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Introduction: Language-in-Use and Literary Fieldwork

LITERARY CRITICS AND THEORISTS OFTEN shy away from talking about writers and readers as people who put language to use. Instrumentalized reason, positivism, and other watchwords warn against turning a literary artifact into mere data or information, or making it part of an exchange of language that is not exclusively aesthetic in nature. At the same time, when critics seek praxis in literature, speak about the performative attributes of a text, or discuss how to do things with words, they usually treat whatever text they are considering as a stable object. The contributors to this special issue of Representations are all interested in language-in-use as it applies to different kinds of linguistic artifacts and to text understood as the dynamic product of an interactive process. We take it that even the most literary of artifacts can be considered from this point of view. It is possible, for instance, through a kind of “literary fieldwork,” to discover the kinds of dynamic, social, indexical, and context-based negotiations of literary and cultural value that will be at stake in the essays making up this volume. Such negotiations are inevitably present in and around literary artifacts because those artifacts are made of language, and because in using them more language is frequently produced. Even in the midst of an argument for literary autonomy by someone taken to be a key spokesperson for the idea (Gustave Flaubert) we can locate the dynamic relationality of language-in-use and see how it is relevant to the texts he produced.

ABSTRACT This introduction offers an initial account of the usefulness of an interdisciplinary encounter between the fields of linguistic anthropology and literary/cultural studies and, in doing so, introduces a series of key terms from linguistic anthropology and its way of studying language-in-use as a locus in which culture happens: nonreferential (or social) indexicality, entextualization, and metapragmatics. It establishes a set of common attitudes toward language and cultural production found in work by Bourdieu, Bakhtin, and a number of linguistic anthropologists (Michael Silverstein in particular). It suggests three analytical levels on which such an interdisciplinary encounter might take place: analysis of (1) works that themselves show an interest in language-in-use (for example, novels by writers such as Proust, Eliot, or Dostoevsky); (2) the “interactive text,” of which any given literary artifact could be said to be a precipitate (one construal of Bourdieu’s approach to an author like Flaubert); and (3) the role of the ongoing uptake of given language-based artifacts in maintaining and altering their meanings and values. Representations 137. Winter 2017 © The Regents of the University of California. ISSN 0734-6018, electronic ISSN 1533-855X, pages 1–22. All rights reserved. Direct requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content to the University of California Press at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?p=reprints. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/rep.2017.137.1.1.
In late 1875, six or so months before her death and while he was working on his *Three Tales*, George Sand and Flaubert, in the letters they were exchanging, were having a discussion about the function of literary form. "It seems to me that your school is insufficiently attentive to the substance of things," Sand wrote in mid-December, "and that it remains too much on the surface. Being so caught up with form, it slights substance." Flaubert, writing from Paris, had informed her a few days earlier that while in the capital he tended to see the same group of associates on Sundays—Ivan Turgenev, Émile Zola, Alphonse Daudet, and Edmond de Goncourt—and he had asked her if she had any thoughts about the writing of a couple of people on the list. It was in her response to his query that she offered her opinion about the failings of his "school." In his reply to her letter, he insists that he is doing his best to have no such thing, and he distinguishes himself from his associates by saying that they "strive for all that I scorn, and are only concerned in a mediocre way by the things that torment me." He elaborates:

I consider technical details, local pieces of information, really the whole historical and exact side of things as quite secondary. Above all I seek Beauty and my companions have only a mediocre concern with that. I find them unmoved when I am ravished with admiration or with horror. I swoon in the face of phrases that seem to them entirely ordinary. Goncourt, for example, is delighted when he overhears in the street a word used that he can then stick in a book. Whereas I am most pleased when I have written a page without assonances or repetitions. (*Correspondance*, 513–14)

No empirical fact finding, no linguistic fieldwork for Flaubert, it would seem. He and his colleagues cannot form a school because their writing practices are too divergent and are based on different structures of taste.

This passage from Flaubert’s letter to Sand caught the eye of Pierre Bourdieu, who cites it in *The Rules of Art* in a discussion of the kinds of formal work that manage somehow to bring social reality into a work of art, to register some aspect of the social world. Part of what Bourdieu sees Flaubert doing in this passage from his letter to Sand is making a claim for the ways both his aesthetic agenda and his artistic practice are distinct from those of his contemporaries with and against whom he constructs his own aesthetic point of view, his own writerly practice.

Language, we could say, provides the occasion for its users to be distinctive when they use it, in many ways and across different scales, and in both oral and written forms. To varying degrees, Bourdieu suggests, some of us might “sense the meaning that the possible which the writer is in the midst of realizing may acquire from its being put into a relationship with other possibles.” Or, as he would put it in one of his last seminars on Édouard Manet, in March 2000, “To understand someone who makes something, it is
necessary to understand that they aren’t making something else. It’s as simple as that. It is a lesson that comes from structuralism: a phoneme only exists in relation to a space of other possible phonemes.”³ All the information a phoneme carries, it is able to carry because of the difference between the way it sounds and the way other phonemes sound (or the way other people saying the “same” phoneme sound). Bourdieu is interested in the information that works carry because of the way they differ from other works around them (and perhaps even from works a writer only imagines to exist). Meanwhile, Flaubert’s difference from Zola, his difference from Goncourt, is not only something that he asserts in writing to Sand; it is a difference that makes its way into his work. It informs the work, and the work thereby harbors formally a relation (an indexical relation) to the works it somehow manages not to be like.

