, but it is reasonable to anticipate that the variables will remain too many and too complex to form the basis of assured long-range prophecy. The scientist may state with some, although not complete, assurance the geological condition of the Western hemisphere ten thousand years from now. But the social scientist is dealing with a vastly more complex body of data; the task of prophecy, while *not* of a different order, is equally more difficult.

- (3) At some point the theorist may be able to say that he is working with explicit, detailed explanations of what is, has been, will, and ought to be. This is the level of more conventional, habitual, and facile theoretical investigation. That is not to say that a great deal of painstaking labor is not required for the development of the date out of the ordering of which generalizations on this level proceed. No charge to the theorist can be made that he provide a general test for revealing what level he is working on. Since the distinction between levels (2) and (3) is quantitative rather than qualitative, the decision can be an *ad hoc* one, determined in response to a simple question. Is the theorist dealing with variables which, for the social sciences, may be precisely described

verbally or mathematically? Or, put another way, do current techniques for the evaluation of data permit easy description of the area of concern so that a rather higher order of prediction (a better word than prophesy on this level) is possible? Description is a basic concern here, but this involves a statement of so-called causal relationships or juxtapositions. Every datum may be expected to be a complex of such relationships and, in turn, a part of an infinite complex of relationships isolated in the descriptive process for purposes of evaluation. It is isolated not only contextually but also in time, so that it is inevitable that some sort of prediction will be associated with reference to it. Marx, the scientist, burrowing in the British Museum and viewing the British economic and social order of his time or the time immediately preceding him could do an effective and pioneering job of describing the operation of that order. One must assume with some degree of faith the reliability of the sources one employs. The tests are commonsensical. Do the sources represent the best efforts of men and organizations to provide descriptions of institutions and processes? Can the motives for mishandling statistics and descriptions be assumed to be at a minimum? Do the predictions one finds on the hypotheses suggested by the data ordinarily come to pass and thus provide some sort of verification of the causal relations embodied in the descriptions?

On every one of the three levels of theory suggested above, value may be presumed in some degree to operate. On the level of theory of theories, the universalist is expressing some sort of preference for seeing the universe as an approximate or exact manifestation of the mind's orderings. The protagonist of each philosophy will assert that logic and assured analysis underlie his position. In fact, he may assert that, while preferring to believe or conclude one thing, his analysis and logical processes require a contrary conclusion. In any event, once the major philosophical premise and its eschatological consequences are accepted, the working out of the details of the position will be more influenced by values. The other two levels of theory will more obviously be compounded partly of values or value preferences. This means ultimately that every cognitive act or event cannot be a value-free act or event. The viewing of a chair and its qualities through the senses is an immediate assessment of the chair as to beauty of configuration, design, softness, color, use, etc. The words used as the medium of understanding can only be abstract items of nominal quality, with respect to which the observer will stand in some degree of value assertion or statement. Particularly where an

object is viewed in terms of its possibilities of *use*, and, quite obviously, its aesthetic quality, cognition cannot be value-free. It is even possible to argue that every cognitive act has a value component. But that is not necessary to the argument, for what we are concerned with is the social situation, a description of which cannot be value-free even in the presence of the highest degree of professed detachment.

Reform and Theory

Political scientists are often criticized for their reformist zeal. The implication is often conveyed that it is not the function of the scientist to posit the goals in terms of which it may be said that reform either is or is not accomplished. It may be admitted at the outset that a main function of the scientist is to describe what “is,” that is, smaller or larger situations which are complexes of causal relationships. These situations cannot be viewed apart from values; therefore, they are viewed in terms of a calculus of their place in a process of goal achievement. The situation is also viewed as an end, that is, an event to which a quality of goodness or badness must be attached, and, at the same time, a means or an understandable causal event in the time continuum leading to future events, both ends and means. The act of viewing what “is” and what “is becoming” is not value-free and is part of an inevitable reformist purpose. A theorist may conceivably desire the holocaust or extinction, but, even though he is eccentric, extinction becomes “good” and is, in fact, reform for him. The vast majority of men will not, however, equate reform with extinction, but rather with human survival within the best possible situations as judged by value preferences. They will inevitably and naturally be occupied with the task of discovering, through magic, metaphysics, or science, the best means to achieve those situations of survival, which are at the same time means to future ends. The theorist cannot be excluded from the process of determining the ends or social goals that will be sought. In fact, a major part of the theorist’s function will be determining the nature and variety of social goals, to the definition of which he also makes a contribution as a social being. The physician seeking through experiment to discover the means of achieving a cancer-free world does not have the goal established by other agencies alone. He himself places a personal imprimatur upon the good as one which will conduce to human survival, which, as a scientist—unless he is a rare eccentric—he will ordinarily seek with some degree of his skill and energies. The scientist

and pedagogue who essays the role of evaluator and describer of means, pure and simple, is fooling himself if he believes it. This is tragic enough, but if he is taken seriously the damage he does may be grievous. He may misuse a whole generation of students whose reformist awareness may be crushed under an erroneous and arid scientific pretense.

Both the theorist and the statesman must and will seek to achieve situations deemed compatible with survival in terms of defined values. The emphasis in the role of the theorist, pure and simple, is upon producing ends and means; in the role of statesman, upon applying means to desired ends. The ideal would be a combination of capacity to discover and apply in the same person or persons. An approach to the ideal is the collaboration of the theorist whose expertise includes the capacity to gather sufficient and relevant data and organize them, particularly those relating to the political conditions influencing the statesman's activity, and the statesman with the capacity to recognize necessary expertise when he sees it. This collaboration requires some combination of amateur and professional capacity in both.

The refinements of theoretical capacity called for in the preceding paragraph could become infinite. Not the least requirement is that both theorist and statesman have some insight into the self-fulfilling and self-denying capacities of theory itself. As theory becomes self-conscious it may conduce to the production of ends not foreseen in the theory itself. In other words, the existence of the theory may set in motion so-called causes which are part of altering events, but in directions that either could not be or were not foretold in the theory as description or prophecy. To take into account such potentials, in other words, to improve the theory of theories requires advance mainly in the field of individual and social psychology, although other fields of related investigation will be involved as well. The search will be to discover means of making theory more complete, so that its manipulative effect as well as its immediate descriptive function may be more thoroughly understood and accounted for in the continuing human calculus.

Theory of International Relations

The plea here, in terms of the major premises, is for greater awareness on the part of the natural collaborators, theorist (scientist), and statesman (practitioner of theory), for greater awareness of the nature of the scientific process, for greater awareness of what they are or should be doing. The theorist in international relations considering modern India as a factor in international

politics must be as well-grounded as possible in the human and general ecology and the demography of the subcontinent. The statesman who neglects the identical data in his calculus regarding India would be inadequate; his making the right decisions would be fortuitous. Both the theorist and the statesman should drive to improve the available descriptive (causal) data on the various levels of theoretical investigation involved. They will or should recognize the component of value in the data as they were gathered, as they are evaluated, and as they may be used to describe means or conditions within which means will be employed.