Bourdieu’s concept of a field of cultural production involves both makers and critics in conceiving a constantly evolving set of works and the complex indexical relations between those works and also between their makers, relations that themselves become discoverable through critical forms of fieldwork and archival inquiry. Yet his interest in the way a literary work might index, might register the social world around it, involves more than relations to other works in the same field of cultural production. The work done on language by writers such as Flaubert can, for Bourdieu, register the wider social world in which it comes into existence in innumerable ways.⁴ Bourdieu is interested in the specifics of Flaubert’s writerly practice or, perhaps better said, what transpires because of the specifics of that practice. Flaubert may not wish to be associated with the “realists” around him, the ones who want to describe minute technical details of what they have observed, or who collect snippets of spoken language with which to ornament their books. Yet for Bourdieu, Flaubert, perhaps despite himself, achieves a “realist formalism.” Bourdieu notes that in certain circumstances, in certain hands, “it is pure work on pure form, a formal exercise par excellence, that causes to surge up, as if by magic, a real more real than that which is offered directly to the senses and before which the naïve lovers of reality stop.”⁵ This more real real of which Bourdieu is speaking is the reality of the social world and all its immanent tendencies, the reality of the social topography we all move through with varying degrees of practical skill, the reality of the distinctions and distances that exist between different actors and different positions within the social field. The contours of that social world, and the distribution of people and positions within it, we might say, are indexed by formal elements of the work that it is possible to decipher using what Charles Sanders Peirce once called collateral observation. That term appears in Peirce’s 1907 essay “Pragmatism,” where he refers to cases in which “the whole burden of the sign must be ascertained, not by closer examination
of the utterance, but by collateral observation of the utterer.” And, we might add, of the context in which that particular person makes that particular utterance.

It is precisely this difference in attention, from the referential or signifying aspect of a sign to its social function, that motivates the contributors to this issue. The writers we’ve gathered here begin from the somewhat obvious assumption that both texts and their makers are shaped by the forces that also produce the social world around them. Certainly makers of texts, by the work they do in making them, reflect upon, or uncover, or recover (in a process Bourdieu calls “anamnesis”) the relationship between the writing they do and the way the social world is shaped and has shaped them. What does it mean, or what does it involve to find in certain formal features of a work (for example, the frequency or rarity of repetitions and assonance) aspects of its relation to the structures of the social world from which it emerged? How would one understand a literary artifact—a novel, for example—to operate within such a system? “The novel as a whole is an utterance just as rejoinders in everyday dialogue or private letters are,” Mikhail Bakhtin once wrote, adding a few pages later that “of course, an utterance is not always followed immediately by an articulated response. . . . In most cases, genres of complex cultural communication are intended precisely for [a] kind of active responsive understanding with delayed action.” Such an understanding involves the positing, the discovery (with the aid of Peirce’s collateral observation, of fieldwork) of an array of indexical relations between that novel and other utterances (obviously not only novels) with which it could then be said to be in some kind of dialogue. What that dialogue might be concerned with is an open question, and might substantially change what, at first glance, a novel or some other literary artifact might be said to be “about.”

For the contributors to this issue, one key implication of these remarks from Bourdieu, Bakhtin, and Peirce, taken all together, is that particular formal features of a given literary work (or other kinds of crafted utterances) can be taken to index aspects of the social world in which it or they originated. And the formal features in question are remarkably diverse. Noticing them depends on the work that is done to establish the context in which that indexical function can be perceived. If Bourdieu liked the contrast between Flaubert and Goncourt that Flaubert somewhat snidely drew (“Goncourt, for example, is delighted when he overhears in the street a word used that he can then stick in a book”), it is surely because Goncourt can be taken to represent a kind of naive empiricism in the face of social reality, whereas Flaubert’s hostility toward such empiricism counterintuitively helps him to produce works that register some other version of reality in more astute, if less easily discoverable, ways.
Our contributors are all interested in the way linguistic artifacts are linked by various indexical modes to surrounding social worlds, the worlds in which they originate, but also the worlds through which they circulate over time. Part of what various aspects of the form of these artifacts and their subsequent entextualizations do is to indicate, to give us the means to understand some thing or things that are happening in the worlds in which they originate and circulate. This way of looking at form asks that we discover in its features the places in a work through which it is attached to, and contiguous with, a variety of contexts from which much of its value and meaning come.

Form, Sociology, Pragmatics

Form seems to be very much in the air in literary studies these days, yet, more often than not, it is invoked as part of a process of turning attention inwards, from one feature of the work to another, negotiating and elaborating internal relations of the work, as if meaning and value resided primarily in the relation between elements of the work itself. Here we ask instead how a work’s form, how the forming of a work, connects it (indexically) to the social world from which it emerges and also to the social worlds through which it circulates.

The turn to such a method is in some ways akin to a consensus that appears to have emerged in certain circles lately that traditional hermeneutic reading practices, especially the “hermeneutics of suspicion” and “symptomatic reading,” no longer seem capable of carrying the political and ethical burden placed on them by earlier generations of Marxist, psychoanalytic, and new historicist critics. Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best’s introduction to their issue on “surface reading” in Representations (2009), James English’s introduction to the issue on “the sociology of literature” that he co-edited with Rita Felski in New Literary History (2010), and Elaine Freedgood and Cannon Schmitt’s introduction to their issue on literal and denotative reading, also in Representations (2014), have each sought to invent and/or recognize alternative reading practices to hermeneutics.

As critics reach for a vocabulary that would provide a different way to discuss literary analysis not coterminous with “close reading,” they sometimes turn to “pragmatics” and to terms like “entextualization.”11 These terms—keywords in linguistic anthropology—often arrive without much of a history or a sense of how their particularity would alter analytical practices in the special issues just mentioned. Indeed, even when as sharp a critic as Heather Love explicitly rejects “close reading” in favor of what she calls “descriptive reading,” it might be observed that both close and descriptive...
readings appear, from another point of view, remarkably similar to each other: they both seem to arise out of the encounter between a critic’s intellect and a text understood as a thing to be contemplated by that intellect.\(^\text{12}\) (From another perspective, Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban have noted that “to equate culture with its resultant texts is to miss the fact that texts [as we see them, the precipitates of continuous cultural processes] represent one, ‘thingy’ phase in a broader conceptualization of cultural process.” Here we argue for the value of attention to that process, which includes re-entextualizations of artifacts by the critics who use them.)\(^\text{13}\) If we suggest a turn to linguistic anthropology, juxtaposed with other traditions (Bourdieu, Bakhtin) to which it has an affinity, it is because of the way these lines of thought are all engaged in forms of analysis of the context-dependent, dynamic, and open social production and negotiation of meaning in which all speakers, writers, and texts are caught up.\(^\text{14}\)

An overly simplified and polemical version of this argument might say that we suggest a turn from Ferdinand de Saussure’s symbolic (sign-signifier) linguistics to Peirce’s indexical, context-dependent semiotics. Saussure’s model undergirds much of twentieth-century theory, from what Bourdieu calls, in the Manet lectures cited earlier, “structuralism” to the hermeneutic models of Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Fredric Jameson, and so on. But Peirce’s writings have rarely been taken up by these theorists, or by literary scholars in general.\(^\text{15}\) Yet, when those scholars interested in the sociology of literature invoke “pragmatics”—whether they define the term or not—they necessarily point to the Peircean notion of indexicality, and the sense that textual objects gain their value as they circulate through social fields, as writers and readers take up certain accepted or presupposed forms, and alter or seek to entail new forms and modes of speaking about texts. The essays included here rely on a robust sense of pragmatics and social indexicality, on a clear distinction between “the semantic content of speech (the ‘meaning’ of the words spoken) and the pragmatic aspects of the same discourse (the functioning—not always semantic—of linguistic signs to establish and do work in and on their particular context).”\(^\text{16}\) The many entextualizations of a textual artifact include the ongoing instances in which such an object is taken up, studied, quoted, or otherwise socially situated by language users. And investigating metapragmatics involves paying attention to the ways patterns of social indexicality emerge in utterances and actualize their own poetics, following arrangements, forms of regimentation, genres we might say—that allow meanings of particular kinds to emerge for certain people in a contextually determined situation.\(^\text{17}\) The contributors to this issue work from the inheritance and expansion of Peirce’s theories in linguistic anthropology to consider just this kind of language-in-use.
With this vocabulary in tow, what we hope to emphasize are the ways in which the forming of works is a place or a process rich in potentials for connecting the work and the world. A comparison of two recent approaches to poetic form helps clarify the difference we’re after. For example, at one point in Caroline Levine’s recent *Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network*, she “make[s] the case that rhythmic forms and political institutions both seek to control time . . . in different and sometimes contending ways” (74). What Levine doesn’t ask is how the use of a rhythmic form by Elizabeth Barrett Browning in “The Young Queen,” to borrow one of her examples, could be part of (to use Bourdieu’s word) an anamnesis of the immediate social world from which the work emerged. Nor does she pursue how the poem could be related to a point of view on that social world either narrowly construed (perhaps a distinctive prosodic choice revealing a poetic practice that differentiates her from or associates her with other poets), or more widely considered (say, in the way it implicitly calls for—or indexes—a particular public with particular beliefs about or uses of poetry).

On the other hand, Meredith Martin, in *The Rise and Fall of Meter*, does ask the question of meter that resonates with the kinds of questions we and the contributors to this issue are interested in. Martin observes that “Meter” in the nineteenth century meant different things to different communities, as well as to different poets. . . . A poet’s use of meter almost always implied a concept of the community and the nation. By stabilizing, attempting to define, or grappling with their use of meter, poets and prosodists were often attempting to define, transform, or intervene in an aspect of national culture. . . . The concept of “meter” emerges as a way for poets to mediate between various publics, broadly conceived.¹⁸

If we were to translate this kind of observation into the terms some of our contributors might use, we would say that rhythm or meter is a *pragmatic* feature of language that is sometimes organized according to *metapragmatic* functions that are known and recognized by some users of language, but not others, and that, in certain social circumstances, are inculcated into some language users and not others. To the extent that a work can be perceived as forming itself according to some metapragmatic function, it can be understood as having been informed by, having been formally responsive to, certain kinds of social structures: those structures that participate in creating the particular distribution of knowledge regarding the metapragmatic functions in question.

Once again, this specific vocabulary from linguistic anthropology offers an alternative methodology to literary scholars, albeit one that engages with theorists like Bakhtin, Roland Barthes, Bourdieu, and others to describe the multifarious ways in which literary artifacts work in the world. More than just another jargon, the method enabled by this terminology allows our
contributors to describe literary artifacts as social texts, wherein words (and many different features of those words), registers, works, or genres enact culture. Linguistic anthropologists, like many novelists and other writers, are interested in what could be called “the social life of language,” in how culture happens when humans use language to interact, in how the social world’s existence is maintained through multifarious particular acts of language use.19 To notice this requires listening to language in certain ways. This issue is in part about what it would mean to listen to language in literary texts with the ear of linguistic anthropology.