On the level of choice, lying especially before the statesman but also before the theorist, the premises here suggest that there must be a priority of value preferences in terms of achievability. Eschewing the idea of moral absolutes, the nominalist will not be concerned with acting in accord with a consistent and symmetrical structure of moral norms. He will be concerned with acting within the process through which moral goals are given expression. This is a social process. Some moral statements have precision and a long historical pedigree. The real content of the norm is only understood in each and for each case and then only as scientific statement can give each case precision. The theorist and the statesman should avoid therefore the use of such words or expressions as “democratic dynamism,” “democratic purity,” etc., for they are not only philosophically unsound but they are positions around which people may build myths of absolute value, obstructive to policy implementation. Max Lerner several years ago criticized the Truman Doctrine and its application to Greece, since Greece was not a democracy and we were in consequence shoring up an undemocratic regime there. This is the very kind of liberal absolutism that has served the cause of democracy so poorly in modern times. In terms of a sounder epistemology and value theory, Lerner should have asked himself some relevant questions. Was a stupid or inept undemocratic regime in Greece more essential for the survival of the major democracies than a communist regime based on Moscow? Could the Greek regime more easily be made democratic than a communist regime? The danger must be clearly seen that the moral relativism supported here could be used by some as a disguise for a real intention to destroy democracy. But that fact does not mean that democratic theory or values cannot be relativistic. What must be avoided is the loss of all because of a refusal to seek the possible.

The question of more choice is not one that, in our terms, can be answered out of context, in a vacuum. The Greek question could be approached, even from the moral standpoint, only on the basis of a host of other factors. Assuming the major goal to be the safety, security, and survival of the Western polit-

ical and social order as it is and as we may want it to become, we may bring in a great many experts to assist us in establishing the moral and value priorities. They will assist us in deciding those values and situations that are threatened immediately, those that must be sacrificed, those that can be defended. We ourselves have to apply a rude calculus concerning the degree to which we will modify moral principles, that is, apply them relatively, in seeking the safeguarding of the maximum values we assume the situation makes possible. The geographer will have much to say about the importance of Greece from the strategic standpoint, its intrinsic qualities as a base, its defensibility, and so on. Other experts with a differing expertise will have reports on the morale and ethos of the Greek people, the stability of their government, the viability of their economy. The ideal would be the fusing of these expertises into one and the extrapolation therefrom of a general descriptive and manipulative theory related to the whole of one's instant theory of international relations.

This whole approach implies a caution against playing a situation by ear, especially when doing so creates the impression of an unguided policy and the myth of ineptness. The struggle for awareness will pay dividends in creating the appearance if not the reality of efficiency. The spreading knowledge of the existence and function of the National Security Council, whether or not there is a consistent or self-conscious theory underlying its operation, is a boost to the success of American policy. The myth of the Kremlin brooding over and weighing Soviet foreign policy with a high degree of awareness of the whole operation has served that policy well. Opposite peoples and statesmen are frozen into a kind of terror and sense of futility by the impression of glacial inexorability created by the myth concerning its major sources. Such knowledge is deemed akin to the deity which both foresees and creates the future events. And the myth may in the same degree express the reality. Oxenstierna's aphorism concerning the stupidity with which the world is governed may become relevant primarily to the past. At the least we cannot remain content with the processes that have brought us so close to the precipice. John Foster Dulles, Eden, Acheson, Schuman, even Eisenhower and Churchill playing by ear in the formulation of policy under the shadow of the hydrogen bomb is a spectacle that suggests, if it must be continued, that man is little beyond the capacity of his infancy in dealing with the problems of choice in struggling for survival. A sounder theory as well as scientific investigative technique may alter the metaphorical spectacle in some degree and, who knows, see us safely weather the end of the century.

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Digest of Discussion

The chairman opened the meeting and suggested the group first turn its attention to the working paper before it and then proceed to further considerations of international relations theory in general. He asked Mr. Lipsky to summarize the interesting exposition contained in the working paper.

Mr. Lipsky pointed out that, as noted in the first paragraph, the paper was not intended as a theory of international relations. He agreed with David Easton, however, that the data of international relations has to be studied in terms of systematics and the working paper was, therefore, an attempt to suggest a methodology applicable not only to theories of international relations but to all fields within the social sciences. The basic assumptions made in the paper might be summarized as follows:

- (1) The knowledge of the scholar is essentially the same as that of the practitioner. There is no real distinction between the so-called prudential knowledge of the statesman and the scientific knowledge of the scholar. In this respect, Mr. Lipsky could not agree with Easton who made such a distinction.
- (2) A theory of theories should comprehend all that is important to say about a philosophical system. There, epistemology is important and the theorist must direct his attention to it.
- (3) A theory should say something meaningful about policy. He used Lerner's criticism of the Truman Doctrine as an example. Lerner's absolutist moral position drove him to denounce the doctrine because Greece was not a simple democracy. The nominalist, on the other hand, seeks to establish a hierarchy of values with regard to a given situation and chooses those he wishes to defend at all costs and those he is willing to sacrifice, if need be. The selection process is partly the result of the environmental conditioning of the individual in question.
- (4) Finally, it is appropriate to mention the distinction made between the artist and the statesman. The artist is primarily concerned with the emotive factor on the basis of some hypothesis concerning reality. To that extent, the artist tends to be non-scientific and runs a genuine danger of imprecision in expressing reality. But, however, the artist's function is the same as that of the statesman in that both wish to move men emotively.

Professor Holborn wondered whether Mr. Lipsky's proposition is to be taken as the basis for a theory of "social action," applicable to all the social sciences, rather than simply the basis for a theory of international relations. Mr.

Lipsky confirmed this and went on to say that a burden of the paper was that such a distinction should not be made. That is, there are no peculiar types of data in the international relations field which necessitate a theory of theories especially for that field. There might be peculiar problems in the international relations field but the epistemological basis for a theory of international relations should be applicable to political science, sociology, and so forth. Mr. Niemeyer said he took exception to Mr. Lipsky on that point but would defer comment until later in the discussion.

Some Definitions of Terms

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered whether Mr. Lipsky used the term “nominalist” in the sense of Thomist philosophy. Mr. Lipsky confirmed this. It refers to a refusal to identify thinking and being and implies a rejection of Platonic philosophy. The professor and Mr. Lipsky agreed that “operational philosophy” might convey the same meaning. Professor Holborn felt such terminology to be somewhat obscure and archaic.

The chairman wondered whether the substance of the working paper offered a criterion for distinguishing between types of theory in international relations. Would a so-called “nominalist school” agree on a common way of approaching international relations, or in identifying a theorist like Morgenthau as a non-nominalist? Mr. Lipsky thought it impossible, in any case, to classify Morgenthau as a nominalist. Morgenthau postulates a realism which anybody can identify yet which actually obscures a definite system of values.

Professor Strausz-Hupé thought it dangerous to attempt to classify theorists into various schools. Just as philosophers of Thomist days wrangled over who was a nominalist and who was a realist, so such an attempt now might become a mere “dialectical exercise.”

Mr. Lipsky said he assumed that a war is raging involving conflicting patterns of thought. In large measure, those who identify thinking with being represent the apologists of authoritarian systems while nominalist theorists, by and large, assert concepts which tend to support democracy. Mr. Zinner wondered how Mr. Lipsky knew this dichotomy to be correct. Mr. Lipsky asserted that, as a political scientist, he had observed, analyzed, and classified a substantial number of theories and had verified that authoritarian theoreticians assert values as a large, if not decisive, area of reality and strive to impose these values on the external world. Nominalist theoreticians recognize the role of value primarily as an expression of ignorance.

Professor Holborn remarked that Mr. Lipsky’s nominalist position has nev-

ertheless led him to assert a universalist position. The working paper asserts, for example, that all statesmen should act in a prescribed manner and in conformity with a prescribed theory.

Mr. Lipsky thought that the working paper had attempted to differentiate between the moral absolutism of a person like Lerner and the relativist position argued therein. The relativist assigns priorities of value in a given foreign policy situation and decides which should not be protected and which may have to be sacrificed.

Mr. Lichenstein observed that a decision to go to the aid of Greece could just as well grow out of a universalist theoretical position—that is “absolute containment”—or it might be the result of a variety of “theoretical postures.” Conversely, the fact that Lerner and the communists both opposed the Truman Doctrine does not necessarily mean that their epistemological positions are identical. He doubted, therefore, the relevance of such questions to the group’s enterprise.

Mr. Lipsky said that the working paper strove to establish a theoretical framework for decision making conducive to survival over the long haul of history. By survival he wished to make clear that he meant not mere physical survival but survival in terms of moral values, thus implying the preservation of certain conditions necessary for the functioning of such values.

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered whether the group could not more readily “back into the future” rather than attempt to argue the validity of goals beforehand. The absolutist projects absolute values into the future while the positivist does not. But the group is concerned, first, with identifying the causes of international phenomena; second, with finding uniformity and laws in these phenomena; and third, with being able to manipulate developments on the basis of such knowledge. Theory develops through observation and experimentation whereas if too much attention is placed on goals one runs the risk of confusing the results of theory with its beginnings. Professor Strausz-Hupé thought it quite possible to assume a theory which contains no moral goals whatsoever but which offers the policy maker practical guidance for dealing with future situations.

Mr. Lipsky doubted whether it is possible to provide a formula which would give a statesman any certainty that he could succeed through time. One of the requirements of better decision making is the need for statesmen to give greater time and thought to the more basic theoretical considerations of a given policy situation. Professor Holborn noted that statesmen, especially in the present day, have very little time to do this. Mr. Lipsky felt that this was a tragedy of the current situation. Professor Holborn observed that Mr. Lipsky

had made a moral judgment but that the difficulty itself was not remedied by the theory presented in the working paper. Mr. Lipsky noted that the working paper expressed concern about the need to slow down the tempo of diplomacy so that statesmen would have time to consider the knowledge which must be considered before decisions are reached and to examine fully the experiment inherent in a developing policy situation. The chairman agreed but wondered whether it did not amount to the commonsense observation that the more time men have to weigh a given situation the more apt they are to come to a better-considered decision. He questioned the need to refer to a fundamental philosophical position in order to reach that conclusion.

Referring to Lerner's opposition to the Truman Doctrine on the ground that Greece was an imperfect democracy, the chairman agreed that the US should nevertheless have gone to the aid of Greece on the basis of other overriding considerations. However, he questioned the need to refer back to nominalism in order to reach that conclusion. It is simply a matter of judging the consequences of failure to aid Greece. Many of the problems raised in the working paper appear to be of that nature.

Mr. Lipsky thought that all decisions must be related to a fundamental body of knowledge. Professor Holborn thought it unnecessary for the builder of the George Washington Bridge to know Einstein's theory of relativity or to be conversant in advanced theoretical physics. Similarly, he doubted whether an understanding of epistemology is as necessary a tool for the practitioner of international relations as it is for the interpreter of international relations.

Mr. Lipsky inquired as to the criteria a scholar would refer to if asked by a statesman to evaluate a given foreign policy situation. The scholar would have to refer to many of the finer points of philosophy discussed in the working paper.

Professor Holborn thought the working paper needed to distinguish more clearly between theory and action. Furthermore, a continuity in the social process must be shown. That is, the theorist who advises the statesman should be able to identify certain regularities or trends in the historical development which are apt to project themselves into the future. These postulates would have to be proved. In other words, he would need a theory of social change, such as a theory of progress. The theorist needs to be able to analyze how novel elements enter the process of history and past trends tend to influence that process. Therefore, continued Professor Holborn, the statesman has little use for an Olympian epistemology, though Professor Holborn, on the whole, agreed with the position taken in the working paper. The statesman needs a theory for action and not a theory for interpretation and that problem is not

sufficiently discussed in the working paper. It is not simply a question of observing and analyzing facts but the moral content of the social process as well. Therefore, values should not be mentioned as though they were disturbing elements to pure analysis.

The Relation of Fact and Value

Professor Strausz-Hupé suggested the following example for distinguishing fact and value in policy formation. Assume that an academician, hired by the government of Costa Rica as an advisor to the foreign minister, is called upon to draw up a resumé of the Far Eastern situation for the purpose of preparing Costa Rica's position at a forthcoming meeting of the Economic and Social Council. The advisor analyzes the situation and observes the existence of certain trends and forces by deductive processes. Up to that point, the advisor is little concerned with value. But when the foreign minister asks "what should I do about it?" then the advisor's values come into play.

Mr. Marshall agreed. In the first instance the advisor is performing the intelligence function of briefing the foreign ministers. The advisor would probably have ten minutes in which to give the busy minister a précis of an enormously complex situation and he would have to select his facts on the basis of relevancy and importance. The advisor might also suggest what Costa Rican policy should be in the light of the data. But if the foreign minister replies, "no, the US wants me to vote this way and I shall," that is where value enters policy.

Mr. Lipsky doubted whether the function of description could be performed free of value since it involves selectivity. Professor Holborn thought that a simple but important fact, such as the high birth rate in India, could be reported without concerning oneself with values.

Mr. Niemeyer observed that the fact had meaning only in terms of value. Thus, a high birth rate is "good" in relation to France and "bad" in relation to India. While it might be useful for purposes of discussion to distinguish between values and cause-effect relationships, these are really not separable. Cause-effect is inextricably linked with value, and value gives meaning and selectivity to sheer observation. On the other hand, he disagreed with Mr. Lipsky's position that values are attributable primarily to individual "prejudice" or "ignorance."

Continuing, Mr. Niemeyer thought that in approaching a theory of international relations, it might be more fruitful to start with general political

theory and then proceed to international relations theory. Since Plato, the theory of government has been concerned with societies characterized by a sharing and a common adherence to a nexus of values, under the “umbrella” of a common government. This is a fundamental characteristic of political phenomena as related to the state.

International relations, on the other hand, has a peculiar quality denied in the working paper. International relations differs from government in the sense that government refers to common institutions as repositories for common agreement on values while the working out of the international political process involves the working out of differing systems of agreed values. Hence, international relations theory is the science of pluralism. Each state seeks ways of relating and pursuing its values vis-à-vis the others. Policy decisions are made in terms of the extent to which the “good life” is furthered or hindered from the standpoint of the nation concerned and in terms of how that decision would reverberate through the international scene. In the last analysis the two aspects are only synthetically separable.

Mr. Lipsky ventured that Mr. Niemeyer overestimated the strength of consensus in the nation-state.

The chairman thought that Mr. Niemeyer’s remarks had potentialities for developing a theory of international relations. He thought it useful to explore the applicability of political theory to international relations theory. Within the state, there exists a unity of jurisdiction and a basic nexus of common values. At the international level there no longer exists the same area and range of shared values nor is commitment to those values shared with the same intensity.

Mr. Marshall observed that both levels are characterized by coercion and consent but that, in international relations, one deals with a multiplicity of jurisdictions, of cultures, and of areas and shared values. Mr. Niemeyer agreed and felt that this makes for an entirely different problem for which a different type of theory must be devised.

Is Value-Free Theory Possible?

Professor Strausz-Hupé asked the chairman whether it is not the essence of theory that it be free of teleological or value-directed content. The chairman disagreed and pointed out that most theorists tend to identify teleology with causality. Mr. Niemeyer thought it possible to develop a value-bound theory which is in itself free of value—that is, perfectly systematic and scientific.