**Forms of Context: Indexicality and Entextualization**

As we have already pointed out, linguistic anthropology is interested in language-in-use. Language is a social object. Social history is sedimented in language and actualized upon use. Language precedes its use in some ways, and any given use of language presupposes its prior existence while also entailing the appearance of something new. There are different ways of conceiving of language as a social object. A certain current of recent sociologically inclined literary criticism takes its inspiration from a particular moment in the work of Bruno Latour in which, in Rita Felski’s paraphrase of Latour’s work, “society does not stand behind, and covertly control, human practices, as if it were ontologically distinct from these practices, akin to a shadowy, all-seeing, puppet master. Rather, the social just is the act and the fact of association, the coming together of phenomena to create multiple assemblages, affinities, and networks. It exists only in its instantiations.”20 Or, in David Alworth’s even more pointed statement of the position: “For Latour . . . there is no ‘specific sort of phenomenon variously called “society,” “social order,” “social practice,” “social dimension,” or “social structure” that can be defined against other phenomena, such as the material, the psychological, the economic, or the natural. Rather, there are only networks of actors in contingent and momentary relationships that must be traced before they can be understood.”21 We take our distance from this current of work for a number of reasons. First of all, to reduce the order of social facts to the bugaboo of a controlling puppet master is too crassly reductive a caricature of a discipline to be at all useful. Second, it would seem clearly to be a kind of entitlement that certain social agents might be more likely to have than others to imagine that actors only meet in “contingent and momentary” relationships, that something we call the social does not precede any of its instantiations. So many things perdure—hierarchies of value, forms of inequality, relations of domination, language as organized hierarchically into
registers—and precede any instance of language-in-use, or any structured social encounter. All those perduring things are indexed in momentary encounters, in acts of language-in-use, in manifold ways.

The sociology of literature is a valuable response to the limits of hermeneutics, but we find it most useful where it intersects with linguistic anthropology. For example, in her article “Indexing Gender” from 1992, Elinor Ochs offers two assumptions that ground sociological and anthropological approaches to language: “(1) language systematically varies across social contexts and (2) such variation is part of the meaning indexed by linguistic structures.” She continues:

Sociolinguistic studies tend to relate particular structures to particular situational conditions, or clusters of structures to such conditions. The meanings so indexed are referred to as social meanings, in contrast to purely referential or logical meanings expressed by linguistic structures. Hence two or more phonological variants of the same word may share the identical reference but convey different social meanings, e.g. differences in social class or ethnicity of speakers, differences in social distances between speaker and addressee, differences in affect. In every community, members have available to them linguistic resources for communicating such social meanings at the same time as they are providing other levels of meaning. This system of multifarious signalling is highly efficient. Competent members of every community have been socialized to interpret these meanings and can without conscious control orchestrate messages to convey social meanings. Sociological and anthropological research is dedicated to understanding these communicative skills, interpretive processes, and systems of meaning indexed through language.

As we think about social indexicality, about “the indexical modes that link speech to the wider system of social life,” we necessarily notice that these indexical modes often have little to do with the referential content of the language use in question. Yet they allow us to dismantle and rebuild text artifacts by examining each as an “interactive text” produced in a shared “real time” involving the poetic construction of context by an array of participants. Context, in this case, is construed not as a static or universalized structure, but as a constantly renegotiated product of dynamic, ongoing processes of contextualization and entextualization. Seeing literature as language-in-use entails readings focused on the interactivity of literary texts within a broad range of social affiliations and cultural processes. Such “pragmatic” reading involves shifts in attention from solidified text-artifacts to ongoing interactive processes of utterance and uptake, or from the semantic or representational to the pragmatic and social indexical.

That is, in much of literary studies, when we think of context, contextualization, or intertextuality, we often dwell in the realm of text-artifacts themselves, weighing what claims we can make for the relations between one text and another or between a text and accounts that have been made of
its historical and cultural surroundings. To think of literature as language-in-use is to think about processes of entextualization. To focus on how entextualization (the process of producing, while often making use of previous entextualized material, an utterance that could be said to cohere within a present context—a context that is itself being delineated or asserted by the speaker out of myriad possible contextual constructs) implicitly reveals an (immanent) architecture of social relations is to emphasize how the formal texture of the resultant text indexically connects it to the context(s) of its use. To do so, the linguistic anthropologist (like certain novelists) hears in language use more than the referential content of the words and seeks out indexical relations between instances of language use and systems of value and meaning that are sociocultural in nature and immanent in the social context of the instance of language use. To approach the social world as something more than traceable “networks” requires attention to the nuance of language use as it is deposited, sedimented, excavated, and redeployed in repeated exchanges and formations. Thus, linguistic anthropology does not abandon meaning to mere context. Rather, it demands further detail in reading as language shifts, adapts, and moves.

We would like to signal a few examples of recent critical practice that, while they might at first seem distant from our concerns, nonetheless strike us as having interesting relations to the approaches presented by this volume: for instance, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick might seem an odd partner for Bourdieu, Bakhtin, and the linguistic anthropologists we have mentioned thus far, but her work was notably attuned to what is sedimented in language, and to ways in which some of that sociocultural stuff can be put to use indexically in both aesthetic and critical contexts. In the introduction to *Touching Feeling*, Sedgwick developed an interesting set of possibilities around what she called (following on from an essay by Renu Bora) *texture* and *texxture*. She writes of the former: “To perceive texture is never only to ask or know What is it like? nor even just How does it impinge on me? Textural perception always explores two other questions as well: How did it get that way? and What could I do with it?” She continues: “I haven’t perceived a texture until I’ve instantaneously hypothesized whether the object I’m perceiving was sedimented, extruded, granulated, polished, distressed, felted, or fluffed up.” As for *texxture*, it is “the kind of texture that is dense with offered information about how, substantively, historically, materially, it came into being.” Assuming that such information is present in any number of formal features of a work, or in their combination, how do we access it? What work is required if we want to understand what has been achieved (texturally) by, in Bourdieu’s words, “pure work on pure form, a formal exercise *par excellence*, that causes to surge up, as if by magic, a real more real than that which is offered directly to the senses”? Texture, as Sedgwick
suggestively describes it, is the felt sense of the indexical relations that always potentially exist between the work, the world from which it emerged, and the world in which it is circulating.