Mr. McClellan thought that was what Mr. Lipsky had been driving at in his working paper.

In response to Mr. Lipsky's assertion that even the descriptive function cannot be entirely divested of value, Mr. Diebold wondered whether Mr. Lipsky was not confusing relevance with value. Mr. Marshall agreed; the consultant to the Costa Rican foreign minister has to select from countless data, those facts and trends which are of importance to Costa Rica. He doubted whether establishing orders of relevance is synonymous with injecting personal values into the reporting function.

Mr. Lipsky thought that the best way of reducing the function of value is to increase man's knowledge of cause-effect relationships. Mr. Lichenstein noted that many analysts warn the reader of personal biases contained in their works. This is a practical method of reducing the value element, as it impinges on scientific analysis.

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered whether Mr. Lipsky held, as a logical example of his position, that a Roman Catholic would be unable to make a value-free analysis of demographic trends in India. Mr. Lipsky said this was so. The chairman thought description could and should be value-free, but this is not to say that selectivity does not enter the descriptive process. Mr. Marshall agreed. It is not the describer's values but the nature of the problem being described which guides the selection of data. Mr. Niemeyer observed that values preferences often enter the very selection of the problems the describer chooses to describe.

Professor Holborn noted that Hitler had once asked his intelligence advisors about US capacity to bring military power to bear upon Europe if it entered the war. When he was advised of American potential in that sense, the dictator flew into a rage, denouncing the officials as traitors and defeatists. This, remarked Professor Holborn, is a good if crude example of fact vs. value; Hitler paid for those value preferences. The chairman agreed. *Mein Kampf*, for example, contains gross misstatements and errors of facts due to the value preferences of its author.

Professor Holborn observed that at a certain level of analysis one has to deal with "stubborn facts." On the other hand, ideological forces have exerted a tremendous influence on the historical process by their very influence upon the minds and actions of men. For example, the war aims of the Second German Empire were by their nature unable to attract allies to the cause of the Central Powers because they offered nothing to the non-Germanic nations and contained no concept of a postwar international order. The result had a realistic impact on history. The same could be said today about the inadequacy

of democratic ideology for enlisting the loyalty and enthusiasm of the colonial peoples.

Mr. Zinner wondered whether Mr. Lipsky conceived of values as having the same value or whether values arrange themselves in a hierarchical order. He was inclined to the latter interpretation and felt that the hierarchy of values which come into play would differ as between differing situations; moreover, it is often necessary to choose between competing values.

On the other hand, Mr. Zinner continued, Mr. Lipsky held that values are the product of individual conditioning. Mr. Zinner asserted that either this concept was not true or, if true, would lead to complete anarchy in attempting to theorize about international relations. Mr. Lipsky also held, Mr. Zinner noted, the concept of overwhelming insight on the basis of shared values; this is contradictory to the previous concept.

Mr. Marshall, reverting to the example of the advisor to the Costa Rican foreign minister, felt that when the advisor was called upon to brief the minister on the Far Eastern situation, his function would not be affected by value but by relevance; when the advisor is asked to make suggestions as to policy, only then would his function be affected by value preferences. Mr. Lipsky thought that even the first function was not merely the relating of "stubborn facts" but of data organized in terms of a personal value system.

Mr. Lichenstein disagreed with Mr. Lipsky's denial of a distinction between prudential and scientific knowledge. Mr. Marshall's illustration had, he felt, indicated the difference. Prudential knowledge is related to the selection of goals—that is, policy making—where the operation of value preferences is at a maximum.

Mr. Roberts wondered where judgment entered the epistemological picture. It seems somewhat oversimplified to assert that knowledge is simply the relating of causal relationships to value goals. Somewhere one has to take into account some important facts as a sense of timing, the ability to maneuver adroitly, the "something" which distinguishes the good poker player from the poor one. The two facets previously discussed do not, by themselves, constitute all the necessary requisites for statesmanship. The chairman agreed. It is a kind of skill which allows one to relate the facts in a meaningful way. Mr. Marshall thought that the element of judgment entered both the descriptive and the policy-advising functions of his previous illustration, but in different degrees.

Professor Holborn thought that his reference to "stubborn facts," which must be taken into consideration regardless of value preferences, could be illustrated by two examples from German history, namely, the severe losses

suffered by the German population around 1350 and again around 1650 as a result of the Black Death and the Thirty Years War. Those were basic developments which no historian can neglect. The first altered the whole weight of town-country relationships in Germany in favor of the towns; new trade routes developed while the nobility lost part of their previous power and authority. The second loss tended to strengthen the countryside at the expense of the towns and saw the ascendance of the nobility and Junkers, this process being facilitated by the Great Elector's policy of benefiting the Junker class. Historians might differ on the importance of those facts but such difference could be discussed in terms of the facts themselves.

Mr. Lipsky ventured that the descriptive function might have a different significance for history than it does for the other social sciences. Professor Holborn thought his observations equally applicable to international relations where a body of facts also exists, having nothing to do with value preferences. The chairman thought, on the other hand, that the selection and arrangement of facts in orders of importance is a value operation. Mr. Marshall reiterated his belief that the selection of data is an operation based on relevance to the problem at hand; one selects the facts as they relate to the problem one is faced with, not in terms of how one wishes the problem to be solved. Mr. Niemeyer thought that some of these difference in opinion were largely semantic in nature.

Upon reconvening, the chairman expressed the opinion that a partial consensus had been reached on the basis for a theory of international relations: the combining and relating of causal interpretation to some kind of value system. The nature of that value system was still in dispute. It is recognized that the field deals with states as entities. Value operates in terms of state policy goals as well as in conflicts between states. International relations theory deals with the phenomenon of international relations and their relation to governmental goals or values.

Mr. Lipsky, with reference to Professor Holborn's previous remarks, felt that while facts can certainly not be denied, they are not important per se. They become important by virtue of their being organized by a theory which accords them importance and, hence, in order of value. The moment one introduces causality, one introduces the role of value.

The chairman questioned the necessity for making this assertion in terms of elaborating a theory of international relations. Moreover, the theory of physics shows causal relationships which are free of value. Mr. Lipsky doubted whether natural science theory is relevant to the problems of social science

theory because the areas of ignorance are so much broader in the social sciences. The chairman expressed skepticism on that point. The difference, he thought, is more a matter of difference in the nature of the data under consideration. Phenomena in the social sciences are concerned with human beings, their plans, and the results of their plans.

Mr. Lipsky thought that a problem of the social scientist was his ability to detach himself from the field he was observing. To the extent that the social scientist can extract his personal prejudices from his observation, he is approaching the position of the natural scientist. Mr. Lichenstein felt an acceptable alternative method was for the social scientist to indicate his personal preferences to his audience and allow the audience to do the extracting. Gunnar Myrdal in *The American Dilemma*, for example, warned the reader about his prejudices with regard to the Negro problem in the United States and asked him to discount, therefore, for bias.

Special Difficulties in Social Science Theory

Mr. Marshall noted that the way people may revoke their will in the face of facts is itself a datum which the social scientist has to take into account. One might liken the problem to that of the football coach who is training his team in tackling. No amount of practice in tackling stationary dummies will enable the players to learn the technique of tackling an opponent since the opponent, unlike the dummy, will adjust and redress in the face of the approaching tackler. Part of the data of the social sciences is the way people redress in the face of other data.

The chairman agreed and thought the analogy illustrated the point neatly. But the human element influenced all the sciences, even the natural. For example, a full generation went by before physicians adopted the practice of washing their hands before delivering babies, despite the fact that the relationship between natal mortality and lack of hygiene had become common knowledge among midwives.

Mr. Lipsky wondered whether the difference between the problem of the natural and the social scientist is one of degree or of a qualitative nature. The chairman thought this would introduce a problem doubtful relevance to the group's purposes. Mr. Lipsky expressed the opinion that that problem was relevant for determining whether the social scientist could employ identical or merely similar methods to those of the natural scientist. The chairman

thought this was an ultimate problem which might best be deferred until the group had dispensed with the more immediate problems arising in international relations theory.

Mr. Thompson held that the most common points at which that particular issue is joined is with reference to the dogmatists in both camps. One school asserts that the transfer of methods is simple and unimpeded while the opposite school firmly denies that such a transfer is remotely possible because man is both the observer and the phenomena observed. The first school leans to a radical systematization of fact and value while the latter school merges the two facets so absolutistically as to be equally unrealistic.

Mr. Lipsky thought that perhaps the social scientist could so refine his methods and extract his personal prejudices from his functions as to be able to approach a common goal of knowledge on the same level as that of the natural scientist. One great peril to achieving this, he felt, is the assertion of a special prudential knowledge, apart from scientific knowledge, expressed as an artistic grasp of “feel” for a situation.

Professor Strausz-Hupé thought that the group had covered that ground previously. Dr. Rabi had already noted the presence of an artistic element in the scientific approach and this was being increasingly acknowledged by science. The important question, Professor Strausz-Hupé thought, is whether the field of observation the social or natural scientist stakes out for himself is small or vast.

Mr. Lipsky said he agreed with Professor Holborn that “stubborn facts” in themselves do not make up a theory or knowledge. One cannot know unless one can relate observed data to questions of right or wrong.

Mr. Zinner observed that one must also be able to verify what is right and what is wrong. Mr. Thompson felt it appropriate to point out that people had been discussing right and wrong since classical times but that is not to say that such questions can be verified by social scientific techniques like public opinion polls. One can, however, undertake some verification in terms of causal consequences and thus reach a primitive or low-grade morality. Sensible men have differed on the finer points for centuries.

Professor Strausz-Hupé said it is obvious, for example, that the international communist movement is morally bad, yet the important question for the group is whether the Politburo acts on the basis of Marxist ideology. Mr. Niemeyer felt that even if that question could be answered with certainty it would constitute only a fragment of the knowledge necessary for dealing with the Soviet Union. Most of the other questions could only be answered with reference to moral factors.

Professor Holborn observed that Hitler had never been able to understand why Britain had not come to terms with Germany after the fall of France. By every measure of world politics Britain had been defeated, yet Churchill was resolved to fight on. Although the possibility existed that the US would come to Britain's aid in time to help, this could not be counted on. The decision was made in terms of faith and ideals.

Mr. Marshall agreed. The decision was beyond what the existing data then supported. Politics is something akin to navigating a ship. Ever since the days of dead reckoning, the science of navigation has been closing in on the area of guesswork as the compass, celestial navigation, and radar became available. Yet no one has been able to devise a substitute for the skipper on the bridge who must be able to make decisions beyond the reach of known data when the situation warrants. Likewise, politics is sometimes a question of moral guesswork.

Professor Holborn said that statesmen at supreme moments in history must act largely on faith. Some elements of shrewd calculation might have entered the British decision to fight on—that is, that Hitler was a fool and that the US might eventually become a fighting ally—but it was largely a decision based on moral fortitude. Mr. Lipsky agreed that on the basis of the knowledge then available, the British had been defeated although he was inclined to place greater stress on the probability of American intervention than was conceded by Professor Holborn.

Mr. Zinner felt that the discussion was moving in ever-converging circles and becoming less and less fruitful in the process. Two questions occurred to him which might be more profitably considered: first, can existing knowledge of the international political process be systematized into a theory of international relations? And second, what is that nature and the boundaries of the field one wished to have knowledge about; what set of phenomena can be delineated as the subject matter about which one desires greater knowledge?

The “Purpose” of Theory

The chairman felt that analysis of why the British acted in a certain manner at a particular juncture had little relevance for a general theory of international relations; it was simply an act of statesmanship at a particular moment of history. He wished to add a third question to those of Mr. Zinner: what is the objective of international relations theory; what purposes would such a theory be designed to serve?

Mr. Niemeyer noted that Plato had speculated about the purposes of the state and had found the answer in the concept of justice. The purpose of a theory of international relations might be defined as the “good life” and the purpose of democratic foreign policy might be defined as a foreign policy which promotes the good life of that nation.

The chairman observed that this raised a fundamental problem. In theorizing about the state one is theorizing about communities bound by certain underlying consensus systems and traditions which can be evoked and which designate the state as an ethical complex. However, when one enters the international relations field with the purpose of putting forward a hypothesis designed to advance thinking about that field, one is dealing with a system of relations among states and not with the foreign policy of a particular state. Each state embodies a more or less unique ethical complex and the first problem for international relations theory seems to be to define what value elements, if any, are common to all states. One must assume, he thought, that one value which international relations serve is the desire of people to be related to other peoples in various ways; on the other hand, each state wishes to preserve a certain degree of autonomy in its relations with the rest. Therefore, the problem seems to be a matter of how one can establish a system in which both these values will be assured.

Mr. Thompson thought this might offer a better start toward a theory of international relations. One first ought to deal with the uniformities of the field before proceeding to the variables. It did not seem fruitful to start with the higher values and aspirations of men—such as justice—for different nations interpret these values in different ways. The quest for security, however, is a more basic and universal value which appears to be a constant motivational guide in international behavior. The question as to why Churchill decided not to make terms in 1940 could be answered by reason of the lack of security which Britain would face in an Axis-dominated Europe.

Professor Strausz-Hupé wondered how such a general principle would guide US policy makers in deciding whether to jettison the EDC and rearm Germany regardless of French wishes or whether to continue supporting EDC. Mr. Thompson said that the major threat to US security comes from the Soviet Union and the US reaction is to create a position of strength in Europe to counter that threat. This implies some arrangement in which Germany can contribute to the common defense. If the EDC arrangement is viable in these terms it should be supported; if not, then other means will have to be found. Professor Strausz-Hupé ventured that a security-oriented theory of interna-

tional relations appears to signify “maximizing what one likes and minimizing what one does not like.”

The chairman thought that the question was not how any one state should act in a given situation but the construction of a world of states in which they could live together and retain certain common minimal values while preserving their own richer national values.

Mr. Thompson felt that if the pursuit of security was the lowest common denominator of international relations, the next basic phenomenon was the merging of national interests in cooperative configurations.

Mr. Niemeyer held that a security-oriented theory of international relations would be inadequate as a guide for some of the most vital problems in foreign affairs. If a man meets a tiger in the jungle, a theory based on the universality of the security drive will not be much assistance as a guide for coping with the situation. Similarly, such a theory would be inadequate for helping U.S. policy makers cope with the aggressive expansionism of Soviet Russia.

Mr. Thompson questioned whether Mr. Niemeyer’s classification of nations into “tigers” and “non-tigers”—and logically, into “bad” and “good” states—would carry things very far in terms of theorizing about international relations. Mr. Niemeyer thought the analogy of the Soviet “tiger” confronting the American “non-tiger” an apt one in terms of the realities of world politics. Mr. Marshall observed that the American “non-tiger” has managed to coexist with the Soviet “tiger” for some thirty-seven years without being gobbled up and they even sit together side by side in the UN.