As context changes and new publics form, or new addressees enter the dynamic, meaning changes as well. Studies of subculture, counterpublics, and alternative textual communities have helped elaborate the lively semiotic instability of texts not in order to demonstrate a fall into undecidability, but rather to locate how authors and readers use texts to analyze and produce knowledge. Michael Allan is another critic who, in his book *In the Shadow of World Literature*, has elaborated how different reading practices and forms of literacy alter even the meaning and definition of the category of “literature” and especially “world literature.” Allan does not avail himself of all the terms we focus on here; however, he mentions Silverstein’s work and borrows from the linguistic anthropology of Webb Keane and Sheldon Pollack, as well as the work of anthropologists like Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad, to argue that the politics of entextualization can clarify how the genealogy of a category like “literature” sheds light on the role reading practices play in the construction of binaries like religious/secular, civilization/barbarism, literate/oral, and so on. In a stunning account of the histories of the uses of the Rosetta Stone (“the story through which an object becomes a text”; 42), Allan observes that to entextualize the stone and transform its various languages into referential equivalents—different languages all referencing the same object or term—involved setting aside the theological and social worlds those writing systems were meant to separate. Allan’s interest, we might say, is in the different metapragmatic functions that govern or could govern the different entexualizations of the writing found on the Rosetta Stone. Calling attention to how “the world within an object such as the Rosetta Stone comes to matter” (54), he demonstrates that part of what a particular entextualization of it enabled was “a way of rendering linguistic and textual traditions equivalent in spite of phenomenological distinctions between them” (48). By phenomenological distinctions, he means “where and to whom [different languages] speak, how they differ in modes of address, and the status of speech they entail” (52). Once again, in the terms of this collection of essays, it is the pragmatic difference between the writing systems rather than the semantic affiliations that gives the object much of its meaning for Allan. From this and other examples, he concludes that “literature,” rather than a stable term to denote textual objects, emerges as a dynamic category that helps invoke specific audiences and modes of reading and disqualify others. It does not matter so much what a term denotes as what kinds of social worlds are bound up with a word or a language, and how it is deployed to entail transformations in the social field.
Allan’s argument offers a compelling challenge to the assumed conditions of any reading. Nevertheless, that knowledge traditionally categorized as literature can also play a key role in helping to produce social descriptions and adjustments. As we have said, the primary object of study for linguistic anthropologists is language-in-use, listened to with a particular analytic orientation. Yet, the way that language is listened to and studied by linguistic anthropologists (to be described a bit more in what follows) is not exclusive to them. It can be found in novelists as well. Indeed, more than thirty years ago, Barthes and Frédéric Berthet specifically proposed that literature, and especially the novel, was a privileged form in which to study “language in action [langage en acte]” as long as one turned to “a part of semiology, long neglected, which is called … pragmatics [la pragmatique].”28 Their turn to the novel for instances of pragmatic knowledge should hardly be surprising, given that one of the things many novelists do is construct scenes in which imaginary people exchange utterances. Flaubert may have scoffed at Goncourt for having been an unimaginative collector of overheard words, which he then inserted into his novels in clumsy ways. Yet a novelist’s relationship to talk (language-in-use) and the work it does can be more sophisticated than what Flaubert found in Goncourt’s pages.

Marcel Proust, for instance, had notebooks in which he is well-known for having consigned lists of words that he was considering incorporating into his novel, lists of examples whose principle of selection is more frequently than not unmentioned by him when he writes them down.29 Here is one example:

- Charlus or St Loup
- cosmic
- practical
- catastrophic30

If Proust proves to be a less naively empirical novelist than Flaubert and Bourdieu take Goncourt to be, it is because Proust has a general conceptual framework that governs what he imagines the representation of speech in a novel can do. Perhaps he put this framework together from reading other novelists who gave considerable thought to the issue (Honoré de Balzac, George Eliot, or Fyodor Dostoevsky, for instance). Here, for example, is the first part of the passage in which “cosmic” makes its way into the Recherche. Proust’s narrator is discussing his fascination with the language spoken by the Duke and Duchess de Guermantes:
A literary mind [un littérateur] would similarly have been enchanted by the conversations, which for him . . . would have been a living dictionary of all the expressions that are passing out of the language by the day (Saint-Joseph neckties, children pledged to wear blue, and so on), and which survive today only among people who have taken it upon themselves to act as the obliging and benevolent custodians of the past. The pleasure that a writer experiences in their company, far more than in that of other writers, is not without its risks, for he is in danger of believing that the things of the past have a charm in themselves, of transporting them raw into his work, which, if he does, becomes stillborn and smacks of staleness, for which he consoles himself with the thought, “It’s appealing because it’s authentic, that’s how people talk.”

The person who would be fascinated by the register in which the Guermantes speak is not exactly Proust’s narrator, but a generic figure, un littérateur, one who, like the narrator, could be attuned to and reflective about the way people’s speech locates them within social space, someone attuned to the fact that registers (that of the duke and duchess and also, as we will see in a moment, that of their hipster nephew Saint-Loup) have particular kinds of distributions that are fundamentally relational or even oppositional. The passage suggests that an interest in, an enchantment by, the register of speech that is the duchess’s is in itself an indication that you, as a littérateur, are a particular kind of person, someone with a particular point of view, and that your own point of view, like that of the duchess or Saint-Loup, is one of the constituents of the social space in question. Such a littérateur (but apparently not the narrator, and certainly not Proust) perhaps runs the risk of falling into the trap that Flaubert accused Goncourt of falling into, putting words into novels merely because people said them.

If this does not happen to the narrator, it is because it is the relation between the speech of the duchess and the speech of her nephew Saint-Loup that the narrator wants to make audible. The passage continues:

These aristocratic conversations had the further charm, in Mme de Guermantes’s case, of being conducted in excellent French. For this reason, they made it permissible for the Duchesse to react hilariously to the words “vatic,” “cosmic,” “Pythian,” “supereminent,” which formed part of Saint-Loup’s vocabulary—in the same way as she did to his Bing furniture.