The chairman thought that a theory of international relations ought to deal with the minimum conditions necessary for nations to live together in the same world; it should postulate the minimum relationships having sufficient support to produce a viable world order.

Mr. Lichenstein discussed problems of approach and content of international relations theory. He felt that theory should not only have abstract epistemological value but should be of concrete assistance to the policy maker. He thought the approach should begin with the foreign policy problems of a particular state, such as the US, and move into the broader field of multinational relationships.

The chairman was of the opinion that international relations theory dealt with the behavior of some sixty-odd nations. Mr. Niemeyer thought that the substance of international relations, however, is the quest for fulfillment of autonomous value systems.

Professor Holborn felt that a security-oriented theory would offer little

content except *raison d'état*. Mr. Thompson said that he was not suggesting security considerations as the only basis for theory but as one of the essential minimal bases. Mr. Niemeyer observed that the expectation of war is not the only context in which nations relate to other nations. This might be true for US-Soviet relations but that is but one phase of the international field. Mr. Thompson observed that US-Soviet relations is a fairly dominant phase of current international relations and affects many other phases, such as East-West trade.

Mr. Zinner thought that two different and opposed concepts were under discussion. The first creates a goal and strives to work out a theory for approximating that goal under some kind of pluralistic arrangement. The second assumes that one is dealing with two political systems and that the likelihood of war between these systems cannot be denied. He thought it would be helpful if the group could decide which of these propositions should be pursued, or attempt to find a neutral ground which would accommodate both.

Mr. Lichenstein wondered whether it was necessary to lay down the value premises of a theory before elaborating the rest of the structure. He felt that, regardless of the premises, some consideration should be given to the steps one has to go through in elaborating a coherent theory—i.e. its methodology.

The chairman agreed that two different kinds of theory were under consideration. He thought it necessary to reach agreement on premises before proceeding with their consequences. Ultimately the correct premise would tend to be verified by historical evidence.

Mr. Lipsky wished to know, before the meeting ended, why the group had objected to his assertion of survival as a goal of international relations theory. Mr. Lichenstein and Mr. Zinner thought that it had been questioned because it had carried a connotation of being the ultimate value—hence survival at any price, even slavery. Mr. Lipsky said this had not been intended; he had always thought of survival in a value context.

The chairman, on behalf of the group, thanked the Council on Foreign Relations for having made this study possible. Regardless of the value the group's work might have for Mr. Lipsky, for individual members, and for the Council, it had certainly been a most enjoyable experience.

Mr. Diebold, on behalf of the Council, expressed his cordial appreciation to the group for its work and particularly to the chairman for his very capable efforts.

John D. Blumgart
Rapporteur

Notes to Working Paper No. 7

1. *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science* (New York: Knopf, 1953), 87.

2. That is the theorist who has an adequate conception of the scientific function. At this point, I am suggesting that logically and scientifically the theorist and statesman should be seen to be working in terms of what must be considered the same kinds of knowledge. Their situations or the demands of the contexts within which they operate are different and provide the differential in conventional responses thereto. Should improved scientific technique be developed, theoretically the situations may be brought to some kind of affinity if not identity. The theorist whose methodological procedures are not sufficiently clarified may reverse this analysis. He will distinguish scientific from prudential knowledge and may develop strong ambitions to become a statesman, since prudence and intuition are not qualities denied to the scholar. Then to crown the structure of his inconsistencies he will, as statesman, take as advice the conclusions he has reached as scholar. If the statesman operates in terms of so-called prudential knowledge, I can see no reason why Morgenthau's *In Defense of the National Interest* should be of any interest to the statesman at all. Since this conclusion is obviously ridiculous, the premise upon which it is based must be questioned, unless we are to assume that the book itself contains prudential rather than scientific knowledge.

3. The term causal theory, used at this point in the essay, is that used by Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science*, 4, 53–4, 77–8 *et passim*. Easton, while generally accepted here, will be qualified in subsequent pages.

4. *Op. cit.*, 52–64, *et passim*.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 55.

7. We may say that some analysts assert that the statesman as artist applies common sense rather than scientific knowledge. If this be true, and if they accept Easton's definition (which seems sound) of common sense, then in effect they contend that the statesman proceeds in terms of much that is concealed at the same time it is a part of the essential situation faced. See *ibid.*, p. 54.

8. Morris R. Cohen, "The Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences," in *The Social Sciences and Their Interrelations*, ed. W. F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser, 451–52 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1927), quoted in Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science*, 54–55.

9. See *ibid.*, 55–57: one might first suspect that Easton's theory on the highest level is a reference to his theory of theorist, but further consideration disallows this conclusion. His book states his theory of theories for which he has, as far as I can see, no explicit reference; his "broad-gauge or systematic theory" is rather the theory in terms of which one may judge the facts that are relevant to a particular discipline. Synthetic theory, plus theory at the highest level, must be employed together in deciding the structure of data for the particular discipline.

10. *Ibid.*, 86–87.

Notes

Introduction

1. de Carvalho, Leira, and Hobson 2011.
2. See the contributions to Schmidt 2012.
3. Guillhot 2011.
4. Solovey and Cravens 2012.
5. The historical literature on the impact of the American state on the social sciences is large and growing rapidly. The following list should not be considered exhaustive. Nonetheless, general accounts include Amadae 2003; Cohen-Cole 2014; Chomsky et al. 1997; Jewett 2012; Geiger 1993; Robin 2001; Rohde 2013; Solovey 2015; Solovey and Cravens 2012; Isaac 2012. The rise and fall of modernization theory has generated a particularly large amount of work, see Ekbladh 2010; Engerman 2003; Latham 2000, 2011; Gilman 2003. On the impact of the Cold War state on the specific disciplines, see Lockman 2016; Khalil 2016 on Middle East Studies; Stampnitzky 2013 on security studies; Price 2011 on anthropology; Barney 2015 on geography and cartography; Reisch 2005 on the philosophy of science; Oren 2003 on political science; Engerman 2009 on Soviet studies; and McCaughey 1984 on international studies.
6. Solovey 2012, 4.
7. As, for example, when Paul Zinner noted during the fourth meeting that “he was appalled at the ease with which the group had drifted into a discussion of US-Soviet relations.”
8. See, among others, Lepgold and Nincic 2012; Walt 2005. See also <http://bridgingthegapproject.org>, accessed January 13, 2019.
9. Letter from MacIver to Study Group, 6 November 1953. Council on Foreign Relations Archive, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (CFR), box 151, folder 3, 1.
10. Memorandum on Professor Lipsky’s Proposed Study, CFR, box 151, folder 4, 1. A thorough attempt to trace Roberts’ biography before 1953 and his subsequent trajectory unfortunately drew no further information about Roberts.
11. Letter to Professor MacIver from William Diebold, November 5, 1951, CFR, box 151, folder 4, 1.
12. Ibid.
13. Kirk 1947.
14. Memorandum on Professor Lipsky’s Proposed Study, CFR, box 151, folder 4, 1.
15. Ibid.

16. MacIver to Study Group, November 6, 1953, 1. CFR, box 151, folder 3, 1.
17. Ibid.
18. Morgenthau 1952.
19. Ibid.
20. Grose 1996, 11.
21. Ibid., 11.
22. Ibid., 11–12.
23. Ibid., 12.
24. See CFR, box 104, folder 10.
25. *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939–1945* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1946). Available at <https://archive.org/details/CouncilOnForeignRelations1946TheWarAndPeaceStudies>, accessed January 13, 2019. See also Parmar 2004, 110–16.
26. *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations, 1939–1945*, 10–11. On the important role played by the great philanthropic foundations on postwar American foreign policy and social science, see Berman 1983; Hauptmann 2006, 2016; Parmar 2012.
27. Guillhot 2011, 88.
28. Lipsky 1950.
29. George Lipsky, Prospectus for Study Group Meetings in Theory of International Relations, November 5, 1953, 1, CFR, box 151, folder 3, 1.
30. Ibid., 1–2.
31. See Owens 2018.
32. Letter to Professor MacIver from William Diebold, November 5, 1951, CFR, box 151, folder 4, 1.
33. William Diebold to Robert MacIver, November 5, 1953, CFR, box 151, folder 4, 1.
34. Ibid.
35. Discerning the identities of these individuals is problematic. Mr. Cohen could well be Benjamin V., a prominent lawyer in the Roosevelt administration and Council member. The identity of Mr. Bennett is unfortunately lost to history.
36. See <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0016/001631/163143eb.pdf>, accessed January 13, 2019.
37. <http://cw.routledge.com/ref/harlem/tannenbaum.html>, accessed January 13, 2019.
38. <http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hou01777>, accessed January 13, 2019.
39. See the digest of discussion from the First meeting.
40. As Ole Waever notes (2011, 105), there is no index entry for either theory or realism in Morgenthau's *Scientific Man Versus Power Politics*.
41. Gurian 1946, 276–77.
42. Ibid., 276.
43. Dunn 1949.
44. Thompson 1952.
45. Morgenthau 1948.
46. Herz 1951.

47. Thompson 1952, 435, emphasis added.
48. *Ibid.*, 436.
49. See https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=International+Relations+Theory&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2CInternational%20Relations%20Theory%3B%2Cc0, search conducted December 19, 2018.
50. See https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=theory+of+international+relations&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Ctheory%20of%20international%20relations%3B%2Cc0, search conducted December 19, 2018.
51. See https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=IR+theory&year_start=1800&year_end=2000&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2CIR%20theory%3B%2Cc0, search conducted December 19, 2018.
52. Guilhot 2008, 281.
53. See Easton 1953; Gunnell 1993; Ross 1991.
54. Guilhot 2008, 282.
55. Morgenthau 1946, 1948.
56. Niebuhr 1944.
57. Guilhot 2011, 129.
58. Schmidt 1998; Ashworth 2002.
59. See Waltz 1979; Knorr and Rosenau 1969.
60. Guilhot 2008, 282.
61. *Ibid.*
62. The exception being a series of comments by Thompson during the final meeting, where he clearly references a distinction between different types of theory made at the Rockefeller meetings by Walter Lippmann; see the digest of discussion from the Seventh meeting, under the heading “Special Difficulties in Social Science Theory.”
63. Guilhot 2008, 145–47.
64. References to Lipsky’s nominalism are scattered throughout the papers. See especially his preparatory papers for weeks 5 and 7.
65. Pribram is not to be confused with his more famous well-known nephew, Karl H. Pribram, the neuroscientist.
66. Pribram 1949.
67. Lipsky may well have been pointed to the book by CFR study group member Henry Roberts, who reviewed the book for the October 1950 issue of the Council’s in-house journal *Foreign Affairs*.
68. Pribram 1949, 3.
69. Lipsky 1972, 3.
70. See, e.g., Checkel 1998.
71. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
72. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
73. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
74. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
75. Nitze 1989.
76. Rusk 1980.

77. Katznelson 2003.
78. Pribram 1949, 14.
79. *Ibid.*, 162.
80. Lipsky 1972, 22, note 7.
81. *Ibid.*, 3.
82. *Ibid.*, 3.
83. Guilhot 2008, 282.
84. See Brown 2012; Williams 2005; Williams 2007; Rösch 2005; Tjalve 2009; Scheuerman 2009.
85. Lipsky 1972, 4, 6.
86. See Parmar 2017 for an introduction to the large and important literature on elites and American power that can only be nodded toward here.
87. See the record of the Second meeting.
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. Lipsky 1972, 3.
91. *Ibid.*, 16, 6.
92. *Ibid.*, 13.
93. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
94. Levine 2012.
95. Lewontin 1997, 2.
96. Solovey 2012, 1.
97. Oral history with Jacques Reinstein, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, available at <http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Reinstein,%20Jacques%20J.toc.pdf>, accessed January 13, 2019.
98. See especially Jewett 2012.
99. Solovey 2012, 2.
100. Lewontin 1997, 1.
101. *Ibid.*, 5.
102. See the record of the First meeting.
103. *Ibid.*
104. E.g. Lawrence 1919.
105. Heyck 2013, 1.
106. *Ibid.*, 4.
107. See Isaac 2012.
108. Heyck 2013, 24.
109. George Lipsky, Working Paper No. 3—Harold Lasswell, CFR, box 151, folder 3, 1.
110. *Ibid.*, 8.
111. *Ibid.*, 2.
112. Kaplan 1957; Bessner and Guilhot 2015; Guilhot 2011.
113. See the record of the Third meeting.
114. See the record of the Second meeting.
115. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
116. See the record of the Fifth meeting.

117. See the record of the Fifth meeting.
118. See the record of the Fourth meeting.
119. See the record of the Fourth meeting.
120. See the record of the Fourth meeting.
121. See the record of the Fourth meeting.
122. See the record of the Fourth meeting.
123. See Abella 2008; Kaplan 1983.
124. Robin 2003, 55.
125. *Ibid.*, 37.
126. As Robin notes, “There was a touch of poetic justice in the fact that the feverish Lasswell, who spent most of his productive years without a tenured position and many of the other perks of academic prestige, would hover in the background as his friends, disciples, and colleagues from graduate school gained prominence in the military-intellectual complex.” Robin 2003, 56.
127. Robin 2003, 37.
128. *Ibid.*, 55.
129. *Ibid.*, 13.
130. See the record of the Fifth meeting.
131. See the record of the Fifth meeting.
132. Easton 1953.
133. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
134. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
135. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
136. See the record of the Second meeting.
137. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
138. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
139. Rohde 2013, 4.
140. *Ibid.*, 4.
141. *Ibid.*, 63.
142. *Ibid.*, 64.
143. Proctor 1991, x.
144. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
145. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
146. See the record of the Third meeting.
147. See the record of the Third meeting.
148. See the record of the Third meeting.
149. See, e.g., Goldstein and Keohane 1993.
150. See the record of the First meeting.
151. See the record of the First meeting.
152. See the record of the First meeting.
153. See the record of the Fifth meeting.
154. See the record of the Second meeting.
155. See the record of the Second meeting.
156. See the record of the Third meeting.
157. See the record of the Third meeting.