The novelist, the narrator, and certain characters (here the duchess, Saint-Loup’s aunt) are intensely sensitive to—they stumble over, or are diverted by—the effects of the registers through which individuals negotiate not only group membership but also the manner in which that membership is enacted, manners that include questions of taste, questions of generational difference, and much more. The words Saint-Loup uses are, for his aunt, the equivalent of wearing the wrong color of slippers to a party or patronizing the wrong suppliers of furniture.
Proust’s novel is one closely attuned to the representation of speech diversity of various kinds, in a way that marks a difference from the practices of both a Flaubert and a Goncourt. Just as his novel is interested in what makes utterances distinctive, it is distinctive in its own right as an utterance. The Proustian novel allows for a demonstration of and commentary on certain features of language-in-use in specific circumstances of face-to-face talk that pertain to the maintenance and the transformation of group membership. Its approach to the study of talk is rigorously ethnographic or linguistic-anthropological. It sets out to observe what talk achieves in sociocultural terms, how talk is a medium through which culture is brought into being interactively, and how the interactions in which this happens are shaped by various institutions. It demonstrates a rather brilliant practical understanding of the functioning of social capital in individual scenes of talk: certain instances are conceptualizable as skirmishes in a struggle occurring across a larger time frame and having to do with shifts in balances of social capital among different individuals and the groups to which they belong. Proust is a novelist fascinated by what Bourdieu calls the “unceasing effort of sociability” presupposed by “the reproduction of social capital . . . a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed.”

There are any number of moments in Proust’s long novel in which it is evident that the narrator is listening to language like a linguistic anthropologist, posing questions about language use that a linguistic anthropologist might pose, and seeking answers to those questions in the way a linguistic anthropologist might: by collecting data from language users in order to confirm hypotheses regarding implicit structures of cultural value and meaning actualized within a given moment of verbal exchange. “In order to fix our specimens for analysis,” Michael Silverstein writes, “we . . . make recordings of events of language use, and then we transcribe such recordings in fine detail in order to study at analytic speed what was, in the real-time of interaction, flying by in words, facial and other bodily cues, bodily alignment and orientation shifts, and so on.” Anyone who has read much of Proust’s novel knows how many pages can sometimes be spent getting through a very simple and somewhat brief moment of verbal exchange, not only because the narrator carefully and lovingly describes all the kinds of cues and shifts Silverstein mentions, but because, we might say, the narrator also does another kind of fieldwork, performing a kind of archaeological dig on and around the moment of exchange, excavating relevant moments from the pasts of the various interlocutors, bringing in various bits of the surrounding cultural universe that might be indexed in some way by the exchange to hand, and so on. When Silverstein describes in another article how linguistic anthropologists “‘listen to’ language analytically . . . in order
to ‘hear’ culture,” he notes that they do so on the assumption that “discur-
sive interaction brings sociocultural concepts into here-and-now contexts of
use—that is . . . that interaction indexically ‘invokes’ sociocultural concep-
tualizations—via emergent patternings of semiotic form.”35 This assump-
tion clearly undergirds the way Proust (and/or his narrator) understands
verbal interactions, and it also explains the dilatory pace at which the novel
presents verbal exchanges to its readers, precisely because there is so much
the novel wishes to reveal about how an exchange is participating indexically
in its sociocultural surround, and about what kinds of patternings are being
produced through the ongoing elaboration of the verbal exchanges that
are, in the novel, simultaneously being presented and subjected to analysis.

Another feature of the analysis of the social life of language that is
common both to linguistic anthropologists and to Proust, is the process
of acquiring information regarding the range of meanings different aspects
of language use have for its users. As Silverstein puts it,

In addition to fine-grained linguistic analysis, we also generally get native language-
users’ reactions to and understandings of specific contributions to the interaction
that may be salient to them; this sharpens, but does not determine, our analytic
account. Through . . . collecting . . . and collating people’s reflective sense of the
appropriateness and effectiveness of various denotational-textual forms in imagina-
tively interrogated contexts, we can begin to get a sense of the differential indexical
meanings, the pointing-to-context, of contrasting forms that comprise a pragmatic
(indexically constrative) paradigm.36

When working in our own language, Silverstein also notes, “we can serve as
our own consultants in this respect, short-circuiting the usually required
fieldwork” (492). But that might be a somewhat problematic assertion, it
turns out, as Proust’s novel makes clear, since the French the narrator
speaks and the French he hears around him do not always seem to be
precisely the same language, with the result that sometimes he needs assis-
tance from native speakers of the particular variety of French in question
because that variety feels too distant from his own for him to count himself
as a native speaker. Sometimes he ends up revealing something about his
own social position by the way he displays his understanding (or his misun-
derstanding) of the speech of those around him, and then sometimes he
serves as a perfectly reasonable native informant regarding the speech he is
relaying to his readers.

There are numerous moments in the novel where the commentary
Proust’s narrator is able to offer on the speech around him is based on
fieldwork of some kind. Sometimes, for instance, he suddenly indicates that
in a moment not covered by the novel’s diegesis, he went off to perform that
necessary fieldwork in order to verify a certain hypothesis of his. Sometimes

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he admits that the necessary fieldwork ended up being impossible to perform or else unsuccessful. The existence of these moments has a great deal to tell us about what we might call the social scientific ambitions of the *Recherche*, ambitions Proust clearly understood to be a key component of the novelistic tradition to which he wished to belong.37

The contributors to this issue could also all be said to work at the intersection of social scientific and literary knowledge. Their articles span multiple linguistic and literary traditions—from 1960s Latin American sound poetry to contemporary South African novel writing, nineteenth-century British romanticism, twentieth-century North American indigenous tribal narrative, 1970s Korean and North American oratory, and contemporary Italian vernacular poetry—but they share various methodological principals, and they all work across three distinct levels in which literary or other textual artifacts could be said to be engaged in or as language-in-use. On an initial level (and this is the level primarily involved in the foregoing analyses of Proust), certain literary works can be read or analyzed as occasions in which writers both theorize and represent the social work being done through verbal exchanges, or occasions on which they theorize, represent, and enact moments within large-scale transformational social processes by means of attentiveness to microsocial verbal interactions. On a second level, literary works can themselves be studied as products of a wide set of interactive processes (as participants in a variety of coconstructed contextual arrays), all involving multiple agents that collectively produce a work’s “public meanings” (Bourdieu) around the moment of its publication, and also well beyond that moment.38 Finally, as literary or other verbal artifacts go on existing across time, the collectively constructed contextual arrays in which they are read and reread (which include institutions in which reading or other forms of uptake take place in structured ways) are themselves subject to alteration so that the text’s meaning, value, and even content can be shown to be fluid as the text is subjected to use and reuse.

Thus, Michael Silverstein’s article “The Fieldwork Encounter and the Colonized Voice of Indigeneity” examines how the unique use of a grammatical form in the Kiksht language indexes a colonial encounter. This *hapax legomenon* appears when a Kiksht narrator taught in English-language schools slips into a form of “indirect free style” at the very moment when he narrates his own ritualized story of transition from adolescence to adulthood. The grammatical form represents the sedimentation in grammar of a pedagogical experience that modifies the possibilities of narrative perspective. Language use, in this case, reveals both the history of a language user’s identity between languages and social systems, and the negotiation of that position.

Across the Atlantic and a century earlier, William Hazlitt’s work to adapt talk to print and print to the spoken word provides a different instance of
linguistic dynamism. In “Talking with Texts: Hazlitt’s Ephemeral Style,” Tristram Wolff studies how Hazlitt’s printed texts strove to alter what the nineteenth-century British writer criticized as an inadequacy in political discourse. Noting the conversational, casual, and even “mouthing” style in Hazlitt’s writing, Wolff argues that Hazlitt studies politicians’ false spontaneity in the use of “common-place,” seemingly scripted, spoken phrases in order both to fault their conservative style and its uncritical reception and to elevate his own inventive writing. The written word becomes a way to analyze “real time” interactions and produces a space for the kinds of verbal ingenuity oratory pretends at.

Poetry, too, can enregister cultural interactivity and change through a play with spoken and written language. Jillian R. Cavanaugh’s “The Blacksmith’s Feet: Embodied Entextualization in Northern Italian Vernacular Poetry” introduces readers to a poet whose performance depends on the conjunction of his body and his words. Cavanaugh’s pursuit of regionalism leads her to identify what she calls a “geographic expression,” whose valuation arises from markers of authenticity in body and language dependent on each marking the speaker’s attachment to a specific place. The poems’ public meanings require uptake by audience and poet alike in order to forge the poetic value of place.

Aaron Bartels-Swindells’s “The Metapragmatics of the ‘Minor Writer’: Zoë Wicomb, Literary Value, and the Windham Campbell Prize Festival” also ponders how cultural and financial capital accrue to writing and a writer within a specific scene of reception and production. Intrigued by the institutional values that create categories and types of writers, as well as a writer’s modes of resistance within the aesthetic and social field of the literary prize, Bartels-Swindells borrows from the toolbox of linguistic anthropology to analyze Zoë Wicomb’s sophisticated position-taking as she struggles to find a footing that would value her work in its particularity. The exchanges of cultural uptake, presupposition, and entailment in this article help foreground how metapragmatic decisions at varying levels of awareness can open new modes to speak about identity and politics against the confines of aesthetic value alone.

If Bartels-Swindells takes an obviously literary event (a literature prize) to expand our notion of what counts as a literary textual artifact (a prize catalog) Nicholas Harkness’s study of Billy Graham’s Korean translator reveals the complex narrative and characterological meaning that can take place through the sound of a spoken sermon. In “Transducing a Sermon, Inducing Conversion: Billy Graham, Billy Kim, and the 1973 Crusade in Seoul,” Harkness tunes our ears to the sonic cues in speech that enable Billy Kim to translate and evoke narratological meaning through shifts in pitch, rhythm, and volume. Drawing on Bakhtin and Erving Goffman while
advancing theories of sound studies, performativity, linguistic anthropology, and narrative theory, Harkness’s study finds in a speaker’s sonic efforts to voice characters and to voice a self a means to represent the collective in the individual, and a mode of translation whose theological belief in universality allows one speaker to transduce another through performance.

Such sonic meaningfulness carries into Tom McEnaney’s “Real-to-Reel: Social Indexicality, Sonic Materiality, and Literary Media Theory in Eduardo Costa’s Tape Works.” McEnaney turns to the Argentine artist Eduardo Costa to fuse a tradition of material indexicality in theories of photography and film to Michael Silverstein’s nonreferential social indexicality in order to bring together media theory and literary theory and, like Harkness, to point to sound as a semiotically rich site of social meaning rather than a surplus or limit for written language. Costa’s theory and practice of stereophonic tape in the late 1960s serves as the grounds for experiments that would expand the range of literary meaning by introducing new sonic possibilities.

In an afterword, Tristram Wolff briefly reflects on the shared work of the issue’s essays taken together, suggesting how a renewed relation with the critical perspectives that introduced the concept of “entextualization” (linguistic anthropology, ethnopoetics) might shift the terms of literary reading. At a moment of apparent unease in literary studies around questions of close reading and literary form, this last reflection relocates form in affectively and culturally charged situations of social emergence.