158. E.g. Marshall 1954.
159. See the record of the Sixth meeting.
160. See the record of the Second meeting.
161. See the record of the Seventh meeting.
162. See the record of the Third meeting.
163. Robin 2003, 38.
164. *Ibid.*
165. George Lipsky, Prospectus for Study Group Meetings in Theory of International Relations, November 5, 1953, 1, CFR, box 151, folder 3, 2.
166. *Ibid.*
167. *Ibid.*
168. *Ibid.*
169. See the record of the Third meeting.
170. See the record of the Third meeting.
171. See the record of the Sixth meeting.
172. See the record of the First meeting.
173. See the record of the Second meeting.
174. See the record of the Second meeting.
175. See the record of the Sixth meeting.
176. Schmidt 2013, 79.
177. See also McCaughey 1984, 68.
178. Schmidt 2013, 79.
179. Thompson 1952, 443.
180. See Waltz 1979; Bessner and Guilhot 2015.
181. Hoffmann 1959.
182. Ferguson and Mansbach 2002. See also Little 2009.
183. “George A. Lipsky,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 5, no. 1 (Winter 1972): 85.
184. See Lipsky 1950.
185. See Tinkcom 1951.
186. Lipsky 1953.
187. Morgenthau 2012 [1933].
188. Lipsky 1959.
189. Lipsky and Blanchard 1962.
190. See especially MacIver 1926, 1939, 1948.
191. MacIver 1948.
192. *Ibid.*, 4.
193. *Ibid.*
194. <http://www.asanet.org/about-asa/asa-story/asa-history/past-asa-officers/past-asa-presidents/robert-m-maciver-obituary>, accessed January 13, 2019.
195. Halas 2001.
196. MacIver 1968.
197. See Ware 2005, 219; also “Dorothy Fosdick, 83, Adviser on International Policy, Dies,” *New York Times*, February 10, 1997. At <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/10/us/dorothy-fosdick-83-adviser-on-international-policy-dies.html>, accessed January 13, 2019.

198. Members of which played an outsized role at the Rockefeller Foundation conference; see Parmar 2011, 195–98.
199. Ware 2005, 219.
200. Fosdick 1955.
201. It seems legitimate to assume that MacIver was Fosdick's main advisor at Columbia. Not only does Fosdick (1939) cite MacIver (1939) on four occasions (xiv, 154, 157, 176), she acknowledges his "constant encouragement and his careful and critical supervision of the manuscript at every stage" (1939: x).
202. Fosdick 1939, 1942.
203. Fosdick 1939, 154–80.
204. See Bell 2004.
205. Brock and Lerner 1962.
206. The best available source on Holborn is the special issue of *Central European History* in his memory, vol. 3, no. 1–2 (1970), especially Gilbert 1970 and Gerhard 1970. See also Pflanze 1991.
207. Rösch 2014, 113.
208. Gilbert 1970, 6.
209. Holborn 1951.
210. Krieger and Stern 1967, xiii.
211. Holborn 1949.
212. Holborn 1953.
213. Pflanze 1991, 177.
214. *Ibid.*, 173; see also Winks 1987, 93–95.
215. Gilbert 1970, 6–7.
216. Kaplan 1983.
217. "William Kaufmann, Nuclear Strategist Who Helped Reshape Policy, Dies at 90," *New York Times*, December 21, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/washington/22kaufmann.html?_r=1, accessed January 13, 2019.
218. Kaplan 1983, 19.
219. *Ibid.*, 21.
220. *Ibid.*, 13–14.
221. "William Kaufmann, Nuclear Strategist Who Helped Reshape Policy, Dies at 90," *New York Times*, December 21, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/washington/22kaufmann.html?_r=1, accessed January 13, 2019.
222. An edited collection, Kaufmann's *Military Policy and National Security* featured contributions by Gordon A. Craig, Klaus Knorr, and Frederick Dunn. Kaufmann 1956.
223. Strausz-Hupé 1942.
224. Spykman 1942. See also Crampton and Ó Tuathail 1996.
225. Strausz-Hupé 1941, 1945, 1952.
226. <http://www.fpri.org/contributor/robert-strausz-hupe/>, accessed January 13, 2019. Also Crampton and Ó Tuathail 1996.
227. Strausz-Hupé and Possony 1950. See Vitalis 2015, 152–56, on the racism of Strausz-Hupé's close friend Possony's work.
228. "Kenneth Thompson, former director of the Miller Center, dies," *The Daily Progress*, October 6, 2015, at http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/article_a141f2c4-

7192-11e2-951f-001a4bcf6878.html, accessed January 13, 2019. See also Rajae 2013, 4.

229. Rajae 2013, 5.

230. *Ibid.*, 6.

231. Morgenthau and Thompson 1951.

232. Thompson 1960.

233. Rajae 2013, 43.

234. *Ibid.*

235. Thompson and Nitze 1959.

236. Although see Eisfeld 2014 and Douglas and Szabo 1994. The lack of detailed work on Wolfers may have to do with the fact that he destroyed his personal correspondence on three separate occasions, in 1949, 1957, and 1966. Eisfeld 2014, 127.

237. <http://drs.library.yale.edu/HLTransformer/HLTransServlet?stylename=yul.ead2002.xhtml.xml&pid=mssa:ms.0634&clear-stylesheet-cache=yes>, accessed January 13, 2019.

238. Wolfers 1962, 73–74.

239. *Ibid.*, 74.

240. *Ibid.*

241. Stuart and Szabo 1994.

242. See Winks 1987.

243. *Ibid.*, 41.

244. *Ibid.* See also Bissell 1996.

245. Guilhot 2008, 261.

246. See http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009155?seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents, accessed January 13, 2019.

247. “Dr. Leo Pasnolsky [sic] of UN Fame; Economist, Ex-Aide at State Department, Wrote the UN Charter,” *New York Times*, May 7, 1953, at <http://www.nytimes.com/1953/05/07/archives/dr-leo-pasnolsky-of-u-n-fai-ie-economist-exaide-at-state-department.html>, accessed January 13, 2019.

248. Fingerhut 2002, 32.

249. See Niemeyer 1971, 1996.

250. Niemeyer 1952.

251. The edited volume in which Niemeyer’s chapter appeared was a product of the “Princeton Group for the Study of Postwar International Problems,” which included IR scholars Harold Sprout and Winfield Riefler, the pioneer of security studies Edward Mead Earle, historian Gordon A. Craig, and one George Gallup of the American Institute for Public Opinion; see Whitton 1944, 226–28. Niemeyer 1944.

252. *Ibid.*, 33.

253. *Ibid.*, 34–35.

254. *Ibid.*, 44.

255. *Ibid.*, 48.

256. Niemeyer 2001 [1941].

257. Henry 2001 [1941], xiii.

258. Lewis 2002, 118–19.

259. Niemeyer 2001 [1941], 9.

260. McClellan's basic biographical information has proven impossible to find.
261. Stebbins and McClellan 1955.
262. McClellan 1959, 1964, 1970.
263. See www.fpa.org/about, accessed January 13, 2019.
264. "Charles M. Lichenstein, 75, American Envoy at the U.N.," *New York Times*, August 31, 2002, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/31/world/charles-m-lichenstein-75-american-envoy-at-the-un.html?_r=1, accessed January 13, 2019.
265. <http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/22/world/president-backs-idea-that-un-can-leave-us.html>, accessed January 13, 2019.
266. See <http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Blumgart-John.pdf>, accessed January 13, 2019.
267. Kirk 1947.
268. "William Diebold to Robert MacIver," November 5, 1953, CFR, box 151, folder 4.
269. "The European Union Was Always a CIA Project: As Brexiteers Discover," *The Telegraph*, April 27, 2016, at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/04/27/the-european-union-always-was-a-cia-project-as-brexiteers-discover/>, accessed January 13, 2019.
270. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-J-Donovan>, accessed May 17, 2017.
271. http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/07/nyregion/george-s-franklin-jr-82-foreign-policy-expert.html?_r=0, accessed January 13, 2019.
272. E.g. Zinner 1962. See <http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/sfgate/obituary.aspx?pid=156896343>, accessed January 13, 2019.

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