The diverse subject matter of these contributions points, we hope, to the wide relevance and intellectual flexibility of the methods we’ve outlined throughout this introduction to grapple with a variety of cultural traditions and their artifacts. Our hope is that the examples of interdisciplinary work presented in these pages will encourage literary critics and theorists to head back into the field, equipped with new tools and concepts, with additional modes of analysis to enable them to tune in to words and meanings perhaps previously invisible or inaudible without these methods. Continuing and expanding such literary fieldwork will introduce new problems, new questions, and new ways to both recognize and produce language-in-use.

Notes


4. To “enregister,” or the process of “enregisterment,” are technical terms from linguistic anthropology intended to designate the way sets of linguistic features come to cohere and become socially recognizable as a formal register, one that other speakers can associate with or index to a particular kind of speaker from a particular social location. See Asif Agha, “The Social Life of Cultural Value,” *Language & Communication* 23 (2003): 231–73 and Asif Agha, “Voicing, Footing, Enregisterment,” *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 15 (2005): 38–59.


7. “The research that could be called formal on the composition of the work, the articulation of the stories of different characters, the correspondence between the setting or situations and the behaviours or ‘character types’, as well as on the rhythm or the colour of phrases, the repetitions and assonances that must be hunted out, the received ideas and conventional forms that must be eliminated, is all part of the conditions of the production of a reality effect more profound than the one analysts ordinarily designate by this term. . . . It is through this work on form that the work comes to contain those structures that the writer, like any social agent, carries within him in a practical way, without having really mastered them, and through which is achieved the anamnesis of all that ordinarily remains buried, in an implicit or unconscious state, underneath the automatisms of an emptily revolving language”; Bourdieu, *Rules of Art*, 108.


9. *Entextualization* is a keyword within the body of work from linguistic anthropology that we draw upon, and it will occur frequently throughout this issue. Most of the academic forms of literary or cultural analysis with which we are familiar can be understood as practices of entextualization. As Jan Blommaert writes, “Analysis is entextualization—a term pointing towards processes of lifting text out of context, placing it in another context and adding metapragmatic qualifications to it, thus specifying the conditions for how texts should be understood, what they mean and stand for, and so on”; Jan Blommaert, “Context is/as critique,” *Critique of Anthropology* 21 (2001): 18.

10. Caroline Levine, in her recent *Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network* (Princeton, 2015), even while pointing out that “formalist analysis turns out to be as valuable to understanding sociopolitical institutions as it is to reading literature” (2) and helpfully insisting that literary texts are not unified, but “inevitably plural in their forms—bringing together multiple ordering principles, both social and literary” (40), does not provide much help for thinking about how in perceiving a work’s form we can perceive traces of or connections to the social world in which it was made and the social worlds through which it has moved. The world and the work seem, in Levine’s presentation, distinct entities, separate spheres within both of which forms operate, but without any connection.


15. However, in a 1979 introduction to a special issue on “conversation” in the journal *Communications*, Roland Barthes and Frédéric Berthet turned to “a part of semiology, long neglected, which is called, following the Anglo-Saxon authors, pragmatics [la pragmatique], where one studies language in action [langage en acte], observed, not in the immanence of the verbal message, but in the real game [le jeu reel] of its partners”; Roland Barthes and Frédéric Berthet, “Présentation,” *Communications* 30 (1979): 4. Other literary critics have made use of pragmatics, but focused less on the social-indexical functions we discuss here. See, for instance, Richard Shusterman, “Pierre Bourdieu and Pragmatist Aesthetics: Between Practice and Experience,” *New Literary History* 46 (2015): 435–57; Paul Grimstad, *Experience and Experimental Writing: Literary Pragmatism From Emerson to the Jameses* (New York, 2013); James M. Albrecht, *Reconstructing Individualism: A Pragmatic Tradition from Emerson to Ellison* (New York, 2012); Ann Marie Mikkelsen, *Pastoral, Pragmatism, and Twentieth-Century American Poetry* (New York, 2011); Tim Milnes, *The Truth About Romanticism: Pragmatism and Idealism in Keats, Shelley, Coleridge* (New York, 2010).


17. “Without a metapragmatic function simultaneously in play with whatever pragmatic function(s) there may be in discursive interaction, there is no possibility of interactional coherence, since there is no framework of structure—here, interactional text structure—in which indexical origins or centerings are relat- able one to another as aggregated contributions to some segmentable, accomplishable event(s). In effect, metapragmatic function serves to regiment indexicals into interpretable event(s) of such-and-such type that the use of language in interaction constitutes (consists of). Understanding discursive interaction as events of such-and-such type is precisely having a model of interactional text”; Michael Silverstein, “Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function,” in *Reflexive Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics*, ed. John A. Lucy (Cambridge, 1993): 36–37.

22. Bourdieu critiqued this kind of position long ago in *Distinction*, where he wrote: “The notion of situation, which is central to the interactionist fallacy, enables the objective, durable structure of relationship between officially constituted and guaranteed positions which organizes every real interaction to be reduced to a momentary, local, fluid order (as in accidental encounters between strangers), and often an artificial one (as in socio-psychological experiments). Interacting individuals bring all their properties into the most circumstantial interactions, and their relative positions in the social structure (or in a specialized field) govern their positions in the interaction”; see *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA, 1984), 578–79n25.

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38. “The public meaning of the work, as an objectively instituted judgment on the value and truth of the work (in relation to which any individual judgment of taste is obliged to define itself) is necessarily collective. That is to say that the subject of an aesthetic judgment is a ‘one’ which may take itself for an ‘I;’ the objectivization of the creative intention which one might call ‘publication’ (in the sense of ‘being made public’) is accomplished by way of an infinite number of particular social relationships, between publisher and author, between author and critic, between authors, etc.”; Pierre Bourdieu, “Intellectual Field and Creative Project,” trans. Sian France, *Social Science Information* 8, no. 2 (1969): 104.